 So I wanted to thank everyone for joining today's discussion of the 2020 and 2021 coups in Mali, which is part of the US Institute of Peace's larger series on the recent spate of coups. I'm Inna Dionne. I'm part of USIP's governance justice and security team, where I've been running programs on human security and security sector reform in Mali and the Sahel for over the past five years. I'd like to start by introducing our distinguished analysts, first we have with us Ambassador Jay Peter Femme. He's a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, where he previously served as vice president for research and regional initiatives, and director of the Council's Africa Center. In 2020, he was appointed the first ever US Special Envoy for the Sahel, assuming the lead in shaping, devising and coordinating US strategy on the cross borders security, political, economic assistance and social issues arising in the Sahel, as well as coordinating with both international partners and US government stakeholders to help the Sahel return to stability through programs to enhance security, governance, political liberalization, social progress and economic development. He's also served as the US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region of Africa, and has previously held positions including Senior Vice President of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and editor of its bi-monthly journal American Foreign Policy Interests. And as a tenured professor of justice studies, political science and Parcona studies at James Madison University, where he directed the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs. He served on the Senior Advisory Group of the US Africa Command, and as vice president of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa. He's also the author of more than 300 essays and reviews, and the author, editor or translator of over a dozen books, as well as from 2009 to 2017, acting as editor in chief of the peer review quarterly journal, Journal of the Middle East and Africa. Welcome Peter. Next we have with us Dr. Ibrahim Yahya Ibrahim. He's a consulting senior Sahel analyst based in Dakar. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Florida, where his dissertation focused on Islam and political contestation in the Sahel region. It's a comparative study of the phenomenon of protests, riots and jihadist insurgencies in Mauritania, Tunia, Niger and Mali. He's a co-founder and research associate with the Sahel research group, and an alumnus of the Fulbite program and analyst for freedom in the world as a Nigerian Mauritania expert. He's also worked for four years with the Islamic NGOs in Niger, including two years as the executive director of the Niger based office of Al-Basar International Foundation. He has a background in sociology, Islamic jurisprudence and management. He's from the Islamic University of Seyh and Abu Muni University of Nyameh. And finally, we have Miriam Dehloj Jameh, who holds a degree in political science from the University of Montreal and certificate from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government in Women and Power. She has more than 10 years of experience in promoting gender equality and girls empowerment. Previously she was regional coordinator of I know politics for the South Saharan Africa region. She's committed to peace building and transitional justice in Mali. She was a member of the UN Women's Civil Society advisory group and spent three years advising the Prime Minister on gender and governance issues. Currently she leads the NGO Women Leadership and Sustainability. She received the award of national merit and was recognized as woman of the year in 2017 and 2020. Again, welcome to all of our panelists and thank you each for being with us. And now I'd like to invite each of our panelists to give a short opening remarks on different aspects of the two coups. Miriam, if you could start by giving us an overview of the lead up of the events to the first coup in August 2020. And then that period of transition, the coup itself and the period of transitional governance that followed up until the May 2021 coup. Thank you very much, Anna. There were several events that led up to the first coup. You could even say that from the beginning of the protests against President Ibrahim Bouboukar Keita, the coup was nearly inevitable. People wanted him to leave the office of president. He was re-elected in 2018, but after his election, the security situation in the center of the country got worse and worse. There were terrorist attacks and inter-community conflicts. Some were bloodier than others. There were other violent attacks on military camps, which invited the emotion of the population. There were also corruption scandals. People who are close to the presidential regime were receiving favorable treatment and there were always new scandals. Some of the military brass and military commanders were not able to respond to these attacks the way they wanted to. And many of these protest movements contributed to what later became the June 5th movement, the M5 movement. There were often protests with thousands, hundreds of thousands of Malians, and this wave of uprisings eventually led to a military coup in August 2020. So that's the background, or that's a bit the list of events that led up to the military coup. So there was the security crisis. There was corruption and scandals involving the government. There was the inability to prevent various attacks. And of course, economic crises, the economic crisis present throughout the country. All of these factors led to the coup. Thank you very much, Maryam. And I'd like to turn to you Ibrahim to talk a little bit about the second coup, some of what happened in the lead up in the second coup itself, and then the second period of transitional governance from this May 2021 coup to the present. Well, thank you very much. So, I mean, following the first coup in August 2021, the international community exercised pressure on the Malian government, on the transition on the junta to appoint civilian leaders, including President Bindau and the Prime Minister Mokhtar Wan to lead the transition with the leader of the junta, Azmi Gweta, as vice president. So they formed the government. And they functioned until the moment when the civilian leaders tried to reshuffle the government and attempted to out to main leaders of the junta, including the Minister of Defense, Sergio Camara, and another leader who was at that time Minister of Security. The decision by the civilian authorities to do that, government reshuffle prompted a crisis between them and the junta, leading the junta to actually arrest the two leaders and to engage, to take control