 Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Nixay Cheney. I'm senior fellow and deputy director of the Japan chair here at CSIS and On behalf of Dr. Hamry who unfortunately could make it today and my CSIS colleagues. It's my pleasure to Welcome you this afternoon. Delighted to see you all here We're also webcasting this event at CSIS.org and I'd like to welcome our online audience and For your Twitter fans, we're also tweeting at CSIS hashtag CSIS live So this survey project is a sequel to a survey we conducted in 2008-2009 on Asia's emerging power relations institutions and norms That original survey as well as the one we're discussing today is on our website But very briefly I just thought I'd go through a few of the core findings from our original effort because I think you'll hear those Themes over the course of our discussion today The first core finding in our original Survey was that there was notional support for the creation of a so-called East Asia community But that there was also skepticism about the ability of regional institutions to handle security economic or transnational crises A second core theme was that we found a strong degree of support for the idea that an East Asia community should be based on Democratic norms such as human rights free and fair elections and good governance But there were divisions also about whether states should see national sovereignty to advance those norms and In response to questions about regional dynamics, there was a clear assessment that power was shifting to China But trust was highest toward the United States with the exception of Thailand where mistrust of the US was significant Needless to say much has transpired in the region since then and our team here at CSIS decided It would be good to do a follow-up survey To reassess these trends in the region And our panel of CSIS scholars here will share some of the results and their analysis in a moment But very briefly, I just want to make a few comments about the methodology up front Like our previous effort of this survey was aimed at strategic elites Which we defined as non-governmental experts who are influential in the debate on international and or Asian regional affairs Excluded we're serving members of the legislative judicial or administrative branches of government and those whose expertise lies outside of international relations or Asia This time around our team identified candidates in Australia Burma Myanmar China India Indonesia Japan Singapore South Korea Taiwan Thailand and the United States And we made a very conscious effort to get a balance range in all of those And to get a sense of strategic views across the region In collaboration with opinion dynamics corporation, we then developed an online survey template And this survey was fielded electronically between March 24th and April 22nd of this year Out of approximately 1500 candidates we generated 402 responses, which was a response rate of about 27% And that response rate is broken down on page 5 of our report I want to note though that to allow comparisons across a range of national responses that varied from 23 to 81 We used average values that weight each country equally Burma Myanmar was excluded due to a low response rate But you'll see that we analyzed that separately in a section at the end of our report Very quickly just wanted to note that there are some advantages and limitations to this kind of survey sample You know this this is a good cross-section of strategic views on power and order in Asia But the selection of strategic elites is necessarily subjective And the sample does not necessarily reflect the full range of elite views in the region So this type of survey cannot be compared to larger public opinion polls in terms of precision or margin of error Nonetheless, we're confident that it'll enhance understanding of the strategic landscape in Asia With respect to power norms and regional institutions Finally just a few quick words of thanks first. We'd like to thank the MacArthur Foundation for supporting this research I'd like to acknowledge Ernie Pycopolis principal at opinion dynamics corporation for his expert advice and Collaboration on this effort our media partners Asahi Shimbun China Times and Jungang Ilbo For their support and assistance in disseminating the results and our survey analysis Our project director dr. Michael Green as well as our team of Asia scholars I'd like to thank will Coulson and Zach Cooper who really put in a lot of time and effort on this report As well as a number of staff in the CSIS Asia programs External relations and the Publications Department who helped us design and implement this survey So without further ado, let me turn it over to dr. Green. Thank you Thank You Nick and Nick really honchoed this effort with our media partners and with opinion dynamics and Our partner Ernie Pycopolis and within CSS. So thank you Nick We're going to go through the the major findings that that we drew from the survey and I'm going to Give you nine of them And one or two or three graphs for each and then for each finding I'll ask a Colleague or two or three to weigh in on their view of what we're seeing And then we want to leave time for discussion with the audience questions, but also comment or insights This is a survey in effect of all of our counterparts in the region not all of them a significant number of our counterparts in the region We tried very hard to have a balanced pool. We did the surveys in Thai Japanese Korean Chinese and so forth But as Nick said, this is not a public opinion poll with a scientific margin of error This is a snapshot or an impression. Some of the results were surprising to us Some of them confirmed what we're all hearing in the region But it's really the starting point for a discussion of the dynamics in Asia and especially how Strategic elites people thinking about the region expect Order power trade values to look over the next decade And so it's a starting point in your comments to us today Are frankly as important as what we found in the survey we want to use this to generate discussion and debate So please don't come away with the idea that we have a scientific conclusion game over You know the US will lead forever in Asia or something like that So let me start going through the findings Will Colson is going to put them up and We can come back to them later during the discussion if you wanted to ask about a specific survey or Share an insight on what might explain the result. You should all have a Binder in front of you with the report. This is the not quite as fancy version We got for today. We'll have a slightly same content slightly fancier cover in a week or two And it's on our website as well the the first finding Consistent with our survey four years ago was that Experts in the region expect power to shift over the next decade to China Next slide will so this is in your packet as well, but as you can see the unbalanced the view across the region when we averaged or waited for each country was that Power the China would exert The most power in Asia in 10 years There were two At least two really interesting Responses though if you look on the left and you'll see that Those who disagreed with this notion were primarily Chinese and American experts 71% of the Chinese respondents said that the US in fact would exert the greatest power in East Asia in a decade and a similar number 68% of the Americans agreed US allies Japan, Korea Australia tended to be that way and then Other countries we surveyed expected more of a power shift to Asia So I'm going to come to our experts in a second But that result is not completely surprising the sense that powers shifting to Asia But the Chinese response and perhaps the American response were a bit unexpected Next slide we we asked a number of questions about China's impact on the region And found on average 79% of respondents thought that China would exert a very positive or positive impact economically But 61% across the region expected that China would exert a bad or very bad influence on the security developments The blue column shows the expectations for those who said China would have a very positive or somewhat positive impact on economics the red security you'll note that only in only one country did a Majority of respondents say China will have a good impact on regional security. That was China 83% of the experts Across the rest of the region much lower particularly low in the US and Japan And then the third one for this particular Grouping of findings next slide. Yes. Thanks. Well, that's it Which of the following countries do you think will be your country's most important economic partner in ten years? And this obviously is part of the explanation for those countries that found Japan would excuse me China would exert the most influence Leading the list Taiwan followed noticeably by Korea and Australia If you look to the right of this chart, you'll see the outliers Japan and Japanese experts 71% Said that the United States in ten years would be Japan's most important economic partner my First reaction to this was that it was wishful thinking in Japanese think tanks Nervous about China, but as I talked I was in Japan this last week as I talked to CEOs and economic planners I think sometimes in the US we miss how much Japanese companies are interested in American shale gas Infrastructure energy, so I think