 Welcome also to all who are following us online through the WF and LPAI's website. We are gathering today under a powerful headline in my view, the return of the state where next for industrial policy. I think it's one of the most significant trends of the changing times we are living in. We've got a wonderful panel here assembled by the WF. I'm going to briefly introduce the speakers we have today to you. From the other side of the stage starting from there we've got Mr. Music Gafela who is Minister of Investment, Trade and Industry of Botswana. Next we've got Mr. Mark Zwilling, Chairman of the Board of Directors at Development Bank of Southern Africa. Next we've got Madame Kelly Tsai, Dean and Chair Professor at Hong Kong University in Science and Technology. And here close to me we've got Mr. Gerro Corman, Head of Digital Technologies and Platforms at Volkswagen Group Production. Thank you for being here. I'm sure it's going to be a very hot provoking panel. So let's go for it. As you all know we are living in times marked by hardening competition between powers, threatening climate change, concerning global health issues. All of those are converging towards the first idea of our panel which is the return of the state. And the second one, the second syntax of our headline, the industrial policy is one of the most meaningful ways in which the state is returning. It is of course in purely economical terms thinking about jobs and growth, which is the idea of the conference here in Geneva, thinking about supply chains, thinking about innovation, risks of protectionism, but also in terms of geopolitics. For many industrial policy can be a factor defining the future balance of power between states. So I think we have to think about two aspects of it. And of course big players are fully swinging in this field. We got made in China 2025. We got in the U.S. the IRA and the Science and Cheaps Act. The EU is getting sucked together in this and other actors of different science and different parts of the planet are moving also. So we're going to try to think about this. We're going to try to think whether industrial policy can achieve its objective, avoiding provoking bad backlashes, trying to keep this into the realm of competition, not steering towards confrontation. We're trying to take stock of where we are in specific important places right now, who could be winners and losers, what are main opportunities and risks. So let's go for it. Let's start the discussion. I would like to do it showing to you some data assembled by the WF in its chief economist outlook published today. I think they are very significant. I hope they can be shown here. Here they go. So please have a look at that. I think it's a very significant data here. 24% of the economists polled in this believe that this trend will become a widespread approach to economic policy globally. Alarmingly, 90% believe it will deepen geocomic, geoeconomic rivalry and tension. 70% that it will stifle competition and 68% that will lead to a problematic increase in sovereign debt levels. And then we have here not much confidence about positive outcomes. 39% believe it could be a driver of innovation. Only 20% believe it will lead to an overall increase in global economic activity. So this is the context. This is the forecast of chief economists. It's not very well optimist. And on the ground of this data, I would like to kick start the conversation. I would like to start with you, minister. As a political leader coming from a country of what many call now the global sound, I would like to hear your assessment of what's going on right now in industrial policy, which is mainly happening in the northern hemisphere. How do you look at it? I guess there must be some part of it that are interesting to you. For example, investment in green technologies that may produce a reduction of emissions in the future. Other things maybe concerning, how do you look at it from the global sound perspective, from your country? Thank you very much, Andre. Since 2014, we embarked on industrial policy where I come from. And one of the things which we are embracing under it is pursuit of green technology and increasing reduction of reliance on fossil fuels. But we are a larger part of the African continental free trade area. We are larger, we are part of, oh sorry, we are also a part of the Southern African customs unit. In Sadek, African countries in the South, out of all of these regional blocks have embarked on industrialization. Our heads of state have mandated ministers responsible for trade to embark on it. Because for quite a long time, Africans had been relying on, the economies were pretty much based on resources, but increasingly the trend is towards industrialization of Africa. The challenge of course that we have is the manner by which we will accomplish that. Pursuit of green technology is in the forefront of our minds, but as the AU has declared, it's got to be a just transition, it cannot be a sudden occurrence. Of course we are all committed to meeting the Paris agreement and zero emission by 20, by 20, 20, 20, 30, but there is a challenge, Andrew, and there is a challenge there in that we are, a lot of Africans don't have access to energy. And even under the use of fossil