 An introduction to the Speedy Trial Act. Welcome to the Speedy Trial Act pre-training program. This program is designed to give you an overview of how the Speedy Trial Act affects your docketing responsibilities in criminal cases. Notice that I've referred to this program as a pre-training program. That's because you'll receive comprehensive hands-on training in the areas covered here at a later date. That is, when you've attended classes at one of the federal courts, two automation training centers, the Automated Systems Training Center in San Antonio, Texas, or the Training and Support Center for Automated Systems in Phoenix, Arizona. So, this is a pre-training program. We'll prepare you for the training you'll receive later on by giving you the basics of the Speedy Trial Act and how the Act affects case docketing. The Speedy Trial Act is a statute passed by Congress in 1974. Its goal is to ensure that criminal cases are processed through the district courts promptly. In order to help achieve this goal, the federal courts have developed a new electronic docketing and case management system called ICMS Criminal. ICMS Criminal saves you time by maintaining case records, preparing docket sheets, and tracking deadlines for you electronically. In other words, ICMS Criminal provides you with an electronic docket sheet, and that allows you to provide judges, attorneys, and members of the public with case information more easily and more quickly than ever before. In order for you to use ICMS Criminal effectively, you'll have to learn the fundamentals of the Speedy Trial Act. That's because almost every step in the processing of a criminal case calls a section of the Speedy Trial Act into play. In fact, most of the case deadlines you'll be tracking in ICMS Criminal will be deadlines imposed by the Speedy Trial Act. That's why we'll focus on two main areas in this program. First, the basic requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, and second, how ICMS Criminal helps you keep track of those requirements. For convenience sake, we'll also refer to the Speedy Trial Act as the Act from now on, and we'll use a hypothetical criminal case to show you how the features of the Act affect your docketing responsibilities. The case, United States v. Smith & Jones, is a variation on a case used in another Federal Judicial Center program, how criminal cases move through the district courts. How criminal cases move through the district courts is program two of the center's five part video series introducing the federal courts. It illustrates the major steps in the criminal process by tracking a two-defendant drug case from arrest through sentencing and post-judgment proceedings. If you are not familiar with the major steps of the criminal process, we strongly recommend that you watch how criminal cases move through the district courts before watching this program. Let me mention another feature of this program before we start to examine the Act. This program comes with a set of written materials. These materials are an important part of your pre-training, so you should review them carefully. They include an outline of the program, a glossary of terms used in it, and three self-test exercises. Using the self-test, you can test your understanding of the information discussed in each segment of the program. You should have your outline with you when watching the program. The outline follows the program very closely. If you want to take notes, you can stop the tape and do so in the space provided in the outline. You can keep the outline of course and refer to it later to answer any questions you might have. Now we're ready to take a look at the basic structure and purpose of the Speedy Trial Act. As we've said, the Act seeks to ensure that criminal defendants receive Speedy Trials. It does this by limiting the length of time that can pass between significant events that occur in the processing of a criminal case. Speedy Trials of these events include the defendant's arrest, the defendant's first appearance in court, the return of an indictment, or the beginning of a trial. In ICMS criminal, the time interval between these events is referred to as a procedural interval. For example, the Act limits the amount of time that may pass between a defendant's arrest on a complaint and the return of an indictment against him. The time limit is 30 days. In this example, the procedural events involved are the arrest and the return of an indictment. The 30-day interval between these procedural events is called a procedural interval. The procedural intervals you'll be tracking in ICMS criminal are numbered and abbreviated for your convenience. For example, procedural interval 4, which we'll define in a minute, is referred to as P4. The procedural intervals used in ICMS criminal are P1, awaiting indictment, P2, awaiting trial, P4, trial, P5, awaiting sentence, P6, post-sentencing, P7, appeal, P8, probation violation, and P9, count disposed. There's also P0, the interval that applies before any significant procedural event occurs in a case, and PNT, or procedural non-trial interval, the period of time during which the defendant cannot be forced to stand trial. In case you're wondering, let me reassure you that we didn't skip over procedural interval 3 when listing the intervals just now. Of course, we didn't mention it either, and the reason we didn't is because procedural interval 3 is not used in ICMS criminal, so you don't have to worry about it. Now, let's take a closer look