 CHAPTER 63 German Philosophy Kant. Third period. From Kant to our own time. One of the most striking results of the French and German illumination was the nationalization of philosophy. During the Middle Ages, Latin was the language of the scientific world, and even long after most of the manners and customs of the Middle Ages had disappeared, it continued to be the language in which philosophical treatises were composed. Contemporaneously with the rise of the deistic controversy in England and the spread of the illumination in France and Germany, Latin was discarded and philosophy began to speak in the vernacular. The result of this change was that philosophy ceased to be cosmopolitan in character, and racial and national traits which had always been distinguishable became more strongly marked. Hence we have, during the 19th century, German, English, French, Scotch, and Italian philosophy, each possessing its distinctly national characteristics. It will therefore be found more convenient from this point onward to follow philosophy in its national development, and to treat the history of philosophy according to nations rather than according to schools and systems. For the history of the philosophy of the 19th century, consult, besides the works already referred to on page 422, Royce, the spirit of modern philosophy, Boston, 1892, Burt, History of Modern Philosophy, Two Volumes, Chicago, 1892, Griggs Philosophical Classics, edited by Morris, Series of Modern Philosophers, edited by Sneeth, The Library of Philosophy, edited by Muirhead, End of Footnote. Chapter 63. German Philosophy. Although the greater part of Kant's life lies within the 18th century, his philosophy belongs to the 19th. It is from the fundamental principles of a system of thought that the great speculative and practical tendencies of this third period spring. With Kant, therefore, begins the last period in the history of modern philosophy. Kant. Life. Emanuel Kant was born at Conningsburg in the year 1724. His parents were, according to family tradition, of Scotch descent. At the age of sixteen he entered the University of Conningsburg, and there for six years studied Wolff's philosophy and Newton's physics, having for teacher Martin Knudsen. On leaving the university he spent nine years as tutor in several distinguished families. He returned to Conningsburg in 1755 to qualify himself for the position of licensed but unsalaryed teacher, Privatossent, at the university, a career in which he lingered for fifteen years. His first book, which was published in 1747, under the title Gedankenvor der Waren Schatzung der Libedinge Kraft, Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces, was followed by several others which treated of physical and metaphysical problems. Meantime he continued to lecture on Wolffian philosophy, employing the textbooks then commonly in use, although it is evident from his written works and from the program of his lectures that he had at this time begun to criticize both Wolff and Newton. The first outline of a definitive independent system appears in the dissertation der Mundi sensibilis atke intelligibilis formis et principis, which was published in 1770. In the same year Kant was appointed to the chair of philosophy at Conningsburg, which he held until 1797. Epic making work, the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, appeared in 1781. This was followed by the Grundelugen zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785, the Kritik der Pratekeschen Vernunft, 1788, the Kritik der Ur-Thalschhaft, 1790, and the Religion Inneraba der Gretzen der Blossen Vernunft, 1794. The last of these works provoked the hostility of the Orthodox and was the occasion of a reprimand from the government of East Prussia. Kant spent the greater part of his life as professor at Conningsburg. He never travelled and had no appreciation of art. He was, however, thoroughly in sympathy with nature in all her moods, professing unbounded admiration for, quote, the starry sky above him and the moral law within him, end quote. He died in 1804. The three Kritiks, the Kritik der Pure Reason, the argument of which is presented in shorter and more readable form in the Prolegomena to any future Metaphysik, the Kritik der Practical Reason, and the Kritik der Faculty of Judgment, form a trilogy of Kantian literature. Kant's complete works were published at various times, the best editions being Hartenstein's second edition in eight volumes, Leipzig 1867 to 1869, and Rosenkranz and Schubert's edition in twelve volumes, Leipzig 1838 to 1842. A new edition is being published by the Berlin Academy of Sciences. The Kritik der Pure Reason was translated into English by Mecheljohn, London, 1854, and by Max Müller, London, 1881, the Prolegomena by Mahaffey and Bernard, London, 1889, the Kritik der Practical Reason by Abbott, London, 1889, and the Kritik der Judgment by Bernard, London, 1892. To the list of secondary sources must be added M. Reeson's Kant, Grand Philosoph series, Paris 1900, and Paulson's Kant, translated by Creighton and Lefebvre, New York 1902. Footnote. Conferred Falkenberg's list, Opus Cetatum, page 269, English translation, page 330. The works of Adykes, B. Erdmann, and Wehinger are of special importance. End of footnote. Wallace's Kant, Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, Edinburgh and Philadelphia, 1892, and E. Card's Critical Philosophy of Kant, London, 1889, are the best English presentations of Kant's system. Footnote. Consult also T. H. Green, Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant in Works, Vol. 2. Adamson, the Philosophy of Kant, Edinburgh, 1879. Watson, Kant and his English Critics, London, 1888. Article on Kant in Encyclopedia Britannica, etc. End of footnote. Doctrines. General Standpoint and Aim. In the introduction to the Prolegomena, Kant informs us of the origin and aim of his philosophical investigations. Quote, it was, he observes, the suggestion of David Hume, which first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction. I first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only one by which the understanding thinks the connection of things a priori. I sought to make certain of the number of such connections, and when I had succeeded in this, by starting from a single principle I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts which I was now certain were not deduced from experience, as Hume had apprehended, but sprang from the pure understanding. End quote. Footnote. Mahaffey's translation, page 7. End of footnote. If therefore we divide systems of philosophy, into rational and empirical, according as they lay stress on the a priori concepts and principles of the pure understanding, or on a posteriori impressions and associations of the empirical faculties, we may describe Kant as dissatisfied with the rational philosophy, because it exaggerated the a priori, and with the empirical philosophy, because it exaggerated the a posteriori elements of knowledge. Consequently, he sets himself the task of examining or criticizing all knowledge for the purpose of determining, or as he says, quote, deducing, end quote, the a priori concepts or forms of thought. And if it is the task of philosophy to answer the questions, what can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope for? Kant considers that the answers to the second and third questions depend on the answer given to the first. His philosophy is therefore a transcendental criticism, that is, an examination of knowledge for the purpose of determining the a priori elements, which are the conditions of knowledge, and which we cannot know by mere experience. Footnote Falkenberg, Opus Citatum, page 277, English translation, page 340, explains that although Kant at different times attaches different meanings to the word transcendental, he always uses it as opposed to empirical. Confer dictionary of philosophy and psychology edited by Baldwin, article, Kant's terminology, numbers 12 and 13. End of footnote Division of philosophy Kant, as is well known, first devoted his attention to the transcendental criticism of pure reason, and afterwards took up the transcendental criticism of practical reason. In the first part of the critique of pure reason, he distinguishes the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental logic, and subdivides