 Good afternoon. It's a beautiful day after all that rain. And here to hear a conversation about a government that existed when it seems like a time pass that nobody can remember, but I think that probably is why people have shown up for the event today. So thank you all for showing up today. And I want to start off also by thanking the person sitting at my right, Rick Enderforth. Rick Enderforth, of course, preceded me as the Wadwani Chair in U.S. India Policy Studies and built up a terrific program. And I'm very overjoyed. I had to have a database that brought out fine people like you, but also the substantive backing of policy that brings people to CSI's time and time again, Rick. So thank you so much for your terrific work and leading relationship. We should call this the Rick Chair from here on out. So if there are any ricks out here, you may be in line after this, Rick. So I do think of this. Also another very special person for the Wadwani Chair, Ajay Kela, who runs the Wadwani Foundation. Ajay is the CEO for the Foundation and doing terrific work to try to make sure that over the next few years, five million people in India get employed that otherwise wouldn't have so great work. And hopefully at the reception, if you haven't met Ajay, you'll be able to do so. So one more event, looking at India's elections. Can I ask who's been to an Indian election event so far in Washington, D.C. this season? Yeah, looks like about half. I think there's been approximately the same number of events as there are voters in India. So the numbers are roughly equal right now so far. At this time, though, we're taking a different tack. Instead of looking ahead at what a potential next government of India might look at, what it means to perform its policies, its priorities, instead we're going to take a look back. You know, I found this was the first event that popped in my mind when I came and joined the chair. It wasn't that long ago that we last had a BJP government. And it's a very reasonable prospect that we may have a BJP government soon. But conversations about what the BJP is had tended to be painted by what we've seen of them as an opposition party rather than what they'd actually done in practice. So I thought well worth to have a discussion just in case they should happen to win. I think it's worth mentioning that right now, polling data, as good as it is, shows that the BJP is expected to win the highest number of seats and therefore be in an excellent position to form the next government. But as we were joking about before the event, ten years ago today, just ahead of the 2004 election, the BJP had won almost the same percent of seats in the same five states. And polling data showed them winning 200 seats, which would be up from 182. And the next morning we woke up and Sonia Gandhi was forming the government. So nothing is certain in Indian politics. So take this for what it is. It's a look back and maybe if they come back there will be some points here that you'll find useful. 1976, Lauren Michaels of Saturday Night Live fame took the closest stab and nearly got the Beatles to get back together on stage for a final performance. He failed, and where he failed CSIS today has succeeded, if the Beatles in your minds are the people that led American foreign policy engagement with India during critical time of transformation. So very excited to have this panel here today. You all have their full bios in front, but I'll just mention the key roles that everybody played during this transition period. Of course, Ambassador Richard Celeste took over as our ambassador to India just after the BJP came to power and tested nuclear devices. A job that I can't even imagine stepping into. Ambassador Rick Enderforth was our assistant secretary of state during the initial stage of when the BJP came to power and led engagement just after this interesting early period. Ray Vickery actually began his work in the federal government at the Department of Commerce as assistant secretary for trade development and led the secretaries work on actually raising trade relations with India just before the BJP's election, but continued to be a private sector leader in increasing American business engagement with India even after leaving the administration and including our good times at India Chem 2000. The largest business delegation ever. Forty-three, right? Forty-three companies. Forty-three. And Don Kamp who served at the National Security Council and also after that is a state department both throughout the BJP but also during the transition period. So thanks everybody for coming out and Ambassador Schleske, we'll let you. Thanks very much. Two disclaimers right at the beginning. At first place, the US government's going to work with whoever wins this election and so no one should take our comments as though we are sitting here wishful thinking about what the outcome is. We're reflecting on the past. Second, yesterday's BJP is not today's BJP. So in some respects it's very clear that the BJP has evolved during the past decade or so. Let me start by being a little more exact about when I arrived in India. I arrived in India in November of 1997. I handed my credentials to the President of India on the 28th of November in the morning and that afternoon