over the government. And this is what was considered as the second coup. And following that, we had a new Prime Minister that was appointed, who is Shogelko Kalamega, and with a new government that was put in place. Since then, we have seen that the crisis has only deepened. I mean, the political crisis in Bamako, with the international community trying to still pressure the junta to organize election. And I mean, keep their words regarding the time limits of the transition, which is supposed to end by April. So they had to organize an election by February. So far, that deadline seemed to be untenable and the junta has made it clear that they cannot organize election by February. So there is now discussions about the extension of the transition, the transition periods. And they also want to organize the Assyz National Delirium Foundation, which is a broad consultation between Malians to decide about how to reorganize and refound the states and its institution. And they said, only after that Assyz National, they will be able to decide what would be the timeline of the transition moving forward. And this is a prompting crisis between them, the international community, but also with political leaders domestically. Thank you for that background. And you mentioned a little bit about the role of international actors following the second coup. But now I'd like to turn to you, Peter, to give us a bit more background on what role international and regional actors play both in the lead up and then in the first and second coup since. Thank you again for convening us together and to your colleagues at USIP for making this possible. And I'm especially delighted that Camisa Kamara was involved in this since the day of the first coup I was in repeated contact with her as things were unfolding. So in no way brings things full circle. I can make just a few points and picking up from where Maryam began dating the crisis back to before the coup of August 18, 2020. I think it's very important, both in the discussion of what happened in Mali, but also in the other conversations that the Institute is having around military actions in this part of the world is that the crisis didn't begin with the coup or the event, whatever you want to call it. The crisis began much earlier and was the manifestation of process that been underway. And one could argue that in many respects, the Mali and crisis was one that predates not just the second mandate of President Keita, or even his first mandate but really going back quite a ways. Certainly to the flawed elections, which took place after the French military intervention in 2013, but even well beyond before. Recently we had, during the recent celebration of Mali's independence in September, there was a news item from Mali where the government made a great deal about a village which had finally received a visitation from the national government for the first time since independence. Imagine if they've not had any contact with the national government for more than six decades. And that goes to a point that I made repeatedly when I was special envoy that the crisis in the Sahel is not a crisis of violence, although violence is a manifestation of it. It's not an economic crisis, although poor economy certainly exacerbate the situation. Ultimately it's a crisis of state legitimacy. And we really have to go back to that crisis of the state. It's connection with the citizens provision or lack thereof of goods and services and really revisit that issue is without attempting to at least understand that dilemma once condemned to almost repeat it. Second point I'd like to make is also the importance of the regional in this, you know, the Sahel itself, the shore between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, the linkages, therefore, and the regional actors and the senior question and the other importance. And one could say that the regional actors, especially ECOWAS, but also the G5 Sahel, the African Union and broader international community were very engaged, not only in the aftermath of the coup of August 2020, but also involved in a different way in the lead up to the removal of the president and Prime Minister of the transition. And this is a little known episode. At that time I had left government, but I was still in contact with many actors in the region as well as in Mali. And I was concerned, as were many observers, of where the confrontation between the military members of the transition and the civilian were headed. And I spoke with actually several regional presidents at the time. And there sure made that things were under control because President Dau had promised them that at the, when they all met in the conference in Paris, that he would do nothing until after the ECOWAS mediator, former Nigerian president, good luck Jonathan, had an opportunity to visit and consult with stakeholders. That's what he promised to no fewer than three African presidents in Paris. But then he went home and did the exact opposite. And before good luck, Jonathan, even gotten on the plane, he had removed the two ministers, as Maryam mentioned, and we are where we are today. I'm not justifying that action, but there was a context to why the current president of the transition, Kimi Goita responded the way he did and why regional leaders were muted at that time because a number of them felt that they had been actually deceived. So the importance of the regional. The third point I like to make is that ultimately what is going to be sustainable, whether it be in Mali or anywhere else in the region is what has local buy-in. It has to be a locally owned. So it can't be dictated by the international community as a whole or even by the neighbors, although they certainly have their influence and their role to play. Fourth point very briefly, we need sustained engagement. And I have to say, observing now from outside government, that sustained engagement has, it was there certainly in the first months after the 2022 when the African Union stood up a group to support the transition in Mali, GST Mali, and had a first meeting in Bamako, which I attended, and then further meetings, second meeting in Lomé and onward. The international participation that dropped off, and with the change in ECOWAS presidency, it also petered out. And so there's a lack of engagement, which I think leads to some of the issues we see today. And finally, kind of coming full circle to my earlier point, there's no quick fix. And that's to be kept in mind. I think it was ambitious to want elections in 18 months when elections were the approximate cause of the crisis in Mali in 2020, that it would all be fixed in 18 months. Granted, one has to set deadlines, one has to establish