this in my view and that others may want to weigh in this actually maybe and not just wishful thinking But a fairly accurate perception of of where the US-Japan economic relationship might be in ten years But the particularly striking one was China where 83% of Chinese experts said Not surprising when you think about it, but 83% of Chinese experts said the US would be the most economic Economically important partner and this included Canada the EU and others to me. That's quite striking It suggests that there's a lot more recognition in Beijing among elites of how important the US is Then perhaps there is in other parts of Asia That other parts of Asia may not appreciate how much the US and China economically have Of a stake in each other and particularly how much Chinese experts view their stake in economic relations with the US So for some commentary from colleagues on this first set of findings, let me ask Chris and Rick and Victor Chris is our Freeman chair on China studies Rick is our what one each year on us India and Victor is our Korea chair and let's start with you Chris I think I guess I suppose the first thing to point out is from the first slide where obviously you have this large number of Chinese respondents That is suggesting that the US will exert the greatest power. I personally didn't find this to be a terribly Shocking response, but I think it does highlight a couple of things The first is that I think it's emblematic of what we're seeing If you look at the arc from the global financial crisis and now moving forward As we kind of get back toward a more steady equilibrium in us China Perceptions of themselves in each other. I think after the global financial crisis. There was a very strong perception in China that They had found some third way and that their rise was inevitable and the US was in either You know seriously had stumbled or was already in permanent decline I think those assessments have started to even out as the US has done better economically as the shale oil and gas Revolution takes place and most importantly I think affecting these numbers are deepening concerns inside the Chinese system about their own ability to maintain the robust economic growth that they've been Witnessing over the last several years, especially as the reform process that they're going through now is really beginning to bite And you're getting a much more solid understanding I think across Chinese elites that that's going to be a very difficult process and there'll be some bumps in the road I think the second reason why we see that number again is Tells us the story to some degree of this debate within China about what kind of China does China want to be And how are they going to comport themselves on the international stage and so on and so that number Reflects to me that still this sense of we're still sorting that out So the US you know will continue to play the same role that it has been in terms of leading And then I think most importantly that slide also really gives the lie if you will to this notion that all Chinese Are just brimming with hubris and and assertiveness and aggressiveness Clearly that doesn't isn't reflected here and on the second slide. I just wanted to make a comment. Well, can you move to the second one? Yeah, so the numbers I take from this one I think it's quite interesting is that for Sino-US relations the implications here are we need to focus on the economic pieces of their Relationship not the security stuff right and we're going through this right now With cyber and everything else so we've witnessed here in the last couple weeks I was just in Beijing and when I came Conversations I had there is abundantly clear to me that too much emphasis on trying to solve very difficult Intractable security problems when in fact they should probably be being managed and not enough emphasis on trying to look at the economic pieces Of the bilateral relationship where in fact there may be some solutions Well from the Indian perspective, I mean you see that India looks at China's rise as the regional power And they sit see that does as the most likely scenario at among the highest levels Across all of Asia and they do have concerns about what that means for the region at the same time They're they're one of only two countries in the region Japan being the other that view that the United States will be their economic They're strongest economic partner in 10 years So I presume that the new Prime Minister in India Mr. Narendra Modi has probably seen this data that we prepared and That is painting his administration's Outlook and foreign affairs so far because you look at the steps that he's taken I mean there was a there was a lot of hair pulling you can see that I was active in that before on whether or not the The the denial of the revocation of mr. Modi visa 10 years ago would paint his perceptions about the United States Whether we would have a warm welcome when he was when he was if and when he was elected And indeed, you know, actually, I think that the the steps for outreach that the US has taken so far have been reciprocated As warmly as can be expected. In fact, you know, there's rumors going on right now I don't know the outside has confirmed it that he may actually come to Washington later this year So I think he looks at this same things that that the experts in India picked up here China is gonna be the big power They're concerned about that rise and the United States will be their top economic partner and Modi's not gonna want to Wait for that future He's a pragmatic guy and the day that he's in office if that's what he thinks the future is gonna look like Let's start rushing towards that right now. So I think so far I think this kind of this sort of sentiments are painting what he's been doing so far Well, if you can go to the third slide Is that the third slide? Yeah, okay so From the Korean perspective if you look at this, I mean to me what's so interesting is you see Korea there at 86% seem China's the most important economic partner and then just on the way on the other side of the graph is Japan that has almost a completely the reverse view of their economic future partner and I think for Korea what this I mean Korea is very schizophrenic Or perhaps even bipolar when it comes to China and then I think The set of charts really do show that because on the one hand they acknowledge the objective reality that China is their most important economic partner but then on figure two if you look As to the question of whether they like the fact that China is their most important economic partner You know whether China has a positive impact You know their numbers are pretty high there, but they're still lower than the United States Australia Singapore Thailand in fact even lower than China So again that just shows to me that the Koreans on the one hand There's this objective reality that they acknowledge China is their key economic partner, but whether they're entirely happy about that Is not at all clear furthermore not to step ahead Mike But in in the next set of charts you'll that you're going to be showing you'll see when it comes to the question of how Korea feels About us leadership In the future they're way off the charts in terms of positive support So, you know, it's a very sort of conflicted and schizophrenic view Thanks. So the second finding we broadly took away was in spite of this perception of a shift in Relative power towards towards China There are strong expectations among regional experts. We interviewed or excuse me We surveyed that on a regional basis you really us leadership will remain strong and in this next slide you'll see we asked The expectations of these experts over the next decade and we gave them Five different scenarios Continued us leadership even if relative US power declines An uneasy balance of power among the major major regional states, but with no one state dominant The yellow bar is a new community of nations based on strengthened multilateral institutions and cooperation The red bar is Chinese primacy and then the bottom bar I think that's gold is a US China condominium. You hear a lot of talk about all these scenarios in the region I'm sure you have you've read about them, but when we asked our experts in the region to choose The strongest answer was that the first one that there would be continued us leadership and as Victor noted especially in Korea Generally among US allies in China Whereas Thailand Indonesia Less certainty about that then we asked which of these five scenarios would be in the best interests of your country and in the next 10 years You know Japan no doubt about it US leadership Japanese are even more sure that than Americans are and Then the US allies and partners It's interesting that India China to a lesser extent Indonesia Thailand in other words especially South and Southeast Asia had a preference for a community of nations Based on a multilateral cooperation There was not a lot of appetite for a balance of power Among the major states presumably India Australia Korea Japan not much appetite for that very little appetite For Sino-centric system and very almost no appetite for a US China condominium Most respondents had strong preferences and one thing that jumped out here was that in China there was quite a diffuse Mix clearly not a lot of enthusiasm for US leadership But not a strong preference or consensus