energy, they still do not have access to energy. As politicians, it is absolutely important that for us to be meaningful to them as leaders, they should access energy. It's going to take quite a while, I must say, for a transition to occur in terms of which a sort of green energy then becomes a day-to-day occurrence. But I must say, from the Bosona's perspective, we have embarked on a lot of programs which support green technology, we are quite alive to our geographic location where we are. We have 3,200 hours of sunshine in a year. So this is an opportunity for foreign direct investment in green energy in Botswana. We do not have much, water is not abundant. So hydro energy is not something that we can really look into, but wind energy is. The southern part of Botswana, the southwest part of Botswana, there is some potential of use of wind in those areas for energy. So as we transition towards 2030, we need to, I would really urge that the whole world should be alive to these challenges which Africans do have in terms of the drive towards the complete eradication of fossil energy. Thank you very much, Minister. Now to hear your views, Mr. Zwilling, industrial policy is changing, it's changing its nature quite strongly. I'd like to ask, what is your point of view about this change from someone who has a very profound knowledge of a big region, sub-Saharan Africa, how do you see this change of nature of industrial policy worldwide? Okay, thanks very much. I think the reality is that this conversation is pitched in as part of the discussion about changing geopolitical realities. Part of that is the extraordinary competition that's been triggered by the Inflation Reduction Act. What this effectively means is that the US is going to trigger a competitive dynamic around industrial policy for green tech with Europe, which in turn is going to further stimulate Chinese investment to participate in that competitive dynamic. All of that doesn't spell good news for the Global South. The Global South is effectively excluded from that dynamic. So what we have to face is industrial policy strategies that are going to have to address typical Global South challenges. This new geopolitical reality is going to change the cost of capital, is going to change the directionality of financial investments, which up until now in terms of green tech has been fairly advantageous for the Global South. I suspect that that's going to shift. That's my first point. The second point is that survey, I find very depressing. Why? Because essentially the chief economists are talking about old generation industrial policies, which were about picking winners, about cost benefit analysis, and about market failure. The new generation industrial policies are not about that. The new generation industrial policies are really about facilitated collaborations around mission-led industrial policies that create innovation spaces and spaces for thinking about blended finance solutions that could result in the creation of whole new industries, whole new opportunities. So that's, I think we need to take seriously that. If you hang on to a traditional conception of industrial policy, you end up thinking in terms of, oh, this is going to worsen the sovereign debt crisis, oh, this is going to diminish competition. Actually, new generation industrial policies are actually having opposite effects, which is actually what underpins the I read in the Inflation Reduction Act and various strategies in sub-Saharan Africa. So I would ask us to just think critically about what we mean by industrial policy going forward. And as an academic, I would say that as the chair of the board of a developing finance institution, I have to say that because we have to participate in blended finance solutions. Thank you very much. I would like to hear now from you, Madame Tsai. Mrs. Willing has just stressed the geopolitical aspect of these new trends in industrial policy. I really would like to hear your point of view about how China's industrial policy has been evolving lately. It is, of course, a very important actor worldwide. And I would be really happy to hear from you on this. Sure. First, thank you for including me on this panel. It's an honor to be here. And I really appreciated my panel co-panelist point about differentiating among different types of industrial policy. I think there's a misunderstanding that China's rapid growth and becoming the world's factory is due to industrial policy, and that's really quite inaccurate. For the first couple of decades of China's reform era, starting in the late 1970s, there were efforts to engage in industrial policy, but it was actually bureaucratically too fragmented and there was just too much. It was actually quite disorganized at the central level to be able to pull off a type of coherent industrial policy like what you might see in Japan, Korea, Taiwan in the post-war era. It really wasn't until 2008 that it developed the bureaucratic capacity to have something resembling industrial policy, and it wasn't until 2015 that China then launched its very ambitious Made in China 2025 industrial policy, which I think it's important to understand the context under which that occurred. China's evolved from a familiar model of state capitalism