at the procedural intervals we've mentioned. We'll do so in the context of a hypothetical criminal case, United States versus Angela Smith and Michael Jones. Let's say that Robert Long, an agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration, has been investigating drug trafficking in the Centerville section of our city. Working undercover, Long approaches two people in a van parked in a known drug distribution area. Long asks them if they have cocaine for sale. The passenger says something to the driver and then gets out of the van. She negotiates an agreement with Long as they walk toward a clearing in the woods. In the clearing, Long buys 30 grams of crack cocaine, or cocaine base. After Long makes the purchase, he leaves the area where he bought the drugs. He then radios descriptions of Smith and Jones to a DEA arrest team waiting nearby. The arrest team moves in to arrest the suspects, but they escape from the scene before they can be detained. Long continues to work on the case, however. Convinced that he can identify both suspects if he sees them again, Long reviews DEA files containing mug shots of known drug offenders. He finds photographs of both suspects, Angela Smith and Michael Jones in the files. Working with the United States Attorney, Long prepares a complaint and affidavit charging both defendants with distribution of cocaine base and conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. The magistrate judge examines the complaints and the affidavits to see if they establish probable cause to believe Smith and Jones committed the charge defenses. After concluding there is probable cause, the magistrate judge signs the complaint. He also signs warrants for the arrest of Smith and Jones. As you know, many criminal cases begin as magistrate cases. For case docketing purposes, the phrase magistrate case refers to a case in which a criminal complaint has been filed, and the phrase criminal case refers to a case in which an indictment or information has been filed. Most misdemeanor cases and pre-indictment felony cases are assigned to magistrate judges. Once an indictment is returned, however, a felony case is assigned to a district court judge. One way a magistrate case can be opened is by the filing of a complaint signed by a magistrate judge against the defendant. So when a complaint signed against Smith and Jones is filed in the district court, a magistrate case with two defendants is opened in ICMS criminal. When the complaint is filed, ICMS criminal immediately places Smith and Jones in a procedural interval for speedy trial purposes. It places the complaint in P-0 for each defendant. Why? Because P-0 is the interval that occurs before the time limits imposed by the act begin. P-0 has no time limit. As a practical matter, it extends from the opening of the case, here by the filing of a criminal complaint to the first procedural event considered significant for speedy trial purposes, such as an arrest or service of a summons upon the defendants. So Smith and Jones will remain in P-0 until they are arrested. Smith is arrested one week later, in the same location where she sold the crack to Agent Brown. On the same day, Jones is arrested at his apartment. When the defendants are arrested, they move into P-1. At P-0, P-1 has a time limit. P-1 covers the time interval between the arrest of the defendants on a complaint and the filing of an indictment or information against them. Service of a summons ordering a defendant to respond to a complaint by appearing in court also moves a defendant into P-1. Interval P-1 is called a waiting indictment. The act limits P-1 to 30 days. That is, an indictment or information charging a defendant with a criminal offense must be filed within 30 days of either the date the defendant is arrested or the date the defendant is served with a summons. P-1 is often referred to as the 30-day clock. If an indictment is not returned against the defendant within P-1's 30-day limit, the case may be dismissed. And if the defendant is in custody when the case is dismissed, the defendant may be released. Let's say our co-defendants make their initial appearance in court the day after their arrest and an indictment is filed against them within a 30-day period. The indictment charges both defendants with two counts. Count P-1 charges them with distribution of cocaine base and Count P-2 charges them with conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. It's important to keep track of the individual counts in a defendant's case when using ICMS criminal. That's because ICMS criminal tracks time limits for procedural intervals on a per count basis for each defendant. The filing of the indictment moves the defendants from P-1 to P-2. P-2 Interval 2 covers the time interval between the filing of an indictment or information against a defendant who has had an initial court appearance and the start of a defendant's trial. P-2 is often called a waiting trial. The time limit for P-2 is 70 days. This time limit is also referred to as the 70-day clock. But what if, unlike the situation with Smith and Jones, an indictment is returned against a defendant before that defendant makes an appearance in court? Let's say, for example, that after her arrest Smith tells Brown the name of the chemist who's been providing her with the ingredient she used to make crack cocaine. The chemist's name is Marcus Mandello. The government then obtains an indictment against Mandello before he's arrested. The counts charged against