among the Chinese experts about what sort of regional order they'd they'd prefer instead So let me ask for comment on that to Bonnie and Ernie Well on the first slide I think that the there is recognition in China as Chris was saying earlier of Persisting US lead particularly in comprehensive national power The Chinese but especially the strategic elites that we interviewed excuse me survey I think don't share this public opinion in China that when China overtakes the United States an aggregate GDP That that will necessarily mean that China's power is going to be greater overall than the United States. So I think that's one point Secondly, I think that the Chinese are really not ready to take on leadership themselves It's widely seen in China that getting too entangled abroad Getting distracted from their major task of increasing their own economic power Domestically that this is not necessarily in Chinese interest at the same time It's quite clear that they are uncomfortable if you go to the next slide With the notion of US leadership So you do see relatively small numbers of Chinese that support continued US leadership another comment that I would make is Yes, it there's quite diffused views in China as to what kind of Power they would like to see in in Asia Community of nations is certainly among I think scholars think-tag experts is the preference But note that there is greater support more than 20 percent for US China Condominium then in any other country and I think that this is the way a new type of major power Relationship is in fact viewed in China This is Xi Jinping's notion that he has put forward. It's not quite Explicitly referenced as a g2 arrangement But I do think it reflects China's preference for being treated as an equal with the United States and sharing power For Southeast Asia what we can see here is that the Southeast Asians Understand balance and consensus. That's their priority And we take the findings in these slides with the earlier slides What what there's a clear message for US strategy here if we did have one and that would be That economics in Asia is security. I would really underline that point For the Southeast Asians They cannot imagine a regional economic framework that doesn't include China and They can't imagine a regional security framework that doesn't include the United States They want both of us included I think the things that could change these lines of trajectory are Are the would be a US failure to move forward with a Comprehensive economic Strategy for Asia that's TPP and beyond TPP would not be sufficient In my view and and or a Chinese failure On the security side Southeast Asia is responding very negatively to increased Chinese aggression in on the South China Sea And up north and there's a lot of concern about that. So what we're seeing here is a strong indicator a strong pull for the from the Southeast Asians and a comfort level with Regional frameworks being built to manage these relationships notable Malaysian diplomat once told me That the genius of ASEAN was that it took Indonesia Which was in the 60s the big boy in the neighborhood who no one really understood They didn't know what the Indonesians wanted or what the Indonesians wanted to be and they created a framework ASEAN in which the Indonesians could have a lot of face a lot of room to be the the Bapak or the big the big player And and then eventually co-op the Indonesians into making the rules and playing by the rules in the neighborhood And that is exactly what the answer to Southeast Asians want to use to manage China's emergence on the regional and global stage Thanks, the the third broad finding we had was that there is a Broad support for the US rebalance also known as the pivot but concern about implementation The next chart we show this both in a bar graph and in a heat map of the region Green is enthusiastic red is opposed. So this looks a little bit like I Think some of our Chinese friends image of containment strategy, but that's not what it's intended to show what it shows Is the view of the rebalance 79% on average across the region? But only 23% of the Chinese respondents had a positive view But China is really an outlier every other country. There was strong support for the rebalance In the US 96% so CSIS Scholars were not allowed to answer the survey, but we we tried very hard to have a balance across town So I don't know who but this means our friends at heritage or AEI who have not always been as charitable to the administration I Would say broadly support the rebalance so this to me should be a sign to our friends in the region that this has bipartisan legs and that With maybe one or two exceptions. We won't say on the record pretty much any candidate going into 2016 Is going to keep doing this? Various polls not ours the public opinion polls show that now Consistently a majority of Americans say Asia is the most important region in the world to us So the 96% support for the US I think is actually Maybe the most surprising part of this and it's good because a lot of us up here feel the the rebalance should should continue Now when we asked about how it's going or how would you characterize the rebalance on the next slide? It's a little more mixed result for the administration We broke these into the four answers And what you find is that in the upper left? One one characterization was would you would you describe the rebalance as too confrontational towards China? Nobody took that bait almost no country responded that way except in China where there was a very strong response That the rebalance is too confrontational to China But but that was only in China, and I think it's important to recognize that the over half of the respondents view was There just needs to be more of it insufficient resources and implementation We could go round and round about why that is It's particularly strongly felt among US allies Matt pointed out earlier Among TPP partners so part of it is probably a lack of satisfaction at progress on TPP in this town I suspect part of it is concerned about the defense budget here You don't have to read too far into the Japanese Korean or Australian media to see that there's concern about Syria and what that meant And and frankly whether the second term President Obama has people who are as committed as the first term some of this is impressionistic But the bottom line is The entire region wants us to do this thinks it's important, but we have a problem in China. So let me ask for some some comments Actually, why don't we why don't we move on an accident? I just want to ask Rick to comment on the India part because India's response to the rebalance is interesting Yeah, well, you know, I think ten years ago. We didn't have a term for it We didn't call it the pivot back then but I think you know those of us that are so buried in just us India Only saw about ten years ago a real pivot towards India We didn't we didn't call it that same thing at the time But it really was and you know for a variety of reasons, but most importantly because of how India handled the liability law specifically nuclear liability a little bit of interest was lost And so those of us that are stuck in the US India vein look at the rebalance towards Asia As though a little bit less attention in the region on India And so again for the US India folks the rebalance in some ways, you know It gives India a little bit less attention But interestingly that India had actually above higher support people in India had above higher support for the rebalance because for them It's not just about having a love fest with the United States It's about their own regional security and they're more concerned as as we show in our in our data as well On there actually being you know hot warfare potentially because of regional issues because of border issues So for them, it's not about a one-on-one relationship or anything like that But anything that puts more attention on the region there and creates a more stable environment India is very supportive of Our fourth broad finding Was that experts in the region Clearly view territorial confrontations as the major obstacle to regional community building And as nick noted we did the survey in 2009 with the support of macArthur foundation They also were very supportive and Both in content and budget for this effort as well In 2009 we asked a lot of questions about institutions And we and then we asked questions we call the ghostbuster questions Who are you going to call so if there's a financial crisis a pandemic a A proliferation problem of who are you going to call and we listed all the institutions apic arf You know and what we found was Even the most ardent East Asia community builders in asia were not about to call the arf Or the azean plus three if there was a crisis they were going to call the imf The seventh fleet So we didn't ask those same questions because there was such a Strong skepticism about the utility of these institutions beneath A very robust support for trying to do them You can be very for community building As a long-range goal and be very skeptical about whether you'd really rely on it That's what we found so this time we asked a little different question. We said It's not here. We but we asked how was the east asia community building going And you know a majority of respondents said Moderately well and then we asked what are the major obstacles