benchmarks, but one also has to be realistic about it. And so I'll stop there. Thank you. Thank you very much. And thanks to all of our panelists for that introduction to the events leading up to the coups and what's followed since. In the first few questions, I wanted to talk a little bit more about some of the drivers of the coup or some of the factors that contributed to the coups that have been mentioned by our panelists. And I'd like to go back to you, Peter. I think you sort of indicated in this direction that maybe to put a finer point on it. There's been a lot of talk in light of the recent series of coups, not just in Mali, but elsewhere in Africa and really in other places in the world as well. About a wave of democratic backsliding or, you know, whether there's coup contagion going on, taking the case of Mali. To what extent do you think that that's a helpful characterization or accurate characterization in trying to help us understand what's going on there. Well, I think, let me be very clear. Let me preface this by saying, I do not justify, defend or encourage military intervention in political affairs or military takeovers. Strong civilian oversight of the military is a cornerstone of liberal democracy. That being said, however, the contrast is not between democracy before and military takeover. I think it's an erroneous presumption to make that now there were elements of democracy. There are elements of those things. But to say that what was before, whether it be in Mali or other countries was as democratic as perceived. I think there were flaws. Let's put it that way. It's human. Every human system has its weaknesses. And so one has to accurately benchmark what came before. To step away from Mali for just a moment to another country I know well because I lived there earlier in my career, Guinea Conakry. There was a coup. Undoubtedly, there was a coup in September of this year. But what came before the coup was a questionably legal third term for the president. What came before that was a 2015 election where ethnic hatred was stoked in order to manipulate the vote. And what came before that was an election that occurred 2010 that was highly contested and whose outcome to this day speak as a political scientist. I have trouble finding credible. So not to justify a coup, but one has to acknowledge that what was overthrown was not necessarily a democratic regime as most of us would recognize either. So I think that's an important thing to keep in mind. That being said, that's why it's important to go back, address the root causes. That takes a long time. I realize we're very impatient as an international community. We'd like to get things done and proclaim a success and move on. That's some call it pragmatism. I call it kicking the can down the road. So I think that's important to keep in mind. So has it been a bad period in Africa, especially West Africa in recent years? Yes, unfortunately. Is it necessarily backsliding somewhat but not to the extent to which I think the compare and contrast would lead us to. And then, you know, the final point I would make here is what's important is that having learned these lessons, we look for ways to sustainably restore democratic institutions and make sure that they have a real chance and not simply a short lifespan before we're back to where we are today. Thank you. And along those lines, I'd like to turn to Miriam. You know, you mentioned in your introduction or your opening remarks that the popular protests in your words made the coup almost inevitable. And I think that that is as well reflected in Peter's remarks just now saying that this coup didn't come out of nowhere. There were a lot of pre-existing issues with the previous government. Could you expand a bit more on how those pre-existing issues and some of the issues that you mentioned, the economy, the corruption, the rise in insecurity really did make, you know, maybe if not this coup such as it was inevitable, that it played out exactly like that. But, you know, put Molly maybe on a path to something along these lines. Well, the second coup, when we don't normally call it a coup d'état, it's more the return because it was just the people in power fighting for power amongst themselves. Of course, there were people in political power removed by the second coup, but they have only been named by the military to begin with. So people were, I would say, surprised that these two political figures were removed from power. And later we heard reasons that they were removed from power and those reasons surprised us as well. There wasn't any popular unhappiness with the acting president of the transition. There were no protests against him or against the prime minister. Things were going forward. Things were progressing. And then there was the rectification, as we call it, rather than a second coup. And it really made me wonder about the underlying reasons for this coup and for its justifications. And there are several in terms of the partnerships that were chosen international partnerships. Some people wanted to be closer to France. Some people wanted to reach out to other partners like Russia, perhaps that may have been one point of disagreement. So these are the possible areas for disagreement. They also disagreed about the composition of the government that was being put together. The prime minister had announced a new government, a new cabinet just before the second coup. And Asim Goyta was not in agreement with the composition of this new government. So was it a problem with leadership or did Asim Goyta feel like he had been pushed aside? Is that why he decided to make what could be called a unilateral decision to take control of the government? He was vice president at the time who was unsatisfied with the choice of people for the new government, for the new cabinet. And so he decided to remove that government from power. And the population did not have a very violent reaction to this rectification. It wasn't something the population had asked for that the people had asked for. Of course, some of the population wanted Asim Goyta to become president. And they in the end were satisfied. Thank you. And maybe to turn to a bit of a different factor that may have contributed to the coup. So I think it's very clear that there's been a lot of international attention and a good amount of international assistance focused on Mali. And a lot of that has focused maybe not on some of the underlying issues that Peter mentioned, but particularly on counterterrorism objectives and specifically strengthening the security sector. What role may this have played in the two coups? And what does it tell us about our prevailing approach to trying to stabilize Mali and to