 Good afternoon, everyone. I'm Kathleen Hicks. I direct the International Security Program here at CSIS, and it's wonderful to see so many of you here today. On behalf of the Japan Chair and the International Security Program, I want to introduce our guest speaker, Admiral Kawano, Chief of Staff of Japan's Self-Defense Force, and he is our guest here today for a very timely and important discussion of the State of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance. In his capacity as Chief of Staff, Admiral Kawano supervises the operations of the Self-Defense Forces under the Minister of Defense and serves as the Minister's top-ranking military advisor. Prior to assuming his current position, the Admiral served as the Chief of Staff of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces, the Commander-in-Chief of the Self-Defense Fleet, and the Vice-Chief of Staff, in addition to serving in various command and staff positions throughout his distinguished career. Notably, Admiral Kawano is a graduate also of the U.S. Naval War College. Admiral, Kawano joins us after meeting with General Dempsey earlier today for the U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue, which was held over at the National Defense University, and we hope that was a particularly productive and frank discussion. I'm also pleased to introduce our moderator for today, Ambassador Richard Armitage. He has served as the Deputy Secretary of State and in various senior positions in the government. He is, of course, himself an expert in the Asia-Pacific region and is a former naval officer himself. Ambassador Armitage is currently the President of Armitage International and a member of the Board of Trustees here at CSIS. After Admiral Kawano speaks, Ambassador Armitage will engage him in a discussion, and then he will moderate a question-and-answer session that will involve the audience. As a reminder to our audience, as a military officer, Admiral Kawano will not be responding to questions related to the Japanese political process, including the ongoing debate on security legislation in the Japanese diet and the relocation of Futenma Air Base. Finally, before we begin today, I want to share with you our building safety precautions here at CSIS. We're quite confident that nothing will happen, but should we have any issues, we will all proceed out of here under my instructions as the safety officer. I will be right here in the room with you, and we'll let you know where we walk. With that, please join me in welcoming Admiral Kawano. This is a little bit high, Tomi. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I am Admiral Kawano, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Japan Self-Defense Forces. I am glad to stand here to address CSIS. Today is July 16th. In a month from today, it will be August 15th, the day the World War II ended for the Japanese people. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II. Both Japan and the United States fought against each other as bitter enemies, and the fierce battle claimed millions of lives. In August 1945, when the war ended, not many people could have envisioned the state of Japan-U.S. relations today. Seventy years have passed since the end of hostilities, and our bilateral relations have achieved miraculous levels of development. Now, in this milestone year, both countries are moving forward toward a new stage. Since time is limited today, I would like to talk about a future vision of the Japan-U.S. alliance, briefly touching upon the history and evolution of the Japan-U.S. alliance and effort to maintain the peace and security of Japan. Our alliance started with the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty signed in 1951. As symbolized by the Korean War, the East-West divide was a great challenge for the East Asia region, as well as Japan and the United States. In the Cold War era, one of the main roles of the Japan-U.S. alliance was to defend Japan by preventing communism from spreading into Japan. What made it possible was the forward deployment of the United States forces stationed in Japan and the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. as a deterrent. Three years later, in 1954, the then Japan Defense Agency and the Grand Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces were established. I was born that same year. I don't know where it is just a coincidence or destiny that I wear the uniform of the JSDF now. As a time, most of the equipment operated by the JSDF was supplied by U.S. forces, including warships and aircraft. After that, Japan started to domestically develop its own equipment and also began least production of the same asset of the U.S. forces, such as the P-2V7 patrol aircraft and the F-104 fighter jet, and then equipped JSDF with them. This was the beginning of the trend developed our time and continues to today. These assets shared by the both forces can be said to have become the foundation of the current level of interoperability between the JSDF and the United States forces. The current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was signed in 1960, and since then, the government of Japan and the United States have worked together to build a robust alliance based on the ideals of democracy, respect of human rights, the rule of law, and on our shared interests. Positioned