 Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, and to our leader this evening, Catherine, ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, diplomats, excellencies, leaders of our public sector, the Chief of Navy, I see in the front row here, and so many friends and colleagues who have joined us here tonight, but most particularly the author, Professor Metcalf. Thank you for your welcome and your kind introduction. Helen, please pass on our very best wishes from a long distance to Brian. I also acknowledge the traditional owners of the land on which we are meeting here this evening, the Ngunnawal people, and pay my respects to their elders past and present and emerging. I also acknowledge my colleague in the Senate, the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Wong. We are both, I presume, in the midst of estimates, travails of one sort and another, and you will hopefully excuse at the very least my early departure during this evening's proceedings. It is, as Helen has reminded us, always good to be here at ANU and particularly at the National Security College, ANU itself, an institution that has led and defined our national discourse for decades. I want to start by congratulating our author, by congratulating Professor Metcalf on contest for the Indo-Pacific and its US version, which as Rory reminds me, has to have the word America in it to be sold in the United States, productively. The opportunities and the challenges that are explored in this work are not actually academic, because as Australia's foreign minister, I and the government deal with them in one way or another every day. I want to focus tonight on how we perceive and how we respond to the notion of a contest. There is a somewhat persistent chorus about how we live in a time of great power competition, but really that begs the question of whether that's all that's going on in the 21st century. And I think it's far from the reality. The numerous risks and challenges facing our region, which are supercharged by unprecedented connectivity and technology, have motivated us to think hard about how we define and actively project our national voice in what is admittedly a much more complex world. We cannot and we will not be a passive player as the world changes in our region and more broadly. As power, wealth and influence has moved rapidly back to our region in recent decades, Australia is well placed to contributing to shaping what Rory observes as the centre of gravity in a connected world. That's what our region expects of us. Across the region, our perspectives are highly regarded as a valuable contribution that has real and tangible influence. That includes our steadfast support for free and liberal trading rules which have underpinned Australia's 29 years of consecutive annual economic growth. Our clear and equivocal advocacy of resilient sovereign states that determine their own futures in their national interests and cooperate on the basis of shared interests. Our defence of individual human rights and freedoms in the face of illiberal and authoritarian oppression. Our practical and positive vision for an Indo-Pacific in which states and individuals make their own decisions free from coercion and intimidation. And as the contest for the future of our region intensifies, we're clear in articulating and promoting the fact that Australia's perspectives, Australia's values, Australia's principles have universal application. The government is focused on playing our role in shaping the evolution of the Indo-Pacific in ways that advance the interests of Australia and other countries in the region. The environment that will best support us through the 2030s and beyond is one that is open, inclusive and prosperous. And this is the one that we will continue to promote. And it's in this vein that I commend Rory's contribution. It has pirates, elephants, dragons, empires, presidents and a phantom menace. It's fast paced, a letter to the Indo-Pacific that is fundamentally optimistic about the role that Australia can play. As Professor Medcaf rightly reflects, Australia was the first government to formally start using the concept of the Indo-Pacific as our strategic framework for the critical region in which we live. In fact, we've been using the term Indo-Pacific for almost as long as Rory. Australia is a nation that is deeply ingrained in both the Pacific and Indian oceans. The term Indo-Pacific, as the book records, serves as a signal that we do not and should not see our region in terms of false binaries. Our region is made up of much more than the strategic competition between the United States and China. Indeed, we share one of the core premises of Professor Medcaf's book, that the regional players, not just the global superpowers, can have a profound impact in shaping the region's future. Australia is doing this through our expanded and deepened engagement, both through our Pacific step-up and with the region more broadly. Our approach to the Indo-Pacific has ASEAN centrality at its heart. As ASEAN nations said last year in their outlook on the Indo-Pacific, they want a region marked by peace, stability, security and prosperity. So do we. As the Prime Minister has said, this means backing the rights of all nations, large and small, to make their own decisions, to be who they are. We're engaged at all levels with our South East Asian friends and neighbours. In February, I became Australia's first foreign minister to make a bilateral visit to Brunei. I travelled again to