And on average across the region is a little hard to see it's in your packet On average it was territorial issues and history issues that ranked number one Followed by uncertainty about china And they're not wrong because i want to show you the second slide which was To me quite striking when we asked on this question of territorial problems if If another country seized your sovereign territory and assuming that diplomacy didn't resolve the crisis, would you support military force to retake your territory? So for americans, you know 88 percent You know koreans 86 percent it was all quite high But the one that jumps out here is japan 81 percent of japanese experts Said that they would support military force And although we didn't mention the senkaku daoyudao daoyutai I think that's clear to what was in people's minds. So these territorial issues are More than we found in 2009 really in the forefront of the entire region's View of what's in the way of more cooperation And if this poll shows, you know, there's there's some reason for that I want to ask a couple people to talk about these because these disputes of course are all across the region So let me turn to to chris and bonnie and murray I would just point out That I think the numbers for china really aren't that surprising I mean my feeling is that this reflects The not only the messaging that we're seeing coming out of the chinese government But also the behavior under the new chinese leadership and it is a good reminder that While it can be taken too far to suggest that the leadership is constantly under pressure, you know from Their own society on these issues. It's certainly a factor. I mean a lead opinion obviously is very Pointed in one direction on that obviously the chinese government has done that to themselves through Stoking those nationalist sentiments over the years to legitimize the system But I think it does suggest to us that There's not going to be too many audiences in china should a an accident or something occur who are saying Hey, wait a minute. Let's take a pause here or worse if something was, you know, an effort was made to seize their territory Well clearly on the history question What the chinese are saying here is that the problem is japan That is no surprise. There's obviously that Very much a consensus in china that when it comes to history issues that an obstacle to community building in east asia in their view Is because japan has not Resolved and acknowledged its role in history. I'm on the territorial issues I think that what the chinese are thinking about here is that There is a in their view a sense that the u.s. Rebalance is emboldening Nations of the region to challenge china's territorial claims. I think that's what they have in their minds there And on the on the second slide I think what we see in this of course, you know throughout the region not just in china Real support for using military force if your if the if in their Territory were were attacked I think that Really what we see is whether it's in scarborough show or second thomas show Or the recent oil rig that the chinese have positioned Off the coast of the parasails and vietnam That there really is just widespread support for these actions and for asserting china's claims More forcefully. So again, I think that they they support what their nation is doing and are critical Of what other nations are doing and what they see as u.s. Support for challenging china Can we go back to the first slide? I'll talk a little bit about About southeast asia. It's really interesting. You see the average is 7.9 Out of a on a scale of 1 to 10 the average is 7.9 concern about About territorial confrontations, but the highest two there's a tie indonesia and singapore both are 8.4 They're the highest score in the whole grouping in thailand is 7.3 the lowest score In the in all of these countries and I guess uh, you know, the reason that you would I expect that that this would be the case is that indonesia and singapore Probably are you know, they're on the edge of the conflict or the The disputes in the south china sea They would be most affected if there is a dispute its trade would be most easily disrupted Well, on the other hand, thailand this this survey was taken before the coup, but in the middle of middle of the seven month Political unrest ahead of the coup and the ties of are clearly been internally focused for quite some time But they're also the furthest away From the from the dispute in the south china sea and so the least affected Then if you go to the next slide, it's these numbers are born out again Singapore and indonesia are very Very high numbers for supporting military force of diplomacy fails while thailand it's only 61 percent And again, I think that's uh Based on their perception their their threats are internal mostly at this point In their view and so the external threats are are probably minimized as a result Hey, hey mike. Can I just real quick on this? You know, I mentioned it briefly upstairs But it really you know when you see it presented in this graph when I saw the raw data didn't really jump out of me But you know getting back to india when you look at the countries here. I'm sorry on the first slide The countries that are named specifically as will these be obstacles to community building in east asia So there's three that are mentioned in there that are also pulled china And china ranks itself the lowest as a threat to community building japan japan rakes itself lowest india india ranks itself middle of the road So it considers itself Actually in the upper half as an obstacle obstacle to community building in east asia So, uh, I'm not sure exactly what joe responds to say that but they certainly have a pretty high opinion about what they plan on doing In east asia in the future here, so The the fifth broad finding was on this question of of history and while the territorial issues were Ranked very high all across the region as an obstacle to community building as a concern History was particularly acute as an issue in northeast asia on this slide You'll see that we asked And victor and I spent a long time trying to figure out how we could in one or two questions try to capture How elites thinking about security and economics would describe The nature of these historical disputes. So we gave them four options That it could be a source of diplomatic conflict, but not military The green line that it could be a source of military conflict Yellow, it just doesn't apply and then red. It's a political nuisance, but it's not going to be diplomatic or military Now india stands out here because I think for the indian experts its own neighborhood, especially pakistan drove the answer Most countries the the leading answer was that these History disputes disputes over how you interpret history would be a source of diplomatic but not military conflict Both the japanese and korean experts Felt that China stands out a bit though Chinese experts were more evenly divided with a significant number Thinking that it could be a source of of military Conflicts. So I wanted victor to try to unbundle this one for us Well in the case of korea quite obviously, you know, it's all about japan Korea was one of the few countries. It's not the only country in the survey That rated historical obstacles His history is an obstacle to east asian community higher than uncertainty about arising china And and and very clearly They see Lots of concerns with japan. What is interesting however, and I don't know if we're We're not at the next slide yet But what's interesting however is when we when we look at Can we go to the next will you can go to the next one? It's um How concerned are you about the following challenges? What's interesting is if you so korea obviously the historical issues are about japan But when you look at this slide and you look at japan and korea side by side If you look at almost all of these other issues climate change nuclear proliferation terrorism You go down the list with the exception of natural disasters korea and japan are almost equivalent in terms of their concerns about all of these issues They nearly they nearly mirror each other So I think that is really the picture of japan career relations. There's a really difficult problem with regard to history thankfully Both koreans and japanese don't see that as a source of military conflict largely as a source of diplomatic conflict But at the same time across the broad range of issues Japanese and koreans share very similar views. They have a very very strong overlap of interest on a lot of practical issues Mike just to add on southeast asia You know history is not Not a major concern. You can see on the from the first slide Political nuisance, but not likely a cause of conflict I think that's important because This in response to prime minister abe's speech at the shangra la About japan wanting to or being willing to support The modernization and capacity building and militaries around the region and southeast asia The southeast asians don't carry a lot of baggage From world war two on that and then they're very I think very open to it. They want to be careful Not to send the wrong signals and provoke china, but I think they're willing to take up that japanese offer I'm glad you mentioned that we if you sort of compare this with public opinion polling about japan in asia You know in south and