the latter into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic. Transcendental aesthetic is defined as, quote, science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, end quote, or the inquiry into the a priori conditions of sensation. Footnote Critique of pure reason, page 17. References are to Max Mueller's translation. End of footnote. Now, our external senses represent their objects as extended in space, and our internal senses represent our conscious states as succeeding each other in time. Space and time are the a priori conditions of external and internal sensations, conditions or forms which make sensation possible. They are, therefore, anterior to all experience. Space and time are not, as is commonly supposed, empirical concepts derived from experience. Their a priori character appears from the very fact that knowledge based on the nature of space and time, mathematical knowledge, is necessary and universal. For it is a primary postulate of all Kant's transcendental inquiry that nothing which is necessary and universal can come from experience. Space and time are not properties of things. They belong to the subject, in here in the subject, and are, so to speak, part of the subjective world. Their role is to reduce the multiplicity of the object to that unity which is an essential condition of being perceived by the subject, which is one. They are the conditions of sensitive intuition and have no objective reality, except in so far as they are applied to real things in the act of perception. Quote. Space and time are the pure forms of our intuition, while sensation forms its matter. End of quote. Footnote. Opus Cetatum, page 34. End quote. Transcendental logic, general logic, treats either of the pure forms of thought or of these forms in their relation to concrete experience, applied logic. Transcendental logic treats of the origin, extent, and validity of concepts which are neither of empirical nor of aesthetic origin but are a priori. It is divided into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic. The first treats of the forms of the pure understanding, judgment, while the second treats of the elements of that knowledge which is pure understanding applied to objects given in intuition. And as this application is made by the reason, we may describe transcendental dialectic as the criticism of reason in the stricter sense of the word. The first treats of the forms of the pure understanding, judgment, while the second treats of the elements of that knowledge which is pure understanding applied to objects given in intuition. And as this application is made by the reason, we may describe transcendental dialectic as the criticism of reason in the stricter sense of the word. Footnote. Confer Opus Cetatum pages 42 to 50. End of footnote. A. Transcendental analytic. The a priori forms of the pure understanding are the categories which stand to intellectual knowledge in the relation in which space and time stand to sense knowledge. It will be well to consider a. The existence of the categories, b. The construction of the table of categories, c. The nature of the categories, and d. The objective value of the categories. A. The existence of the categories. All intuitions being sensuous and the understanding being a super sensible faculty, it is evident that the concepts which belong to the understanding are not immediately referred to an object, but to some other representation, that is, to an intuition or to another concept. All the acts of the understanding may therefore be reduced to judgments. Footnote. Opus Cetatum page 56. End of footnote. Now there are judgments which are merely contingent and particular as, quote, this table is square, end quote. And there are judgments which are necessary and universal as, quote, the sides of a square are equal to one another, end quote. But, and this is the fundamental assumption in Kant's critique, what is necessary and universal in our knowledge is a priori. Therefore, there is in our knowledge of necessary and universal propositions an a priori element, and this is the form or category. B. Construction of the table of categories. Kant considers that Aristotle failed to draw up a complete and scientific table of the highest genera, because that, quote, acute thinker, end quote, did not realize that the right method to be pursued is not the analysis of being, but the analysis of thought. Now, according to Kant, to think is to judge, and to judge is to synthesize or unite two representations, namely subject and predicate. But since we are inquiring into the a priori elements of thought, we must empty the subject and predicate of all their empirical and intuitional content, and consider merely their relations to each other. On the different kinds of relation, which exist between subject and predicate, we shall base our construction of the table of categories. These relations introduces to twelve, to which therefore correspond the twelve categories. Table. First column, kinds of judgment. Second column, categories. Section one. Quantity. One. Universal. Unity. Two. Particular. Plurality. Three. Singular. Totality. Section two. Quality. Four. Affirmative. Reality. Five. Negative. Negation. Six. Infinite. Limitation. Section three. Relation. Seven. Categorical. Subsistence and Inherence. Eight. Hypothetical. Causality and Dependence. Disjunctive. Reciprocity. Active and passive. Section four. Modality. Ten. Problematical. Possibility in possibility. Eleven. Assertory. Existence. Non-existence. Twelve. Apothectic. Necessity. Contingency. End of table. It may be observed in criticism of this system of categories that an analysis of judgment is not a complete analysis of thought, for the ideas of which the judgment is composed are themselves capable of analysis. Indeed, while the analysis of judgment may be made the basis of a system of predicables, it is on an analysis of ideas that a system of categories must be based. Moreover, it is evident that in the Contient Table of Categories correctness of analysis is sacrificed to symmetry of arrangement. C. The nature of the categories. Cont's a priori forms or categories are not mere subjective dispositions, mere tendencies such as Leibniz attributed to the psychic monad, capabilities to be evolved into actuality in the process of ideation. Nor are they full-fledged ideas, such as Plato attributed to the soul in its prenatal existence. They are the empty forms of intellectual knowledge, all the contents of intellectual knowledge being derived from experience. The nature of the categories is best understood by a study of their function. All knowledge, whether sensuous or intellectual, is conditioned by unity and is affected by a synthesis of the manifold of representations, sense impressions, etc. Now, quote, How, Kant asks, should we a priori have arrived at such a synthetical unity if the subjective grounds of such unity were not contained a priori in the original sources of all our knowledge? End quote. Footnote. Opus Etatum, page 102. End of footnote. We have seen that the a priori forms which affect the requisite unity in the case of sense knowledge are space and time. The function of the categories is entirely similar. To affect the requisite unity in the case of intellectual knowledge, to synthesize the manifold of experience. But how is the application of the form to the contents brought about? The a priori forms must be brought down to the empirical contents anteriorly to experience, for they render empirical knowledge possible. Kant is therefore obliged to have recourse to the doctrine of schematism. The schemata are the work of the synthetic imagination and mediate between the a priori form and the manifold of experience. Thus, quote, the transcendental determination of time which is the principle schema is so far homogeneous with the category that it is general and founded on a rule a priori. And it is, on the other hand, so far homogeneous with the phenomenon that time must be contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. End quote. Footnote. Opus Etatum page 113. End of footnote. From the fundamental schema which is time, are derived as many schemata as there are categories. The mental field thickens with the multitude of media through which and by means of which the process of intellectual knowledge takes place. We