counterterrorism security systems and if I could address that to Ibrahim? I think there is today a broad consensus among international actors, observers that counterterrorism approach is limited and it cannot be the lasting solution to the problem of insecurity in the area. It has been almost a decade now since this crisis has passed. The airport has concentrated on military interventions to try to defeat insurgent groups, but I mean it is clear that crisis has expanded. It has intensified and it's clear that this all military solution is not exactly the last solution, but this is well now. What is less known, I think the new dynamic that we see emerging in the region is the ability of this security crisis to feel disorder in political disorder in capital cities. On the one hand, and this is the first point that I would like to make, the Jihadist crisis has so far been a rural insurgency. Jihadists have not been able since 2012, they have not been able to overtake big urban centers and it is still the case today. But the insecurity that they created, the security crisis that they created in rural areas has been fueling disorder in urban cities. I think Miriam mentioned how the inter-communal violence and the Jihadist violence and the attacks that the Jihadist conducted on military in 2018, 2019 demoralized the Malian public and pushed them to come out and start to manifest, to protest against the government. And this protest is what led to the fall of President Ebeqab. This is not only in Mali, we see also similar trends in Burkina Faso right now. Over the last few days, we have seen a lot of protests due to the security crisis in the rural areas that people are manifesting to try to call the government to take strong actions to, but this is destabilizing the capital cities. I think in Niger we see a lot of concern about what could happen if this crisis continue to deepen. So it is, I think this is really important, the real threat is just the security, the insecurity, but also the ability of this insecurity to fuel disorder in the capital cities. I think this is something that we really need to be focusing a lot of attention on. The second point that I would like to make is about how this insecurity is creating, is reinforcing the military segments or the military constitution. If you remember, I mean, these countries have been in democracy only 30 years and before democracy in the 1990s, the ship toward democracy, we had a military dictatorship. So democratization and the political class came to try to replace the military. It had different trajectories. In Mali, I think the political class were able to actually control to some extent and subjugate the military. In Niger, it wasn't the case. We had a decade of political instability between military trying to take over and political classes trying to come back. What this crisis is doing now is to pump a lot of resources to the military, a lot of financial and the human resources, actually, because all these countries are recruiting a lot of increasing the military capacity, fueling Mali, etc. The military have come to the forefront of politics. I think it is shifting a little bit the balance between these two main political, between these two main states actors, the political class and the military. So I do think that this may have a strong impact in the future in the sense that the politicians, the political class is going to get weakened because they are losing credibility, because they are losing legitimacy. At the time when the military are gaining more resources and being put to the forefront and asked to do the job of securing the country and this is going to legitimize them even more than before. So I do think that this is one of, this is two trends that we need to be observing, new trends that need to be focused on. Thank you. And maybe now to turn a little bit to some of the reaction to the coups, having talked a bit about somewhat about the drivers. In the introduction, Peter, and I think others as well mentioned the role played by the economic community of West African states, so Iqawas. And they were playing a big part in trying to encourage a transition back to civilian leadership. Well, do you think they played this role? And if we're looking forward, what can we learn from the success or failure of their efforts so far. Yes, okay. Well, Iqawas was fairly complacent with regard to Mali in between the first and second cruise. But the problem today, at least from a Malian standpoint. The problem with Iqawas is that it is more an organization of heads of state and government than it is an organization of the peoples. In Ivory Coast and Guinea, we have presidents who are taking a third term, and Iqawas has accepted that and the people are unhappy with that state of affairs. And when it comes to their own power, they make decisions that are favorable to themselves. But they don't listen to the people when the people are crying out. It's true in Guinea, where there were protests against a third term for the president, but still, he was made president for a third term. And so in Mali, people don't like the Iqawas sanctions. They think that, okay, Iqawas came in to support Ibrahim Boubou Karketa or to get what they could. So maybe that's a bit of a misperception on the part of the Malian people, but there's at least this perception that it's an organization that is for promoting the power and influence of heads of state and government and not for listening to their peoples. In general, in Mali, people feel defiant towards the Iqawas sanctions. They think that these sanctions, they really make people angry. People don't understand them. People reject them. So ultimately, that strengthens the bond between the people and the military leaders who are in power because the people feel victimized themselves by these sanctions. So today, Iqawas has lost a lot of credibility. Because if you want to have other people respect certain principles, you need to respect them yourself and apply them evenly across all contexts. But that's not what Iqawas has been doing. And the sanctions that have been put into place for travel restrictions, other things like that, asset seizures, of course, that affects the government and the committee for the transitional committee. But the Malians wonder, will it all end in a complete embargo of our country? And some Malians are even calling for Mali to leave Iqawas. So there's a lot of tension and the relationship between Iqawas and Mali is very, very tense right now. If I could just jump in right after Maryam there is, I think she really captured an important thing to keep in mind is that it's often a mantra in Washington to say we deferred to the regional organizations or to the