Mandello remain in P-0 until his first appearance in court. Notice that after Mandello is arrested, his counts do not move to P-1. That's because P-1 covers the time during which the defendant is awaiting indictment and Mandello has already been indicted. Nor do Mandello's counts move into P-2 after his arrest. Even though Mandello's been indicted, his counts won't move into P-2 until his first court appearance. Why is that? Because under the act, both the filing of an indictment or information and an initial appearance in court are required before P-2's 70-day time limit is called into play. And P-2's 70-day time limit starts to run only after the latter of these two events. In other words, P-2 runs from the filing of the indictment or information or from the date of the defendant's first appearance, whichever event comes last, to the start of trial. If the defendant is not brought to trial within P-2's 70-day time limit, the case may be dismissed. Let's say this happens in Mandello's case. The dismissal is without prejudice, but remember, when a case is dismissed without prejudice, the government is allowed to re-indite the defendant. So Mandello is soon re-indicted. P-2 ends the date the defendant's trial starts. If the defendant has a jury trial, the trial is deemed to start when voir dire begins. If the defendant is tried by the court without a jury, the trial is deemed to start the day the case is called for trial, provided some step in the trial process occurs on that day. Of course, since P-2 covers the time interval during which the defendant is awaiting trial, P-2 will end if the defendant pleads guilty instead of going to trial. That's what happens in the case of defendant Angela Smith. She decides to plead guilty. But defendant Michael Jones doesn't want to plead guilty. Jones goes to trial, and his case is tried before a jury. Procedural interval four covers the period of time when the defendant is actually in trial. Unlike P-1 and P-2, P-4 has no time limit. It extends until the end of the defendant's trial. Let's assume that defendant Jones' trial ends with a verdict of guilty on all counts. This moves his counts to the next procedural interval, P-5. P-5 awaiting sentencing includes the time between a guilty verdict and the next significant procedural event in the case, sentencing of the defendant. As you know, the great majority of criminal defendants waive their right to a trial and plead guilty, like Angela Smith did. They simply admit committing one or more crimes, enter a plea of guilty, and get sentenced. So, you may be asking, where do their counts go after P-2? Well, that's a good question. And the answer is this. Since a defendant who enters a guilty plea must be sentenced, just like a defendant who was found guilty after trial, the counts a defendant pleads guilty to also enter P-5. The only difference is that unlike the case with a defendant who goes to trial, the counts involved in the guilty plea move directly from P-2 to P-5. In other words, since the defendant who pleads guilty never has a trial, that defendant's counts never enter P-4. So, when Angela Smith enters her guilty plea, the counts involved in the plea move from P-2 awaiting trial to P-5 awaiting sentencing. Jones's counts, however, went from P-2 to P-4 trial before entering P-5. As you can see, P-5 covers all defendants who have been found guilty of a crime, whether after a guilty plea or a jury trial, and who are awaiting sentencing. The Speedy Trial Act doesn't place any time limit on P-5, but most defendants are sentenced within 30 to 60 days after they are found guilty. The counts on which a defendant is sentenced move to Procedural Interval 6. P-6 is often referred to as the post-sentencing interval. This interval has no time limit. When a defendant is sentenced, the counts on which he is sentenced stay in P-6 unless he files an appeal or violates conditions of release. Jones decides to file an appeal. This moves his counts into Procedural Interval 7, the interval that applies when a case is on appeal. There's no time limit on P-7. It runs until the appeal is decided by the Court of Appeals. When the Court of Appeals decides the case, one of several things can happen. First, the Court of Appeals may affirm the conviction. If that happens, the defendant simply continues serving his sentence. In that event, the counts return to P-6. Second, the Court of Appeals may remand the case, that is, send the case back to the District Court for further proceedings. If the remand is for resentencing, the counts return to P-5. And that's because the defendant will again be awaiting sentencing. Third, the Court of Appeals may reverse the conviction and order a new trial. If that happens, the counts return to P-2. That's because they are again awaiting trial. Fourth, the Court of Appeals may overturn the conviction and order the District Court to dismiss the case. If that happens, the counts move to P-9, the interval that applies when counts are dismissed by the Court. Unfortunately for defendant Jones, the Court of Appeals affirms his conviction. We'll take a closer look at P-9 in a moment. But first, let's look at Procedural Interval 8. A count can move into P-8 only when a defendant on probation or supervised release is accused of violating a condition of release related to that count. Let's say that after serving his prison term, Jones is placed on supervised release. But he then tests positive for cocaine and is charged with violating a condition of his release. This