have, first, the manifold representations of sense impression, then the application of the forms of space and time resulting in sense intuition. Next, we have the schema and last of all the a priori form. And yet all this multiplicity is introduced in order to effect the synthetic unity without which knowledge is impossible. The representations are unified by the application of the a priori forms of space and time. The intuitions resulting from this application are in turn unified by the determining schema which gives reality unifying form, namely the category. Finally, above all these is the unity of consciousness. The doctrine of the function of the categories is well summed up in the formula representations without the categories are blind. The categories without representative or other empirical content are empty. With regard to the schematism of our understanding applied to phenomena and their mere form, it were well perhaps to content ourselves with Kant's saying that such schematism is an art hidden in the depth of the human soul the true sense of which we shall hardly ever be able to understand. Footnote Page 116 And a footnote D The objective value of the categories The value of the categories lies in this that they render synthetic a priori judgments possible and thus make intellectual knowledge possible. In judgments which are merely analytical, we remain within the given concept while predicating something of it. In judgments which are synthetic, we go beyond the concept in order to bring something together with it which is wholly different from what is contained in it. Footnote Opus Etatum, page 126 And a footnote It is therefore by means of synthetic a priori judgments that we make progress with intellectual knowledge of reality. And since the categories are the a priori elements of such judgments, the elements which confer necessity and universality on them thereby making them to be scientific. It is evident that it is the categories that render intellectual knowledge possible. Without the categories, the objects of intellectual knowledge would be given in experience but known. Although the categories are a priori that is independent of sensation, they do not extend our knowledge beyond phenomena. They do not lead us to a nomenal knowledge of that which is given in sensation. Of themselves, they are empty. In order to be valid, they must be filled by experience. In all the content which is put into them is phenomenal. Quote The understanding a priori can never do more than anticipate the form of a possible experience. And, as nothing can be an object of experience except the phenomenon, it follows that the understanding can never go beyond the limits of sensibility. As phenomena are nothing but sensations, the understanding refers them to a something as the object of our sensuous intuition. This means a something equal to X, of which we do not nay, with the present constitution of understanding, cannot know anything. End quote Footnote Opus Hitatum Pages 201 and 204 End a footnote This something is the numinon, the transcendental object, the thing in itself, ding and zik. B. Transcendental dialectic, which is the third portion of the critique of pure reason, has for its object the examination or criticism of the ideas. These are forms less general than the categories, elements of reasoning rather than of judgment, serving to unify the manifold of intellectual experience just as the categories and space and time serve to unify the manifold of sense representation and impression. Consequently they do not refer immediately to the objects of intuition but only to the understanding and its judgments. Now, just as the forms of judgment furnished us with the basis for the system of categories, so the forms of inference serve as a basis for the enumeration of ideas. To the three forms of syllogistic reasoning namely categorical, empirical and disjunctive correspond the three ideas of the reasoning faculty namely the idea of the soul or thinking subject, the idea of matter or the totality of phenomena and the idea of God the supreme condition of all possibility. Footnote Opus Etatum pages 240 and following end of footnote reason being imminent that is having no direct relation to objects, these three ideas, the psychological, the cosmological and the theological should remain imminent. The attempt to establish them as existing outside the mind must necessarily lead to an entanglement of contradictions and it is the aim of the transcendental dialectic to expose these contradictions and so dispel that transcendental illusion which has vitiated every system of psychology, cosmology and theology. A. Psychological Idea Kant rejects the rational psychology which attributes to the soul, identity substantiality, immateriality and immortality. The whole Wolfian and Cartesian system of psychology, he considers to be false in its starting point, the assumption namely that we have an intuitive knowledge of the understanding. We have, he contends, no such intuition. Thought is a succession of unifications or synthesis. At the apex of the pyramid the basis of which is the manifold representation stands the conscious principle. But as the conscious principle is devoid of empirical content it is like the numinon an X an unknowable quantity. Descartes says I think but what Kant asks is the I it is the emptiest of all forms a psychological subject of conscious states which never can become the logical subject of a predicate referring to these states or to anything else. Empirical psychology which alone can extend our knowledge of mental life does not aim at telling us anything about the ego. Rational psychology which does aim at establishing truths concerning the ego is wrong in its very starting point and is full of contradictions in the course of its development. Kant of course does not deny the unity substantiality etc of the soul for he contends that reason is far from being able to disprove as it is from being able to prove these truths which as the critique of practical reason will demonstrate rest ultimately on man's moral consciousness. B cosmological idea the totality of phenomena or the world of which the cosmologists speak presents according to Kant difficulties similar to those presented by the psychological idea. To every thesis which is formulated concerning the ultimate nature of matter may be opposed an equally plausible antithesis. The antinomies however as these apparent contradictions are called do not disprove the formal correctness of the inferential process employed in rational cosmology they merely show that the cosmical concepts of matter, cause etc extend beyond the limits of empirical knowledge and rational experience. The antinomies are four corresponding to the four classes of categories alpha thesis the world must have a beginning in time and be enclosed in finite space antithesis the world is eternal and infinite beta thesis matter is ultimately divisible into simple parts, atoms or monads incapable of further division antithesis every material thing is divisible there exists nowhere in the world nothing simple gamma thesis besides the causality which is according to the laws of nature and therefore necessary there is causality which is free antithesis there is no freedom everything in the world takes place entirely according to the laws of nature delta thesis there exists an absolutely necessary being belonging to the world either as a part or as a cause of it antithesis there nowhere exists an absolutely necessary being either within or without the world it is only in the case of the first two antinomies that Kant considers both the thesis and antithesis to be false see theological idea the idea of God is according to Kant the ideal of reason the expression of the need which reason has of coming to a perfect unity Kant nowhere denies the objective validity of this idea he contends however as we shall see that it rests on the moral consciousness not on any speculative basis the criticism of the theological idea is therefore confined to an examination of the ontological cosmological and physical theological proofs which natural theology brings forward to establish the thesis that God exists the ontological proof which was formulated successively by Saint Alzheim Descartes and Leibniz deduces the existence of God from the concept which we are able to