African-led solution, which is a nice principle in the abstract, but one has to look at how it's viewed on the ground. I think she made a very good point there. And I think even with Iqawas, its moral authority evolved over time and not necessarily in a positive way. At the beginning of the Malian crisis a year and a half ago, Iqawas was at that time chaired by President Isufu of Niger, a leader who was respecting the two-term limit and stepping down. So there was a bit of moral authority there to be exercised. And being from a country that bordered Mali and was impacted by what happened there, he was very seized with the matter. And so for the months that he was still in his role as chair of Iqawas, I think we did get a lot of effective action out of the regional organization. But then there was a change in leadership and not saying that the current chair of Iqawas, President Akufado of Ghana, is not engaged, but something different. His country is not border state to the crisis. The Iqawas mediator, former Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan, was a well-meaning former head of state, but the role of mediator is not an employment scheme for underutilized ex-heads of state. The poor man doesn't speak French. How he communicates with the Mali and people is, you know, through a translator is certainly not ideal to put it mildly. And as Mario I think pointed very correctly, the sanctions, first, are they effective or do they punish people? In many cases, these military gentlemen who take over, they don't have bank accounts abroad. They don't have assets abroad, so you're not really doing anything to them. I've met with Colonel Esteve Goita in his home, the home he had before becoming vice president and president. And, you know, that was not the home of someone who had real estate purchase in other countries or bank accounts that were going to be frozen. So the sanctions were meaningless except to, you know, pick at him, but the embargo on the country, that was aimed very much at hurt ordinary people. And that's why it doesn't have the credibility. And I think institutions really need to think and so responding with the default settings, so to speak. Yeah, thank you for that. I think it is a really interesting and important point and I think it ties back as well to some of the things that you were saying earlier about understanding what the baseline was pre-coup. And there is certainly a tendency to look towards these institutions, as you can see in the processes, the democratic process in Mali, or institutions like Equaloss and how they understood the default. But when the legitimacy isn't there, the popular legitimacy, I think it raises interesting questions about, you know, for the U.S. what our role is and who we're interacting with and what we're trying to support and how we respond to these kinds of things. And if I could pick up on something, Miriam, that you said in your response about Equaloss, you know, that their response is actually driving people closer to the military government and talk a little bit more about the government itself and its relationship with the Malian people, you know, the performance of the government. So, I mean, thus far, they've come in and they were faced with all of the same set of issues that have been confronting the previous government, insecurity, the weak economy, the corruption issues, and it doesn't seem like there's been a lot of progress on these. As it looks more and more like their time and power is going to stand beyond early 2022, how well equipped do you think they are to actually respond to the needs of the people in Mali? And what will that mean for them? And what will that mean for the country? Yes, I will do my best to answer your question. When I was studying political science, we looked at Mali and we looked at Benin as case studies. This was in the 90s. And at the time, you wouldn't have been able to imagine that Mali would have evolved the way it has. Just imagine that you're living under a kind of psychological shock and you can't get away from it. Today, Malians are living in a country where we've been through three multiple coups in just a few years. And just look at what happened to Libya. And we cannot disconnect our situation from what happened and what is happening in Libya. And when we started talking about these issues and we talked about the peace agreement, that also helped contribute to the current crisis. Because the peace agreement took a lot of time to put together and the government had to work with lots of different armed groups. And so the crisis only continued. So for Malians, we said to ourselves, OK, we lived under a dictatorship for 20 years. Then we had a bit of democracy. But under democracy, what happened? We had corruption. We had a lack of transparency. We had elections that were contested. And so that's what's going on in Malian's minds. What's important in the end? Transparency, good governance. And what does it matter whether it's civilians or army officers? Malians just want leaders that you could call strong. We want strong institutions. We want good governance. We want transparency. Because the greatest evil in Malia right now is corruption. And unfortunately, if you look at Malian politicians, and it's been the same class of politicians for years, most of them have, well, let's call it a history, a history with corruption. So people are saying, OK, at least these new military leaders, they don't have any major financial scandals yet. And hopefully they will be able to act. Under the former president, there are projects that cost millions and millions and never got off the ground. All the money went to corruption. But the military government has tried to show a little more what's doing with the money. But you have to understand, Malians are incredibly frustrated. They are fed up with corruption. When I've worked with NGOs, I was able to go into some of the smaller villages in some of these very remote areas. And there is someone, I went to a village in an area that is suffering from terrorism. And someone tried to sell me a phone card for 10,000 CFA francs, but that card should be free normally. So the authorities, there's so much corruption, they aren't able to have connections and relationships with all of these villages and all of the parts of Mali. So Malians in general are rejecting the political class in general. And people are saying, why not? Why not a military government? Why not? In the end, we've tried everything else. And we have so-called intellectuals who are telling us that they can govern without corruption, but they wind up falling into corruption scandals over and over. Malians are caught between feeling many different ways about