 Okay, good afternoon and good afternoon and welcome to Vermont House Judiciary Committee. And we're starting our consideration of S184 and actually relating to defense of others and justifiable homicide. And we are joined by Senator Joe Benning. Welcome. Good afternoon, Madam Chair, members of the committee. The proper identification state Senator Joe Benning from Caledonia County. I have introduced S184 as a result of a correction that we all had made last session to a bill modifying justifiable homicide. The intent was there and correct. The tweak that we made left some cloud, I guess I'll call it over whether or not an individual acting on behalf of another who was under threat of lethal force could actually move to protect that individual if the person moving to protect that individual was not under the same threat of lethal force. That's a common law doctor that goes back centuries. You have the ability to act on behalf of another who was currently under threat of lethal force. The way that we had corrected things sort of muddied that up and there were questions that came about. So I brought this extremely short bill which merely attempts to correct that. And if you remember, there was a concern enough about it that both the chair of this committee as well as the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee joined in a letter to the governor to explain what was not intended. And this bill seeks to modify that to make it the correct version of what we actually had intended. And that's really all that I can say about it. I do know that there are folks who look at justifiable homicide and see that there is archaic language in there and wanna bring other tweaks to it. I tend to agree that there is a more in-depth conversation to have about that. But at this point, I managed to get a quorum of the Senate on to this bill and I would hesitate to have it mucked up in any way. We'd be happy to answer any questions. Thank you. Thank you very much. Any questions? I'm not seeing any. So good to see you and thank you for your flexibility this afternoon. I appreciate it. Thank you guys. We'll see you. Yeah, take care. Bye. Eric, good afternoon. Hi, good afternoon, everybody. Good afternoon. So you could have a walkthrough. I guess a walkthrough is appropriate. But next, just again, you could reiterate what Senator Benning said and help us understand what this bill does and does not do. Yes, I'd be happy to. This is Eric. It's Patrick with the Office of Legislative Council. Here to talk to the committee about Senate Bill number 184, which has come over from the Senate. It's an act relating to defense of others and justifiable homicide. It's actually very, although it's short, it's also very important language-wise to sort of see what's going on here and why this particular language was chosen. And that's gonna require me to share the screen if that's okay, Representative Grad. Sure, thank you. Yeah, so what I'm gonna do is we're gonna look at a couple of different documents really quick and it should show everybody what it was that happened last year. And this involves last year's act number 127, which was the law enforcement use of force, standards for law enforcement use of force bill that I know this committee spent a lot of time with. And there's a lot in that bill, all sorts of things about choke holds, law enforcement use of force, that sort of thing, none of which is addressed by this bill. This only deals with one particular piece of that legislation that passed last year that has to do with justifiable homicide and self-defense and defense of others. And that section, which is comparably small part of that other lengthy bill, is the one in which there appears to be an ambiguity that was inadvertently created and that the S184 attempts to create. So having said that, just to point out to you what that ambiguity is, it's gonna be helpful for me to just point out what the statute was before you enacted 127 and what it was, how it was changed in Act 127. So those are the two things we're gonna look at really quick, shouldn't take long. But the, can everyone see my screen now? Yes. Okay. So this is the justifiable homicide statute that was on the books, say roughly two year and a half, two years ago. This was what the statute was before you enacted Act 27. And we're talking about, again, self-defense and defense of others, both of which have been on the books for a long time have been part of the common law for centuries, the ability to raise when another person has been killed to raise as a defense that the killing was lawful either because you were defending yourself or you were defending someone else. And we're gonna focus in this case on subdivision two here, but you'll see that the language provided that if a person kills or ruins another person then they shall be guiltless. And that is under subdivision two. If the act was committed in the suppression of a person attempting to commit murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, burglary or robbery with force or violence. So in other words, if the actor either use force or kills or wounds, as you see in the introductory language, if you've killed or wound another person while you are attempting to stop that person from committing one of those enumerated offenses, then you're not guilty. You can't be charged with the killing or the harm that you've caused because the theory is that you're trying to prevent the harm of one of these offenses. But you'll see the way the language is phrased there in subdivision two. It's phrased as in the suppression of a person attempting to commit one of those offenses. It doesn't say they have to be committing the offense against you, the actor. They're just trying to commit the offense. So that brings in the concept of it could be against you in which case it would be self-defense, but it could be they were trying to commit that offense against somebody else, in which case it would be defense of others. Either way, if you're attempting to stop that person from committing that crime, then you can't be charged. So it could be self-defense, could be defense of others. So this was the statute that was on the books prior to act 27 of last year. So then last year you passed act 27 and that modified that statute. As you see now, section four of the bill, I'm sorry, of the act last year, provided an amendment to subdivision two that we were just looking at. And