moves Jones' counts into Procedural Interval 8. His counts will remain in P-8 until the Court holds a hearing and decides whether or not he actually violated his supervised release. If the Court rules Jones violated his supervised release, his counts will return to P-5, awaiting sentencing, for resentencing. If no violation is established, Jones' counts will return to P-6, post sentencing. We said earlier that one or more counts may move into Procedural Interval 9 when the Court of Appeals overturns a conviction and the District Court enters a dismissal order. That's one way a defendant's counts can get into P-9. But there are other ways, too. First, the counts may be dismissed with or without prejudice by the District Court. Second, the defendant may be found not guilty on some counts or all counts after trial. Third, the U.S. Attorney may agree to defer prosecution of the case. That is, agree to dismiss the counts pending against the defendant if he complies with certain conditions spelled out in a written agreement. In all three of these examples, the result is the same. Some or all of the counts against the defendant are disposed of or dismissed. So they move to P-9. As you can see, the Act seeks to ensure speedy trials for criminal defendants by imposing time limits on some of the procedural intervals we've discussed. Notice, however, that the time limits involved, the 30-day clock and the 70-day clock, are imposed on the government as well as the court. They require the government to obtain an indictment and prepare for trial without delay. But suppose the government acts very quickly in a given case. What if the government gets an indictment the week after the defendant first appears in court and asks for a trial the following week? Well, in that case, the Act protects the defendant's right to a fair trial by ensuring that the defendant has at least 30 days to work with a lawyer to prepare the case for trial. Under the Act, the defendant's trial cannot start less than 30 days from the date on which the indicted defendant first appears through counsel. This 30-day period is referred to as the minimum time to trial. In ICMS criminal, it's called the Procedural Non-Trial Interval, or PNT. Two events are required to start PNT in a criminal case. First, the filing of an indictment or information. And second, the entry of an appearance by counsel for the defendant. PNT starts only when both of these events have occurred. PNT also applies in magistrate cases when counsel enters an appearance and the defendant consents to trial before a magistrate judge. PNT runs for 30 days in both criminal and magistrate cases. Case law defining when a defendant appears through counsel varies from circuit to circuit. But basically, a defendant does not appear through counsel until an attorney takes some action that signals the court that he or she is entering the case on behalf of the defendant. For example, a defendant can appear through counsel when his counsel accepts a court appointment, files a motion, or signs a document related to the case. At this point, we've discussed each of the procedural intervals you'll be monitoring in ICMS criminal. Now, let's focus on two important points to keep in mind as you monitor these intervals. First, it's important to remember that many of the cases you'll be docketing in ICMS criminal will be co-defendant cases, that is, cases involving more than one defendant. The defendants in the case may be arrested, indicted, or even tried on different dates. So, it's important that when you enter case information in ICMS criminal, you enter it for the right defendant. Let's say that defendant Jones' counts should properly have moved from P2 awaiting trial to P4 trial. On July 1st, the date his trial began. But if you made a mistake and docketed defendant Smith is starting trial on July 1st instead of Jones, you'd create a host of problems. ICMS criminal would then show Smith's counts as being in P4 instead of Jones' counts. And ICMS criminal would not move defendant Jones' counts from P2 to P4 because there'd be no docket entry telling it to do so. Instead, ICMS criminal would keep Jones' counts in P2 and let Jones' 70-day clock continue to run for those counts, even though Jones was actually in trial on those counts. In addition, ICMS criminal would keep Smith's counts in P4, which might mean she wouldn't receive her trial within P2's 70-day limit. So once again remember, make certain your docketing entries in ICMS criminal apply to the right defendant. Second, it's important to remember that when a defendant is charged with more than one count, the counts may be in different procedural intervals on any given day. When the counts are in different intervals, you should track the count that is the fastest moving count in the case. Let's take an example. If defendant Mandelo is charged with five counts and goes to trial on one count only, then only that count moves to the trial interval P4. The other counts remain in P2 because they are still awaiting trial. In this example, the count Mandelo goes to trial on is the fastest moving count. During the time Mandelo is in trial, the time limits for his counts remaining in procedural interval 2 are temporarily stayed. Finally, you should know that ICMS criminal makes it easy for you to monitor the procedural intervals a defendant's counts are in. Whenever you docket an event that requires moving a count into P1 or P2, ICMS criminal will move the count to P1 or P2 automatically. And when you docket