 Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome. My name is Bill Burns, and I'm the president of the Carnegie Endowment. My great pleasure to introduce today's keynote speaker, the first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Carnegie Endowment alum, and my friend and former colleague David Lipton. On the eve of the first anniversary of the Iran nuclear agreement, it's only natural because we've been doing throughout today's event to pause and reflect on the road traveled. There is no doubt that looking back and drawing lessons is a worthwhile exercise, but it's far more important, in my view, to look ahead. There's still a great deal further to travel. Paralysis, political, diplomatic, regional, and technical landmines litter the road before us, and all those traveling on this road and navigating around these obstacles will have choices to make. Choices that will determine not only whether this specific agreement will hold, but whether regional order can be rebuilt, and indeed whether the global nuclear order can hold together. It's important to recall why we ended a 35-year diplomatic vacuum and engaged directly with Iran, including the quiet bilateral talks that we began more than three years ago. We had one clear objective in mind, to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, to achieve that objective diplomatically. We knew we needed to demonstrate a willingness to engage, as well as the ability to build leverage. Over a number of years, we built an unprecedented set of sanctions and other forms of pressure in service of an equally unprecedented verifiable agreement. The agreement we saw was one that would close off all the pathways to a bomb, which sharply constrained Iran's program over a long duration, and it would set out an intrusive monitoring verification and inspection regime that would detect and address violations quickly and effectively. This was not the perfect outcome, but it was the best of the available outcomes, and it was the outcome that was achieved. We did not expect any overnight transformation of Iran's disruptive and threatening actions across the Middle East, and we certainly did not expect any overnight transformation with Iranian relations. What we set out to do was to ensure that an unconstrained Iranian nuclear program, let alone a nuclear-armed Iran, could not add yet another layer of risk and fragility to our already chaotic region. Thanks to President Obama's leadership, Secretary Kerry's determination and the skill and perseverance of the entire multilateral negotiating team, Iran stands today and for decades to come, well short, with the bomb. We are safer, our partners in the region are safer, and the world is safer, but we cannot afford to be complacent about implementation, about the nonproliferation regime, or about the broader region. Rigorous implementation of this complex agreement will require sustained attention and focus. Already over the past year, parties to the agreement have come together to ensure compliance and to address issues quickly and to the letter and spirit of the agreement. One of the challenges before us is whether the member states will ensure that the IAEA will have the resources it needs to implement effectively. Our first panel today touched on the IAEA issue and a number of other technical aspects of the deal that deserve careful examination. It also looked at what features of this agreement could serve the broader nonproliferation regime, including our own team's effort to define a firewall between civil and nuclear weapons programs. Another priority for this and the next administration is embedding the nuclear agreement in a wider regional strategy that pushes back against threatening Iranian behavior, reassures our partners and allies, and addresses the political and economic dysfunction which makes many parts of the region so vulnerable. Our second panel looked at Iran's evolving domestic politics as well as regional reactions and recalibrations to the post-deal landscape. For our keynote session, we are very fortunate to have with us David Lipton. David recently visited Iran and can give us all a fresh perspective on Iran's efforts to reintegrate with the global economy after many years of sanctions and many more years of economic mismanagement and decay. Few people have a more intimate sense of the complexity of economic transition. David has lived and worked through the post-Soviet Union transition to capitalism, Asia's recovery from its financial crisis in the late 1990s, and the tumultuous global economic transition we're all living through today. Few people bring a broader set of perspectives and experiences to the task. David has worked in a number of senior positions at the Department of Treasury and White House at the IMF and private finance and here at the Carnegie Endowment. And few people bring to this task a sharper mind or greater skill than David Lipton. So it's a great pleasure to welcome David back to Carnegie. I hope you'll all join me on giving us a speech. I almost dumped it on the Quran alongside my podium. Dr. I used to call you Ambassador Burns and then Secretary Burns. Thank you. And it's great to see you, Jessica. I have a special place in my heart for Carnegie. I came here as a fellow after serving in the Clinton administration. And it's a great institution. One of the few places I came here because I like the fact that one could be working on subjects in the economic area, but alongside people working in other related disciplines and the way in which the institution brings together thinking in different areas. I think it's key. It's key to the way I try to approach subjects. And I think the subject that I want to talk about today, Iran, is one that really demands this. It's very hard to simply go at the subject of Iran looking just at one or