IK Gujral, the Prime Minister handed his letter of resignation to the President of India. Had this been the 60s when I first lived in India, Blitz would have headlined New American Ambassador Government Falls. Those were not related incidents on the 28th of November but I had arrived with the expectation that we would be planning a visit by President Bill Clinton scheduled and penciled in for late February of 1998. And of course when the Gujral government fell, that visit was postponed. I had come out to India so fast that they brought me back for consultations. That happened in late April, early May of 1998. There had already been one BJP government and that government lasted only several months and one of the coalition partners, a willful female leader from South India, decided that she was going to step back and as a consequence the coalition government fell and there was a second election. I was in it and let me say after that election one of the prominent issues in the BJP platform which needed to be parsed very carefully was a statement that India was going to exercise its nuclear option. We weren't sure what that meant. Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson came out to India and had an interesting conversation with Jocelyn Singh. For any of you who've ever had an extended conversation with Jocelyn Singh, you know that it's a very erudite, articulate, often ob-scupation. It's covering up whatever it is that is exactly what he wants to say in any event. I think Bill Richardson heard that exercising the nuclear option meant considering what was next for India. We found out what was next while I was sitting in Hawaii when the Indian government tested nuclear weapons in May of 1998. And of course that triggered both sanctions that were required by virtue of our legislation. And sanctions that went beyond that by virtue of our irritation. We felt really misled and let down by that decision in the government of India. And so for the next several years, we were engaged in an interesting conversation between the United States government and the government of India. I think that Rick Hindeforth can talk more about the dialogue between Jocelyn Singh and Strobe Talbot that continued over that period of time. I carried bags in and out of that meeting. He was much more directly involved. But the interesting thing is that it really represented the most sustained, high level diplomatic exchange in the history of India as an independent country in the United States as a partner. And in that discussion, though, I don't feel that we believe that India had moved very far, relationships were formed that served us well in the months that followed. Also during this time, other things happened. I mean, do you remember something called Y2K? Now, the BJP can't claim credit for Y2K, those two things aren't related. But Y2K became an incredible driver of the economic relationship between our two countries. It opened up a whole new perspective on the part of American business leaders as to the capability of Indian businesses. And it presented the BJP government, which was committed to a forward-looking economic policy and committed to strong ties with the Indian diaspora in the United States. It created an opportunity for sustained conversation even at a time when sanctions were enforced between our two nations. And then, of course, there was the incursion into cargo, which occurred. Cargo was important because it represented first a blow to the efforts on the part of the government of India to move forward in dialogue with Pakistan. I mean, the Indian Prime Minister had made a trip to Pakistan in an effort to promote dialogue. It represented the first time really when the United States had to make a clear choice between India and Pakistan, and we chose India because the facts were with India. And because as we consuled the BJP government to restrain itself and not cross the line of control, something that many of our own military people thought would be essential to drive the Pakistani forces who were up in these very high outposts in Cargo, though it would be necessary to go after the logistical lines that supported them. The government of India showed restraint. And all of that, I think, set a stage for when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to Washington on the 4th of July, hoping to secure some kind of, I think, face-saving help from the Clinton administration. And Bill Clinton said, you've got to withdraw. Period. Full stop. That's the only thing that will satisfy us. And then, of course, not too long thereafter, Bill Clinton came to visit India. Now, the only mission I had when I went to India, the one that really counted, was a mission that had been given to me personally by Hillary Clinton before I was confirmed. We were at a habitat building in Kentucky and she grabbed me by the arm and she said, Dick, there's one thing you have to do when you go out to India's ambassador and that is get Bill out there to see it. Those of you who've been exposed to that kind of direct demanding from the First Lady know that you will do whatever you need to do. So I did some things which won't appear in any history books and won't be divulged here, but tried to point out to President Clinton that if he was going to