form of him Kant points out the impossibility of arguing from the idea of a thing the existence of that thing existence he observes is not a quality or attribute of the same nature as goodness or greatness it adds nothing to the content of the idea quote a hundred real follers contain no more as to concept than a hundred possible ones end quote besides all existential propositions they are synthetical because existence is not a quality of an idea but a relation between the idea and experience therefore an existential proposition cannot be demonstrated from a concept without reference to experience the cosmological proof argues from the existence of contingent being to the existence of necessary being Kant criticizes the argument from the viewpoint of his own theory of cognition since the axiom of causality on which the argument rests is a synthetic judgment it cannot be applied beyond the limits of experience quote the principle of causality has no meaning and no criterion for its use beyond the world of sense while here it is meant to help us beyond the world of sense end quote footnote opus etatum page 491 end of footnote the physical theological argument is that which is commonly called the argument from the purposiveness or design which is evident in the order of nature now order and design quote may prove the contingency of the form but not of the matter end quote they may prove that there is a designer not that there is a creator of the universe Kant wishes to quote commend and encourage end quote the use of such a line of reasoning but he maintains that quote it cannot by itself alone establish the existence of a supreme being end quote footnote opus etatum page 503 end of footnote the conclusion of the transcendental dialectic is therefore that the ideas do not add to our experience speculative philosophy does not add to our knowledge of the soul the world and god nevertheless these ideas although they do not constitute experience regulated so that we cannot better order the faculties of the soul than by acting as if there were a soul neither can we better order our experience of the external world than by representing it as made up of a multiplicity of created things each of which stands to the rest of reality in reciprocal relation necessitated by law and all of which spring from a common ground of unity and are ruled by the same guiding principle moreover the criticism of the ideas shows that while speculative philosophy is enabled to establish the existence of god the immortality of the soul and the freedom of the will materialism fatalism and atheism are equally unable to overthrow our belief in the truth of these doctrines the ideas therefore clear the way for irrational faith founded on the moral consciousness before we come to the constructive portion of Kant's philosophy as contained in the critique of practical reason we may hear some of the results of his destructive criticism of speculative philosophy and of theoretical knowledge in general there is no transcendent knowledge no knowledge beyond the limits of experience in our knowledge of the empirical world there is however a transcendental element the a priori forms of compensation the categories and the regulative ideas which make empirical knowledge possible although they do not add to it either in content or in extension the moral consciousness alone takes us beyond experience to the immutable eternal and universally valid ground on which all higher truth rests critique of practical reason when we pass from the critique of practical reason to the critique of practical reason from the study of what is or must be to the study of what ought to be from the inquiry into the conditions of possible theoretical experience to the inquiry into the conditions of actual moral experience from the analysis of thought to the analysis of action we find ourselves in an altogether new atmosphere the second critique discovers in the obligation of the moral law the aliquid inconcussible which as the first critique taught us is not to be found in rational speculation and thus are restored the existence of God the immortality of the soul and the freedom of the will which in the first critique were relegated to the rank of mere regulative formulas Kant's empathetic assertion that the supremacy of the moral law is well known the starry heaven above us and the moral law within us are, he was accustomed to say the only objects worthy of supreme admiration but on what is the moral law founded consciousness tells me that I ought to perform certain actions and little thought suffices to convince me that the oughtness is universal and necessary if I analyze for example the sense of obligation in the negative principle lie not I find that apart from the question of motive or utility which our contingent determinates it is a principle valid throughout all time and space now it is these properties necessity and universality that will enable us to answer the question on what is the moral law founded it is necessary however to remark that according to Kant the universality and necessity affect the form not the contents of the moral law so that in the example just mentioned the universality of the prohibition lie not is derived from the general formula into which all obligation is translatable so act that you can will that the maxim on which your conduct rests should become a universal law footnote Grundelung Zürmete Physik der Zitten 2. Abschenwerke edited by Kirschmann Volume 3, 44 also Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft Number 7 Würke Volume 2, 35 end of footnote more simply the maxim on which your conduct rests must be fit to be an element of universal legislation the moral law is not founded on pleasure for nothing is more unstable than feeling which is the determinant of pleasure whereas the moral law because of its universality and necessity must rest on an unchangeable foundation it is not founded on happiness for the essential characteristic of the moral law is its obligatoriness and no one is obliged to be happy it is not founded on a moral sense for a mere sense cannot represent obligation as necessary and universal finally it is not founded on perfection itself for perfection is in final analysis reducible to pleasure or happiness the moral law is its own foundation it is autonomous being neither imposed by any external motive nor deduced by the purely speculative reason from theoretical principles but being impressed on the will by the practical reason and revealed to us by immediate consciousness thus it stands on a basis firmer than that which theoretical knowledge can furnish and it remains unaffected by the contention and clamour of metaphysical discussion the moral law is imperative consciousness reveals it to us as commanding not merely as persuading or advising its command may be categorical as thou shalt not lie or hypothetical as if you wish to become a clergyman you must study theology the categorical imperative is however the characteristic expression of the moral law and it is only in the authoritative though hollow voice of the universal categorical imperative so act etc that the moral law speaks with all the authority of a universal and necessary moral determinant the moral law is the form which imparts to the contents of an action its goodness the contents may be good relatively the will which is the form is an absolute good nothing can't observe can be called good without qualification except a good will effects and circumstances are not therefore of themselves determinants of moral value the sense of duty is alone praiseworthy the only moral motive is respect for the moral law thus does Kant carry his reverence for the moral law to the extreme of purism the exclusion of all egotistic motive as derogatory to the moral worth of actions the moral law is unconditional in the form of the categorical imperative the voice is unconditionally authoritative and its command is unconditionally a law of human conduct it speaks to us immediately for we are conscious of its commands here then we have found something which metaphysicians have sought in vain an incontrovertible truth on which the freedom of the will the existence of God and the immortality of the soul may be made to rest the will is free for the moral law in saying thou autist implies that thou canst we have no immediate