to what we would consider now party state capitalism, and this evolved due to a deep sense of insecurity, both in terms of domestic concerns as well as external perceived threats. China started to bubble up in the late 2000s with the global financial crisis, with riots and Xinjiang protests in Tibet, social instability, growing corruption. These were all perceived domestic threats to the Chinese Communist Party's role. Then externally, there was Arab Spring. The global financial crisis was a real wake-up call in terms of China's dependence on export markets, and then I think more than anything else, the Edward Snowden affair led China to realize how risky it was to be dependent on foreign technology, and so all of that combined, the perceived internal and external threats led Beijing to really take industrial policy seriously and securitize its economy and come up also with this concept of comprehensive national security, which was introduced in 2014 right before the Made in China 2025, which identifies 17 different types of security for China, like ecological security, economic security, biosecurity, it's comprehensive national security. So China's industrial policy has been securitized, its mode of political economy has been securitized very heavily, and that's expressed in industrial policy. Just one last point I'd like to make is that industrial policy isn't always effective. It's really important to look sectorally, you know, by sector. China's most successful companies, its internet companies, the FinTech, Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent, they were not the products of industrial policy. Their most successful surveillance firms, Hikvijian and Dahua, again, private sector did not benefit from industrial policy until they were already very large, and so the sectors that have benefited, PV photovoltaics, solar, they produced so much they had to export. They didn't do well in autos, though, and commercial aircraft was an utter failure, so I think it's really important to keep that in mind when we're thinking about industrial policy. It doesn't always work and can be a colossal waste of resources. Thank you, so we just heard that it's not always successful. Mr. Korman, how do you see this triangle unfolding in Europe and the United States? Both wagonings, of course, a global group, it's taking a look at things worldwide, analyzing it, for deciding its strategic investment for the future. How do you see specifically how things are evolving in Europe and the United States, so important actors globally and for your company? We see those big programs in the US and in Europe showing up. We've seen protectionism also in Europe, like Volkswagen Group producing car all over Europe, all over the world, with Brexit, etc. and our very complex supply chains. We were facing challenges, while my colleague just said about industrial policy, what is actually targeting, what's part of it. Automotive often was in the past and is still in terms of components. And this is like something that we try to leverage. So the US pushing for more local production is nothing new, right? So in the automotive industry, local content is a very familiar term. So trying to met regulations in terms of where manufacturing actually happens. That's something that the automotive industry, as a global industry, is very familiar. And that is happening in the US, that is happening in Europe, it's accelerating. I think what's actually new is that it's not only about production capacity. That's one part of the story, like for example, of course, Volkswagen is investing in factories in the US, a new battery factory for the North American market in Canada to fulfill rather the idea of build components and cars locally for local markets. But I think what's new is also that it goes deeper in the value chain in terms of what kind of components. So restrictions and limitations and regulations about what kind of components and even what kind of manufacturing technology can be used and will be used in different areas. Will it accelerate innovation? Well, if I follow the report, probably not. Will it give some steering or might give some advantage for specific countries? We will see in the near future. Thank you very much. I will start now a new round, but I would like to tell you that afterwards, we will have some time for questions from you. So please, if you wish to ask, just later on, I will open up, raise hands, and we'll go for them. So, ministers, since we've got you in this panel, I would really like to have a political view, because we've seen how much this policy is intertwined with geopolitics. And we see that many consider this as a way to reduce dependency on others, to increase resilience, to get a hedge over competitors in strategic technologies, and therefore to ensure the economic strength in this global power struggle. So we think it's unfolding in a frightening way, and it's mainly from the north. So I would like to go with a political question. How do we avoid this going towards confrontation? What do you expect from these great powers, which are on course of something that may have bad effects on the rest of the world, especially on the South? How do we avoid this spiraling out of control? Well, the global powers, I would