another aspect. I think to understand Iranian issues demands looking at all dimensions. We've had sessions today on nuclear issues, talked about sanctions, talked about regional politics. And I want to add the economic dimension. I won't talk about the other subjects. I think the choices in the economic, well, all of the choices Iran's going to make with all of that coming up, understanding the state of Iran's economy, the problems they face, the possibilities that they have, I think is something that regardless of which subject interests you, it's something that's well worth considering. I believe that with the JCPOA implementation now happening, Iran faces a very fundamental and simple economic choice, whether to stick with the present economic structure and the approach that they've had, and that seems an oil-based economy, fairly closed economy, or to try to integrate into the global economy with all of what that means and entails. I think the first, to me, will fail to deliver job growth, economic growth, dynamism, because the economy really is still oil-based, fairly closed. I think the second can succeed, but it's by no means a simple strategy. It's a strategy that will require very deep and meaningful economic change. I think it will really require a transition that's on the scale and of the type that countries in Central and Eastern Europe had to go through. This will be challenging, challenging to existing structures, existing vested interests, and it's a process that even if done well, will take quite a lot of time. Now I know which I would recommend, and this was subject to many of my meetings and remarks in Iran, but having been there and spoken to them, I'm not sure which way they will go. Let me back up for a second, though, and set the stage for what I want to say. As I'm sure you know, Iran's a member of the IMF, and so in a sense our relationship with Iran is different than a country's relationship with Iran. Iran is a member, like all of its members, we have an ongoing and uninterrupted relationship. We have had annual policy dialogues, sometimes when those were a bit delayed by the geopolitical events and tensions, but we have teams that visit Iran every year, and we have had good and a working relationship. Iran participates in our executive board in all of the discussions and decisions that we make about other things we do in the world. Now of course we take into account geopolitical events and geopolitical realities in as much as they affect Iran's economy and our assessment of their economic prospects when we formulate policy advice, but we try to focus on the economics. I visited in May with some others who are sitting here today with me. It was the first visit of anyone from our management team to Iran since before 1979. I went in order to further develop our relationship since coming at a time when we see Iran at quite a critical junction with the nuclear agreement, with economic decisions to make in key areas that are going to affect their economy, but I think also affect the political prospects and their international relations. We were hosted by the central bank, by the central bank governor, saw various senior economic officials, of course the people we saw were reform oriented. Let me say roughly speaking what we heard before saying what kinds of messages, what kinds of conclusions we drew and messages we conveyed. We found them very interested in restoring growth and trying to do without rekindling the inflation that the country has faced. They all focused very sharply on the need to reestablish links between their banks and international banks. We're interested in what was causing the problem and what we could do to help. They were trying to figure out how to cave in the face of continuing sanctions, but also the sanctions relief that's taken place. They were trying to understand the reluctance of international banks. I had a sense, although no one really quite explicitly said it, that they were very eager to show some economic results from the JCPOA and concern that unless they could do that, that would put them in a difficult position as advocates of reform. I had also the sense that they were concerned that continued financial isolation would block reintegration and block down from their objectives. As we look at the Iran's economy, clearly the legacy there is decades of an oil-based economy, many years with limitations on the degree, the kinds and degree of interconnectedness that they could have with the global economy. And now with a very substantial need for a range of reforms to become integrated. And we see that integration as key to bringing some prosperity. I think one of the strengths of the IMF is that we have 189 members and have for years been working with them to deal with the problems that they have encountered. So we have some experience that we can bring to bear in visiting a country and looking at its situation. So what I tried to do in the trip was to bring to bear some of the lessons that we thought were applicable, while of course the international experiences of countries are rather special, countries are all different, but we thought there were some quite important lessons that could be brought to bear. So let me mention three. First and one that I think Iran for the most part really has heated but is well worth for them bearing in mind because there are continuing pressures is that it's very important to protect stability. And if there's no reform, there's in essence no reform path that's going to be possible, no integration that would be possible or successful if there's financial destabilization. I think that's something we've seen range of countries that tried to reform but succumbed to various populist pressures that have led to instability. They have for the most part reacted to the increased costs, trade