Indonesia in early December with Minister Reynolds for our annual two plus two meeting. And of course, we recently hosted and welcomed President Wododo here in Australia. Before that, my counterpart from Malaysia, Saifud and Abdullah. In fact, on a cursory examination of the last few years, I know that I've visited nine out of ten, one to go. As ASEAN's either as Defence Minister or as Foreign Minister for very productive exchanges and engagements in the last four and a half years. Our relationships in the region have grown and changed. They are richer and more buried than in the past. And they reflect South East Asia's growing economic heft, shown in particular by things like the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and the regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which again has ASEAN at its core. The Indo-Pacific region has its share of challenges, as I said. Long-term shifts in power relatives, unpredictable development trajectories, economic instability from time to time and the need for infrastructure, the recognition of the impact of natural disasters and climate change amongst them. New and complex challenges will emerge over the coming years, and a reading of the final chapter of Professor Medcalf's book adverts to many of those. But the key principles that guide our engagement with the region must remain consistent. A commitment to open markets with trade relationships based on rules, not coercion. An approach which protects sovereignty and builds resilience, respect for international law and the peaceful resolution of disputes without the threat or use of coercive power. A commitment to supporting ASEAN centrality and strong and resilient regional architecture. We are putting these principles into practice every day. Our focus is on encouraging the strongest possible US engagement in the region's economic and security affairs based on our enduring alliance. On working more closely than ever before with other partners like Japan and Indonesia, India, South Korea and Vietnam. A constructive relationship with China, whereby we pursue the key aspects of our broader relationship and trade, all the while managing those issues on which we have differences. Both stepping up in the Pacific across the board and maintaining our focus on continuing to be a partner of choice in Southeast Asia. Building resilience and leading collaboration on issues such as cyber security, on infrastructure development and maritime security. And speaking up to preserve the established rules and norms to guide constructive cooperation. Indeed, we share one of the core premises of Rory's book. That was not quite what I meant to do. Indeed, I'm sorry, this is an agenda that has a great deal of momentum behind it. Across the entire government, we are, as a team, putting our shoulders to the same wheel. So it's challenging as our strategic paradigm is. Rory's book is not essentially pessimistic and nor are we. It's been a challenging start to the decade, by any means. I don't know about you, but Christmas seems a very long time ago. We have had significant bushfires. We've seen the increase of tensions between Iran and the United States. We have the outbreak of a coronavirus, the impacts of which are still playing out. Ladies and gentlemen, as Australian policymakers, grapple with these challenges. Professor Medkaaf has, in his work before us today, made what I regard as a deeply insightful and timely contribution that I commend to you all. I have had it in estimates with me this week, which accounts for the blank cover. Too many ministers before me have been pinged for their reading material. I think I would have been proud of this one, but why create a story if you don't have to. Thank you all for your support and interest this evening. I wish Professor Medkaaf the very best with his work, the very best here in Australia and internationally, indeed, as Helen observed. And I look forward to hearing much more from those who have had an opportunity to read it. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Payne. I can't let this moment pass. It's a particular pleasure for me in the week that ANU advertises the position of director for the Global Institute for Women's Leadership here in the Pacific. It is a particular pleasure for me to be introducing both the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, and indeed the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, all of whom are women. And this is, I'm sure, really will indulge me in just commenting that this is both unusual, but hopefully something that will remain unusual for not too much longer. Anyway, moving along, it's my very great pleasure to introduce Senator, the Honourable Penny Wong, the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the Opposition in the Senate. Senator Wong is the first woman to hold both of her roles. She's been the Shadow Foreign Minister since 2016 and has been a consistently strong voice on Australia's place in the world and our Indo-Pacific region. Senator Wong is also a good friend of the college and the ANU, including the colleges Biennial Women in National Security Conference. So please join me in welcoming Senator Wong. Can I start by acknowledging the traditional owners of this land on which we meet and paying my respects to the eldest, past and present. Thank you for that introduction, Helen. Can I acknowledge my parliamentary colleague, the Minister, to Secretary Adamson, Secretary Moriarty, to Nick Warner, senior members of the