that enacted, I'm just trying to get all of subdivision two on the screen at once there. And you see the way it's sprained there that it takes a common law principle and codifies. And that's this sort of expands on the notion of the defense. And it provides that if the person reasonably believed that he or she was an imminent peril and that it was necessary to repel that peril with deadly force. Now that's part of the common law that has developed around this defense. So that's reiterating that. But you notice the way it's phrased if the person reasonably believed that he or she was an imminent peril and that it was necessary to repel that peril with deadly force. See, it's, I think inadvertently potentially excludes the situation where the person believes that someone else is in the imminent peril from one of those crimes. Remember the way that it was phrased and the way this defense has always worked, it can be not only self-defense, it could be defense of others, which would also operate as a defense as an excuse for the conduct. So what happened, I think Senator Benning alluded to this already was that in response to this language at the very end of the session, last year, the very end, the last few days of the session, the governor sent a letter indicating some concern about the language that limits this defense to a situation where he or she, in other words, the actor was an imminent peril as opposed to other people. And in response to that letter, the chair, chair grad and chair Sears sent a letter back to the governor saying, well, just clarifying that that wasn't the intent. The intent of this new language that you see in front of you was not to eliminate that common law defense, defense of others. And so at least that letter was on the books for the time being, but the idea of S184, which you have in front of you now is to clarify that. So that, well, you have a letter on the books indicating, well, that wasn't legislative intent. That's obviously to a court that was reviewing the statute. Now, as it exists now, wouldn't necessarily see that letter. And the idea is to change the ambiguity, potential ambiguity in the language, so that you don't have it on its face. So that, regardless of what other sources might be used to indicate what legislative intent was, the language itself would be clear. And that's the idea is to clarify that point in S184, which I will now pull up. So you see, now go to subdivision two, which is just where, this is the third version of this we're looking at. So this is the proposal in S184. You see the he or she is struck. So it's clarifying here that it's not just gonna be if the person reasonably believed that doesn't say he or she anymore, it's the one in imminent peril, if the person reasonably believed that the person, in other words, the person themselves or any other person was in imminent peril. And it was necessary to repel that peril with deadly force and the violent suppression of et cetera, et cetera. So that's exactly the same as it was. But it changes it to clarify that it's not just the actor who might be in imminent peril. It's another person who could be in imminent peril as well. And that on behalf of that person, as long as it's the other criteria are satisfied that it's necessary to repel that peril-deadered force and, you know, when one of those listed offenses is being committed, then the defense would apply. So that's the proposed clarification to get rid of the ambiguity that may have been created by Act 27 of last year. So that's what's done in section two. You'll see also, now that was the bill was introduced. And in addition, while the bill was in committee, there was a change made in subdivision one above that. You'll see that there's another change there. And that's another way in which self-defense can be proven. In other words, it's not just subdivision two that we looked at, which is about defense when one of those listed offenses is being committed, but also subdivision one, when you're defending your own life or another person's life. So in that case, it's not just imminent peril, in other words, which subdivision two applies to, but it's actual a threat to a person's own life or someone else's life. In that case, you know, the existing language, and I don't know the history behind this, but the defense had been limited to either defending your own life or the life of your spouse, parent, child, sibling, guardian, or ward. Not sure the history behind that or why that was, but upon looking at that and certainly consistent with common law generally, the Senate decided, does it make sense that why is the defense of the other person's life limited to one of those particular relations and shouldn't it be defending your own life or the life of any other person? And so that's why you see that change in subdivision one. So those are the, and lastly, also added in committee with subsection B, this I think comes from the aggravated assault statute just to be clear that whatever other defenses a person may have under common law that they might also be able to raise that none of this language is intended to limit that, that all those defenses continue to be available and viable for the defendant as well. So that clarifying language was added also. And I think that's the upshot of the walkthrough. I can take the screen down now, that would be helpful. Sure, thank you. Yeah. Great, thank you, Eric. That's actually very helpful. Questions? Just a quick one, Eric. I noticed where they had military officers and or regular military in there today. What was the reason for them deleting that? I see they still have provost marshals and the assistant provost marshals under that bill. Just because it doesn't belong under state statute or military individuals? I'm not following that. Where is that exactly? Under the original, the first one you showed us. Oh, the original law. Way down to the bottom there. Oh yeah. I think that that is a, I don't know for sure, I didn't look into that piece of it. That was another piece that was done last year. It looks to me that looking at that change, it looks just like a modernization and updating of older language that may be outdated. Yeah, I don't question. I just wonder why it didn't appear in the new version. I like the new version, don't get me wrong, but I did see under Vermont statute that the provost marshals and the deputy provost marshals were included in the