their country. But in the end, they just say, let's try something new. Let's try something different. Maybe that will get us out of this crisis. And there are still attacks throughout the country. The economic crisis is ongoing. And how can you have a good economy in a country where there are regular attacks? No one can do any economic development in places, in areas that are insecure. So it's very difficult for everyone. There are villages under siege by jihadists. What are they to do? In spite of all of that, the Malians are saying, well, let's try it. And there was so much hope in Ibrahim Boubou Karketa when he came to power with more than 75% of the vote. Everyone trusted him. But after three months, he lost the trust of the people. He lost the confidence of the people. So if and when we do have elections, who will we elect and what will that person do? All of these factors contribute to the popularity of the military leaders because the Malians are ready to trust them. That's, I think that's a very helpful perspective and provides, I think, a really interesting contrast to some of the next couple of questions in terms of how we're viewing the events. If I can direct the next question to you, Peter, I think there is a growing tendency to view events in Africa and in Mali as well through the lens of competition between on one hand, the EU, the US and other allies and then Russia and China and the other. What impact do you think that this strategic competition has actually had on the events in Mali? And what kind of response and how should international actors respond to Russia and other involvement in Mali? Well, I think we have to disentangle a couple of things in that question. One is what many of our competitors, rivals of you will geopolitically have come to recognize is that for a very small investment on their part, they can tie up significant strategic resources, either from some of our European partners or the United States or others, and therefore those resources aren't available to be used against them in other theaters. So it becomes actually quite interesting from a political science point of view, quite interesting asymmetric competition. A good example, stepping away from Mali, perhaps to give us a little bit of detachment is what happened in the Central African Republic. It didn't really matter to Russia whether it made money out of its engagement there, but for a few million dollars worth of arms, it gained influence and it certainly frustrated Paris a great deal. To the extent that Paris has spent arguably, although we don't know for sure because it's black budgets, a lot more money in trying to counter it. And so even if they made no money and evidence seems to be that they are making some money through the private military companies that are there and the resources they've gained control of, but even if they didn't, it would have been worth the investment. And I think we have to keep that in mind. Not that every case is like that, but keep that in mind. Secondly, I think it's also important is where our conduct again, not to encourage bad behavior. I think the United States is a very clear line. When there is a coup until constitutional government is restored by law, obedience to our laws and our principles, the US cuts military and security assistance to the regime that takes power until constitutional order is restored. In fact, at the US Embassy in Bamako today, because of a decision made when I was in government about the nature of the overthrow of President Cata a year and a half ago, there are a number of vehicles that would have otherwise been handed over to the Mali and military, but they sit there in the taking up space in the parking lot, quite literally, because they can't be handed over in terms of assistance. That's fidelity to our principles. On the other hand, that can be taken too far in cases where the security challenge remains. I think Merriam underscored how much state legitimacy is tied up with providing security. Merriam's point is well taken that their counterterrorism seems to be disproportionate that's effects. On the other hand, people demand as they are demanding and Burkina fossil currently as they demanded Mali security. So the international community needs to also be be careful about what it does. And how it blocks. For example, I'm aware of a situation that occurred after I left government, where the Mali government is seeking to acquire with its own resources, some equipment necessary for, I think, in my unprofessional opinion, since I'm not a military man, it's fight against the extremists and the armed groups. But that's held up because there's a small US component to the whole thing. And that's caused a bit of tension. And in those tensions, I'm not surprised that they would look to other partners, including ones that trouble us. So I think that has to be born in mine as well. It's a balancing act. All these things, every one of the dilemmas you've brought up presents us with a tension between and that we have to balance very finely. Thank you. Thank you for that nuanced answer. And maybe to take a similar question, but look at it from the perspective of the Malian government. So the transitional government's negotiations with the Wagner group, the Russian mercenary group with the Kremlin ties. You know, they've been talking about military training and this has raised a lot of concerns in France elsewhere. How do you characterize the aims of the transitional government in speaking with the Wagner group? And how should France, the US and others respond to the Malian government's actions? Well, thank you. So I think there are two to two sides to that question. First is a question about Wagner. Second is how the, I think, the international community reacted to it. And the third, I think it is how the US and the French should, I think, position themselves regarding that. So let me start with the Wagner question. I think regarding Wagner, there are facts and there are a lot of rumors. The fact is that the Malian government has decided to diversify their partners in terms of this effort to engage with, to address the problem of security. Among those new actors that they are speaking with are Russians. They have bought helicopters, I think military equipment from including helicopters from Russia. They, but they are not only talking with Russians, and this is with the Russian governments, and they're not only talking to the Russian government, they are talking to other actors, including Algeria, Morocco, etc. Regarding Wagner itself, they have denied any engagements with the Wagner group, per se, saying that there is nothing yet. There is no deal between the Malian government and the Wagner group. And they