Defence Force, Chief of Navy, to Excellencies and members of the Diplomatic Corps, Professor Metcalf, it's thank you very much for the opportunity to be here and to participate in this launch of what is a very important contribution to Australia's foreign policy debate. I am grateful to have been asked to launch this and to be here with Maurice to affirm our bipartisan approach to the Indo-Pacific and to the challenge of fully realising Australia's place in it. More so, I'm particularly grateful that Rory has been willing to take on the task this book represents. You see, admiring the problem is relatively easy. Many an elegant phrase has been written about the present disruption and describing the strategic competition that defines our current circumstances. It is far harder to posit how we might respond. Certainly when I took on this portfolio, I commented that the playbook of decades past may be of limited utility in dealing with the challenges that lie ahead. That's a confronting realisation for us and one which gives rise to a wide range of consequences and demands. Amongst these is a willingness to go beyond existing habits and comfortable orthodoxies to take on the risk of articulating different approaches. That can be risky, but it is exactly what we need from policy makers, thinkers and practitioners and this is what Rory has done. So I thank him for that and thank also the National Security College and the ANU for this contribution. So within that frame I want to share briefly my impressions of this book. In the time frame I have these are necessarily truncated. Edgar, Rory's son is reading the book, he described it as somewhat dense. I think he means in terms of content. So I will do my best to give you a brief take out from my perspective. First the Indo-Pacific is both a strategic construct and mental map of our region is key to navigating our present circumstances. As you know Labor was an early adopter of the Indo-Pacific perspective, thanks primarily to prominent Western Australians Kim Beasley and Steven Smith. This was continued by Prime Minister Rodin Gillard and I'm pleased that the bipartisan acceptance of the Indo-Pacific as our primary region of strategic interest has continued. Australia as a dual ocean facing middle or rather substantial power faces an increasingly competitive relationship between our closest ally and our largest economic partner. And we must do more than simply navigate the slipstream of great power competition. Secondly, adhering to the binary of choice between the US and China, a narrative that is constructed primarily as one of containment or accommodation is not in our interests. As a US ally, security partner and friend we have already made a choice. But that is not the end of the matter. Realising the region we want in the decades ahead demands multi-parlarity, not just binary competition. You see our real choice is actually what sort of region we want and how we best work towards that. Thirdly, shaping the region we want highlights importance of partnerships in our region. Professor Medkaaf writes of the difference that middle powers can make whilst working together and while their vital interests are at stake. Fourth, the risk of armed mistrust between the world's two largest economies is becoming too prevalent. Competition in certain sectors is outweighing cooperation and there is a rising risk of confrontation by mistake or by design. Amongst these elevated risks, of course, is climate change, encapsulated by the author as a potent interplay between vulnerable populations, rival nations and extreme weather events. And of course there is the more impending risk of a global pandemic and the stress this gives rise to in terms of the international health system and the global economy. It is a particularly acute risk in developing countries. The consequential imperative for our government is to work to elevate cooperation and those mechanisms that lessen the risk of escalation. Whether this is through diplomatic architecture, confidence building measures for practical risk reduction, working to build greater predictability and transparency to lessen the likelihood of confrontation or generating cooperation around shared interests, we need to tilt the balance away from competition and confrontation. As Rory points out coexistence reinforced by diplomacy and deterrence is essential to our interests. This task demands a comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy that has the resources to demonstrate our consistency in the region and ensures that outcomes are not only determined by power. I regret that this task has not been helped by the government's step down in our development assistance to Southeast Asia. We also need to work together to enhance the resilience of the Australian nation to navigate this period. As Rory makes clear this calls for a better integration of policy across security, economics, diplomacy and the information sphere. We need to work to get beyond zero some false binaries with position security against economics. And I would also add we need less domestic politics and greater bipartisanship. But by partisanship I mean less an absence of disagreement and rather more shared purpose and deeper engagement across the parliament and across the parties of government. Which is why in Rory's own words it was short-sighted that parliamentarians continued to be denied comprehensive briefings on China by our security agencies. It stands to reason that the discussion on managing this