enforcement officers in the state of Vermont. Right, right. Yeah, that's a good question. I'm not sure, but it was Bryn who worked on this one last year. So I don't know for sure about that change, but I can follow up on that if that might be helpful. Yes, just curious, that's all. I don't have a problem with just curious. Oh, sure. So I have a question. So, to Bob, are you saying that 20 BSA, 2351A, and those are worth, okay, so those are still under the old common law, the original one that we changed under what was the bill number? Yeah. First of all, they put up the head military officers and regular officers, the regular military in the, and under this new one, they don't, tonight in one of those statutes would ever cover that, but I see in Vermont statutes where provost marshals and assistant provost marshals are covered in this particular law. Yeah. Okay, thank you. Martin, I don't know if you're answering that or not, but I'm gonna move it to the other side. Now I have a different question. Okay, keep going. Go ahead, Martin. Yeah, Eric, how does the court interpret, and I know this is current law, but I'm just curious, how does the court interpret necessary defense of the person's own life or what is the other part? I guess the question is the idea of, well, of the net set, yeah, I'm sorry, it was necessary to repel that peril with deadly force or necessary defense of the person's life. Well, how has the court interpreted that? I don't know if they answered that. That's a good question. Hadn't looked into that specific legal question, but I'd be happy to look at some of the case law and see what they might have said. Yeah, and I guess to be specific, I'm curious if, you know, there's the concept of, and I don't think our law says this at all, a stand your ground kind of law versus a duty to retreat. And it seems like which way that goes depends on how the court is defining necessary defense of the person's own life. I mean, I would certainly argue that that language suggests that if you don't need to use deadly force on somebody, in other words, you have an opportunity to retreat, then it's not necessary, but it would be interesting to understand how that's interpreted. Right, right, yeah, that's an interesting question. I'll take a look at some of the cases and see what, how that term has been interpreted. I appreciate it, thanks. Anybody else? So, sorry, I had to step out, but didn't we look at this last year or the year before or something like this? This is fairly new, right? We looked at it last year. Yeah, so Bob, I'm looking at these references here. I'm trying to find what you were referring to. I haven't found it yet, but. Do you still have that first version, Eric, on the common law that you can put back up on screen? Yeah, sure, yep, I can pull it right up. I think is that what you're looking at? Subdivision three there? Yes, subdivision three, exactly. Right. In case the civil officer, military officer, private soldier will likely call that to suppress a riot or rebellion. My question was, I see it's not in this bill and I'm assuming if they're called out to work under DOD and not state of law statutes, correct? We repealed that. Yeah, I think that's right. Well, we repealed that because maybe was it unconstitutional or was it anybody, remember why we repealed that? It was part of the supporters. The lawfully called us to suppress riot or rebellion or to prevent. We had a reason. I think it's because it was overly broad, I mean, to assistance serving legal process and suppressing opposition against him or her. I think there's a constitutionality. Is there a reason for that? Martin, do you remember it? No, that's right. That's right. It was way too broad. And if it was ever actually looked at by the court, which we didn't have any indication that it was, it would likely be struck down as unconstitutional. And I think we also just heard from so many witnesses that said like this is just a complete, you know, get out of jail free card basically that renders. Yeah, it was very counter to the use of force law that we put into place. I mean, it's kind of undermined that whole concept of the use of force law. I mean, it essentially says that for any purpose, essentially law enforcement could use force and that would be a violation of, it would be essentially a seizure, an unconstitutional seizure. Right, right. Now, I don't think there was any disagreement. I think DPS and everybody was on board that. That part should be on board with that. I think so, so, all right. I was just wondering why it wasn't there. Yeah, thank you. All the way to the bottom. Yeah, yeah. Good question. Good question. All right, anything. Okay, so we do have some more testimony. It'll be, we're still very brief on this tomorrow. But we'll finish it up tomorrow. So, great. All right. Well, thank you. Thank you, Eric. Okay, and so committee, just in terms of looking at our schedule, what we didn't get to today, S-130, I'm sorry, S-113 Medical Monitoring. We are hearing from Department of Financial Regulation, the Insurance Division, right at nine o'clock tomorrow. So that will be helpful, because I know that they did not testify in the Senate. So I'm glad that we'll be hearing from them in here. And I did just tell Chair Marquardt of Commerce that we aren't taking that testimony tomorrow in case he wanted to have anybody come in or whatever, just to give him a heads up. Because when we did this bill last time, it did go to Commerce. However, this is a very, very different situation this time around. And yeah, so we'll be able to also tomorrow morning we'll be able to hear from Marshall, Paul and Judge Zone on 224. So pretty much taking the afternoon testimony, tomorrow's afternoon testimony and fitting it into the morning. I think we will have the time because you're not gonna get back here tomorrow afternoon or Thursday afternoon from what I'm hearing. And yeah, yeah. And then so we'll see what happens with the Thursday afternoon testimony, but we can always do that Friday morning. We'll see how things are going with the budget and other things. And we are not meeting before the joint assembly on Thursday, so that give our members of Judicial Retention time to go over the report, whatever they need to do and not have to rush after having a long night. It's tomorrow and then a long day on Thursday. Yeah, Judicial Retention gets a special treatment. Do you want that? So let's.