southeast asia japan gets over well over 90 positive ratings On the other hand, we didn't ask the exact same question that we did last time But the overall unease about japan is also a little higher this time So it's it cuts it cuts both ways, but the shangra la Presentation by prime minister abe was was well received with one very important exception As those who were there know If the the other thing worth mentioning on on this chart the chart on the screen right now Is if you look at the country the country that feels it doesn't apply to them the most Is the united states? And and that could be a reading a Literal reading of the question in the sense that americans don't feel that They have a lot of historical issues with the countries in the region or it could be read as They're just not interested one or the other Although a literal reading of the question would lead you to believe they're responding to The notion that there aren't a lot of historic issues between the united states and the countries in the region Or it's just a message to everybody. We're tired of this issue. Yeah, we don't care I'm going to combine the next two before I turn to the panel, but let me uh turn to finding six We asked You know we asked earlier. What are the obstacles to community building? This is a slightly different question What worries you the most? um Number one across the region Economic and financial crises i'll turn to matt in a second on that um Number two across the region territory and history climate change um Still uh still pretty high Um except in the u.s But in certain parts of asia, it's it's a concern a security concern. That's that's quite high Um north korea, excuse me south korea sort of stood and japan out from the rest of the region in their concern about north korea Um, so it's a bit of a mishmash. I mean what people are really worried about varies Uh across the region. Um, but that but the financial crises that's pretty much common across the region, especially in developing parts of asia Um and the territorial uh and history disputes um turning to finding uh seven um Since economic crises and economic concerns were paramount um In terms of challenges, I think it's important to look at how Experts view the future of economic frameworks in this region Um, the next slide if you could will we gave them a lot of options. This isn't all of them. Um And asking them how important is the success of each of these following economic frameworks to your country's future um If you look, um at the ranking across the region um You'll find that trans-pacific Formulas are really quite the dominant um apek Um, you know a few years ago people were writing off apek if you'll recall the debate um It was matthew goodman because the response now that he's out of government about apek is much higher than when he was working on it But that could also be a sort of lag time effective is good work Um g20 Quite a strong support for g20. Um, the ozzyne economic community is high because for ozzyne members. It's very high But then the next one is tpp. So You know at one point and still there's been debate, you know, are we looking to decoupling where we're going to have rsep, which is listed Sixth year or fifth rsep versus tpp some sort of division Um, it doesn't come out in the expert surveys. Um, there's a pretty heavy weighting it seems Towards an architecture that's trans-pacific and inclusive of course We have to get tpp right and a few other things, but this I think is generally encouraging news for the u.s let me ask matt to to To sort of deal with both of these economic crisis concern and the and the Framework that people see as most important for their country's future Sure. Well, I mean, I think this is this chart is encouraging if it really reflects broader elite opinion including among, you know official policy makers in the region as mike said it it shows that there is interest in support for these broader These broader trans-pacific and even global institutions I'm obviously i'm particularly Overjoyed to see apex score so highly since I usually call it the rodney danger field of us foreign policy Because it doesn't get enough respect but it shows that people think it is a useful part of the architecture At least this this group as surveyed And you know even china admittedly they're hosting apex this year So that may bump those scores up a little bit, but china seems to appreciate these these institutions And so I think that's all positive and I think it does reflect more broadly that When we say that there are these schisms between people interested in one track or another track I think we have to be careful about that because that may not be so much about The substance of these Undertakings in other words whether tpp or arsep is really the the better approach to To regional economic integration, but more about kind of who's sitting in the big chair with the microphone and the gavel So I think This may reflect hopefully the the real story about the substance on the previous slide I think probably particularly because of the and murray might want to comment on this the the the the scoring in the southeast asian countries On regional economic and financial crises, you know, I assume this is a legacy of the 1997 A crisis financial crisis in asia and of course the more recent crisis And then just generally, you know, it's the economy stupid I think that's what people really policy makers are worried about as short-term challenges More broadly. So that's that's probably why it scores. So hi Ernie or murray Thanks, I think you're absolutely right mike that the 97 financial crisis still weighs heavily on people's minds I'll also want to just talk a little bit about the the tpp and how southeast asians respond to it because I think that's the next slide, right? It's in the trans-specific partnership The average score was 75 The what's interesting singapore, which is a member of the tpp Scored at very high at 82 Thailand, which is not a member and pre coup government had The the administration had looked at trying to join tpp in the second tranche in indonesia However is only at at 43 Indonesia if you follow it has been introducing some fairly Nationalistic protectionist measures over the last couple of years. They think their time has come They need to keep what's in indonesia for the indonesians and So they they rank it The the tpp very low. However in the regional comprehensive partnership What's interesting the score is almost the same on the in the regional average But indonesia, which only gave 43 percent Rating to the tpp gives the arsep 74 percent and thailand Is roughly in the same place it was on the tpp at 75 percent and singapore also at at 83 percent Which is roughly the same so there's there's a Outside of indonesia there is a broad consensus that the economic architecture the trade architecture It's being hammered out is is worthy of support I mean the the point here mike is that um, you know I just want to make this again because I think we sort of miss this in our trade or economic policy Asia doesn't see an integrated asian in a future of Asian economic integration that excludes china It's not going to happen and I think we have to get our heads around that And and I know china is open or are eligible and invited to join the tpp if they want to But um, I think we really have to reconceptualize, you know, what do we do next beyond the tpp? To have a a comprehensive strategy the other thing that Is I think just screams out from this chart is that for a lot of asia Economics is the foundation of security And so these things are these are very tightly linked In the minds of our our partners in the region I would just add quickly that if you look at taiwan it wants to be in everything it can maybe this is the point You're about to make money Obviously it can't be in the asian economic community, but taiwan one's in right I was just going to make the point that taiwan clearly wants to be included in something It is excluded from all of these these multilateral organizations But it's really notable that 100 percent support tpp support arsep taiwan just clearly wants to be included Two more if you'll bear with me Finding eight we've found robust support for regional In the region for democratic values Except in the u.s. Where the support declined considerably since our last survey we we asked Last time For our respondents to rank The priorities for creation of an east asia community over the course of 10 years Next slide. Well, this is the current one, but it was the same questions And not surprisingly the top priorities were establishing a framework for trade and regional economic integration And then confidence building preventing conflict Last time 2009 it jumped out at us that the next priorities were all About good governance human rights free and fair elections rule of law And so one of the headlines for us last time it really was quite striking was how much in asia With the exception of china, but even in china about half the respondents were Were supportive and of course you have to allow for interpretation of what these terms mean in each country, but there was quite robust support for An east asian norm or set of norms around these these issues with the important caveat that china, indonesia, india You know non-aligned post-colonial and other states Said non-interference and internal affairs is also