complex and consequential relationship can only be enhanced by access to sound analysis. And while efforts to safeguard our sovereignty are necessary we also need to ensure that our communities, particularly ethnic Chinese communities are not marginalised as a result. Remember defending our democracy is about protecting the equal rights of all Australians as citizens. So the Indo-Pacific perspective is necessary is a necessary prerequisite to the realisation and protection of Australian interests. But it is not of itself sufficient. Our capacity to prosecute our interests is also intrinsically influenced by our identity. The narrative of who we are as a nation and as a people. And in order to be a trusted partner and champion of our values and interests we need to deepen our understanding of the region and we need to more effectively tell our own story. We are a multicultural country with a growing proportion of Australians with Asian heritage. Elevating these dynamic diaspora stories must be at the forefront of our engagement in the region, particularly Southeast Asia. And we are also home to the world's oldest living culture. But the stories of our First Nations peoples are not told enough. In this unprecedented information age a unifying and inclusive national story which more fully expresses who we are only serves to strengthen our relationship with our neighbours and Australia's place in the region. Our aspiration should be to work together to shape the region we want at all levels politically, economically, strategically and culturally. Rory's book is a vital contribution to this important ongoing discussion. So I thank him for his preparedness to take on the thorny issues and complex problems that demand solutions. And I thank him for his graciousness in inviting me to be part of launching it. Thank you Senator Wong. So we've heard from two people who have read the book. Probably about time we heard from the person who wrote the book. So without further ado it gives me very great pleasure to welcome Professor Rory Madcough to the stage. Thank you. Thank you very much Professor Sullivan. And I want to extend particular thanks both to the minister, to Senator Payne and also to Senator Wong for I think I was very gracious but also rather insightful remarks as well. It's great to see that these are such live issues. I'll also of course join my colleagues in acknowledging the traditional owners of the land than unawal people and their elders past, present and emerging. Now I warn you all there are going to be some maps in a moment in my students. My students at the National Security College are all too all too familiar with what that means. But I promise there won't be many. You're going to have to read the book if you want the full cartographic horror. Seriously though it's really good to see that in such a disrupted world we're getting a sense of agreement on such important things. By partisanship at least on the need for this country to make its way in the Indo-Pacific. This is the place in the world I would argue that for Australia is literally home between of course the sea lanes of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. At one level the subject of the book I guess seems obvious and my apologies to those colleagues from the Department of Defence who drew the original of this map which the excellent ANU cartographic service, our own geospatial agency here at the ANU have kindly I guess replicated for the purposes of my book. But quite seriously Australia's place in the world defines the opportunities and the limits of what we can achieve as a country what we can do to protect and to advance our interests. Now as explained in my book in contests of the Indo-Pacific and as noted by our speakers Australia was the first country to declare this redefined region of basis for policy and governments from both sides have built this vision such that what we would call an Indo-Pacific strategy connecting ways means and ends is now the holy grail for Australian foreign policy and frankly it's the holy grail for every foreign and security policy in the region. Easier said than done. As an Australian I would say that with the Indo-Pacific we no longer need to ask the region whether we're a part of it by definition Australia is here. What exactly though do we mean by the Indo-Pacific? Why should a mere map and there are skeptics and I fully sympathise with you but why should a mere map matter to the fates of nations and to the welfare of people. These are absolutely the right questions in this age when from bushfires to pandemics we're seeing so-called black swans spreading their wings across the region. Well I would say we're talking really about mental maps that is maps in the mind that are about power they're about priorities they're about imagination. These maps throughout history have defined the allocation of resources and attention the ranking of friends and prospective foes as well who is invited and who is overlooked at the top tables of diplomacy what gets talked about what gets done and what does not. They also go to the question of military capabilities and investment of infrastructure and what are the risk vectors that we need to meet and where do we meet them. And so for Australia the Indo-Pacific is a useful way and I emphasise useful way of understanding our part of the world. The maritime region centred on Southeast Asia connected by the sea to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. And I'd argue that it has replaced what