 Well, good morning, everyone, and welcome to day two of our conference. My name, those of you who don't know me, is Richard Moore. I'm the director of this year's Crawford Forum. Thank you very much for joining us again today. I want to begin as his customary by acknowledging and celebrating the first Australians on whose traditional lands the university sits, the Ngunnawal and Nambri people, and pay my respects to world as past and present. And I extend those respects to any Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people who may be joining us today. Now, very shortly we're going to move to our day two plenary session on whether or not we can find a model of coexistence with China. It's hard to imagine a more pressing or more urgent foreign policy challenge for any nation at the moment and certainly it's one that dominates the policy discussion in Canberra. And China's already loomed very large in our conference we had a strong, very firm speech by the Treasury yesterday on standing firm against economic coercion from China. It's incredible I think for its very clear call to the business community that it needed to understand and adapt to changing geopolitical circumstances, recognize the increasing risk of over dependency on China as a market, and adopt what the Treasury called a China plus approach to our economic links with Australia's largest trading partner. Tonight, the Indian Foreign Minister Dr S J Shanker gave a terrific address the JJ Crawford a ration. If you haven't had a chance to catch up with that speech you can find it on a new TV, the university's YouTube channel. You can find very thoughtful speeches you'd expect from Dr J Shanker and I encourage you to have a look at it. Amongst other things he said and I'm quoting here from Dr J Shanker speech about the impact of China he said, let's be clear this is not just about the rise of another power, however major. We've entered a new phase of international relations and the full impact of China's reemergence will be felt more than those of major powers. So today we have an excellent panel to grapple with I'm very grateful, in particular to our international guests it's still early in Japan. It's shockingly early in Jakarta so thank you Dino for getting up, literally at the crack of dawn and it's getting late in Washington. And I'm very grateful that my friend and former colleague Justin Hayhurst from the Department of Foreign Affairs and trade is also with us today. After the China panel please do stay with us for concurrent sessions on the future of multilateralism, and also on technological competition and whether or not it means that the world of tech globalization is over, at least for now. And then finally if you're not all completely zoomed out by then, please do join us for the short closing session where the Vice Chancellor Brian Schmidt and Heather Smith and I will chew over the conference, the day and a half of the conference and offer a few takeouts of what we heard. Now it's my great pleasure to hand over to Louisa Lim, who's very kindly agreed to moderate this panel discussion over to you Louisa. Thank you so much Richard and thank you for that fantastic briefing paper that you wrote that forms the starting point for our discussion. Before starting I'd like to acknowledge the traditional owners of land from where I joined you today, the Wurundjeri people of the cool in nation. Welcome any members of the media that have joined us today, and to remind you that if you'd like to join the discussion on Twitter please use the hashtag hashtag ACL forum. We're so lucky to have this panel of very distinguished speakers. Please welcome me and join me in welcoming the speakers first Michelle floor no co founder and managing partner of West exec advisors. Michelle served as the US undersecretary of Defense for Policy under President Barack Obama. I'm delighted to welcome Dino Jalal, the founder of the foreign policy community of Indonesia. He's a former Indonesian ambassador to the US and a former deputy foreign minister. I'm joined by Justin Hayhurst, Deputy Secretary of the Indo Pacific Group at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and our final speaker is Akiko Fukushima senior fellow for the Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research, who served on many Japanese government committees. So this panel is examining that most central of questions which is being asked in capitals all around the world, how to coexist with China. The minds from China these days seem to pop back to another era we're seeing the introduction of Xi Jinping thought textbooks and schools even in kindergarten's exhortations to promote revolutionary culture. New regulations requiring foreign vessels to report whenever they enter what Beijing sees as its territorial waters. The political ground seemed to be shifting in China with ideology being the uppermost priority. At the same time it's assertive diplomacy is driving what Richard wrote in his great briefing paper described as one of the most profound shifts in the global order since the close of World War Two. And we've seen this shift most poignantly illustrated by that how each US exit from Afghanistan. As China's state run news agency, Sinhua put it the last dusk of empire. At the same time China is signaling loudly just how eager it is to step into that void. Michelle let's start with you. How much do you think the US withdrawal from