consciousness of freedom but we have immediate consciousness of the moral law which implies freedom I can because I ought and I know that I can because I know that I ought freedom is therefore the ratio as sendee of the moral law and the moral law is the ratio cogniz sendee of freedom footnote confer critique the pratikation vernut verka volume 2 pages 132 and following end of footnote secondly the moral law postulates the existence of God for the imperative nature of the moral law implies that there exists somewhere a good which is not only supreme but complete consumatum an embodiment so to speak of that perfect holiness which is the sum of all the conditions implied in the moral order thus while theonomic ethics supposes the existence of God autonomic morality proves his existence footnote opus etatum volume 2 pages 149 in following end footnote thirdly the moral law postulates the immortality of the soul theoretical reason as we have seen fails to determine in any manner the new mental reality of the subject of our conscious states but surely the practical reason which imposes its law so imperiously is a new mental reality of which it's every action is a determination thus the soul is immortal because immortal duration is alone sufficient for the complete fulfillment of the moral law the highest perfection that we can attain in this life is virtue and virtue is essentially incomplete it is a striving towards holiness with a residual inclination towards unholiness since the moral law will always continue with the same unrelenting imperativeness to urge the soul towards holiness and since the inclination towards unholiness will never be completely overcome the struggle between the desire to obey and the impulse to transgress the law must continue forever footnote opus etatum volume 2 page 146 in following end of footnote the three postulates of the moral law restore therefore freedom, immortality and theistic belief which find no justifiable basis in the speculative reason but which are we to believe the theoretical or the practical reason Kant does not hesitate to reply we are to believe the practical reason for it is supreme faith is a rational conviction based on the sense of duty it is not less but rather more valid than the conviction based on theoretical knowledge this is not the place to take up Kant's theory of natural religion it is sufficient to note that as the principle enunciated at the end of the preceding paragraph implies religion according to Kant is based on ethics we come then to the third of Kant's philosophical critiques critique of the faculty of judgment the understanding, pure reason is the faculty of a priori forms and principles of knowledge practical reason is the faculty of a priori principles of action mediating as it were between these is judgment in the sense of the word which is the faculty of the a priori forms and principles of aesthetic feeling in other words the beautiful or purposive which is the object of judgment is intermediate between the true and the good which are the objects of pure reason and practical reason respectively judgment may be defined as the faculty by which we subsume the particular under the universal law or find the universal under which the particular is to be arranged it refers the manifold to the one the sensible order to the supersensible principle of design and since all actualization of design produces in us the sentiment of the beautiful the faculty of judgment is also concerned with the aesthetic aspect of nature and art we have then as divisions of the critique of judgment one critique of the theological judgment and two critique of the aesthetic judgment a critique of the theological judgment the analytic of the theological judgment has for its scope to determine the different kinds of adaptation these conserves are two external and internal external adaptation such as that of the pine to the soil on which it grows may be explained by mechanical causes but internal adaptation which is found in organic structure and function cannot be explained by mechanical causes alone there is in the organism part to part and part to the whole but no causal relation in anything outside the organism so that the organism is at once cause and effect we cannot explain organic activity in terms of mechanical causality we can understand it only on the supposition that organisms act as though they were produced by a cause which had a purpose in view the teleological concept is therefore regulative of our experience that the teleological concept is merely regulative not constitutive of experience appears from the antinomy of which Kant treats in the dialectic of the teleological judgment the antinomy is as follows thesis all productions of material things and their forms may be explained by mechanical causes antithesis some products of material nature cannot be judged possible unless we suppose a final cause now as doctrines mechanism as opposed to teleology and teleology are irreconcilable but as rules or maxims regulative of our experience one is supplementary of the other footnote opus etatum volume 2 page 262 and a footnote B critique of the aesthetic judgment the name judgment applied to the aesthetic faculty is evidence of the purpose of this portion of Kant's philosophy the purpose namely to mediate between the sensationalists reduced beauty to mere feeling and the rationalists who removed all feeling from the faculty of aesthetic appreciation A in his analytic of the aesthetic judgment Kant determines that as to quality the beautiful is the object of disinterested satisfaction wherein it differs from the agreeable and the good with regard to quantity it pleases universally wherein it differs from the agreeable with regard to relation it is not based on concepts wherein it differs from the good that being beautiful in which we find the form or design without representing to ourselves any particular design finally with regard to modality it pleases necessarily wherein again it differs from the agreeable that then is beautiful which universally and necessarily gives disinterested pleasure without the concept of definite design the satisfaction which we find in what is perfect is intellectual or conceptual the satisfaction which the beautiful affords is emotional or aesthetic footnote der Urthalschhaft Werke Volume 2 Page 41 in following and a footnote the sublime is that which is great beyond all comparison it gives satisfaction by its boundless and formless greatness as the beautiful does by its definiteness of form this greatness is either extensive in space or time or intensive in force or power the great produces it is true a quote humiliating end quote impression but it is the sensitive nature that is humiliated while at the same time the spiritual nature is exalted and carried out towards the idea of the infinite which the sublime always suggests footnote page 42 page 92 in following end of footnote b in the dialectic of the aesthetic faculty content sits that the highest use of the sublime and beautiful is their use as a symbol of moral good for the aesthetic feeling is akin to the moral faculty as indeed the theological judgment also is the question of the objective value of one or other of these faculties leads ultimately to the assertion that there is hidden in nature a principle of beauty and purpose and goodness which the speculative reason cannot formulate footnote confer b erdmann end of footnote historical position cons influence on the development of thought in the 19th century can hardly be overestimated his philosophy is as it were the watershed from which streams of thought flow down in various courses into modern idealism agnosticism and even materialism to this source may also be traced some of the most north-worldly currents of contemporary religious thought especially the movement towards non-dogmatic Christianity for it is not difficult to see in cons assertion of the supremacy of the moral law the origin of the tendency to regard Christianity more as a system of ethics and less as a system of dogmatic truth can influence not only the literature of his own country to an extent unequaled perhaps in the history of that literature but also through his English exponents of whom Coleridge was the chief the literature of the English speaking world philosophy owes to Kant the energetic assertion