squarely in the camp of the free world during the Cold War, the Japan-U.S. arrangement contributed to the security of Japan as well as to the peace and stability of the rhythm as a whole. Almost two decades later, the first guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Corporation were released in 1978. In the same year, I completed the Oshizaka Candidate School and became a naval officer. I cannot remember what I thought and felt about the guideline at that time, but I imagine I had no idea about what the guideline was. I never imagined that I would become the top officer of the JSDF and become involved in the guidelines. This was also the era when bilateral exercise between the JSDF and the U.S. military gained momentum. The first bilateral exercise was held by the Air Self-Defense Force and U.S. Air Force in 1978, and not long after that, the Maritime Self-Defense Force participated in the RIMPAC for the first time in 1980. This was followed by the Grand Self-Defense Forces' first bilateral exercise in 1981. It can be said that the time I was a young officer was the era that the foundation of the Japan-U.S. Corporation was formed. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall collapsed, and the Cold War came to an end. This enormous change to the world order triggered a lot of friction and confrontation around the globe. Among the biggest incidents, at least from Japan's point of view, was the Gulf War, which started with the Iraqi forces' invasion to Kuwait in 1990. Japan provided a considerable financial contribution, approximately 13 billion dollars, which went largely unnoticed by the international community. Based on the international response, the government of Japan decided to send MSDF mine-sweepers to the Arabian Gulf for mine-sweeping operations. This deployment was the first overseas operation for the JSDF. At that time, I was in charge of the deployment at the Maritime Staff Office, and I was working very hard. We didn't have a lot of public support at first, but over time, it became clear that the deployment was viewed very favorably, and it boosted the public confidence in the JSDF. New challenges always come with friction. I believe the JSDF can remove such friction and win the public confidence when the JSDF sincerely accomplish their mission and live up to the public's expectations. Since that first deployment, the JSDF has expanded its overseas activities in various areas, including Cambodia, Mozambique, East Timor, and Gran Heights. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in challenges to trust and transparency in the areas surrounding Japan, starting with North Korea's nuclear development in 1993, and following rising tensions in the Korean peninsula. Based on this situation, the guidelines were revised in 1997. The guidelines stipulated by lateral cooperation in various fields, such as maintenance of cross-corporation, e-formation sharing, and the deliberation of policies in peace time, security dialogues, defense exchanges, peacekeeping operations, international humanitarian aid, and relief activities, a study of bilateral planning and plans of mutual cooperation, strengthened joint exercises and training and building coordination mechanisms in order to defend Japan and build more stable international security environment. In 1998, the year after we revised the guidelines, North Korea launched a ballistic missile which flew over Japan. To deal with the threat of ballistic missiles, the Japan National Security Council approved a Japan-US joint study initiative on ballistic missile defense, which was the start of bilateral BMD cooperation. In March 2004, the diet decided to introduce ballistic defense systems followed by deployment of PAC-3 in 2007. In the same year, the destroyer, ISIS destroyer, Kongo, concluded Japan's first successful launch test of an SM-3. I observed tests in Hawaii as a director general of defense policy of maritime staff office. I still remember everyone around me when we broke into a loud chair as the SM-3 hit the target. Now, bilateral BMD cooperation, including joint development of SM-3 block 2A, is a front runner of bilateral defense cooperation based on the Japan-US alliance. The fight against international terrorist organizations has become the gravest challenges after the Cold War. The September 11th attacks on the U.S. shocked us. In November 2001, the government of Japan sent MSDF warships, including supply ships to the Indian Ocean in order to replenish U.S. Navy's warships engaging in the global war of terror. Our supply supported only U.S. forces at the beginning, but it was eventually expanded to include supplying the forces of other countries. The operation continued for about eight years, including a short break. One of our air transportation units provided humanitarian activities for the war in Iraq in 2003, shortly followed thereafter by the long-term deployment of the reconstruction assistance unit to Iraq from 2004 to 2009. In addition, we have conducted anti-piracy operations of the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden since 2009. After the end of the Cold War, the JSDF has deepened Japan-US cooperation and has expanded the scope and the substance of activities in order to contribute to peace and stability in the region and to the world. Meanwhile, Japan has received a lot of