Afghanistan has accelerated that shift in the global order. First of all great to be with you thank you so much for hosting this great conference. The withdrawal from Afghanistan, you know whether you agreed with the decision that President Biden made or not I think everyone can acknowledge that the execution of the withdrawal, you know left something to be desired it did not go as well as planned. On the one hand, over 120,000 people were evacuated by air, which is a feat that probably no other military in the world could accomplish in just a few weeks, but the level of chaos, the loss of life that occurred. And those that have been left behind and that we're still working to evacuate I think all of those things pointed to a withdrawal that could have been planned and executed better and oh by the way it is very much affected some of our allied relationships some of our NATO allies. We've always had this principle of into operations together out of operations together. I think Australia like NATO didn't feel as consulted as they wanted to be. And it's ironic because this is a president that came into office with very strong foreign policy credentials, you know seen as a real expert with a team around him who's seen as a super competent at execution. So I think this has taken people back, and that will take some time to recover from in some of our allied relationships. On the other hand, this withdrawal does free up bandwidth and resources and attention from the United States to really execute the rebalance to Asia and to focus more fully on the most important region in terms of American prosperity and security and so it frees up bandwidth to, you know, focus on recovering from COVID, getting the economy moving again, shoring up our alliances and partnerships like the quad, showing up in the region, and so forth, and really setting the table to be more effective both in competing with China where we have to, you know, economically, technologically and some security demands, but also seeking to try to find a way to cooperate and curious like climate change, pandemic prevention and, and so forth. So I do think that you will see the administration focusing even more on the end of Pacific showing up even more and seeking to regain its footing after this rocky period of withdrawal from Afghanistan. So to turn to you, I mean, how is, are these developments being viewed from Japan I've seen commentaries worrying about Washington's withdrawal saying it's bad news for those like Japan who rely on US security commitments, but at the same time I was saying that perhaps China will lean on Japan more will in the new sort of reality how does you think how does that new reality look from Tokyo. So the question and I should thank you for inviting me to join this discussion on your question. Someone did say along the lines you have quoted about US withdrawal from Kabul, referring to a possible ramifications on US allies including Japan, but I would argue that that was quite minor and majority of experts are more aware of how we can coordinate and manage this turn of events in Afghanistan. As you know, since two decades ago, Japan has been assisting Afghanistan in terms of their development and nation building. And Mo Gata has spent her last leg of international activities in assisting Afghanistan. We have many Japanese NGOs trying to help Afghan people to recover. And therefore, a foreign minister Motegi has mentioned that Japan will coordinate with the US and other like minded countries to find out how we can better assist Afghanistan for peace and stability. There are sad news coming from my friends and Afghanistan was involved in developing assistance of Afghanistan earlier, about 15 16 years ago, and my friends are suffering. So we have Japan feels that it is important for us to listen and find out how we can assist people in Afghanistan. Female Afghans are very worried about the future and how we can assist them support them would be very important. With respect to implications on our coexistence with China. I myself won't give direct impact, but we have to see how China will take its positions they have already taken their positions, but we have to find out what would be the best for the Afghan people. That's the tone of discussions we have in Tokyo. Thank you for allowing last year you describe the world as a, as being in a hot piece environment from Chicago, looking at China's increasing assertiveness. Do you, would you still characterize the relationship between China and Indonesia as one of hot piece. Look, keep in mind that Indonesia had very bad relations with China historically you know we froze our relations with China, diplomatically in 1965, after the failed coup attempt, which the SWAR to government sort of blame on China China a little bit. Because of relationship between the Indonesian Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party. So after decades of no relations that we resume relations in 1990. And, to be honest, what has happened is China has now become Indonesia's strategic partner and Indonesia's perspective on China has changed. The Indonesian side believes that China is an asset in our national development Chinese largest trading partner, a major investment source now largest tourists. So, so the weight and the content of relationship has changed right so from Indonesia's perspective. Yes, China is the challenge right you know we always see relationship