was known as the Asia Pacific which itself provided great utility for the past few decades of the 20th century but in these things nothing is permanent. And I would note naming our former Chancellor Gareth Evans for a moment that the Asia Pacific was the received wisdom when I was a somewhat more clean shaven recruit to the Australian Foreign Ministry back in the era of Gareth Evans and Alexander Downer. Now the Asia Pacific was useful in its time because it was essential to the diplomacy of bringing together North America, East Asia and the Pacific at the end of the Cold War and it was a novelty too. In fact it took many years to catch on. Including in China such that by the time it finally did its days were already numbered because the Asia Pacific blanked out the Indian Ocean, India, South Asia it inadvertently downplayed the centrality of Southeast Asia and it did not envisage how far and how fast China's interests and power and ambition would compel it to turn south and west and indeed across the sea. In fact the very same year that China joined APEC that gathering of 14 men, I should note for our guests that gathering of 14 men in windy Seattle in 1993, China crossed an even more momentous threshold because its runaway economy made it a net importer of oil. Thus it was a matter of time before China would return its navy to the Indian Ocean for the first time in 600 years going Indo-Pacific and this time planning to be there to stay. So this idea of the Indo-Pacific is reflecting those larger horizons of connectivity of contestation of risk that have evolved over the past 20 years. It's what we would call a many-sided region. It's multi-polar. My book argues that this is a region defined by the intersecting interests of many powers and importantly it encourages agency among middle players such as Australia, such as Indonesia, India, Japan and others. Solidarity and strength that they draw from their shared position in this vast space. This is a region made for multi-polarity and too big for hegemony. In fact, I would argue that the apparent ambitions we're seeing from China across the Indo-Pacific, the Belt and Road and a footprint of security presence and political influence will prove unsustainable over time. We're seeing this year of course the public health and economic crisis of coronavirus and I believe that this provides a moment of reflection for us all to think about the risks for any country of overstretch, especially due to combinations of domestic pressures and indeed the pushback and the staying power of other countries which want to seek that greater solidarity through the Indo-Pacific geography. It's a contention of my book and I would argue that frankly in the long run this is in China's interests too but other nations standing firm to help China find a kind of a settling point in the Indo-Pacific short of confrontational conflict. This is in everyone's interest. Now I think we heard a little bit about dragons and pirates and such like that I've tried to liven up my book with and I'm sure my son will get to those bits in time but the past does hold really important clues as to why I think any power and for now that means China will struggle to dominate the Indo-Pacific. As I warned it's a book about history and it's a little book about maps as well and it's important I think to see that the Indo-Pacific which many of us think of is simply a useful tool for policy makers in the present time is actually a more viable description of the way our region has evolved throughout history. So a quick detour through maps. This particular map the Cognito map from 1402 1402 in Korea very powerfully captured the fact that Asia was always one in a sense but more I guess of the the Mandala I guess rather than a centre with many tributaries. Asia was united through many centres, many belts, many roads, many influences, many cultures. And so we see a map here for example that captures East Asia, South Asia and indeed Africa all in the one frame in the early 1400s reflecting also contact with Europe. We have to know that the term the Indo-Pacific is not so new in fact it's recorded use goes back to around 1850. Science has long defined the Indo-Pacific as a connected space in the biogeography of ocean currents and marine science. So just ask the fish if you wonder about the connectivity of our region and the human precursors of the Indo-Pacific go back thousands of years to a proto economy of regional maritime trade and migration across this space. And then of course during recorded history this was followed by the spread of Hinduism and Islam and Buddhism to South East Asia and beyond Buddhism to China of course Japan and Korea. We saw Chinese tributary relations to South East Asia and very briefly to the Indian Ocean. And then of course we saw European colonialism and the consequent Pan-Asian resistance right across the map. In fact if you track the history of our region if you uncover the submerged history of our region from the 15th century to the 20th century the typical map of Asia caught the sweep of the Indo-Pacific two oceans India, South East Asia and China in a single frame. Now we should move briefly to the colonial period because this map which is my favourite and you'll find it in the book by Autelius of Antwerp one of the great cartographers of the 1500s captured in 1570 a world that we can recognise if you spare for a moment the sea monsters, the mermaids and so forth perhaps more or less fictional than the nine dash line but I can leave