said, if there is any deal with any actors, they will make it public. So these are the facts. Now there are a lot of rumors. And among the rumors are the, I mean, I think the latest one are the arrival of some Russian mercenaries or militaries that came to Bamako. I think there are different ideas about how many there are, there are people who said that there are like a handful of them, others said that there are dozens of Russian mercenaries who already arrived in Bamako. There are also rumors about what these groups will be charged of. What are they, what will they be doing? Are they going to engage the jihadists in central Bali and in the north? Or are they going to be protecting the institutions and the transitional authorities so that they continue with their will to, I think, to extend the transitional period and then stay peacefully in power. So far really anything that we have on these are only rumors. I think sometimes there are credible details about these rumors, but we do not have facts, clear facts available or statements from the Malian government on it. So now what would, I think that the other side of the question is how are the international communities reacting to it? The ECOS has said that there is no, have rejected the idea of bringing in Bangladesh and said that they would not accept it and perhaps this is going to increase the crisis between the Malian government and the regional organization. But it's not only the regional organization. Other countries including a lot of Malian neighboring countries to Mali, including Niger, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, they have expressed clearly that they would not accept the presence of Russian mercenaries in Mali. So this is going to actually, I think, accentuate the crisis between these countries and the Malian transitional authorities. France, Germany and the European Union have also rejected the idea of having Wagner in the country and said that if the transitional authorities in Mali are to move forward with that there will be consequences. Some have said that this is going to be incompatible with their presence and the support to the Malian governments. Now, what should the international community or the France and I think moving to the third part of the question, what France and the United States should be doing? I think Ambassador Pham put it clearly, what we need really is more engagement, not less. More engagement from these foreign powers to support the Malian government, I think, in locally accepted solutions. Let us not impose solutions on the Malians. I like all what Mariam is saying, which I think really, a nuance, this type of discourse that you hear from outside that lets the Malians go quickly organize elections so that we have new elected officials in Mali that would be, I think, acceptable to the international community. But from the Malian side, if you hear a lot of Malians are saying that, I mean, if you look at in the political scene, we do not see any credible alternative. Today, politicians that would come, if we organize election is for what? It's to have a new government that will lack credibility and legitimacy and that will look more like the Ibeka government. Or do we need really to refound the country's institutions and have good international, have good, I think, government that will take care of people's needs. The other side is the security. How do we deal with insecurity? I do think that this is also a question that international community should be working closely with the Malian government. So far, I think if we talk about the way, the balance of power, we see that they are in a mutual understanding. Sorry, I think the volumes cut out, Ibrahim. Sorry, can you hear me now? Yes, that's much better. Thank you. Let me wrap up. I'm saying that we need the international community to be back in the Malian government in dealing with this insecurity, even by changing tack in the way that we have approached the government. You mentioned previously the military solution. We need to go beyond the military solution and try to think about other solution. We have been talking a lot about the need to go for dialogue between the Malian government and jihadists. This is actually one of the indigenous, one of the locally supported idea, which is to engage some of the jihadist groups to try to find solutions to them. But so far, there is, I think if the Malians are to engage in dialogue with the jihadists, the jihadists are likely to have the upper hand. The Malian authorities need to have the support of the international community back in them so that they reinforce their positions in case there is any such dialogue to happen. And I think this is really one of the solutions that I think can bring us beyond the impasse in which we are currently stuck. If I could just make a brief point following on Supreme's excellent points, I agree completely with him on the need for engagement. And by engaging, we learn more about the needs, the wishes, the ideas of the Malian partners, and can better reflect them. I think one of the things that has not been very helpful in recent weeks and months has been an almost hectoring tone by which parts of the international community, including former colonial powers, have lectured the Malians. It works exactly the opposite direction, treating them that way disrespectfully, I would argue, instead of listening to them. And I think that hurts and if anything will drive them further into the arms of people who I think would be unhelpful, including the Russians. I think so that listening to that engagement, I think is very, very critical. And let's face it, they know how to get a rise out of us. And, you know, the overreaction, one would say, of certain former colonial powers to Malian foreign minister, Abdulai Jyot's visit to Moscow, I think just proved the point. I thought it was an overreaction and it all it did was serve to reinforce the very things we don't want to reinforce. So I think we have to be very, very careful. We're seeing that in the Sahel in protests in Burkina Faso that blocked a French convoy a week ago, the protests that they've been met with in Niger. And so for the United States, final point to your question, I think, although we stand by our allies, including our oldest ally, the French, on the other hand, I think it's healthy as the United States. And my advice to the current administration to maintain a little bit of sunlight between the two. Thank you. Yeah. And I think all of the panelists at this point have have said a lot about this. But maybe as we as we get towards the end of the panel to invite any additional points people wanted to make about what you think the outlook for elections, the outlook for