with the big powers such as United States and China. As I say, something that a careful embrace right, but certainly what how China is seen today by Jakarta is very different than China, how China was seen 30 years ago. There's more strategic trust. Not perfect right. There's some concerns about the influx of Chinese labor into Indonesia, their concerns about China's claims in Natsuna. So overall picture is that Indonesia sees China as an important partner for our national development and also for regional affairs. So that's how our relationship has changed with China. Just in talking about changing relationships with China Australia has found its relationship with China. It's been unwinding somewhat in recent years as it's really found itself at the leading edge of China's displeasure I mean China's imposed tariffs or trade barriers on a whole list of Australian goods from Bali to wine to lobster to coal. But, you know, despite the rhetoric on decoupling exports are still growing, albeit with a slower rate of growth. I mean, do you think Australia can continue to sustain a healthy economic relationship with China even as the political one deteriorates. Thank you and good morning colleagues and those dialing into this panel discussion. Of course the potential is there I think structurally economic complementarity, which has always driven Australia's relations with North Asia. The fact import what a lot of those economies including China produces and we export what they need to consume particularly energy and other commodities that inputs into their own processing means that even in the face of disruption, the overall value of exports can grow because it's a fundamental structural coming together of two very complimentary economic systems. It's simply a choice of governments whether they want to let market forces and market rules and agreed trade commitments be the thing that dictate the flow of trade, the flow of goods, the flow of services, or whether there's something else at play. So while the value of our exports is very robust in some sectors it's been severely interrupted, and it appears to be the case very clearly that this is a political decision for a political purpose. It's not an easy situation, but it doesn't mean the present has to be the future. Clearly, as the Treasurer said yesterday, these measures hurt consumers and businesses in both countries and governments can agree to move on and allow trade to be governed by the fundamental market principles which all WTO members have signed up to. So I wouldn't say I'm confident or pessimistic but I think the potential is very clear and the success and reliability of Australian supply throughout Asia is something that I don't think will change and can benefit other economies should they choose to avail themselves of those benefits. Back to you. But as someone who is studying China's actions, what do you see as it's political and economic trajectory moving forward. Well, I think China itself is obviously like everyone grappling with COVID it's got some important economic questions domestically to resolve all the long standing debates about rebalancing its economy. There's obviously some interesting political developments internally very hard to be clear about the future in a country so so complicated and in many ways with a political system so opaque, but it is going to be a major economy. It is going to grow and it is going to continue to need inputs from the rest of the world, dual circulation, which is a new policy framework in China. Some of that's about greater self reliance but some of it reflects the continuing need for the rest of the world economy so in that sense we're an open integrated economy. The potential is there and slowly we have to work through these challenges and I think the government of Australia as you've seen isn't going to lurch from one policy position to the other we want to be steady we want to be ready for for conversations on no preconditions. And our companies are very competitive very reliable and are willing to supply markets wherever they can find them. Michelle. If we look at the Sino US relationship we've seen these attempts to kind of silo certain areas from the border relationship to try to protect cooperation, and one area that was supposed to be siloed was climate change, which was described as an oasis in China US relations. So that seems to have run aground with no agreement in recent talks in Tianjin and China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi even warned if an oasis is surrounded by desert sooner or later it becomes desert. I mean what do you see as the future for these areas of cooperation, given the problems in ties. Are we seeing those areas of cooperation becoming increasingly untenable. I think both China and the US and, and the other, you know, Australia and Indonesia, many other countries have. There's an imperative that we have to work together on climate change, or none of us will succeed. I think it's true for pandemic prevention, although, you know, the roots of the current pandemic have become such a political hot potato that it's very difficult to sort of take a dispassionate view of lessons learned and how do we do better next time at the moment but I hope that we'll get there eventually. So, you know, these are things where it's in the vital interest of every country in the region to deal with these issues and we have to deal with them