an event that requires moving a count into P4 through P9, ICMS criminal will prompt you to move the count into the appropriate interval. So if you make a docket entry telling ICMS criminal that Smith and Jones were arrested on April 15th, ICMS criminal will automatically move their counts to P1 awaiting indictment. And if you make a docket entry telling ICMS criminal that Jones' trial began on July 1st, ICMS criminal will prompt you to move Jones' counts to P4. ICMS criminal also makes all-time calculations relating to procedural intervals automatically. When ICMS criminal counts the number of days in an interval for you, it does not count the first day the interval begins, but it does count the last day. Of course, ICMS criminal relies on the information you docket when it moves a defendant's count from one procedural interval to another. So the information you docket must be accurate. Be sure to consult your supervisor if you have a question about the information you've entered. This concludes our discussion of procedural intervals. Before going on to the next section, please stop the tape and do exercise one in your written materials. If you have any questions about procedural intervals, ask your supervisor. And if you wish to review any of the material we've covered, simply rewind the tape. You will also be responsible for working with Speedy Trial Act location intervals in ICMS criminal. The five location intervals monitored in ICMS criminal reflect the defendant's five possible pretrial locations. Using these intervals, it's important to keep track of two things. First, the defendant's current location. And second, the amount of time the defendant has spent in that location. Why is it important to keep track of the defendant's pretrial location? Because the Speedy Trial Act places strict limits on the amount of time that can go by before defendants in certain locations must receive their trials. For example, the act limits the length of time a defendant may be held in continuous custody for the sole purpose of awaiting trial on federal charges. That time limit is 90 days. The act also limits the time in which trial must begin for defendants who have been released pretrial, but who have been designated by the U.S. Attorney as high-risk defendants. Trial of these defendants must also start within 90 days of the time they are designated high-risk. In a few minutes, we'll show you how easy it is to use ICMS criminal to monitor a defendant's location and ensure compliance with the 90-day time limits established by the Speedy Trial Act. But right now, let's review the five location intervals monitored in ICMS criminal. The location intervals are location custody, LC, location release, LR, location fugitive, LF, location high-risk, LH, and location other custody, LO. First, let's look at location custody. Location custody is the time period during which the defendant is in continuous custody solely for the purpose of awaiting trial. As we've mentioned, the Speedy Trial Act establishes a 90-day limit for this location interval. That is, the trial of a defendant held in continuous custody solely to await trial on federal charges must start not later than 90 days following the defendant's placement in custody. If the trial doesn't start by then, the defendant may be released. Because of the 90-day time limit that applies to it, location custody is also referred to as the 90-day custody clock. Next, location release covers the time period when the defendant is released from court and allowed to remain in the community pending trial. There is no time limit on location release. A third location interval is location fugitive. Technically, a defendant may be considered a fugitive from the time a warrant issues for his arrest until the time he is arrested. So, many courts place the defendant in location fugitive the day a warrant issues. But other courts, reasoning it may take a while to find an arrested defendant, wait until a certain amount of time has passed following issuance of the warrant. For example, 30 days. And place the defendant in location fugitive only if he hasn't been arrested by then. You should check with your supervisor to see what your court's location fugitive policy is. There is no time limit for location fugitive. A fourth location interval is location high risk. A defendant who is released while awaiting trial can be designated a high-risk individual by the U.S. Attorney. Location high-risk covers the time period during which a defendant is both released and designated high-risk. It begins on the date the defendant is designated high-risk by the U.S. Attorney. As we've already seen, the Speedy Trial Act establishes a 90-day limit for this location interval. That is, the trial of any defendant designated high-risk must begin not later than 90 days after the defendant is so designated by the U.S. Attorney. The fifth and final location interval is location other custody. Location other custody includes the time period during which the defendant is in custody on charges other than the charges pending against him in your district. For example, a defendant may be held in custody in another federal judicial district while awaiting trial on charges in that district, or the defendant may be incarcerated in a state or local facility awaiting trial on state or local charges. Location other custody applies in those situations. There is no time limit for location other custody. ICMS criminal makes it easy to monitor the defendant's location and ensure