of the grandeur of the moral law as the foundation of ethics and the scarcely less energetic assertion of the essential unity of consciousness as a point of view for the critical analysis of mental processes whether or not we admit with McCosh that quote, Kant was distinguished more as a logical thinker and systematizer than as a careful observer of what actually takes place in the mind end quote or with Huxley that quote, his baggage train is bigger than his army Maxim is too often led to suspect that he has won a position when he has only captured a mob of useless camp followers end quote we cannot deny that Kant revolutionized the world of speculative and practical thought by introducing a new point of view for the study of mental phenomena and that to this extent at least he is as he himself claimed to be the Copernicus of mental science end quote realistic philosophy volume 2 page 197 Hume page 80 end of footnote Kant inaugurated transcendental criticism now criticism in the sense of a critical examination of experience or the analysis of common consciousness is undoubtedly the beginning of philosophical inquiry and knowledge is a starting point which philosophical method approves but philosophical method cannot approve the attempt to criticize all knowledge without the aid of principles or standards of criticism and such principles or standards Kant does not pretend to adopt we cannot regard as a canon of criticism the assumption that what is necessary and universal in our knowledge must be a priori an assumption which is untrue as to content yet it is to this assumption that Kant constantly recurs in his doctrine of categories in his classification of certain judgments as synthetic and a priori etc it is only in the practical order in the realm of moral consciousness that Kant finds refuge from the pan-phenomenalism which he wishes to avoid for the thing in itself the subject and God though existing are unknown and unknowable as far as the speculative reason is concerned Kant whose express purpose was to deliver philosophy from skepticism might well look back at Hume the skeptic and exclaim quote there but for the categorical imperative goes Immanuel Kant end quote end of chapter 63 chapter 64 of history of philosophy this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Kate McKenzie history of philosophy by William Turner chapter 64 modern philosophy German philosophy and the Schultz-Semitic movement Kant's philosophy was opposed by the exponents of Wolfian dogmatism such as Eberhardt 1739-1809 by the skeptic Schultz-Semitic 1761-1833 by the eclectic Herde 1744-1803 and by the Fideists Hamann 1730-1788 and Jacobi 1743-1819 it was defended and developed by Reinhold 1758-1823 who was successively a Jesuit novice a member of the Barnabite Order a member of the staff of the Deutsche Meer-Kur and professor of philosophy at Jena and Kiel with Reinhold are associated Salomon Maimon 1756-1800 Krogh 1770-1842 who was Kant's successor at Königsberg and Beck 1761-1840 who, like Fichte, attempted to give greater systematic unity to the Kantian system the poet Friedrich Schiller 1759-1805 contributed to popularizing the moral and aesthetic doctrines of Kant The Romantic Movement The Romantic Movement corresponded with the beginning of the area of national reconstruction in Germany and was not without effect on the development of philosophic thought in that country. It accentuated the importance of the spiritual life not only of the individual but of the race and even in a certain analogical sense of nature itself. Jean-Paul Richter 1763-1825 whose dialogue on the immortality of the soul entitled Campanatal is less widely known than it deserves to be of the Romanticists or as some prefer to consider him a forerunner of the Romantic movement. After passing through different phrases of subordination of individual spiritual progress to the general spiritual concept of nature Romanticism reached its final form in the writings of Novalis Friedrich von Hardenberg 1772-1801 Friedrich Schlegel 1772-1829 author of Lucinda turned ultimately from the cultus of genius to the profession of the Catholic faith where he found that emancipation from the limitations of the commonplace which he had in vain sought in Romanticism. It was Fichte who imparted to the Kantian system its highest systematic unity and at the same time combined the many and diverse elements of Romanticism in his assertion of the supremacy of the inner consciousness and inner spiritual life of the individual. Fichte Life Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born at Ramenao in Upper Lusetia in 1762. After studying at Meissen and at Pforte he took a course of theology at Jene and Leipzig. From 1788-1790 he lived at Zürich as family tutor. In 1791 he went to Königsberg and it was through Kant's influence that he was enabled to publish in 1792 his After that he published several political treatises. In 1794 he obtained the chair of philosophy at Jena and published his Wissenschaftslehre. On being dismissed from the University of Jena he lectured successively at Berlin, Erlangen and for a brief interval at Königsberg. In 1808 appeared the famous Reden an die Deutsche Nation and when in 1810 the University of Berlin was founded Fichte was appointed to a professorship which he held until his death in 1814. Sources Fichte's complete works were edited by his son J.H. Fichte in 1845- 1846. Several of Fichte's more important treatises were translated by Dr. William Smith under the title Fichte's Popular Works, 4th edition London 1889 The Wissenschaftslehre was translated by C. C. Everett Fichte's Science of Knowledge, Chicago 1884 and the Rechtslehre by A. E. Kröger the Science of Rights, London 1889 Consult Adamson, Fichte Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, Edinburgh and Philadelphia 1892 A. B. Thompson The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge, Boston 1895 Doctrines Starting Point and Aim Fichte is commonly said to hold to Kant and Spinoza the same relation that Plato held to Socrates and Parmenides. His immediate starting point is Kant's philosophy. His aim is to complete and unify what is incomplete and be partially unified in that system of thought. Kant was well aware that his theory of knowledge as expounded in the Critique of Pure Reason was in complete and lacking incoherent unity. But he was not equally conscious of the lack of a logical and consistent transition from the conclusions of the first critique to the principles with which the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment begin. It was Fichte's aim as indeed it was the aim of Schelling and Hegel to supply a single principle an all embracing formula which should at once complete Kant's analysis of speculative thought and afford a systematic and logical basis for the analysis of the data of ethics and aesthetics. Such a principle Fichte found in the ego which takes the place of the thing in itself as the ultimate reality and is, moreover, the ultimate in the practical as well as in the speculative order. For, in Fichte's Doctrine of the Ego we find that self does not stand merely for self-consciousness but also for duty. When he styled his most important constructive treatise Wissenschaftslehre he did not intend to convey the impression that his philosophy is merely an account of the methods of scientific research. He meant rather that it is a science of knowledge understanding by knowledge and a total of our experience as it presents itself in consciousness so that philosophy may be defined as a rethinking in self-consciousness of the experience which is presented as a completed whole in direct consciousness. It is usual to distinguish the earlier and the later forms of Fichte's philosophical system. Earlier form Here, we may further distinguish Fichte's theoretical and practical doctrines. A. Theoretical Philosophy Thought cannot be reduced to being but being can be reduced to thought. Similarly, thought cannot be derived from being but being can be derived from thought. Kant was unsuccessful in his synthesis of knowledge because he tried to deduce the categories and other forms of thought from the logical relations of subject to predicate and therefore ultimately from experience. If, on the contrary, we deduce the forms of thought from the nature of consciousness we shall find that