transition is and what, what, you know, if there's anything that you haven't already underlined what the international and regional actors should be focusing on. So I'll invite any of the panelists that would like to add to their previous points to jump in on that. And if not that maybe I can ask specifically to you, Miriam. You know, there's there's been a lot of emphasis in our conversation and I think rightly on localized solutions and legitimacy and buying. I think it would be interesting if you could talk a little bit about how civil society and other Malian institutions, you know, shifting the emphasis away from regional and international actors. Can or would hope to be involved in this transition and then what support they might need to play that role. Yes, well, first, I want to answer your question about the community. It's an important question. Because if we are able to organize elections, that will allow us to create pressure to preserve our democratic institutions. But Molly has become really a special case. We have had to an hour in the middle of having a third coup d'etat. So we need people to hold Molly to the rules. And as Ambassador Pham was saying, we can think of all kinds of solutions, but we have to make a difference between what needs to happen under the rules and what can happen in reality. We also have to be careful to not add to the tension that already exists with further sanctions, things like that. As for your question about civil society, it has an incredibly important role to play today. Any solution must go beyond a military solution. So of course, civil society has an important role to play, especially on the ground. All kinds of humanitarian projects need to continue. All kinds of projects that offer training and education of young people need to continue. There's also various financial support programs for young people, for women, to help them try to pull themselves out of the economic stagnation that they're surrounded by. And we need this kind of support in parts of the country that are not occupied, served by the government. Once again, when we talk about negotiating with the jihadists, they're not necessarily foreigners or foreign groups. These are people from these communities who may have strayed from the path, but who don't have any other opportunities or any other economic outlets. And so people either join jihadist groups or try to cross the Mediterranean and get to Europe. So we need to be able to provide economic alternatives to young people in the Sahel and in Mali if we are to really undercut jihadist groups. And when people do leave to join these groups, oftentimes their families will protect them. So it's hard to track them down because they're protected by their communities. The role of civil society in this context is surveillance. We need a new pattern, a new system. Since we're under a military regime right now, and that's not a situation that will last, we cannot rely on our current laws because our laws will change. And people are saying, oh, there's no alternative way, but we don't trust the political class. And that's when you risk falling into authoritarianism. So civil society needs to stand guard and make sure that rights are being respected internally within the country. And civil society also needs to put pressure on the military regime so that they're not doing whatever they feel like. So that's the very important role that civil society has to play alongside all of the humanitarian and development projects that they already do. We also need them to help us ensure that our human rights are respected. And to make sure that the Asis National, that will lead to a good new government. Thank you, Maryam. And I'd like to offer one final invitation, Peter or Abraham, if there's anything that you'd like to add on that question. Just briefly, we brought up an important point earlier that we really don't have the time to delve into. But the question of the widespread support within Malian society of seeking a dialogue, even with extremist groups, at least parts of them. And with the exclusion of those who are transnational terrorists who represent a danger to the world as a whole or by a community. I mean, I think it's a question that should be left open within certain guardrails, but it's best engaged with locally. And certainly I can say during my time when I was special envoy, I didn't preclude that. And we tried to listen to that voice of civil society as Maryam brought up. I even spent three hours one day over at his house with Imam Diko himself. We had a very good and frank conversation. I don't think I walked away convinced by much and I'm sure I didn't convert him to anything, but at least the channels of dialogue were open and we had actually a fruitful discussion. And I think that's important. And so I think there should be within the bounds of certain guardrails. I think it should facilitate rather than Hector the mountains because what ultimately is going to be sustainable is what Malian themselves agreed to accept as legitimate and and can live with. I think you might be trying to jump. Oh, great. Okay. Yes. So I would like to make two additional points here. The first one in regards to the term limits of the transition. I think there is a lot of focus on make it quick, finish it, give power back to civilians, etc. The focus should not be on organizing election for the sake of organizing them. The focus should be on how do we produce institutions that would be able to face the challenges that Mali is facing today to avoid falling in the vicious cycle of political crisis after political crisis and security. I do think that there need to be a focus on the reforms, the necessary reforms that Mali needs to put forward, including the reforms that will make it possible to implement the peace agreement. And I'm talking about the revision of the constitution, the redistribution of reforms, etc. I do think that those are really needed. The focus should be on the quality of those election and the institutions that will come out of it. Well, it seems like we've lost his connection, unfortunately. But I think maybe given that we're almost out of time here I'd just like to thank the panelists again for a really interesting discussion I think you raised a lot of really important themes around legitimacy and trust in national and regional and international institutions. And the need for us to think about solutions that respect the complexity of the political situation of the security situation that address it maybe more holistically and that are really driven by Mali and actors and by the needs on the ground. I think that's a lot for us to think about and so thank you again. And I will be there. Thank you.