visit India and if it were to be a productive visit, then he had to come not later than March of the year 2000. And that visit, which was the first by a presidential visit in 22 years or more lasted five days. It was a stunning success. It was a sharp contrast to his brief few hours in Pakistan. All of this a powerful message to the government of India. So from all of this, how would I describe what it was like to work with the BJP? Well first, the BJP is a proud party. It is a nationalist party and it's devoted to what it believes is in the national interest for India. It's not apologetic about that and it never apologized for making a decision to test nuclear weapons. It's a proud party. It continues to be a proud party. Secondly, it believes in a strong India able to protect itself. In spite of its desire for friendly relationships with neighbors and with the United States, first and foremost, I think that it sees India as one of the great powers, coming great powers of this world and wants to act accordingly, whether it's in the world of diplomacy or military strategy or whatever. The third is that in terms of domestic policy, it is progressive from a pro-business standpoint. In other words, I think ironically, for all of the criticism of the Congress Party and Congress Party reform initiatives from the outside, once the BJP's empowered, does almost exactly the same thing. And if you look at issue after issue, you'll find that there's much more continuity, I think, in this front than elsewhere. And interestingly, one of the key players in all of this time, and I'll mention this and others might come back to it, of course, was Jaswant Singh. I spent a great deal of time with him. Usually, late in the afternoon, at his home, over liquid refreshment of some kind or another. No note takers. I don't know whether he kept the journal. I didn't keep the journal. But I would say in many respects, he embodied those qualities of what I've described as the BJP, proud, strong, progressive. That's the way he thought. And it was interesting, he was the first cabinet member to want to put the information technology into his cabinet office, because he had supported the early development of NIC, that infrastructure network. And it's not, therefore, I say this, because, as you all know, he is not running as a member of the BJP, though his son is a member of the BJP and a member of the legislature in Rajasthan. He's running as an independent. The last thing I would say is that I found the BJP leadership to be a pro-westerner in their outlook. They wanted a positive relationship with the United States. That was important. They wanted a positive relationship with the European leadership as well. So back to my disclaimer. Okay. The United States government is going to work with whomever the people of India and their wisdom choose. And as a former politician, I want to underscore something and accept, I don't care what the polls say, you know, you can't always win an election, but I learned this, you can always lose an election. And you never quite know what's going on when there are 80 to 100 million new voters casting their votes for the first time in India. Secondly, you know, my affection for the leadership of the BJP, Prime Minister Bhaijapai, for the Home Minister, Mr. Devani, or Jhanswant Singh, who was one minister after another in their government, my respect and affection is considerable, but they're not calling the signals in the party today. Thank you, master. Rick. Well, it's very hard to follow Dick Celeste. He was our on the ground ambassador. He knows his people so well. So come back to him with your questions. He's got he's got a lot more to tell you. Rick, thanks for bringing this group together. I don't know for the Beatles. Some of us were humming the way we were as we came in into the auditorium. It is a great idea to try to forecast what the next BJP led government will do based on the experience of the last one, assuming that as I think everyone in this room does that Mr. Modi is positioned to take charge. But in two weeks we'll know and it may not be what we're thinking now. So don't don't bet the ranch on it, but maybe the some part of it. I want to pick up on some of the things that that Dick had to say. Let me underscore one thing. Those individuals within the BJP that we dealt with, this is a new BJP that's coming. It's a generational change taking place. Rajesh Mishra is no longer with us. Mr. Vajpayee is still here but not active. Jaswant Singh has been expelled not once but twice from the BJP party. Now running as an independent. Mr. Advani is no longer in charge. So those that preceded the next BJP government I'm sure will be influenced by, be well aware of, what its predecessor did. But there is a generational change taking place. So I think that we do have to take that into account. What I'd like to do is to go back to that moment that we will never forget. Those of us in government, May 28th, 1998, when India exercised its nuclear option. I do that because it is an issue that is not just in the past. And I'm going to get to this in a moment. It is still with us today and I'll tell you why. By the way, I'm, I'm, and I see Persis Kumbhata here, my former colleague here and at the Elliott School. I've returned