experience and all its numeral content the thing in itself are capable of being derived from the conscious activity of the ego from the deed acts Tathandlungen of the thinking subject. Thus, the thing in itself is absorbed so to speak in the subject and instead of ultimate dualism we have idealistic monism. The ego and the ego alone is real. We need not go beyond experience to find the ultimate reality but in our analysis of experience we abstract the ego which is therefore transcendental, though not transcendent. The Three Principles Taking up now the deed acts of consciousness we find that in every act of self-contemplation we affirm or posit the identity of subject and object the self as representing and the self as represented we have therefore the first principle the ego posits itself. It is hardly necessary to point out that by ego fichte does not mean the individual but the universal self-consciousness the ei-ness ichheit Take the proposition a equals a it posits nothing about a. For a is for the ego simply and solely by virtue of being posited by the ego therefore the nexus between a and a is the position of the ego the affirmation that I am. What considered in the abstract is the logical law of identity is in its application to objects the only category of reality. But if we continue our examination of the facts of empirical consciousness we find there a certain opposition which may be expressed in the general formula not a is not equal to a not to be confounded with not a equals not a which is a case of identity and if we treat this proposition as we treated the first we find that it means that in the ego the non-ego is opposed to the ego here we have the second principle a non-ego is opposed to the ego now since the ego is the only reality it is through the ego that the non-ego is posited and the ego denied therefore the ego both posits and negates itself it is however as fundamental for fichte as it was for spinosa that all negation is limitation therefore the ego in part negates the non-ego and the non-ego in part negates the ego which is the third principle in this thesis, antithesis and synthesis we find the germ of the hegelian triadism it is important to note also that fichte identifies the ego with self-activity and teaches that it exists not only for itself but through itself durch sich from these principles fichte deduces not only the fundamental laws of thought but also the fundamental laws of being the law of causation the principle of sufficient reason etc the question however remains to be answered why does the ego interrupt the unbroken activity by which it posits itself why does it posit the non-ego fichte we have already said regards the idea of duty as no less essential to the ego than the idea of self-consciousness taking up therefore the moral aspect of the ego he answers that effort and struggle are necessary for the attainment of the highest good the ego posits the non-ego in order to make effort and struggle possible the ego is theoretical in order to be practical it is a non-ego in order to act upon it to overcome its limitations and thus to make it disappear in the ego this consideration is the basis of practical philosophy B. practical philosophy without conflict there is no morality activity is therefore the essence of morality and inertness is the radical evil man should strive to become self-dependent and thereby attain independence and freedom to this general maxim is added the special rule of conduct for each individual always follow the inner necessity which urges you to attain to freedom through action fulfill your vocation act according to your conscience besides this internal necessity conscience fichte admits an external necessity namely right which has exclusive reference to external conduct just as conscience refers to internal disposition although right is external it originates from the ego for as in general the ego in positing itself posits also the non-ego so the practical ego in positing itself as a free agent posits the other self the thou as another free agent from the coexistence of free agents arises the limitation of the freedom of the ego imposed by the necessity of respecting the freedom of others this necessity is right the law of right is therefore to limit thy freedom that others may be free along with thee when this limitation is not observed and the freedom of others is infringed it is the duty of the state not of the individual who is injured to interfere and enforce the observance of the limitations of freedom and as it is the duty of the state to safeguard the rights of its subjects it is the mission of the church to impress on all men by means of symbols the limitations of the individual and by doing so to deepen and strengthen moral convictions later form a fichte's philosophy during the last years of his life fichte devoted special attention to the political and religious aspects of his philosophy of self-consciousness his addresses to the german nation contributed much to the growth of the national ideal among his fellow countrymen an ideal which was realised in the educational and political reconstruction of the country during the latter half of the 19th century in the later expositions of the science of knowledge he developed his religious philosophy bringing out into special prominence the truth that in the deity there is something more than self-consciousness that in piety there is something more than moral conduct and that religion is therefore something more than philosophy and ethics for it is peace and life and blessed love the ego which he had identified with God he now regards as an image of the absolute God here we see on the one hand the influence of spinosa's pantheism and on the other that of the christian doctrine of the logos in the historical position fichte's system is the first of a series of post-cantian efforts to reduce the incomplete synthesis which cant had affected to a more compact and coherent form by substituting the unity of a single formula for the cantian trinity of idea, thing in itself and subject the formula which fichte proposed was the ego from this he deduced all thought and all being including the thing in itself and from the ego he derived all reality as the neo-platinists had derived it from the one and spinosa from the substance his philosophy is therefore monistic it may be styled a system of subjective idealism or pan-egoism if when we use the term pan-egoism we remember fichte's protest against identifying the ego with individual self-consciousness fichte's relation to cant and his place in the romantic movement are evident in his doctrine of the essentially ethical aspect of the activity of the ego the inclusion of duty or spiritual activity as well as conscious representation in the notion of self Schelling Life Friedrich Wilhelm Josef von Schelling was born at Leonberg in Württemberg in 1775 at the age of 16 he entered the theological seminary at Tübingen where he studied theology, philosophy and philology he spent the years 1796 to 1797 at Leipzig where while fulfilling his duties as tutor to a young nobleman he studied mathematics and natural science and published his first work Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur in 1798 he was appointed to lecture at Jena where he had fichte for a colleague from 1803 to 1841 he taught successively at Wurzburg, Erlangen and Munich in 1841 he was made member of the Academy of Sciences at Berlin and lectured at the University for several years he died at Regatz in Switzerland in 1854 sources, besides the Ideen Schelling wrote several treatises on the philosophy of nature he contributed to the philosophy of religion and of mythology several important treatises the most systematic of his works is Der Transcendentale Idealismus published in 1800 his works were collected and published in 14 volumes by his son Stuttgart and Augsburg 1856 Consult Watsons Schelling's Transcendental Idealism Griggs' Philosophical Classics Chicago 1882 doctrines general character of Schelling's philosophy while Schelling was a student at Tübingen his favourite authors were Kant Fichte and Spinoza later he came in contact with Hegel and was impelled by a way of reaction against Hegel's naturalism to turn for inspiration to the mysticism of the Neoplatonists and of Jacob Böhme Herde and Giordano Bruno also left traces