interruptions, the limited access to foreign exchange in a way that shows they appreciate the need to establish and maintain financial stability. They in the last few years have supported growth but at the same time reined in an inflation that had gotten out of hand that reached about 45 percent. They've been reasonably careful about keeping budgets and debt from being in the danger zone. We forecast growth this year to be more than half percent and inflation to be around 10 percent. Now while they have that recognition, I think that there are pressures mounting that may challenge this accomplishment with banks in the country having some financial problems of their own. There are temptations. There are political pressures to use. Central Bank created liquidity in order to deal with problems in banks. That approach to using a monetary policy to deal with a real economic problem certainly could lead to a loss of the hard-worn investors. Like other countries, Iran has to deal with what's going on in the world. The oil prices, of course, are very relevant to them. Their production is recovering but the oil price is low and is likely to stay low. They're dealing with a world in which aggregate demand to growth is sluggish and likely to remain sluggish. They have to deal as other countries, as emerging market countries with market access have to do with the risk aversion in capital markets, the volatility that we're seeing in capital markets. So Iran has various challenges to the macroeconomic and financial stability that are important, but I think I certainly felt that they were very sharply focused. The second subject and one that I think runs to the core of the challenge that they face and will be a much harder challenge to meet is the need to modernize the economic structure of the country. The old structure really was one that just evolved. It was an oil economy. It wasn't terribly diversified. It really wasn't a terribly open economy, very integrated with the world outside of the oil sector and then, of course, with various sanction regimes. The degree of interconnectedness has been much reduced for a long time. When you look at what that structure looks like, it's a distinct lack of competitiveness in the economy. There's still heavy regulation. There are sectors that have various forms of protection, whether it's tariffs or state-granted monopoly rights or privileges. This has led to companies that make money that are able to capture economic rents and with the capturing of economic rents come all kinds of other problems. This lack of competitiveness is not an environment that's going to be creating a lot of jobs for a population that's a very young population. Demographics that Iran has really needs to open up, integrate with the world and be able to create jobs and create companies that can export, import and domestic industry that's protected and geared toward domestic consumption is not going to be the engine of growth that the country needs. So they need a kind of structural reform that is not easy. I think the kind of challenge they have is more akin to what we saw in Eastern Europe. They need a broad liberalization of the economy that will remove some of the privileges that companies have. But of course, in doing that and forcing companies to compete, they will have to reckon with the vested interests that have benefited from all of the regulations, all of the protection, all along. So I think this is hard, but I think it's absolutely fundamental. Second, they're going to need an ownership structure that is suited to a modern open economy. State ownership remains very prevalent. There are military and security entities with deep involvement in industry and commerce. There's cross ownership in the economy where companies own banks and banks own companies. There are close relationships between companies, banks and the government that mean that you don't see the kind of governance that's required to support a substantial investment and vibrant growth and certainly not the kind of governance that's going to attract foreign direct investment, something else that they say they want and in fact that they need. When I was asked by a fairly senior Iranian official for lessons that I drew from my experience in working in other parts of the world, and I basically went through these points and talked about Poland and Eastern Europe and talked about the cozy relationship issue of the relationship between banks, companies and government in Asia and the role that it played in the Asian financial crisis. When I finished, I asked him, does any of this sound familiar? He didn't say a word, but he smiled and nodded his head. The third subject, of course, is the need that Iran has to earn confidence of all of the foreign business community with whom they're going to trade and interact and deal with in the world of finance. Sanctions are still a substantial burden to the economy. This is not my area, but surely Iran's actions, policies, behaviors will be a determined whether that confidence can... They are attempting to restore confidence where sanctions removal is creating opportunities. They want to and are trying to open accounts with foreign banks, establish correspondent banking relationships that will allow trade. Some of that is beginning to happen. There's a lot of discussion. We had a lot of discussion about international banks' reluctance to interact with them. The question that was implicit is whether this reluctance is because of the existing sanctions, because of suasion that is coming informally from the United States or other governments, whether this has to do with banks' own decisions, their own risk management considerations. And I think in the end of the day, they have to think about that third question, because that's the one where they have something that they can do