support from the U.S., especially when the Great East Japan earthquake occurred in March 11th, 2011. This major tremor and tsunami claimed tens of thousands of lives. Operation Tomodachi saved a countless number of lives and supported the survivors of the disaster. Beyond just the achievement of the operation themselves, people in Japan remember the U.S. support in their heart as a symbol of the strong bond of the alliance between Japan and the United States. Lesson learned in the Great East Japan earthquake have been incorporated in the new guidelines, such as cooperation regarding humanitarian support and disaster relief activities, as well as the need to have an alliance coordination mechanism available even in peacetime. The new guidelines revise this April, updating the general framework of respective roles and missions for Japan and the U.S., as well as our overall policy direction. The revision also has revealed a strategic vision to build a more robust alliance and share major responsibilities by adjusting the alliance to address the current security environment, and by stressing deterrence and our ability to respond every phase from peacetime to contingencies. The core of the guidelines show the U.S. continuous and waving commitment to maintain peace and security of Japan, while the new guidelines as a whole elaborate on the ways and means in which we can fulfill our commitments through seamless, robust, flexible and effective responses by both countries as an alliance with expanded bilateral cooperation in various fields. The new guidelines have also stipulated cooperation in new fields, such as space and cyberspace, as well as in traditional fields, including peacekeeping activities, maritime securities and logistics, which motivates both countries to make further contribution to international security efforts. The importance of cooperation with regional and international partners and organizations has been also included in the document. In the future, Japan and the U.S. will continue to examine our own effort, develop capabilities and conducting exercises and training. As I mentioned so far, the Japan-U.S. alliance has transformed and evolved itself in accordance with the changing times. In the future, the alliance will be expected to be the one which can contribute to both Japan and the U.S., the region as well as the rest of the world. From a broad point of view on the current global situation, not only people, material and capital, but cultures and ideologies flow across borders on a global scale and this flow is gaining speed. The global economy is growing and deepening its interdependency among nations. The result is a complex structure in which nations cannot solve problems in a bilateral way. Under the current situation, our alliance needs the whole of government approach and cooperation which requires coordination across various fields. In this sense, a high-level cooperation in the field of military and national security as well as in economic and diplomatic levels will be required for our alliance in the future. And one more challenge I am sure we have to tackle is to share as many issues and interests as possible between both countries. The number of shared interests is proportional to the strengths of the alliance. Therefore, it is crucial for Japan and the U.S. to promote basic efforts to deepen mutual understanding and confidence in each other in a steady manner. In addition to creative and innovative ideas and thinking, I believe our success will be born from our character and the principles which we both hold dear and that these will sustain the alliance into the future. I hope my explanation today will deepen your understanding of the alliance and contribute to nurturing a mutual understanding. I would like to conclude my speech by providing one anecdote regarding the alliance. Japan and the U.S. signed the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty on September 8th, 1951 not at the same gorgeous, some gorgeous venue, but at the NCO Clubhouse in the U.S. Horses Base which was situated 20 minutes from the center of San Francisco. As a representative of the government of Japan, then Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida alone entered a room and signed a document. Years later, looking back at the moment, Prime Minister Yoshida said, the treaty itself is only a piece of paper. I signed the treaty because I thought it was the best way for Japan at that time. The future of Japan should be determined by future generations. Seventy years have passed since the end of the World War II and the Japan-U.S. alliance has achieved miraculous development after undergoing many transitions to align with the challenges of the security situation. As an officer of the JSDF, I have been involved on and off in the transition of the alliance in my roughly 40 years' military career. The milestone year is seeing just another step in the progress of the alliance. I believe that the current Japan-U.S. alliance is a piece of work, passed from generation to generation. One generation makes their best effort for the alliance, and the next generation takes over it, added their own achievement to it, and makes it better and better. To continue the succession is an important role I must play now. This concludes my speech. Thank you very much for your kind attention. Thank