of their influence on his philosophy Schelling was at first a disciple of Fichte but he subsequently transferred his allegiance to different schools in succession and since as Hegel said he carried on his studies in public he expounded successively at least five different systems first system previously to the publication of Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature 1797 Schelling adhered to the doctrines of Fichte Schelling was at first a disciple of the doctrines of Fichte second system during the years 1797 to 1800 the most productive period of his literary life Schelling expounded a philosophy of nature and a transcendental philosophy of spirit one philosophy of nature Fichte regarded nature as merely a limitation of the ego as at most a means to the exercise of man's spiritual and moral activity Schelling advocates the recognition of nature as a source of spiritual activity he teaches that nature is not merely object but also subject not indeed a subject fully conscious or completely awake but semi-conscious and slumbering we should therefore study nature in order to discover the laws by which spirit is developed out of nature into self-consciousness for nature is not the antithesis of spirit both being the product of a higher principle which posits nature where when it reflects itself imperfectly and through nature attains to spirit where it reflects itself consciously and to that extent adequately empirical physics regards nature as mere being or product speculative physics the philosophy of nature looks upon nature as becoming or productive but just as Fichte recognized the limitations of the activity of the ego Schelling limits the productivity of nature by positing its essential polarity if he observes there were no arrest of productivity nature would continue striving towards the infinite and there would be no product there is therefore a retarding as well as a stimulating force all nature is dual the magnet with its union of opposite polar forces is the symbol of the life and productive activity of nature in an essay entitled on the world soul 1798 Schelling developed the idea of an animated nature pervaded by an organizing principle which originates and maintains the conflict of contending forces hence the inorganic is to be explained by the organic and in general the lower by the higher 2 transcendental philosophy of spirit the philosophy of spirit concerns itself with the phenomena of the spirit as they manifest themselves in representation action and artistic enjoyment we have therefore three divisions of transcendental philosophy a theoretical philosophy here we start with self-consciousness and proceed to explain how it is that we represent to ourselves certain images of external reality or in other words how it is that in the active representation we feel compelled as it were by an external something to represent in a certain manner the general explanation is that there are two opposing forces the one real and the other ideal which by their alternate action limit the spirit to the state of sensation then to that of reflection and finally to that of volition which is at once the culmination of the theoretical life and the beginning of the practical life of the spirit here we start with impulse which arises from the theoretical activity of the spirit positing the distinction between self and not self and which differs from that theoretical activity by a mere difference of degree progress in moral life means the gradual overcoming of the non-ego and the final goal of moral striving is complete independence of the ego as well it is only in the initial concept of nature as reproduced not produced by the ego and in the supplementary considerations on law state and history that shelling differs from fichte in his practical philosophy both identify moral life with independence see aesthetic philosophy in the theory of art shelling introduces Kant's notion of the beautiful modifying it as he modified Kant's theological concept to suit the needs of his more compact idealistic system the beautiful he teaches is the perfect realisation of the union of the subjective and objective a union to which history approximates but which art accomplishes in art the antithesis between the real and the ideal between action and representation between impulse and reflection disappears art is therefore the solution of all the problems of philosophy so far shelling may be said to have extended and modified the subjective idealism of fichte by distinguishing the philosophy of nature from that of spirit and by recognising as the Prius of both nature and spirit a common ground or principle from which both are deduced in his third system he emphasises the importance of this principle which he calls the absolute in which he defines as the identity of the real and the ideal here the line of thought and even the method and manner of exposition are spinosistic to the philosophy of nature and the transcendental philosophy of spirit which still remain as integral portions of the system there is added the philosophy of identity in which all things are viewed subspecie attorney and are thus led back to the absolute god in whom they are identified it is important however to note that the identification of the real and the ideal in the absolute is complete not because of the power of the absolute to develop the real and the ideal but because of its indetermination on account of this indetermination shelling's absolute was compared by Hegel to the night in which all cows are black in the derivation of the real from the absolute we are to distinguish three moments gravity light and organization the organic concept of nature is however preserved for even in the first moment organization is present in as much as the inorganic is the residuum of the organic that which failed to attain complete organization fourth system in the fourth system shelling after the manner of the neoplatonists accounts for the origin of the universe by a breaking away or falling off from the absolute in the previous system the world was swallowed up so to speak in the indifference of the absolute now it is placed in striking contrast with it and the independence of the absolute is emphasized we find in this fourth system a fuller and deeper realization of the problem of evil and at least an implied confession of the inability of monism to account satisfactorily for the existence of evil in the world fifth system this may be briefly described as a theogony and cosmogony after the manner of Jacob Burma historical position shelling's philosophy is deserving of careful study both by reason of its intrinsic importance and of the influence direct and indirect which it exerted on other systems it offers however more than usual difficulty because of the wealth of imaginative power which shelling brought to bear on even the most abstruse problems of metaphysics and also because of the successive change of view in the five periods into which his mental history is divided taking the third system the philosophy of identity as the most typical stage in the development of shelling's thought we may describe it as a system of idealistic monism in which subject and object are identified in the indifference of the absolute thus it stands contrasted on the one hand with the subjective idealism of fichte and on the other with the dynamic idealism of hegel who identified subject and object in an absolute which is universal not because it is indifferent but because in it all differences are eminently contained before we pass to the study of hegel mention must be made of the disciples and co-workers of shelling who represent different phases of his philosophy of nature and his philosophy of religion among the naturalists influenced by shelling are Steffens 1773-1845 Oaken 1779-1851 Schubert and Karos 1789-1869 all of whom were distinguished in their day as biologists, physicists or psychologists among the philosophers of religion whom shelling influenced the two best known are Bader 1765-1841 who from the catholic standpoint attempted a religio-philosophical synthesis of neoplatonism scholasticism post-medieval mysticism and german transcendental philosophy and Schleiermache 1768-1834 who from the Protestant standpoint endeavoured to combine the most varied elements in an eclectic philosophy of religion End of chapter 64