about it. Central Bank is dedicated to creating an anti-money laundering, countering the financing terrorism supervisory regime. They that they want to spend money laundering and the financing of terrorism in their financial system and in their businesses. And doing that is key. They have passed a counter-terrorism financing law. It's not perfect, but it's a start. And now the next step is for the Central Bank to establish an AML-CFT regime and in turn to see that once that regime exists, that banks come into compliance with that regime. It really will take all of those steps, I imagine, for banks to feel fully comfortable or more comfortable business with Iranian banks. Of course, another aspect of this is that FATF, which presently considers Iran to be a non-cooperative country with respect to AML-CFT, the absence of AML-CFT, would have to find that Iran was coming into compliance and changing their determination. That's a process that will take some time. The Iranians have for some time asked us for help in this area. We have extensive expertise in working with bank supervisors on a range of supervisory issues, and one of those is in creating buying AML-CFT regimes. We've had teams work with them and we'll be sending another team to do work on the creation of this. When speaking with banks, CEOs are very aware of what they may differ in the responsiveness once there's such a regime to bring in place AML-CFT clients' features in their banks, but I think that the banks that do that are going to be the ones that want to find some restoration of confidence. I know that FATF has recently recognized that the Iranian Central Bank is taking on this task and in recognition of that, while they've not changed their determination of how to consider Iran, they have suspended for a year some of the building's requirements that they have been asking banks, whether this is symbolic or appreciable effect, we'll see, but it certainly shows that the world is going to think it shows that the world is recognizing the efforts that they do make. So, what to make of all of it? I think it's a moment where Iran has a very substantial opportunity. It needs to decide on its own economic strategy and chart its own economic future. It also, of course, the other side of the house has to decide on relevant political and security issues and approaches. But whatever they decide on the second, I'm quite sure they aren't going to have economic prosperity without doing the first, so I think it makes sense for them to do the first. I'm sure they preserve macroeconomic stability in really quite intensively to address the structural issues in the economy and that they act to restore confidence of foreign businesses being able to do business in Iran without too much concern but undue risk with respect to the AMLC. So Iran has a decision to make. I think the West also needs to decide whether to encourage and support economic reform and reformers. That calculus will itself feedback and have political and security dimensions to it. Our job at the IMF is to make the policy choices and the consequences of those choices clear to Iran and clear to the rest of our members and to speak publicly about this. We're trying to assist Iran in carrying out, mapping out and carrying out economic reforms that can support growth and stability and can provide opportunities for the next generation. I'll stop with those remarks. I'm happy to take some questions. Thanks, David, and thanks again for coming. I get the privilege of asking you a couple questions and we'll turn it open to the rest of the group. I guess the first one is simple but it's relatively rare for an American with your experience to be in Iran and having the meetings that we did. Just general impressions, first of all, because a lot of us can't travel. Well, I'll tell you, my first impression was arriving at the hotel and seeing that there were flags of Croatian and a huge delegation of Croatians, including the Croatian leadership. And then the next morning those had been taken down and there were the Italian flags and the many businessmen and officials from Italy. Europe is interested in this reintegration. European business is interested in participating. There's a bit of a buzz about Iran right now. That doesn't mean that people are ready to act. I think they aren't, but I think they are ready to go and suss it out. They want to see what Iran is going to do. They want to understand what the opportunities but also what the obstacles are. I don't remember whether it was just before my visitor after, but Prime Minister Renzi was there and had conversations. I think it's a very lively re-engagement going on. Where it will go, I don't know. In your remarks you talked about the various causes and combinations of causes for the difficulty or at least the way forward for Iran to have the kind of growth it wants on a sustainable basis. I think you suggested this and other people have that at least as important as the sanctions or the fundamentals of the structure of the Iranian economy and the issues of transparency and rule of law and all of those things. In your conversations, did you get the impression that your Iranian counterparts feel that way too or is there a tendency, did you detect the tendency to think that the problems were mostly externally imposed and if those external impositions went away, things would just flourish? I think it varies from person to person. But first, I think the Iranian government itself has been saying that the difficulties that the Iranian economy has had are not just about the sanctions that they recognize that their own policies and approach play a role. In the meetings I had, of course there's a natural, it's natural that the first question that they ask is what can you do to help us re-establish relations with international banks. But