you so much. Well, Admiral, thank you very much for your remarks, particularly the reminder at your close of Prime Minister Yoshida's comments about signing a piece of paper, but you really have to make it a living, breathing document. You've had almost 40 years of service to your nation, and I, for one, think that your nation owes you a debt of gratitude. This is as it does your colleagues who are serving in uniform. You know, over that, if you wonder why Admiral Kwano was Chief of Staff, you only have to look at his schedule during this visit to the United States. I'm not going to remember them all. There are too many. Stratcom, Centcom, Socom, Second Marine Expeditionary Force, discussions with the Chairman, General Dempsey, and the Deputy Secretary, Bob Work, and a visit yesterday with our Vice President, Joe Biden. And I don't think that's ever happened before to a chairman here in the United States, at least not in my knowledge. So he's got the energy for four of us. I'll tell you that. You have had, as you suggest in your speech, Admiral, the opportunity to live the alliance. So perhaps as an opening question, I might ask you how you've seen the military alliance change over your years of service. Certainly, as a young officer, I was involved in U.S.-Japan relations. But compared to that time, I would have to say that the relationship between the Japan self-defense forces and the U.S. forces has deepened quite a bit. And if I may speak about this, I did, as a young officer, travel to the United States and participate in meetings alongside my spurious. But I would have to say in terms of substance or what got discussed, it wasn't very deep back then. But today, I met with an engaged in strategic dialogue with General Dempsey and also had a meeting with Commander Harris at PECOM. And what we spoke about was quite substantial and very deep. And my thinking on this is that this has to do with the fact that as of 1991, the self-defense forces became engaged in operations to defend our nation's interests and to cooperate with the United States. Having been involved in these visits from time to time, Admiral, I can assure you that some method, the madness of the United States, the length and breadth of your visits and discussions show, I think, dramatically that the United States government wants to be involved with Japan in a way comfortable to Japan in every aspect of military life. And I think that's something that came through loud and clear to you. I might ask you, sir, if you'd give us in the audience an appreciation of the security concerns and the security environment surrounding Japan. Well, certainly, I would have to say if we look at the security environment surrounding Japan, we have North Korea and their regime is rather insecure, unstable, and the nuclear missile issue has not been resolved at all. And China's activities in both the South and the East China seas having quite rampant. And we are seeing a lot of activities on the part of the Russian military in terms of their modernization and activities that they have been engaged in. So I would have to say the environment is rather challenging. Sir, do you have expectations that we may see, John DeClaire and ADIZ in the South China Sea? And if so, what do we do about it? Well, I did attend the Shangri-La Dialogue. And on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the representative from China did not deny the possibility of declaring ADIZ in the South China Sea. And the representative also did not deny the possibility of making use of the man-made islands that are being built that they could be used for military purposes as well. And when we talk about the South China Sea, we have very important sea lanes there. And certainly that gives us much concern. Sir, it would be my view that if China does declare another ADIZ that we do just what we did last time, China has no ability to do much more than to declare a zone. We've got to make sure it doesn't stand. That's a personal view. Japan has the Air Self-Defense Force had to scramble last year through April, almost a record number of times, certainly since the end of the Cold War. What is your expectation going forward of the need for scrambling aircraft? Do you think it will lower, remain the shame, or even heighten? As far as the number of scrambles we had last year, it pretty much matches the number of scrambles we had during the midst of the Cold War. And one feature of that, or a characteristic, is that we have more scrambles against China. And so my sense is that this trend will continue into the future where China will go beyond the island chain in the Pacific. And so if anything, I would believe that the situation will worsen. Sir, there was an exercise, a trilateral exercise recently in Australia that featured Australians, U.S., and Japan's Self-Defense Forces called Talisman Sabre. I wonder if you'd give me a slight or short preview of the lessons learned. What did Japan learn out of this? What do you think Australia and the United States learned out of this trilateral exercise? Well, the Talisman Sabre exercise is still ongoing, so I have not received any reports from that, so I really can't say a whole lot about that. Now that said, I believe the U.S.