compliance with a 90-day time limits that apply to location's custody and high-risk. That's because ICMS criminal tracks a defendant's location automatically. It simply starts a location interval whenever the defendant's location changes and keeps the defendant in that interval until the defendant's location changes again. So, if defendant Smith is arrested and placed in pre-trial custody on April 1st, ICMS criminal places her in location custody, LC, as of that date. ICMS criminal also computes the number of days the defendant spends in a given location interval. As with procedural intervals, the day a location interval begins is not counted, but the last day is, unless the last day falls on a weekend or holiday. In that case, the next business day is counted as the last day of the interval. This concludes our discussion of location intervals. Before going on, stop the tape and do exercise two in your written materials. As we've seen, the Speedy Trial Act sets definite time limits within which an indictment must be filed, a case must go to trial, and a defendant must be released from custody. In a single case, we can have a 30-day clock running to indictment, a 70-day clock running to trial, a 90-day clock running for a defendant in continuous custody while awaiting trial, and another 90-day clock for a co-defendant released but designated high risk by the U.S. Attorney. But in drafting the Speedy Trial Act, Congress recognized that events may occur during the pretrial stages of a case that make it impossible to comply with the time limits established by the Act. For example, the defendant may become physically incapacitated. A crucial government witness may become unavailable, making it impossible to go forward with the case until the witness is found. Or the defendant may file motions that must be decided before the trial can begin. When events like these occur, they delay processing of the case. They can make it impossible to file an indictment within 30 days of a defendant's arrest or begin a defendant's trial within 70 days of indictment. So, Congress decided that when a case is delayed by one of these events, the time that passes should be excluded from any Speedy Trial Act calculations. In other words, the actual period of delay is not counted as part of P1's 30-day interval or P2's 70-day interval. Nor is the period of delay counted toward the time a defendant spends in location custody or location high risk. The events that cause these excludable delays are called excludables. Here's an example of an excludable. Let's assume Angela Smith decides to go to trial rather than plead guilty. If interval P2 awaiting trial began in Smith's case on April 15th, her trial would have to begin 70 days later, that is on June 24th. But let's say that Smith files a motion to suppress evidence. The court holds a hearing on the motion 14 days later and the hearing takes five days. The time from the filing of the motion to the conclusion of the hearing is excludable time under the Act. That means a total of 19 days will be excluded or not counted as part of Smith's 70-day P2 interval. We refer to the 19 days as excludable time, or time the excludable was running. And we don't count the 19 days the excludable was running when we calculate Smith's trial deadline. So the trial deadline for Smith's case moves from June 24th to July 13th. Since Smith was in custody during the 19 days the excludable was running, the 19 days will also be excluded from her 90-day custody clock. In fact, excludable delays may apply in any of the four situations when the Act imposes a time deadline. The 30-day time limit that applies when the defendant is in P1 awaiting indictment. The 70-day time limit that applies when the defendant is in P2 awaiting trial. The 90-day limit that applies when the defendant is in location custody. And the 90-day time limit that applies when the defendant is in location high risk. We'll look at other examples of excludables in a moment, but first let's cover two principles that apply to all excludable delays. First, in ICMS criminal, each excludable is given an excludable code for ease in identifying it. An example of an excludable code is XA. Code XA is used to refer to the excludable that covers the period of delay resulting from an examination to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial. Second, each excludable delay has a start date and an end date, so the exact number of excludable days can be counted. Unlike the case with procedural and location intervals, both the day the excludable starts and the day it ends are counted when computing the number of days an excludable has run. Now let's mention some terms that are commonly used in referring to excludables. You're likely to hear them often while working in ICMS criminal. First, an excludable is called a pending excludable or open delay while it is open and running. And second, an excludable is called a closed excludable or a closed delay after it has ended. The Speedy Trial Act defines 19 different events that cause periods of delay resulting in excludable time. Among them are examinations to determine whether the defendant is mentally or physically able to stand trial, trial of the defendant on other charges, the filing and resolution of pre-trial motions, the time a motion is taken under advisement by the court, the transportation of the defendant from another district or to and from places of examination or hospitalization, the consideration of a proposed plea agreement by the