really invite them to peer into the African agenda, the African continent of free trade, area agreement, and to learn what collectively Africans are in pursuit of. Our approach, as Africans, Botswana included, is one of peaceful coexistence. Am I not audible? Thank you, sir. Peaceful coexistence, economic integration more than protectionist tendencies. So the way we look at it, even at the regional level, is an approach in terms of which we create winners of all of us. We avoid as much as possible scenarios of policies which, like the IRA, which perhaps may compel manufacturing to take place exclusively in a particular area. We try to spread it across the whole of Africa, because if the competition spirals out of control, it's likely to then beget a lot of unrest, a lot of global geopolitical tension, and possibly it can plunder us into all. Some of the conflicts that we've had in Africa, they have their roots in economic disparity, in economic inequalities. So we approach it from that point of view, and I'd really urge the rest of the world, I mean, America included in Europe, to pursue industrialization in a way which accommodates peaceful coexistence. Give some and take some, not when it takes all approach. So the IRA, I must say with respect, there's some parts of it which are quite useful to us and good, but there are some which are in sharp conflict with our outlook as Africa. We approach it, as I said, as a collective, and I can't speak from Bojana's perspective alone, because we have agreed to be a team, the whole of Africa. Thank you very much. Mrs. Willing, I'd like to ask you, do you think there is scope for the sub-saharan region to get ahead with industrialization? How should the region position itself in this new global scenario? Do you look at it with optimism? Do you think is it possible to go ahead or are you pessimistic about this? I'd be pessimistic if the focus was traditional industrial policies, picking winners and expecting bureaucracies to manage innovation. Then the predictions we saw will come true. The broad-based, mission-led, coalition-delivered approach to industrial policies got much greater potential. I think we're seeing that at a global level, for example, around oceans, the new ocean agenda is very much. A broad-based mission, we have to save the ocean, and a multiplicity of coalitions are emerging around that. I've done work for the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, which is pursuing quite strongly a green industrialization policy for the region. And the outcome of that work is very much about the kinds of coalitions that would be required to ensure that there are centers of excellence that emerge as partnerships between public, private, and civil society sectors to kind of grow high-potential areas, which can be in energy, yes, of course, but also mobility. We can't replicate the old-style concrete and car kind of combination that clogged up cities in the developed parts of the world, as well as communications, where we had leapfrogging over copper cables, and food systems. Food systems, in particular, are really about focusing on new ways of managing soils and nutrient cycles that result in localized value chains that can actually feed Africa. So those are just examples of where everything depends on the kinds of coalitions that get facilitated for innovation and flows of capital to happen. The bottom line is a lot of Africa's dreams are going to be scuppered because of the rising costs of capital and increasing indebtedness, unless we, if we don't think of industrial policy in this more creative way, those are problems that are going to get in the way, and we're gonna end up with another lost decade. Thank you very much. Madame Tsai, I would like to hear about a very, very important issue in this sector. It's about microchips. We've seen tensions growing about this specific area, which is fundamental for all industrial policy. We've seen the Biden administration taking steps. Recently, I think it was in past autumn to restrict exports towards China. Then we saw how other important countries like Japan or the Netherlands, which have important companies in this field that apparently are following the lead of the United States, restricting the exports towards China. So my question is, how is China reacting to this? Since it's so strategic, so strategic for the whole area, how do you see them reacting? How is that unfolding? Yeah, it's a really important question. And I especially appreciated the way that you just framed the context for that question, because what we see here is the rise of a security dilemma in the economic realm. It used to be that in international relations, security dilemmas refer to when a country pursues activities to make itself feel secure, has the unintended consequence of making other countries feel less secure, who then in turn try to make themselves feel secure, and this leads to a downward spiral of mutual insecurity in the arms race during the Cold War was the perfect example of that. And it used to, and then for a good part of the 80s and the 90s and through the early 2000s, it seemed that economic interdependence was a way to foster cooperation. But instead what we've seen now is the rise of a security dilemma in the economic