-Japan alliance is actually a maritime alliance. And what this means is that both countries are seafaring nations and depend on interests at sea. And I believe the same could be said about Australia as well, that they are seafaring nations. So this trilateral relationship that exists between the three countries, U.S., Japan, the U.S., Japan, and Australia, I believe, is very important for the security of our own country, of course, in the region and the world. Thank you, Adam. If I'm correct, a maritime self-defense force, Rear Admiral, is commanding an international anti-piracy operation right now. I think this is the first time anything like that has happened. What are your expectations as we go forward? Is this going to be the norm? Will we look for more and more opportunities over the stage as we move into the next decade for Japan to take part, a leading part, in these great international efforts? So the CTF-151 combined task force commander is now a general emerald from Japan. And this was a major step both for the country of Japan as well as the JSDF. So I believe that Japan, as we go forward, while making the U.S.-Japan alliance its basis, it's important for Japan to step up to the plate in the international arena and by, within the international framework, contribute to the peace and stability of the world. And I believe this is something that the United States hopes Japan would do. And I believe this leads to proactive pacifism proposed by Prime Minister Abe. Now, Admiral, you mentioned in your excellent speech the Gulf War, the First Gulf War, and the financial contribution, which was unappreciated broadly in the international community from Japan. It is my view that taking part in these international operations where Japan chooses to do so will be greatly appreciated. It's a time of the Gulf War that young Japanese were accused of not wanting to engage in dirty, hard, and dangerous work, the three Ks. But the Jayatai is certainly proving that not to be the case. Yes. So during the First Gulf War, as I mentioned, Japan showed out a lot of money, which was not really appreciated by the world. And we were told, Japan, you're too late, too little. And based on the post-mortem we had, after that experience at 9-11, I believe we were relatively quick. We were able to respond fairly quickly. So now comes the part of the afternoon in which we have audience participation. We have some, I think, people in the audience with microphones. I only ask that when you stand up and ask a question, please identify yourself. Wait for the microphone, identify yourself, and ask the question of Admiral Kowano. So I think we have a gentleman right here first. Thank you very much. I'm Ben Self. I'm Vice President of Mansfield Foundation and an adjunct fellow here at CSIS Japan Chair. And in your excellent remarks, you skipped over the 1980s. And Mike Green, who's missing today, we all miss him, taught me that in the 1980s, Japan contributed a lot to our victory in the Cold War through especially its operations towards the Sea of Okhotsk and anti-submarine warfare. And Japan's enormous contributions in anti-submarine warfare against the Soviet fleet helped the U.S. in its victory in the Cold War. I'm wondering that legacy of Japan's strong capacity in anti-submarine warfare can be brought to bear against a growing ballistic missile threat, submarine ballistic missile threat from China based on Hainan? And whether Japan, in addition to potential maritime patrols in the South China Sea for surface activity, would consider anti-submarine patrolling in the South China Sea? Yes, in fact, as you just pointed out, we feel very proud that we didn't make a major contribution to the victory of the Western Bloc in the Cold War. But unfortunately, or regrettably, that was not something that was perceivable by the people. The people couldn't see that. And as far as the capabilities of the maritime self-defense force is concerned, it has always been strong in anti-worship and marines sweeping. And so those are the capabilities they still have that are quite strong. Well, I cannot really go into great details about this. There has been very close coordination between the United States and Japan in this area. So there's been a talk about, you mentioned anti-submarine activities possibly in the South China Sea. And there's been a mention of patrolling or doing surveillance in the South China Sea. But our position on this is we consider this as a potential future issue to be considered depending on how things pan out. Admiral, thank you very much. I'm Robbie Harris, a former naval person and also a fellow with Lockheed Martin Corporation. Thank you for your visit today. Thank you for the friendship with the Japanese Self-Defense Force and thank you for your personal friendship to this country. Would you please comment on the so-called policy of rebalance to the Pacific? Have you seen evidence of that rebalance and are you satisfied with the evidence you've seen? Thank you. Well, the defense budget in the United States is very tight at this time. And the situation in the Middle East is very difficult. You have the ISIL. So in spite of these constraints, we have seen the Ronald Reagan replace the George Washington. And so Egypt's vessels have been deployed in our area. And so I believe that this is evidence that the United States considers the Asia Pacific a very important region. We're going to Japanese and I'll come back to