together to be successful so I think we will get there I think what you're seeing right now is, you know, it's a relationship that where the two leaders, President Biden and President Xi really have to meet to sort of set the tone going forward. I do think this is going to be a situation of managing competition, keeping competition from going all the way to conflict. No one wants to see an open conflict between two nuclear weapons states. The U.S. doesn't want that the U.S. doesn't want that. The only way that happens in my view and the near to midterm is through profound miscalculation. You know, if Beijing were to suddenly believe its own narrative of U.S. decline and think you know the U.S. is down and out they're not getting up. Now is our moment. Therefore, we're going to do something stupid and use military force against Taiwan or in the South China Sea or what have you. So I think, you know, the U.S. administration is trying to create a set of facts that show we are going to recover from COVID. Our economy is starting to move and grow. We are investing in the drivers of our competitiveness here at home. We are reinvigorating our allies to stand with us and so forth. But this is going to be a very challenging. It's managing the competition, finding space, creating space for essential cooperation is very, very complex. But I think it's going to have to come from President Xi and President Biden. And right now, frankly, both are very focused on domestic imperatives. And, you know, she in particular with the run up to the party Congress and the consideration of his third time. I just wanted to ask you, you were talking about conflict. You think it's unlikely in the, I think you said the near to midterm, but the top U.S. commander in Asia, Admiral Phillip Davidson has said China could invade Taiwan within the next six years. And how likely do you think the risk of a major power conflict over Taiwan is. I do think there's a very real risk of miscalculation. If the United States and our allies fail to mitigate our resolve to say look, you know, if you resolve this issue by force the international queue that would violate international norms in the international community would respond. We consider this to be, you know, an issue worth defending. And then secondly, to demonstrate the capabilities for effective insurance, either the capabilities to deny the success of any Chinese military aggression, or impose such costs as an international community that it really wouldn't be in their interest. My view is I don't know how many Star Trek fans are on the on the in the conference but I think China's preferred approach with Taiwan is absorption into the board. You know they they want to create so much economic and dependency and so much political overmatch that they just eventually kind of create a font and a complete more along the Hong Kong model, then you know invading with, you know, a large fleet of ships and aircraft and so forth. Doesn't mean it can't happen. Like I said, the real risk is miscalculation misreading right now because we're not communicating very well. We don't understand each other very well. We underestimate each other in various ways. I think that miscalculation potential is real and I think that's what I don't want to put words in his mouth but I'm guessing that's what I don't know David so was talking about that risk of miscalculation. And Akiko from Japan, how does that risk of miscalculation look. It appears the leading candidates to be the next Japanese Prime Minister both have quite hawkish views on China. They both endorse beefing up Japan's defenses in response to China's dispatch of aircraft and ships around Taiwan and Japan Southern I mean, what what are we looking at in the next couple of years. Do you think Japan has taken a policy of deterrence and dialogue since 1972. When we signed a joint communicate with Beijing to normalize our relations. And I believe we have been very consistent in running both. It is becoming tough these days to promote both deterrence and dialogue. And as you pointed out, there are more assertive actions by China in East China Sea which concerns us. And that is the reason why Japan is trying to take more measures defensive and deterrence measures around the area. Do you know how far Taiwan is from our most western tip of Japanese archipelago called Yonakuni Island. Just 100 kilometers. That at least give you some kind of a ring in mind how we are concerned, but Japan will continue to have dialogue and deterrence. And Japan are neighbors. And we have relations over two millennia. And if I look just to the history from 1972 onwards, I would say that there are amicable and tense relations with the jigsaw trajectory. We have made efforts to have friendly ties with our neighbor, because we cannot move out. And that is something we will continue to do, but we are going to have this tough challenge of doing both deterrence and dialogue. And of course, for things we can collaborate, Japan will continue to push our corporations. And as many of you have already mentioned, global issues such as climate change pandemic environmental preservation and others would be a topic that would like to pursue cooperation with China, because on these issues, none of us can act alone in order to grapple with the issues. And in addition, as being a neighbor to China, the other social issues that we can work on together, for instance, China