I think as the conversations went on, there was a very realistic assessment on their part of most of the senior economic officials of the problems that they face, the fact that right now the banks are not profitable, that something will have to be done about that, that there are risks if you do it wrong, that there are important policy choices to be made. They get that there are longer term structural challenges. They were very interested in thinking a little more perhaps than they had about exactly which were the better and worse ways to go about that. So I felt that they welcomed me. I think they were wary at first. But once we got into the substance of it, I felt that this was a quite earnest exchange of views that they considered to be quite relevant to their own thinking about their own situation. Ben, one of the things that you raised a number of times in your presentation is the anti-money laundering, terrorism financing, in a sense, requirements and the penalties of not complying with that. In the discussions, did they raise kind of definitional issues? In other words, it seems to me that on terrorism piece in particular, the terrorism that is usually associated with Iran isn't what we tend to have in mind what happened in Istanbul yesterday or that kind of thing. It's more structural and political, whether it's with Hezbollah or other organizations. So you can imagine a real definitional dispute, but they don't get a vote in how it's defined. So did that come up in your conversations? No, and I understand there are some things that visit like this that are not discussed explicitly and perhaps is even for the best. But at the same time, I think the central bank's view is that they need an AMLCFT regime. They need to have a situation in which their institutions, in which their institutions can monitor what's going on and where they as a central bank can know whether activities that couldn't be happening are going on. Of course, whatever a state does is a separate matter and its consequences. Our consequences, Iran, will have to deal with. But our view is that to the extent that they are trying to create this AMLCFT regime, which allows for monitoring and allows for enforcement, is a step and one we ought to all be supporting. The feedback I get from the official community country members of the BADF is that they support our work in this area. Yes, it's kind of switched it a little bit and then open it up. But we work here a lot on nuclear policy issues and nonproliferation more broadly, where the potency of sanctions has always been a question. Would it be effective enough? Is it a useful tool? And I think with the Iran case, it surprised many people how effective those sanctions were. And there are reasons for that in terms of the evolving quality of the sanctions and information that goes into them. But where you sit and from an IMF point of view, is there any kind of systematic evaluation of kind of sanctions as tools and how they can be used or not used or how they maybe even interfere with the objectives you guys are trying to seek in terms of stability in a country and where is kind of the sanctions issue fit with you? Given our mandate, it's just not an area that we look at from an analytic standpoint. There are various restrictions that are proscribed in our articles, various kinds of exchange restrictions. But there is in our legal structure an exception for a country that does something for national security reasons. And in essence, once that's invoked, and if that were in principle invoked, it wouldn't be for us to say one way or another, good or bad. So we don't really study the matter. I don't have for you the body of years of analysis of this subject. I think it is clear though, just having also been in the U.S. government watching this different sanction regimes over the years, that obviously multilateral sanctions can be more effective than bilateral sanctions and there are examples of that in the U.S. And it really matters whether there is strong determination in clarity about the application in terms of sanctions. We also of course, in a very relevant case to the IMF, see the sanctions on Russia right now. We have an economic support program with Ukraine. So the Russia-Ukraine conflict is germane to us. So we do have to look at how this is there. It seems to us important that there's clarity about the intention and not back and forth where at one point there's sentiment for sanctions and another weakening of sentiment for sanctions. Useful purpose to uncertainty. But the issue of the choice of sanctions is really not something we get. No, I won't belabor it. But partly I've been thinking about Pakistan and not that it's something IMF affects but if you've got to vouch safe that you think that you're going to get paid back and then that country has sanctions put on it and it affects the prospect of payment, that's where I was wondering if analytically it comes in. In a sense of kind of risk assessment that the IMF makes in working with the country. Yeah, I mean when we lend to a country we have to think about the assurances with respect to the payment so we look at a wide range of things typically been on our list. Let's open it up, same deal as before. And because Barbara Savin was first before, she can be last now but I'll make sure you get in. I've got to be fair. This gentleman here. Doug Hengel with the German Marshall Fund. It sounds like you met mostly with people who were receptive to the reform message and your messages. Did you also meet with people who are sort of on the other side of the spectrum and how did they react to your messages? What's their pushback? No, on this visit I was the guest of the Central Bank and the government and so the official meetings were with people in the government who are our interlocutors and they were all