important This time the the broad support went up a bit But The next slide will but among americans had dropped among the american experts I've sort of pondered what this means seems to me that With the with the question of tactics on how you improve good governance democracy and women's empowerment aside And that's a big question. This is a region that generally is you know quite different from the middle east Um, and that this ought to be part of the american playbook and yet american experts have lost a little of their Shine about these things. It could be because of our own experience as americans with the middle east Which has been pretty darn disappointing over the last decade Could be that it's um as the washington post suggested in an article today It just isn't part of the narrative from the president as much as in the past could be a post rock hangover. Who knows does strike me as a Something of a lost opportunity for americans to think about How this this region unlike say the middle east which we think about a lot generally is a good story On on on democracy good governance and over half of the respondents everywhere supported Including these in east asia community building in our regional dialogue I'm gonna then if I if I uh Ernie you wanted to say something this I would just say, you know, there's been some I think Sort of very superficial analysis of late On you know, suggesting that asia is going backwards on democratic values And human rights and and you know, they're pointing at things like the coup in thailand and You know, there are things to point at that would suggest A challenge to that but I I see something completely different particularly in southeast asia What I see is an assertion of growing and empowered and connected middle class That really is um pushing the envelope pushing for the development of institutions and they are they are asking for more participation better governance and so I see I see the you know, sort of an uptick on The democracy human rights governance interest there will be interesting to see How, you know, some of the current Political situations work out, but I suspect for instance in a place like thailand that Both polls, you know, there's very partisan Or or polar Approach in thailand right now. I suspect what we'll see I don't know over what period of time, you know between two and ten years The rise of a moderate middle and I think we're gonna see that we see that happen in indonesia And I wonder, you know, whether that's not going to be a trend that impacts Places like china in the future So I think this is something I didn't find it a very interesting finding and one that we should really think about strategically Over half of the american respondents said these were important issues, but on women's empowerment and human rights Americans will ask below china And koreans were pretty low on on women's empowerment on other democratic norms. They were quite high. So it's it's you know, it's It's thought-provoking I'm still trying to make sense of it, but something especially for americans to ponder last but not least we asked about taiwan You can just put the slide up and I'll let bonnie explain this one If taiwan were reunified with china through coercive means what would be the impact on your country's interests? Clearly, we did not simply ask the question if it were peacefully unified and we might have gotten very different questions Excuse me very different answers But this to me is very significant 99 percent in the u.s 98 percent in japan concerned a negative impact on our country's interests even more than in taiwan Which is 89 percent and significantly high level of concern in in korea and india and in Singapore notably even in china 43 percent Think that it would have a negative impact as opposed to 40 that would think that there would be a positive impact Now to me this reckoning this reflects At least among the strategic elites in china that they need to pursue peaceful development Strategy to win over the hearts and minds in in taiwan that using coercive Measures would probably read down negatively To chinese interests Now we don't have of course any data for comparison because we didn't ask this in 2009 But my guess is that these Response rates for a very negative impact are higher Than they would have been In in in the past and I think that there was a time that maybe some countries in the region might have seen Chinese coercion against taiwan as a special case that would not necessarily mean that china might use force or coercive measures Against for example, philippines vietnam other countries in southeast asia But I think that that view has really changed I think that's one of the things things we are seeing in this Slide that there's greater concern that if the mainland does use Coercive measures against taiwan that this is going to be even more of a Signal and evidence that of china's willingness to use coercion against some of its other neighbors Very quickly on this I would add to bonning's already excellent analysis that I think to me what was striking about this was it was also saying a lot about How everyone in the region valid us credibility because if you read the question the way it's written It's presuming essentially that there's a course of reunification in which the united states Either became militarily involved and failed or did not stop and for that reason I think it is sort of it is also sort of Prism through which issues of us credibility are affected So there's more actually in the packet and on our website Again, we we listed these nine findings as Things that in our discussions we thought stood out But the main Advantage of this kind of survey we find is makes you think makes you think comparatively across countries and makes you think about regional dynamics Makes you think about expectations and Again, we want to thank Ernie picopolis from Penny dynamics and mccarthur for helping us pay for this and all my colleagues and and their Research fellows and staff and let me now turn it over to you for questions comments And we can always bring back up a slide if you'd like captain nelson Thanks very much chris nelson nelson report a great discussion I have to give a paper all this in berlin in about two weeks So i'm going to cheerfully plagiarize a hell of a lot of what you were talking about A point that you made that really strikes home is The difference between management and and and solution or solving You know, we're all have a tendency to be liberal internationalist small l And you know liberals kind of always believe that we can we can really fix this we can fix whatever it is That's what we do And maybe not some of these things especially in history especially on territory without taking sides So so this is my question in your poll. Did you get a sense that Once you get outside of china that even though the primacy of the China economic relationship is what it is That asians want to see a more robust american Military or strategic response to china's behavior And if so what what are they talking about does it bother them? They don't see the seventh fleet steaming through this garbo shoals You know, is that the kind of lesson they think they're drawing from quotes our failure quotes in syria and ukraine Even though they're you know, they're so different. You don't see how they do it But that keeps coming up in the commentary Do asians seem to want to see a more robust american Strategic slash military response to the chinese activities. Thank you Let me do a first quick stop at this. We didn't ask that question specifically Um, let me also add we didn't include because we didn't have enough money Uh, philippines vietnam mongolia where we would have gotten even more reinforcing of this Um, we want more of the american presence. We're worried. On the other hand, we didn't include russia Which frankly right now would Turn to the other direction. I think it's safe to say In terms of the specific military role, I can tell you It varies from country to country I mean in northeast asia japan and korea want us to be very visible very present vis-a-vis north korea japanis want us to be very visible and present vis-a-vis china south koreans not quite as much So it's going to vary from country to country. We won't have time to go through all of it But the bottom line that comes out pretty clearly in this is that everybody wants more of us economically and insecurity And although the chinese respondents don't want more of us In security, they clearly want more of us economically as you saw in the question about economic partnership. Anybody can't do everybody Well, I'll just say, you know, I mean we did have the question Is the rebalance too confrontational to china and that doesn't necessarily mean strategic military But when I read the question, I think more of that than economic issues And you know three countries in particular india japan and the united states all viewed They sort of voted that no indeed it was not too confrontational towards china Which you could read is saying they wish it were more so and I think you know with india like we look at We look at the the issues of confrontation that china's had on its borders To the east and the ocean but but actually, you know last year there was this issue in in in india Northern india where chinese troops had crossed the border and camped out for a couple of weeks And