realm, where China's made in China 2025 was in reaction to its sense of both economic as well as national insecurity. Then in turn the US comes along with a CHIPS Act in response. And now you ask what is China's reaction? It feels even more insecure, right? So more specifically, its response has been first to use very kind of wolf warrior discourse saying that it's going to backfire on the US. It's not going to work out. Second, it has accused the US of violating WTO rules Third, it is stepping up efforts to invest them. There are all these state government organized investment funds over a trillion dollars have been poured into them at different levels and the problem with them though is all this investment, those dollar figures look really intimidating and scary, right? Fueling that economic security dilemma. But if you actually look where the money is going, they've had to replace several fund managers of what they call the big fund of their national integrated circuit investment funds because of corruption. So much money is going into it but I think it's important not to get too intimidated by it. Other reactions include Huawei claiming that it can now manufacture I think a 14 nanometer wafer that it's developing the internal capacity to do it. It's very nervous that Japan is going to stop supplying it with components and so the reaction is both kind of external anger and defensiveness and then an internal even greater insecurity, unfortunately. Thank you very much. Mr. Korman, I'd like to point of view about how the global landscape of production might change. We are in this since quite a few time now. Data tells us that there is no de-globalization but probably there is a metamorphosis of globalization towards a more politically pushed globalization, more polarized globalization, nearshoring, inshoring, et cetera. So how do you see the perspective for the new global production landscape since you work for such a globalized company? Yeah, so I think from an automotive point of view, like automotive is going to its biggest transformation ever and it has different dimension and all dimension are influenced by industrial policy. So starting with the product itself, so from combustion to more sustainable mobility, of course, industrial policy can steer it, can accelerate, can slow down developments here. The same is for autonomous driving as a product, right? So we go from driving the cars ourselves towards autonomous technology, but that's all over the globe. The second question is what you mentioned and what I just said in the first round of questions, where to manufacture and how does supply chain look like? So one challenge the automotive industry is facing is how to increase and how to make supply chains more resilient and this comes along with a trend that we can see towards more vertical integration. So to do more components in-house, like batteries, et cetera, et cetera, that come along with this transition. So, and this comes also along with the question on where to manufacture, right? As I said, the local for local, the local content topic is nothing new. It has accelerated and it was always on the agenda for the automotive companies, building up joint ventures in China, producing locally in Asia, in Africa, et cetera, to leverage incentives of the countries. But the third dimension is now on how to manufacture. So what kind of technology are you using? And the question is can you leverage the same technology all over the globe or are you facing limitations? So that specific technologies that has been developed somewhere in the world are protected and cannot be used somewhere else. And I'm talking about technology, like advanced manufacturing technologies. I'm talking about technologies that are AI-enabled, artificial intelligence-enabled. And I think that's also an opportunity for countries to try to use that as an accelerator while others still try to figure out regulations on how to optimize manufacturing. I'm not talking about AI, like JetGBT and all these next generation of agents, et cetera, that will change our lives. I'm talking about using artificial intelligence for quality inspection, et cetera, et cetera, which in many countries is not yet allowed. So it's not like an official quality tool. But we see artificial intelligence being applied more and more. And again, the question, can you leverage the same technology across the globe or do we see very local for local manufacturing technologies? Thank you. Well, I would like to open up the discussion if you would like to pose questions to our speakers. We'll be very happy to take it. Please, go ahead if you can introduce yourself and then go for a question. Thank you, good morning. John Morrison, Institute for Human Rights and Business. This question of interdependency. I think many of you sort of correlate interdependency with stability and peace as a good thing. Just want to drill into that a little bit more. Is the current interdependency we've had the past 30 years actually been good for people? And is it something worth preserving? And if so, how do we preserve it? Or should we let it fall away and try and rebuild another form of interdependency? Thanks. Are you, would you like? No, I think we'll be on the panel because the IRA has been