you, please. So I think that's a tangible sign that that's the case. Hi, I'm Hong Mingran from Shanghai Media Group. Actually, I have questions about that. Do you agree that for a Bay administration, the purpose of the passage of this bill is to stir up the hate of the China threat theory to loosen restrictions on Japan's military and in return, unshackle of the control from the United States? Thank you. Do you agree about that for a Bay administration, the purpose of the passage of the bill is to stir up the hate of the China threat theory to loosen restrictions on Japan's military and in return, unshackle the control from the United States? Well, I certainly don't agree with that assessment. Given that this legislation is still under deliberation in the diet, I'd like to refrain from making any comments. However, I can say that the reason why the Japanese government has submitted this bill to the Japanese diet is not to unleash military power and unrestrained military force, but it's to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. Mentioned cooperation between Japan and also third parties in securing peace in the region, recently there have been joint surveillance flights with Japan, with the Philippines, looking at some of these reefs that the Chinese are building up and I guess there's been a political reaction to that from China. But how do you see that cooperation with the Philippines or possibly other regional South Sea nations developing? Yes, we had a joint training with the Philippines in search and rescue and we flew our SDF peace 3C patrol aircraft in Palamon to conduct this training. And as in countries are very important to our country and therefore we hope to engage in more of these, this type of joint training. And I don't have an understanding that China was reacted that strongly to this training that we have with the Philippines. Right under the third camera in Hyodong Road with the Yonham News Agency of South Korea, if there's any contingency on the Korean Peninsula, what will you do? What would be the role of the Japanese self-defense army? What kind of consultative mechanism do you have with the U.S. and South Korea? Thanks. If we're talking about an emergency or contingency on the Korean Peninsula, what is at play now would be our law called the surrounding area situation law. So in that instance, through our consultations with the United States or South Korea, what we would be capable doing would be to provide logistical support. And even if once the security legislation is passed by the diet, that fact, that framework, the basic framework would remain the same. We have time for two more if they're brief. Yes, sir. Thank you. My name is Hiroshi Waguri, visiting fellow to the CSIS. I thank you for your wonderful briefing today. And I just would like to ask you your funny experiences. I think, you know, the effectiveness of Japan, the joint operation between Japan's self-defense forces and U.S. forces are very important, continue to be very important. And could you elaborate how well the effectiveness of joint operation between the two countries have evolved or improved so far up until now? And what do you think that we should do as a next step to further improve that effectiveness? I believe that the bilateral exercises between the two countries have evolved quite a bit. So the U.S. had joint exercises or joint services, joint operations. And Japan now has joint operations, and therefore the bilateral joint exercises between the two countries have become much richer. And JSDF will undergo a reorganization, and that is we will modify our joint staff office. So that would result in even greater evolution of bilateral exercises with the United States. Paul Giar, you have the last word against a short word. Good afternoon. I'm real good to see you again. My name is Paul Giar on the President of Global Strategies and Transformation. You've talked about the history of the alliance, and you've mentioned several very important turning points starting with the security, the signing of the security treaty in San Francisco, Cold War operations, the end of the Cold War, piracy operations and so on. Would you describe and tell us just a little bit about the turning point that came in 2010 with Japan's new national security strategy? In 2010, Japan published a new national security strategy. Would you tell us about that please? So in 2013, Japan formulated the national security strategy. Military or security strategy is something that the United States has had, but up until that point, Japan did not have a security strategy. And thanks to the creation of this national security strategy, we have the defense guidelines that come under that, as well as midterm defense program. So I consider this a major step for Japanese defense in that this strategy enabled us to have our policies formulated for defense, and I consider that to be a major step for us. Admiral, it is left to me now on behalf of Dr. Hamery, President of CSIS, Dr. Hicks, the Director of the International Security Program, to thank you, first of all, and to assure you that your words have left at least the American, most of the Americans in this audience, filled with even greater enthusiasm for even greater efforts to support this alliance. So I would like to ask all of you to join with me and thank our guest, Ed Mokwano.