you know india didn't have very many tools to deal with that and we weren't really in a position that I know For the united states to intervene there. So, uh, you know issues like that, you know, I think kind of India may actually want a little bit of a ratchet up in confrontation So answered a strong no, we don't think the rebalance is too confrontational So if you read in the opposite, they might they might appreciate for southeast asia chris I think you get Sort of the opposite view that that actually, you know us economic engagement a political foundation for American engagement being built in the united states These are what they want to see to repel Or or moderate a giant what they see is an increasingly aggressive chinese approach to their to their sovereignty And and the territorial disputes so they don't the southeast asians don't want to see You know sort of guns And boots But they china is pushing them in some places like The philippines to to be more open to that But what this is what I say I keep saying Economics is the foundation of security for the southeast asians It's also a good reason why southeast the southeast asia that a zion core is a very it's a really intuitive core or fulcrum for regional Regional strategy security strategy. It doesn't replace Alliances, but it it actually is a place where you can meet and and shape How the chinese might behave over time? Thanks Um, I'm going to try to be juice. Yes, michael I want to raise two two issues one is building on what Mr. Barr said It seems that We should really think in terms of the Sort of liberal internationalist approach in a rather different way in the sense that The emphasis in in that approach is on obviously trade and economics and so on and they see that values go out of that But I think what the lesson is from what I've been hearing and what I've felt for a long time is that for I would say all the asian government The question of economics is central to the security of their governments internally And it came out. I think very much in Sino-Japanese relations both sides Recognize that the economic interdependence acted as a kind of restraint as to how far they would go And so in that sense, we have to think of economic relationships and interdependence Much more in terms of the significance it plays in domestic politics It's not just a question of of values and so on The second point I'd like to raise it seems to me that One of the things that comes out, perhaps not fully is that they Chinese experts seem to be a little bit behind their government For example, if you think of the recent major statements of seating thing about foreign policy It's very much asia-centered with china in the middle as it were and a very clear attempt to exclude the united states From the various frameworks he's thinking about But it seems from what from what your surveys suggest Is that the chinese experts Still want to hold on to the relationship with the united states in a very significant and comprehensive way Those are excellent points. Thank you, michael I think you're right about the the primacy of economics to security Particularly for developing countries but across the region. It was striking That over 40 percent of chinese experts thought historical issues could lead to military conflict So there's a there's an anxiety about this that's quite high But your point I think is right. Let me ask chris and maybe bonnie if they want on this question of Of whether the chinese respondents are a bit behind the elite one thing we couldn't objectively measure we can we can Venture some opinions about is how well these reflect government positions and it may be in china less so Than in the u.s. Australia japan or korea I mean, I think there's just based on my recent trips there There is some sense that they're not fully on board with the new approach That the administration has been taking they see it as dangerous possibly counter certainly counterproductive possibly dangerous And something that is not necessarily in china's long-term strategic interest I also think that it does reflect the point i made earlier though that because they're not sure yet how to conduct themselves as an immature International global power There's a sort of clinging for what they know which is the u.s. Dominance I really think that and that comes out especially strongly among america hands inside china So I think there might be a little bit of respondent bias in those numbers, but that's just my own thought I should add we tried very carefully when we made this list to not just the america ask the america hands We we we tried to get a broader representation But there is an ambivalence among the chinese experts that comes out in this about chinese power And just one other point where bonny jumps in I coming back to the economics piece It is about economics is security and economics is also stability I mean, I think one of the key points coming out of the u.s. China thing Numbers in this is that it is indeed another indicator of how the economic relationship plays such an important role as a Stabilizer and shock absorber in the bilateral relationship I was just at the shangra law dialogue in singapore and many of the officials and experts They are cautioned that seijin ping's proposal Of asia for asians is not necessarily aimed at excluding the united states and there seems to be An effort to try and balance this view perhaps china just doesn't want to Be seen as pushing out the united states or taking on a bigger role prematurely But I think that they do understand that the rest of the region certainly doesn't want to see the u.s Pushed out so maybe we should stay tuned for some clarification on that And just to add one point again from some of my discussions at the shangra law dialogue in response to chris nelson's question I think that there are great differences perhaps among the southeast asian nations about us military presence But I would draw a distinction between a strong desire for quiet persistent presence As compared to what some countries are worried about a more Confrontational presence because they really don't want to see Real confrontation and friction between the us and china But continued us presence Particularly freedom of navigation operations in the south china sea. I think we see very warm support Yeah, microphone. Thanks. Yeah Gil rosman victor you talked about the Schizophrenia in korea. I wonder if you look at the overall results of japan in korea on these nine questions and Subquestions whether you see japan and korea drifting further apart as in their views of cjk Or you see some signs that just they because they have so much in common They can overcome the aspects of difference um, I think on um And my colleagues can May have a better recollection when I think about the the pair in terms of their responses to the questions the biggest gap Was on the one of the slides we put up Which was who do you see as your important economic partner in the future? That was where the biggest gap was where greens were you know 86 china and japan is like 70 some 70 something percent us But aside from that on most of the other questions in terms of how they saw Sort of the key issues for their national security and how they saw the economic institutions and the regional institutions There's a there's a lot of symmetry Between um between the respondents in in um in korea and japan And then of course it's the history issue in which we see the biggest gap and I think that um While I don't want to say that that's what I expected to see because then it sounds like our surveys weren't that helpful It was I what it did do was it validated for me for me my own assumptions, which were that Yes, you know, there are these very difficult history issues, but from sort of a real politic level There is such a strong overlap between these two countries for policy makers The question is you know Can you still continue to forge pragmatic cooperation? In spite of these history issues, which I don't think anybody believes are going to go away They're not going to go away. You just try to cope try to get through them each time they come up so So in that sense, I thought the the findings of the survey really provided some good empirical evidence For some of the assumptions that I held as a researcher of these relationships. So so Yes, um, thank you for your research and uh As I am interested in the tighter order and power in asia I would be interested in your view One of the panelists about the Chinese claim you shape in the whole China South China sea and easy as a vietnam call with that and as opposed to the Books published by the chinese government by 2019 12 That the border of china is only To the high non island. So that one is the most far south of china So a hundred years after they claim The sea territory or the whole part of that region and another question is that We all recognize the rising power of china and it is a legitimate Uh desire for china to be a big power as a major nation in asia But how would the people in asia think or particularly the chinese people think about The leadership statement about the rising Power in china in a peaceful way as opposed to their actions Over the last few years with japan with the philippine and now with vietnam. Thank you So nick remind me we we got the survey was Sorry, could you identify yourself, sir? I'm sorry, you would would you