that to others to debate. It captures all of maritime Asia in a single frame. The seaports and the sea lanes the archipelago of South East Asia are central then just as now America actually matters and there it is along with what just may be the edge of Australia. In fact quite tantalisingly even in the world of 1570 someone seemed to know something about the special quality of this continent because if you look at that tiny little fragment of what just may be Australia in the centre of the southern edge of the map it's labelled beach. So moving on briefly through the colonial era the age of empires came and with it all of the all of the brutality all of the dark side of colonialism but also the binding the breaking and the binding the breaking the binding of the region again with a global system until we moved of course to what I would call the Indo-Pacific war that ended in 1945. And if you wonder why we should call it an Indo-Pacific war just remember that 700,000 volunteer Indian soldiers fought and that was only on only on the British side. If you look at the 17th, 18th 19th century conceptions of Asia both European and Asians alike imagined a increasingly and increasingly modern region as a recognisable Indo-Pacific maritime system significantly for Australia of course the idea that our region was essentially the Indo-Pacific goes back to 1848 and this wonderful map from the journal of the explorer Thomas Mitchell who was incidentally trying to find an overland route to get cavalry horses to India. You see even in those days we are spied to a defence export industry but Mitchell discovered I guess not only a land route to the north he also recognised the importance of those sea lanes to India to Southeast Asia to China and North Asia as being integral to Australia's region and identity and it's striking to see that his insights remain relevant to the present day the north and the western coasts of the country accentuated as gateways to Asia. Of course Mitchell meets his match in the modern time with a Chinese cartographic researcher how Zhejiang whose new Asia focus world map house map pivots to just as Mitchell's did and reimagines the grove quite powerfully will come back to that map in a moment. In the meantime it's worth noting that pivoting maps is quite in vogue and in fact this map that has been used by our defence minister accentuates also India and Southeast Asia accentuating Australia's geography for monitoring those sea lanes into the Indian Ocean. But let's go back to to house map for a moment because it's it's fascinating it was authorised by the Chinese government in the same year in 2013 the same year that the Belt and Road Initiative got underway. And as I said maps reflect not only power but strategic imagination. And I think this map speaks of ambition. It illuminates a certain world view note interestingly how the American continent is bisected and consigned to the edges of the world. But most curiously it centres the world not on China but on the Indian Ocean. It reinforces the idea I think that the Maritime Silk Road the ocean part of the Belt and Road is central to China's geoeconomic ambitions, opportunity and indeed risk as well. And of course this is reflected in many ways in visions of the Belt and Road that amorphous initiative that many of us still struggle to define. Our friends in China may not claim to like the term the Indo-Pacific but I think Chinese policy is living it. In fact, China has an Indo-Pacific strategy. The Maritime Silk Road the Indo-Pacific with Chinese characteristics. And this raises many questions. Are we I guess mistaken in Australia to be fixated on the maritime when of course Eurasia the land connections matter too. Now I would argue that for as long as sea transport is cheaper than land transport by bulk we will continue to see the sea prevail over the land but I'm happy to have that debate. And of course in military power sea power has a distinctive quality too that maritime nations like Australia know full well which is why I suspect nations like China are turning to the sea. In fact, it's interesting that if you turn to the military dimension of the Indo-Pacific and what in the book are termed I guess the far flung battle lines of the major powers in this region of both contest and cooperation. Again, the map the mental map that is informing much of that strategic policy is increasingly a two ocean map. Indeed, the Indian Ocean dominates the fascinating map that you see here in this photograph of the PLA battle command centre a few years ago when Xi Jinping staged a national televised video conference with the newly opened military base that China was establishing in far off Djibouti. Now my book does not take an entirely zero sum view of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. Rather, the argument I'm trying to develop here is that China's geoeconomic and strategic ambitions across the region and I would have to say the expectations and somewhat cultivated nationalism of the Chinese public are creating pressures perhaps unbearable pressures for the Chinese leadership to deploy military to new places from the Indian Ocean to Africa to the Pacific and over time as happens throughout history the risks will rise that China will feel the need to use these forces and the consequences cannot be foreseen. Of course, the United States and other powers are also competing with and seeking to counter China's expanded strategic presence. The imperative for a middle power like Australia is