 Okay, so as I say, I'd like to touch on six points today. Three of them are short term and three of them are longer term. The three short term ones are the impact of the exchange rate, the U.K. economy itself and the implications of Brexit for the European wider global economy. The three longer term ones are what the post-Brexit trade relationship between the EU27 and the U.K. will look like. The fourth point is FDI issues and the final issue relates to the general disintegration point about the remaining 27, which I think is now a non-negligible risk, so some few thoughts on that. Okay, so over the past, on the exchange rate, over the past 12 hours, the movements in Stirling have been some of the biggest in that currency's long history. We know in Ireland that our exports to the U.K. are sensitive to movements in the euro Stirling exchange rate. We've seen that since Stirling started to fall in value last autumn, Irish exports, goods exports have fallen over the past nine months, eight, nine months or so. Given the risk to Stirling and the possibility of a much more significant correction, that is a clear downside risk for the Irish economy. One of the points that I haven't heard mentioned this morning is the size of Britain's current account deficit. One of the best indicators of predictors of what happens to currencies and currency movements are not, don't lend themselves to predictions, but one of the good things to watch is the size of a country's current account deficit. That's the difference between the amount a country earns from the rest of the world and the amount it pays out. Britain has been running one of the biggest current account deficits in the post-Second World War era right now. Those deficits tend when a country runs a large deficit like that and it has a floating exchange rate, they can often lead to big movements. There is an underlying overpricing of Stirling in recent times and that is a significant additional risk factor along with the Brexit shock. Moving on to the U.K. economy itself, it's been slowing in recent months. Bank of England has attributed that to uncertainty over the Brexit issue. Just purely from a numerical perspective, if one in four British companies were to postpone their investment decisions in plant machinery premises for six months, that would just be, that in itself would be enough to push the U.K. economy into a technical recession. Given the uncertainties that have now arisen around the Brexit picture, it's very easy to see British companies pulling back from investment, if only for the short term, it could be longer but certainly in the shorter term. Up to now, U.K. consumers have been quite resilient but if there were to be an investment recession, it's easy to see how that could spill over into the consumer side of the economy which is much bigger. So it's very easy to see a more sharper downturn of the U.K. economy and or a U.K. recession. If we were to put the two things together, a weaker sterling and a recession in the U.K., clearly there are big implications for the Irish economy by those, as a result of those two things happening together. What about the impact, the third point, the impact of Brexit on Europe and global recession? I think it's important to say that big financial market crashes and movements don't always feed into the real economy. We saw that in Black Monday back in the 80s, for example. So it's possible that there won't be as big an impact as maybe some people believe. The European economy, the recovery, has been fragile. It is also perfectly possible that it will have an impact. My hunch is that it will have quite a small impact on the European economy. In the short term. Okay. Moving on to the longer-term issues around, first of all, in terms of EU-UK relations. It's important, and I think it's already been said, is the extreme complexity of negotiating trade deals. The current World Trade Organization, the DOA round, has been going out for 15 years. Now, it's not going anywhere, but that just gives an indication of how long these things can take. The EU-Canada free trade agreement that has recently been concluded took many years, and that's been considered as a model, as a potential model for EU-UK relations. So these things take a lot of time, so there's huge uncertainty about it. It's also worth repeating, and I think it has been said that we can have no special deal. There is no such thing as a bilateral trade deal between a member of the EU and a third country. So there won't be special deals, and you still hear people say that it'll be all right. We'll work something out. There'll be a special deal between Ireland and the UK. That can only happen if we leave the European Union. So no bilateral agreement. So there will be almost certainly additional barriers to trade between the EU and the UK. The only question is, will they be big ones, or will they be small? And I think it's fair to say that economists, while we don't agree on much, one of the things that is universally agreed on is the higher the barriers, the more barriers you have to commercial activity, the less commercial activity you get. So that is a very clear longer-term downside. And there's also the issue in terms of those negotiations. There will be no desire or there will certainly be concern about appearing to give Britain the best of both worlds, being both in, out of the EU, but retaining all of the upsides in terms of market access. And just that point that it has been said that Ireland is always traded with the UK. Of course it has, but it's a little like said, and there's nothing to worry about. That's a little like saying that there's always been climate change. We don't have to worry about climate change. It is a very significant risk to Ireland. The fifth longer-term issue is the FDI piece. This is the only, to my mind, the solitary upside from Britain leaving in terms of FDI being attracted, coming to Ireland, both British companies that service the European market from the UK potential that they could move part of their operations, the EU part of their operations to Ireland, as well as non-British companies. Britain has the largest stock of foreign direct investment in Europe by a considerable distance. Only a small portion of that moving to Ireland would have a major impact on our economy. But it's also, it hasn't been said as much, that equally, if there are high barriers to trade between Ireland and the UK, that will also create an incentive for companies based here who service the UK market to jump those barriers by shifting their operations or part of their operations to the UK. So there's a downside FDI threat as well in terms of existing FDI here moving to the UK to make sure that they are behind whatever tower of barriers or trade barriers that come into existence. Finally, the issue of disintegration. Whenever we think about risk, we always think about the probability of the impact. Now, even if the probability of the single market and the euro were to disappear, even if those probabilities are low, the impact is extremely high. In terms of the euro, we know that from the 2010-2012 period where there was a risk the currency would cease to exist. And the impact on the real economy in Europe was disastrous, led to a protracted recession, which came after the recession in 2008-2009. The integrity of the single market can't be stressed enough for this country. Is our economic model more than any other member state is based on having access to the single market? There is no other member state-oriented OECD country whose economy, whose employment depends as much on foreign companies as ours does. So our model is very much based on having full access to the European single market. Any threat to that would be much more significant than whatever deterioration in the relationship between Ireland and the UK and the EU. So that is, if this is to trigger a disintegration, that would be an enormous risk for this country and this economy. Thank you.