and Japan are having aging population and population decline. And I personally believe that China and Japan can work together on this issue in building systems and elderly society that elderly can live better. And also we have, we are working together on ocean plastic debris, which are around us. So there are issues of such. However, I also worry about miscalculation, or misinterpretation of costs and benefit of conflict by force. And I think it is incumbent on us, all of us, to make the ledger sound enough so that we do not demotivate our friend or friends to go for use of force. That's how I proceed the situations today. And that is the reason why we have included peace and stability of Taiwan Strait when Prime Minister Suga met with President Biden and also at G7 summit held in UK this spring. This will not this basic position of dialogue and deterrence will not change, I presume, whether we have new prime minister who takes, did you say hawkish position that position, because we are placed at the very difficult location which we cannot move out, and options are quite limited. Can I just follow up, you talked about making the ledger sound enough so that there's no demotivation, can you be a bit more explicit about how do you make that ledger sound enough, what does that mean. The most difficult challenge isn't it. China listens and analyzes reactions of international society. They would know how use of force would cost them in on Taiwan or wherever they would like to. So if we can make ourselves clear how we see use of force by China in this neighborhood, then they would think twice. I will take the last relation of Mr. Xi Jinping speech at the study session was it in June that he wants to make China lovable, or to be loved by others, listening to that as well as listening to his speech on BRI. A couple of years ago, I sense the quick shift of tone about BRI he was aware of that prompt argument we are making. So he is listening. And if we can make or suggest cost would be quite expensive for a certain country to use force, then I think it we can make that cost benefit analysis, more sound or helpful in order to prevent miscalculations that's how I perceive it. Thank you. Dino, turning to you. How does that cost benefit analysis look when it comes to Indonesia's relationship with China. Other red lines in that relationship and if so where are they. Thanks, Louisa. Good question. First, if Japan's policy is deterrence and dialogue. Indonesia's policy and I think this is true for, for much of ASEAN country, if not all ASEAN countries can be described as EBB engage balance and benefit, which means what. And this is what we do not just for China but for other great powers as well. We have to engage everybody. You know, this is very clear in ASEAN's dialogue relationships and Indonesia lists both China and the United States and Japan as a strategic partner. We engage all and we don't want any particular power to dominate the region, because that would be against the notion of ASEAN centrality. The question is how do we balance their presence and our interaction with all the major powers. This is why Indonesia or ASEAN cannot afford to take sides to choose and one side against another. So it's very important to understand that. Lastly, definitely we need to benefit from these relationships. You asked about China, you know, the figures that the Indonesians understand are enormous. There are about 10 trillion dollars of exports of imports from China. You know, that's a lot of exports for us. 500 billion dollars of investments, potential investments and about 500 million tourists coming from China that we want to attract to Southeast Asia and Indonesia. So I think for us to name the game is engage, balance and benefit. Now the red line obviously is for China and for anybody, this is true for Indonesia, is political intervention. Every election time Indonesians always wonder what foreign powers are playing or intervening or have a design on Indonesian elections. You know, this is the public view, there's a lot of conspiracy theories and so on. On some elections that the U.S. has always been popular, you know, not popular, but public imagination that we're saying is the U.S. who they choose and so on and so on. So far, we don't see China intervening in our elections. China has been very careful to show that they have a totally hands-off position on our domestic politics. And the other thing is really strategic autonomy in Luisa. Indonesians are not just independent, but they're very proud and very jealous of our ability and capacity to make strategic decisions. And you know, it's becoming challenging because when you have a country that is so economically connected to Indonesia now and that economic influence will grow for sure, relative to the U.S. economic engagement with Indonesia, right? I mean, right now, our trade with China is three times more our trade with the United States, which is a lot, right? So the big question is, despite this very close economic engagement that are bound to be rising, how do we maintain our strategic autonomy? And I'm sure we can do that. But on tactical level, that questions comes up again and again. And I mean, to what extent is Indonesia looking at the example of Australia as a kind of cautionary tale? It's a good question. You know, I talk to my Australian friends all the time. And they told us this. They told us, look, we give that benefit of