court, and a range of judicial or administrative hearings which we'll call miscellaneous proceedings. These include bail hearings, preliminary examinations, arraignment proceedings, pre-trial conferences, and depositions. We won't cover all 19 excludables in this program. Instead, we'll focus on the ones you'll encounter most often while docketing criminal cases. One excludable you're likely to encounter is Excludable XE, the excludable that applies to delay resulting from any pre-trial motion from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on or other prompt disposition of such motion. The date Excludable XE begins is the date the pre-trial motion is filed. Excludable XE ends on the date on which the court has received everything it needs from the parties in order to rule on the motion. On that date, the court will either issue an order disposing of the motion or decide to take the motion under advisement, that is, postpone ruling on the motion in order to give further consideration to the legal issues it raises. Either action by the court ends the Excludable XE. Let's say, for example, that Angela Smith's attorney files a discovery motion, but the court does not require any briefs to be filed with the motion and does not schedule a hearing on it. In that event, an Excludable XE would run from the filing of the motion through the filing of the government's response to the motion. At that point, the court would have everything it needed to rule on the motion or take it under advisement so the Excludable XE would end. But suppose Michael Jones' attorney files a motion to suppress evidence, the government files an opposition, and the court decides to hold a hearing on the motion. After hearing arguments, the judge denies the motion. In that case, the Excludable XE would end when the order denying the motion is entered. Let's say that Defendant Jones' motion to suppress evidence is filed on May 3rd. When you dock at the filing of the motion, ICMS criminal will start an Excludable XE. When does the Excludable XE end? Well, let's say the court's order denying the motion is entered on May 20th at the conclusion of the hearing. That means Jones' pretrial motion Excludable XE ran from May 3rd through May 20th, 18 days. Remember, unlike the case with procedural and location intervals, ICMS criminal counts both the day an Excludable begins and the day it ends when calculating Excludable time. Now, instead of ruling on the motion at the conclusion of the hearing on May 20th, let's say that Judge Steiner takes it under advisement. This brings another Excludable into play, Excludable XG. Excludable XG covers the period of time that passes when the court takes a motion under advisement before ruling on it. Excludable XG begins on the day following the date on which the court has received everything it needs from the parties in order to reach its decision. We said Judge Steiner had everything she needed to decide the motion on May 20th because by that date the hearing had been completed and all required briefs had been filed. So, when you make a docket entry reflecting that the judge took the motion under advisement, ICMS criminal will prompt you to stop the Excludable XE and open an Excludable XG. And you would open the Excludable XG as of May 21st, the day after the judge had everything she needed to decide the motion. An Excludable XG is limited to 30 days. That is, the court may take a motion under advisement for up to 30 days before the Excludable XG ends and the speedy trial clock begins to run again. That means an Excludable XG ends either on the date the judge's decision is filed or, at the latest, 30 days from the date it began. In our example, the Excludable XG began on May 21st. So, if Judge Steiner issues an order denying defendant Jones's motion to suppress on May 24th, our Excludable XG would have run four days from May 21st through May 24th. Let's consider another example of an Excludable delay. Let's say that after Judge Steiner denies Jones's motion, she holds a pretrial conference in the case. Judges often schedule pretrial conferences or status hearings to make sure everyone in a case will be ready for trial on the scheduled date. At the pretrial conference, the judge will resolve any remaining pretrial issues and explain to counsel how he or she intends to conduct the trial. The period of delay resulting from the holding of the pretrial conference is excluded under Excludable XH. Remember, we said that certain other proceedings involving the defendant, miscellaneous hearings including bail hearings, preliminary examinations, depositions, arraignment proceedings, and pretrial conferences cause periods of delay that are considered Excludable Time under the Act. An Excludable XH starts on the first day of the proceeding involved and ends on the last day. Jones's pretrial conference lasts only one day. Nevertheless, an Excludable XH is started and stopped for that day and the day is not counted as one of Jones's 70 days in procedural interval two. At this point, we've discussed only three of the 19 Excludable events listed in the Speedy Trial Act, but we'll discuss others later in this program. And when you study ICMS criminal at the Phoenix or San Antonio training centers, you'll receive instruction covering all Speedy Trial Excludables. Finally, your written materials also explain all Excludable Delays in detail. This concludes our discussion of Excludable Delays. Before going on, stop the tape and do exercise three in your written materials.