I think to encourage as we've heard the right combination of defence deterrence and diplomacy to manage these differences and mistrust in ways that lead neither to capitulation nor to conflict. The beauty of the Indo-Pacific in my view is that it lends potential for new security partnerships across dissolved geographic boundaries. Hence those efforts to forge security links with India, Indonesia, Japan and to engage the United States in groups beyond the traditional alliance and to invite global stakeholders of the region to play their part global stakeholders like for example France and other European powers. The downside of course is that this is a region that is simply too large and my critics and the critics of the Indo-Pacific concept have a good point there. It's too large a space in which any nation can fully protect its interests alone. So if you look at the lines of connectivity that have built up in the region, our interests in these lifelines of energy, trade, of infrastructure of information of people and so forth this is a set of interests that no one country can protect alone. No island is an island in this region. And contagion not just pandemic but financial, economic, cyber, conflict, environmental can spread rapidly across this region in ways that no single power can manage. And this is starkly illustrated by the coronavirus crisis. My book concludes with a chapter about these black swans and these shocks of political legitimacy and of course I went to print on the 8th of January when I suspect not even the Chinese leadership had full knowledge perhaps of what was occurring in China. So perhaps I hope there'll be a second edition. But even as I guess China's strategic assertiveness in the region continues and we see fishing fleets and paramilitary vessels and the Navy operating further afield new data is reflecting a sudden fall if you like almost a collapse in the lines on this map. New data recently has shown shipping, commercial shipping to and from Chinese ports is almost at a standstill. Companies are looking to their supply chains. Diversification is becoming a necessity, not just an aspiration. Domestically, there is a shock to people's confidence in the Chinese leadership and indeed the competence and the intent of the party. Internationally, there are challenges to China's image and questions being asked in those countries that have tied their fortunes to the Belt and Road. Now, of course, this is not just about zero sum competition. Coronavirus is a human tragedy, a public health crisis and economic crisis for all countries. This is a lose, lose story. The prospect ahead involves maladies for many countries and they have their own challenges. There's no question that the United States is now desensitized to political trauma within. It struggles to convince its allies that the great republic actually means what the president says because many in the United States system will tell you the republic does not mean what the president says. And the United States is struggling to define its own Indo-Pacific strategy to compete with China in a stable post-primacy future. India, for all of its youth and diversity and promise, is in conflict with itself and undermining the very democratic values that are its long-term strength. So I make no claim about how solidarity among the Indo-Pacific partners will withstand the crisis of 2020. I do think, however, that many nations are reaching a critical moment of self-reflection. There's little sign yet that these moments are bringing about a reduction in strategic rivalry, but there is an opportunity for middle players and middle powers like Australia to emphasise now coexistence and cooperation based on shared interests, on mutual respect and on honest communication. Let me conclude here and a small acknowledgement of the Chief of Navy who I believe is in the audience this evening. The final image captures, I think, one of the most tangible moments of my research and I can still feel the humidity as HMAS Canberra came in to arrive at the Port of Tanjung Priok north of Jakarta during the Indo-Pacific Endeavour activity last year. I thank the Chief of Navy for his willingness to let academics loose on board the nation's warships. It's a reminder, though, of a few things. Not only Chief of the professionalism of our Navy, but the many layers of the waterfront of Indo-Pacific connection, connectivity and contestation. Because here, just for a moment, we saw those parallel worlds of military power, of sea power and commerce, the engine of global growth, of regional growth and of human well-being. And here was also for Australia a major moment in Indo-Pacific partnership. A warm welcome to Jakarta. The recent declaration by the Indonesian president, Joko Wododo, that Australia is Indonesia's best friend. And this probably could have been reported with a bit more emphasis in the Australian media. Australia is Indonesia's best friend in the region. That's an exceptional sign, I think, of how far Australia has come in convergent interests with the power that is actually at the crossroads of the Indo-Pacific. Because the Indo-Pacific is not only about India. Indonesia matters very much in this conception. To conclude, the Indo-Pacific is, in my view, an authentically Australian idea. But with nations from Indonesia to the other Azians, to India, to Japan, to the United States, to France, endorsing their own variants, it is also genuinely of this region, which I would call a sea with many flags. Thank you.