the doubt to China. You know, we extended goodwill and cooperation with China and went fine for a while, but look at what happens now, you know, and you know, very well with the cases that I'm talking about, right? So they're saying, you know, it might happen to you, right? And to be honest, this is the questions that Indonesians are asking, right? Two important questions and not necessarily have great answers. One is what happens when you get too close to China, right? I think this is a strategic question that everybody has to ask, right? What happens when you get too close to China? Different countries have different answers to this. Secondly, what happens when you disagree with China, right? Again, different countries will have different answers to this because China behaved differently, differently to countries that disagree with it, you know. You know, Fiji gets away with it, right? But the Philippines during the Arroyo time got different answers and so on. So, you know, those questions are being asked. But the thing with China, I think, look, it's one of these relationships where you want to get close to China, but you need to stand up when you need to. And what China respects, in my view, right? Sorry, let me rephrase it. When you push back in China and stand firm on your ground, that's how you get China's respect, right? That's how China doesn't push you around, you know. Under Natuna, for example, you know, there were things that China said about their claims, the nine dashed line being overlapping with our jurisdiction of waters in North Natuna seawaters, right? But, you know, President Jokowi took a boat there, did cabinet meeting in warship and so on, and, you know, basically said, look, you know, don't touch us on this, don't mess around with this, you know. And the tone from Beijing change afterwards, right? If President Jokowi had not done that, probably, you know, it's like drawing sand on drawing line on the sand, you know, if you draw one line and nobody does anything, then you erase that line and then you make a bigger line until somebody pushes back, right? So the ability to, the art of diplomacy for China is really how to do those EBB, the engage with balance and benefit, but at the same time, you know, standing strong firm on issues that you need to and not fear the consequences. So, Justin, when it comes to Australia's position, I mean, I'm just wondering how you see the kind of next steps for Australia. I mean, we're talking about models of coexistence and cooperation, but it seems like, you know, the bilateral relationship is Australia's frozen out. There's almost nothing going on. How can you coexist and cooperate when you're in the deep freeze? I mean, what happens next? Louisa, thank you. Look, I think one of the interesting things about this conversation is that it's very hubs and spokes kind of conversation. China in the center and everybody's bilateral relationship one by one. And I think what strikes me about the comments of my fellow panelists and Dr. Jai Shankar's speech last night is that it's really about all regional countries acting together to respond to this particular very new unprecedented phenomenon of a major power that's developed very fast, very impressively. It has a system that is different to the system of almost all of its neighbors and other key regional actors, especially the United States. We get a say, we have agency in the way the region develops and the rules, norms and institutions that underpin engagement between states that facilitate trade that govern the maritime domain and other things. And so, you know, when you say what next for Australia, we've been engaged in an intensive, although COVID constrained regional engagement. We've deepened our ties with ASEAN. Our relationship with India as Dr. Jai Shankar said yesterday has been the most impressive of all the quad bilateral linkages to develop. I don't think we could be closer with our Japanese colleagues and friends than we could be at the moment, you know, we're literally taking forward the relationship and we're open across the board to engage with all partners because how the region develops, how the region accounts for and coexists with China is absolutely fundamental to us. So when you say what next, it's very hard to predict the future, but what we do know is that we will be active and have agency and work in partnership to try and address this challenge. When you are a smaller country dealing with a big power, doesn't matter how well-intentioned or otherwise that big power is, it doesn't work. Regionalism, though, or networked partnership or alliances, they give you something different. And that is the reality we're talking about, not China on its own with one or two individual countries, but China on its own with some regional organizations, China and a network of alliances. How do we work together to fashion a future that's stable? Some of this will be hard to know until the world truly reconnects post-COVID. And China, of course, is a little isolated in that sense, very strict border controls. We have them in Australia as well. There's the wash-up of Afghanistan, but the issue for us, what next is working with as many partners as possible to ensure we maintain peace, stability. There is no one dominant power, and that trade, travel, all these things take place according to internationally agreed rules. And it's very important if you're a middle-sized