reform oriented across the spectrum of the economic parts of government. I visited a university setting, met with Chamber of Commerce and met with bankers and again it's not at all representative of full population, full range of views and I had no illusion that I was hearing points of view from the more conservative side of the Iranian society. You're surprised by how green it was going around Tehran? Physically how many? No actually quite, rather the contrary. I mean I don't know that part of the world well but it seemed drier. You know there was still snow on the mountains. There wasn't that much foliage at that point. So if anything, having never been there before I was surprised that it was less, I mean the parks in the city are beautiful and a lot of people out and about. I thought the city seemed very lively but I guess I also hadn't expected how, I didn't realize how huge. Young man here and then the lady next to him. No offense, I'm not saying you're not young but there's a really young guy right behind you that I was having in mind. My God, it was your hand that looked like it was coming out of his shoulder. Alright then maybe I've offended you anyway but go ahead. Michael, you sort of answered a little bit part of the question where he walks a moment ago. I want to know how did you find the people? Are they happy? Are they sad? Are they fearful? What are they thinking about the future? I asked that in light because there's been a very sharp decline in fertility rate in Iran, part of it of women coming off the land and going to universities and so on and getting an education. What are these people going to do with the price of oil so far down? How much employment is there from the public sector? And my last point is you mentioned structural reform and all these things. Do they have the personnel to undertake structural reform? Are they around or do they need some foreign assistance to do that? Because it's not a simple task. A lot of questions but they're good questions. I can't claim to have met a representative or a broad sample of Iranians but I found that the people I met with were engaged. They really wanted to have these conversations. This is true in the university, true in the UNA, the speech that I gave. I was traveling with a group from the IMF and with some women who were covering their heads and bodies for the first time and so they were very aware of the role of women in Iranian society. There were women in a number of the meetings that I participated in but never did one of them say anything which I thought was interesting. They didn't ask questions either at the university or at the beach. Whether that tells you something about Iranians as a whole or not perhaps it's just about them. But I certainly found that in everyday life walking down the street seeing people seemed like a pretty normal and positive environment. On the question of reform, it's never the case that a country really has barely the case that people have all the expertise they need to do very fundamental reforms especially in economies that have a kind of a misdevelopment and a long legacy of that. Ron certainly has a very well educated population especially in technical matters which is part of its potential. We at the IMF have had excellent Iranian economists. I think it may be that many of the most experienced Iranian economists are not in Iran. And whether at a time of some dedication to a reform process that expertise could be brought to bear, I don't know. But I suspect that they will need, if they want to go down this road of course they have plenty of, a lot of expertise but they could sort of benefit from some outside expertise as well. Thanks to the lady here. Hi, my name is Dorothy Maseka. I'm retired from the Treasury Department. I was with the U.S. Saudi Arabian Joint Commission back in the day. I wondered if you had, thank you very much for an excellent presentation and I want a sense of the political will of these reformers that they can't have or had given the political constraints of it. The answer to that is, I think the answer to that is yes. I'm a little reluctant to, I don't want to say what certain people said and so on and who in the government. But having seen quite a range of economic policy makers, I think there are people who really want to make change. They know that the change is probably bigger and requires more ambition than they're presently talking about. That's part of the reason why they wanted to engage in this kind of dialogue. Whether they will win the day in two senses with the senior government leadership and then with the conservative side of society I don't know. But I certainly thought that I had the impression that they really want to understand what does it take to succeed so that they can bought out a reform program. More on this. Jessica, I know while we're here, we'll go Barbara and then the gentleman back in the back there. Thank you, Jessica Matthews of Carnegie. Almost your last sentence, David. I said the West also needs to decide whether to support the economic performers. And when I was listening, I thought, wait, haven't we already decided that? And then, well, maybe you're talking about something else. So can you tell us what to think about? Look, I don't follow the security discussion that closely. But I understand that many people, there are groups here in the United States in the Middle East elsewhere who are skeptical about Iran's aims and intentions. And there are certainly some who feel that prosperity in Iran may lead to resource availability to be used for purposes that they aren't going to care for, they aren't going to approve of. And so it's not like when Poland transitioned, that everyone wanted Poland to leave the communist system and succeed in becoming a successful capitalist economy. I suspect even in this room we