tell us who you are and who you're with Yes, uh, my name is high jing and I am with the Private consulting firm htkh international. Thank you. So nick Remind me, but we we Had about a two three week period to do the surveys. We didn't want too much time Because then you have people responding to different events, but all the results were in before This, um, uh, chinese Oil ring went out. So, um I suspect based on the atmosphere in changra law and other things We might have had some even more pronounced responses To china's power and uncertainty, but I don't know if I don't know if chris or murray want to weigh in on the specific issue I'm ben self. I'm adjunct fellow here and at gw Um, I have a question about figure 10 For for mic and for rick. Um, I just quickly tried to figure out an average level Of a threat perception in each country. It's rather an average across on the issue Versions if you kind of figured an average up and down vertically to see how nervous these countries are about their security Clearly australia and the united states stand out As very unconcerned. They're basically all green India stands out as the most threatened And so rick i'm curious why india has such a high level of threat at averaging over seven In terms of how serious these issues are but mic. I wanted to ask you Japan is under average 6.1 6.2 Below the the overall average slightly Given recently japanese have become much more concerned about their security environment and you've written eloquently about this What would you say? Explains this sort of lower level than average sense of threat perception by the japanese compared with Their neighbors in the region not, you know, necessarily with the us or australia I have to think about that so you can go first rick Yeah Well, I think you know luckily it breaks it down. So it's the the answers, you know, I mean clearly terrorism I mean there's no question about what the single biggest threat that they've got from an externality. It happens Relatively frequently at a low level and occasionally you've got a mumbai or a parliament attack that so So that one on climate change, you know, that one's a little tricky, right? I mean because you think india Many in india say that well, you know America polluted heavily during its phase of economic growth. We're entering that phase right now We should be given a little bit of leeway But I think with climate change, you know What they may be specifically referring to is the fact that about 50 percent of india's working population is still in basic Agriculture and a good monsoon a bad monsoon things like that is the single biggest impact on the majority of workers lives And so when you think about what impact that would then have on domestic politics, you know When do things really destabilize? Suddenly, you know 50 percent of the people just don't know if they're going to be able to grow in your corn the next year Um, you know, human security needs food water security is I think relatively obvious Lack of natural resources. So nothing. I think that other than the climate change that might be one where You know, I think people would be a little bit surprised that they weigh that so heavily But but I think that probably, huh the tsunami. Yeah, I mean they've got real issues that that pop up I think japan. I think matt was if I understood is Just just tickling just now. I think one reason japan is lost if you look at the bottom Internal ethnic conflict is nowhere on the map. So, you know, that I knew threat from Hokkaido Not a major concern So japan Yes, so, um, yeah, I don't know about gaijin scholars living in tokyo. That's another problem So, um, you know, that probably brings japan down a bit But when it comes to the territorial disputes japan's right up there with korea china and the others um, japan's very low on climate change Uh, actually, which is interesting for a country that was really after all the kyoto protocols were in kyoto quite low I think that accurately reflects the mood in japan right now um post 311 And uh, and frankly out of sync with where washington is when it comes to things like coal And other things matt is did I get your gesture right? Yeah Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you for putting together this This survey. Um, I just I know who you are But would you mind identifying yourself? I should have asked others. My name is shui yuan shui. I work in the chinese embassy Uh, I mean, thank you for putting this Together this survey. I find Many findings are very interesting. Um, before I raise a question. I just want to add two facts on a comment Made by the so-called uh, china-centered Speech by president shijin ping one is Uh, fact is china was the first nation that made the public statement that china welcome The united states to participate. Yes. The second fact is That the platform or where President shijin ping made that Speech considered by some That he means meant china-centered It was not a Group that is exclusive actually many countries including the united states at least is one of the Observers and my question is I I find the very uh in If you look at the figure three and the big seven of this survey You will find in figure three that most of the countries In asia consider China Will be their most important economic partner 10 years from now and in figure seven that most of the countries in asia welcomes the um policy of re rebalance policy of the united states, but they think There is something in Sufficient resource and implementation. I don't know whether this survey also covers The details of what are insufficient sufficient there By the rebalance policy or what do you think? What is insufficient there? Thank you Thank you, and I would note that I think with the exception of the question what future order do you prefer where Only about 10 of the chinese respondents said they wanted a us led order with exception of that There's clear ambivalence about american Uh leadership in the regional order with the exception of that you get a strong sense that chinese experts are welcome If I can say at cohabitation in asia with the united states It doesn't come out in our results that there's a there's a Anything like a consensus or even a strong minority view that china somehow has to push the us out of asia That does come through chris. Do you want to weigh on on this? Well, I just I think we've been tied the theme that's been running through our all of our comments today Is is what's uh missing from the rebalance if you will right and I think it's the trade stuff that only referred to earlier It's the sort of questioning about You know now that we have the policy. What's the next step? You know, we've talked a lot I think among us on the panel about next steps in these various areas And so I think that's reflective. I also think that it's uh reflective of the fact that as you were saying earlier Mike, there's just more demand across the board for the us present If you look at the um the councillor straight pointed out figure seven, which is this box and you know You know, you you'll find that the blue dots in the lower right the countries that expressed were experts expressed the most concern are all TPP partners us allies or countries that in the survey expressed the most concern about china's rise um, so I think that Begins to answer the question about sufficiency of resources. Thailand is a complete Anomaly in every one of these questions. We only have about one minute left, but I wonder if we could conclude Maybe by putting the spotlight on Ernie and murray to explain This by the way was true last time too. The the thai responses were really out of um out of staff with um with the rest of the region They're just a unique independent minded people. I suppose but very different answers to these questions than other us allies Or I think you've answered the question No, I think look, I think a lot of this has to do with with thailand's own feeling of Sort of disappointment in the in what they assumed was a very strong and vibrant us relationship The thais really don't forget When you're inconsistent with them And I hate to generalize like that, but it's true They they really do carry around a very strong feelings as a country over The u.s. Response to the financial crisis, which they felt was very antiseptic And um, and then you can't win after that because thailand began to polarize And our response to the coup in in 2006 Really alienated At least half the ties, okay, you know, so And I think that's a problem. The other problem is that they are some I think murray explained this earlier These guys are really focused on themselves right now. Um and Existential, you know once in a hundred year sort of reordering of power That's underway in thailand and that's what they're focused on. So I'm not surprised thailand had some anomalous Responses I I think if we do this survey and you know after things settle, which I can't tell you what the x is That thailand will be closer to a blueberry than Whatever that yellow thing is up there right now So, let me thank my colleagues. It's been great Great fun drawing on everyone's expertise in designing and interpreting this. Thank you for your comments I we would certainly welcome written comments if you want to send them in Um, we may post some of it on our if you're interested on our blog site cojonesia, but thank you all very much for coming today