or a small country that the big players, whoever they are, stick to their commitments and abound by the obligations they've undertaken. So, I mean, you talk about acting together and about sort of regionalism or network partnerships or alliances, but do you think the sort of the architecture of the region allows for acting together in a way that can counter China, because I think you do make a really good point about the hubs and spokes. Does this different reality that we're in require sort of different forms or bodies to allow that kind of acting together to happen? It sort of hardly needs saying to a panel so distinguished, but Asia is too diverse, too broad and too big to have kind of architecture like NATO formal stuff. So, I mean, there are a lot of places where partnerships like the Quad or trilateral partnerships such as the one between Australia, France and India come into play. I mean, this is about, you know, it's less about traditional structures. It's more about cooperating on issues, coalitions, flexible balancing, all of the things actually that Dr. Jaishankar was talking about last night. We're not going to institutionalize a structure and build new elaborate regional security entities. We've already got ASEAN, we work with it and we respect its role and its convening power and its centrality. But we need many tools, not just one. And that just reflects the reality of different perspectives, different interests and the sheer diversity of views in this particular part of the world. And it also reflects that we have a country like the United States that is fundamental to the region in terms of its economic development and in terms of investment technology supply chains. And then in its security dimensions, well, you know, there is no structure that can be built with the United States in mind that sort of truly pan regional. It's just not viable. But we do have, for example, in the Quad, an ability to function together on issues when they matter, when interests align. But it's like touch. It's based on issues. And it's around a common view of how to work with a region that allows ASEAN to be central and all powers to develop peacefully and in a stable fashion. So, just before we open for Q&A. You know, this has been such an interesting discussion, although quite gloomy in many respects, maybe we could end on a slightly more positive note. Are there any bright spots in the relationship with China that are worth, that can sort of be drawn upon in this conversation about Korea's resistance with China. And Michelle, let's start with you. You know, I do think that we need to be clear with China about sort of how we envision going forward. I think it was unfortunate that the Trump administration sort of started talking about decoupling as a strategy or as a policy because the truth is, all of us have economies that are very integrated with China. All of us will have important trade relationships with China going forward. So, decoupling is neither possible nor advisable or desirable, even from a US perspective, economic perspective. What we need to do is, you know, is not take a sledgehammer to the economic leadership we need to use a scalpel and carve out, you know, where do we need to protect supply chains that are directly relevant to national security, directly relevant to public health, or directly relevant to a particular technology area where we really feel we need to maintain competitive advantage. If you take all of those things together, it's not insignificant, but it doesn't blow up the entire relationship. You know, we still have, we'll have very robust and healthy and mutually beneficial trading relationships with China. I think it's very important to start to sort of countering, counter start countering the assumption that we're headed towards some kind of new Cold War, which I think is a terrible frame for what things should be like and will be like with China going forward. It's a little bit more nuanced in talking about where do we envision continued trade and mutually beneficial in an engagement interaction, and where do we see competition, but competition that we're going to manage very carefully to avoid conflict. And so I think we need to do a better job of really fleshing out. What does that look like? Because right now I think everybody, you know, both China and some in the US, particularly on Capitol Hill, are thinking about absolute worst case scenarios that I think we should be working very hard to avoid. Thank you so much. It seems that we have reached the end of our time. It's just been such a wide ranging and thought provoking discussion. I'd really like to thank fantastic questions from the audience. And of course the wealth of experience that such a distinguished panel brings to this discussion. So thank you to Michelle Flournoy, Dino Jalal, Justin Heyhurst and Kiko Fukushima. And thank you so much Richard for organizing this and for the team behind the scenes who made this all possible in zoom land. So thank you all very much for sticking around as well. We've had so many audience members that have continued all the way through to listen to this. I know everybody has zoom fatigue. So I'm really pleased to see so many people have stayed the course. Thank you very much for your time. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Louisa. Thank you. Justin. Thank you. Michelle. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.