cited in the US as unfair, element of competition, et cetera. I'm intrigued by what governments could or should be doing to safeguard interdependency and to strengthen it or whether actually the current interdependency we have is not worth preserving. That's my question. Thank you for your question. Some of you would like to take it. Please, go ahead. Well, that depends on what you mean by interdependency. So if you mean multilateralism, from a global South point of view, yes, we've benefited from a relatively peaceful world. But if you mean interdependence from a developmental point of view, it hasn't been good news. And Larry Summers ended the last, was talking at the last session of the Wave in January in Davos. And he listed a whole bunch of good things that are happening and some challenges. And then he ended off by saying that one of our biggest problems is no one's figured out how to relocate capital from the global South, from the global North to the global South. And I was struck by that because in the context of, well, the majority of solar and wind resources are in the global South. The majority of the biodiversity adaptation resources in the global South. But the majority of the minerals we're gonna need to build the new infrastructures are in the global South. The capital is in the global North. And in the context of geopolitical, rising geopolitical competition, which is gonna be exclusionary of the global South, we, from a development point of view, face very serious challenges. And it's not gonna be good for the world because the resources, you know, how those resources gonna get accessed if you have strong states that are gonna say, no, no, we want better terms. Some more questions? Please go ahead. I think I'm, Mike, is coming. Thank you very much. My name is Jamal Grip, Director of Economic Development Integration and Trade of the African Union Commission, based in Addis Ababa. Well, I just first to salute our minister. Just two, three issues or comments. Well, first of all, what I have noticed really, there are those drivers of the economy, even on the industrial policies. The drivers, we know them. It's more or less North Africa, North America, you have Latin America, Europe, Asia and South East Asia. So these are really the drivers, but the future. I'd like really that the next edition of the web that we think about the future, how to position the world now going forward about 20, 30, 50 years from now. And I think the future is Africa. It's not because I'm from Africa that time, but the reality is there. The CFTA is on the African free trade areas already there. And within 10 years, they will be coming with one, the most biggest single market in the world. It's about 1.5 billion population. I'm not just talking, I'm talking about the opportunities. And we see some of the countries that are taking advantage from now and coming in. And I see all the remaining within talking those big countries, like big drivers, US, Europe, US, China, US, but not talking about US. And frankly, there are those big things happening in the world, but there is a reality. And the reality of today, leaders, the African leaders are not the same of the 60s or 70s. There is a huge shift. And I can't tell you being really, even in the front of the Agua, that the African growth opportunity act discussion in US, things have changed. And I'd like really to call on the weft to think about going forward to position Africa of the hub of prosperity, with what I call shared prosperity. Because when I listen to the minister about the green transition, yes, but we are not responsible of that one. So for me, going forward, there are many opportunities in Africa. One of them, I think the GVC, we are working a lot on the African Commission with UNICEF, with AFDB. For me, something that we have never talked about the subcontracting, some contractors. We never ever done a study about the subcontractors in Africa. This is something I believe is the future because yeah, this is not only talking about that very advanced technology, but the mid. For me, the weft should a little bit shift, really talking only about those, but bringing to North-South discussion. Thank you. Do you have a question? No, for me, how do you see, for example, the role? Not as a provider of, but how do you see the future? For example, green technology, yes, battery, that, lithium. We know where is it based, now where you have the resource. The raw material, we know where is it located. How do you see the future? Do you think this is the real future? Talking about the electrical car, do you think this is going forward for 50, 60, 100 years? And how are you thinking about how to recycle those batteries, the lithium one of this? I think like the advice and trying to think in the future, let's try to answer it in a way that we have been talking about markets and consumers in different markets, and I think you touched based on that some people might underestimate the future market Africa, et cetera, like happy to discuss. And then we talked about product, like selling cars, producing cars. We touched based on, oh, it's not about the product, it's about components. We talked about ships. We talked about ships not being able to, like making supply chains even more