would get some yay votes and some nay votes with respect to whether we'd like to see Iran become rich sometime soon. Because you'd like to know the answer to the question, to what uses will they put energy in other resources. So I don't presume, as I say, I think from the IMF standpoint, our mandate is to help our members grow in pursuability. Personally, I think that if the two sides of this are taken together and there's a path towards addressing security issues of mutual concern as well as helping Iran see the opportunities that could come through reintegration, creating growth that really will provide social stability in the country. I know what I would prefer, but I don't want to presume to know the answer that everyone in this room would give. Yeah, we're going to get to you. Thanks for being so generous, George. Barbara Slavin from the Atlantic Council. It's just a point of clarification, really. When you talk about an AML CFT regime, you're talking about safeguards for individual banks so that money trails can be followed and so on. And this is separate from whether the state, the government of Iran chooses to send suitcases of money to Hezbollah and Lebanon or to Hamas. So what I'm trying to say is can you give comfort to businesses and so on that will be dealing with Iranian entities, that they can be dealing with entities that know how to follow these regimes and that particular money won't be diverted and explain to them that that's separate from other Iranian governments. I think that's fair. I mean, obviously, the state, the central bank is the state, the central bank is the supervisor of the banks. And so there's a lot that would be in their hands in terms of control. But we know that there are specially designated entities that have been involved in or alleged to have been involved in activities that they shouldn't. And what this regime would do, what the central bank is dedicated to do, is to have a regime in which there will be both legal consequence and enforcement capability to make sure that banks are not involved in that. And that other things equal will allow, would at least create some basis for foreign banks to have confidence that they can do due diligence about their customer and know what kinds of dealings they're in. That is, yes, that is conceptually separate from the question of all of the potential activities of the sub-state. I'm Haigugar as with Argus Media. I wonder if you had a sense from your conversations that there is a vision for the oil and gas sector in Iran among the economic officials. And whether they are watching what Saudi Arabia government is proposing, I'm glad you mentioned that. I should have said more about this. I'm not advocating that it become a non-oil economy. Certainly its oil resources are substantial. That the last ten years have been a period in which they've not produced as much as they had or as they can. There's been news stories on this just this week. They are increasing production this year and aim to increase it further. I did meet with the oil minister who went through his plans and projections and what could be done with present investment levels and what would require additional investment including foreign direct investment and technologies and so on and so forth. There's no question that oil will be a very important sector. Now of course the oil price will matter a lot in how much income that sector brings. I think there's another dimension of this that has a security and important security dimension which is that in a scenario where the nuclear deal is implemented by both sides where there's further steps of reconciliation between Iran and the West one could well imagine Iran establishing closer energy relations with its northern neighbors, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan. And at that point western countries might have to ask themselves would you rather see some of that oil and gas flow through Russia to Europe or through Iran? This came up in our discussions and I can tell you it's something that they're focused on as an economic matter but it's something I think perhaps the West ought to focus on. Young guy back there and then Ellie up here. Thank you very much. Dimitri Georgia from the Crumpton Group. You mentioned in your presentation investor confidence is a key element to jump-starting the Iranian economy. What can foreign investors look for in terms of signals that Iran is serious about building investor confidence? Some concrete signals. Thank you. A tough one. I'm hesitating because look there are plenty of examples in the last few decades of history where foreign direct investors are take comfort from a strong state that gives assurances that investments will be well regarded and protected even if they're going to sectors that are in a number of respects protected and not necessarily exposed to competitive pressures and so there can be that. But if foreign direct investment is going to go into say as well into new industry in Iran industry that hires young Iranian engineers that is not in the energy sector but are in technologically advancing sectors then you really need assurances that the legal system is going to respect your investment that the financial system is going to fund your investment in terms of short term funding needs that the trade system is going to allow you to export etc etc that in essence that you'll be operating in a liberal environment regulated by law and suitable governance those are the kinds of structural reforms I think they need to consider I would recommend that they do and I think that then FDI technological change entrepreneurship can be a job creator for a country that really has a demographic challenge With that we're going to thank you again and let you go back to work but really great thanks David Thank you, so we're going to see you