difficult and even more complex, because you can't use the same components. I mentioned also technology in terms of manufacturing technology, and there will be an age where we see it's even about sharing data. So how to connect the world in terms of sharing data and given access to data. And I think that's something we have to have in mind. Like that everybody is doing on its own, for own markets, et cetera, et cetera, with own technology that will not work out because it's not leveraging the capability of this planet in terms of resources, in terms of many, many other topics. And in order to make sure that we also save our earth and beyond, right? Like I think it's crucial to think beyond just like where are markets and where to sell products. Please go ahead. But please just straight to the question. We have not much time left. Thank you. Rachel Dorenci-Chana from Iconzenda. You mentioned old industrial policy versus new industrial policy. They're obviously created by humans, by leaders. Can you tell me how far we are along that transition in the mindset from an old to a new? I think the shift is taking place more in practice than with any conceptual clarity. Somebody like Mariana Matsukato is trying to give a conceptual framing of what's already emerging. But if you just listen to the panelists from Volkswagen and you hear the same from Siemens and so on, the previous paradigm was about cheap labor, long extended value chains, free flow of capital, no care for the environment. Now the paradigm has shifted. Circularity, localized value chains, costly labor they can handle, they can pay more. Environment matters and constrained capital. In that environment, states have to return and play a role in creating not a disciplined regulatory specification, which like as you say, failed in China in some sectors, managed by bureaucracies, but an opportunity space where problem solving through collaborations can take place in new kinds of environments where the language is about blending, blending finance, blending knowledge, accessing opportunities and multiplicity of spaces, but taking into account these new drivers. Please. We can move forward if we actually understand what we are up to and that the whole paradigm simply is not gonna work. In our context, we don't have the kinds of bureaucracies even if we wanted old style industrial policy. In South Africa, we've tried and failed many times to do that. So. I was etching Andre to comment on the question about the future. We are quite concerned in Africa about the future. As we transition to green energy, especially in the automobile industry, already we have a lot of African countries which are having influx of exploitation of great, great vehicles to them. A lot of the countries in the Central Africa and some in Southern Africa, South Africa has prohibited that entry, but we are seeing an influx. And we think that once we move away from combustible engines, we're going to see an influx of damping, of damping of vehicles in Africa. Already it is occurring. So we just, if we could cooperate with each other so that those which are not usable anymore, far distant places, they shouldn't be shipped. They really shouldn't be shipped over to, because what happens is that they find communities which are in test rates are in dire need. And these are usable for their own day-to-day getting by. So it's readily attractive to them to embrace them. But in the long term, we are really going to see a catastrophe of getting rid of that which is not useful, but sending it elsewhere in Africa. It's really a problem, I'd really urge especially from Asia, because that's where a lot of them do come from. And we, it's difficult for politicians once they have arrived for us to then not accept them. But if from their source, the source itself could stop sending them, that could really help us a great deal. Thank you. I know there are more questions, but we really have to wrap up. So I just would like to give a final word to you, Madam Tsai, a bullet point if you agree about state and party capitalism in China. Could you just give us a point and that we think there is an important thinking about that all over the world. What would you say about it? Or would you explain it very briefly? Okay, sure. I think the rise of party state capitalism is due to a deep sense of the Chinese Communist Party's insecurity about both perceived domestic and perceived external threats. So to the extent that the policies taken by other countries can be framed in less threatening ways, I think that could be a step towards de-escalating what has become an increasingly tense geopolitical situation between China and OECD countries. Well, thank you very much for being with us today here in the room and also all those who follow us online. I would like just to get some takeaways from this session. Well, I think it's clear from the thinking of our speakers that we are in the midst of a profound transformation with many risks in it, many risks. We've seen it from their words and also with the data of the chief economist Ankh Luk. So well, hopefully it will not be of spiraling into confrontation. There is a lot of potential in it, but a lot of risks. Time will tell. Thank you very much for being here with us today. Thank you.