to the faculty at George Washington University. So I'll be speaking not only as a former official but as a professor again. So I have brought reading assignments for you all. So I'll let you know what you will need to read after this. So I'll just go ahead and forewarn you of a reading assignment. The first one does have to do with what Dick referred to and that is Stroke Talbot's book, Engaging India, Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb. It is a wonderful account of the Talbot Singh or Singh Talbot dialogue that went over two years. Didn't get everything that we had hoped in terms of the specifics, nailed down far from it, but in terms of establishing a rapport with India at the highest level over a sustained period of time. It did lay the groundwork for much what, much that has happened since then in terms of the improvement and the strengthening of the U.S.-India relationship. I will tell you on that day of May 28th, it probably was my worst day at the State Department. We had convened down, were you there? I was in your office, it was May 11th actually. I'm sorry, May 11th, May 11th. Yes, I remember. Thank you. I guess I tried to blot it out exactly what they were doing. On May 11th. You and I were in Pakistan on May 28th. That's right, okay. We did try to go to convince Prime Minister Nawaz Shreed not to follow suit. That was a mission impossible, understandably so. May 11th, thank you, Don. In my office and my special assistant walked in my office, we were having a senior staff meeting and she said that CNN was reporting that India had just undertaken a series of underground nuclear tests. CNN, I said, did you say CNN? You mean CIA? She said, no, CNN. I said, let's call the embassy. And we called and I think you weren't there. Ashley Wills had been called into the foreign ministry. So now that was a low point. It was not that great that I then had to go up to Strobe Talbot's deputies meeting that he would share from Madeline Albright and everyone wanted to see me for some reason on that day. They wanted to hear what was taking place. But from that came an extraordinary beginning transformation in the relationship. And Strobe Talbot's account is a very good look, not only into the diplomacy of it, but the politics of it. So that's the first reading assignment. The second one is this one, which I do hope that you have read through. This is the manifesto, the BJP manifesto. Dick has already mentioned that the manifesto then included a reference to inducting nuclear weapons into India's arsenal. And there was a question, what is inducting? What does that verb mean? Various interpretations. Well, we found out soon afterwards what induction meant. And now to read this document, it's a 40 page document. And if you turn to page 39, there is a reference here, interestingly, foreign policy and security policy. Well, the last two pages of this, that may send a signal of where priorities are. First is at home, second is abroad. But if you read this, there is a section on the independent strategic nuclear program. And it says that the new government BJP would be its emphasis would be on beginning a new thrust on framing policies and would look in detail to revise and update India's nuclear doctrine. To revise and update India's nuclear doctrine. Well, that set the New York Times off. It did immediately an article. What does that mean? Let's figure out what these words mean. And the quick assumption by many analysts was that India would look again at its no first use policy of nuclear weapons. Fortunately, within days, Narendra Modi said India is not going to revise its no first use policy. That caused a sigh of relief among many watching. But you do need to read this document. Ray is going to get to the economic dimensions of India under the BJP and where it may be heading. But the international relations, foreign affairs, relations with neighbors, there's a reference, for instance, in terms of internal security, zero tolerance, zero tolerance for terrorism. And I think every country, I mean, what are you going to have 1% tolerance, 2%? No, of course, countries have zero tolerance. Pretty groundbreaking stuff. But what you do want to see is also a question of not having zero restraint. Because restraint must be exercised in terms of attacks which will come, Mumbai, examples, will come. So zero tolerance, yes, but there will also need to be restraint in how to respond. So that whole nuclear issue that we dealt with is still one that is alive, important for both countries and for the world. So do read this manifesto. The third document that I want to recommend is this one. It's much shorter. It's only about three pages. The Lahore Declaration. Dick referred to the fact that Prime Minister Vajpayee traveled to Pakistan to meet with Prime Minister, then Prime Minister, and today's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. I'm going to underscore something here because I spend a lot of time on this. The importance of a breakthrough in the India-Pakistan relationship was underscored at the time of the Lahore Declaration. This was called bus diplomacy. Prime Minister Vajpayee went across the Waga border on a bus. Nawaz Sharif was there to welcome him. It was an extraordinarily important event. The declaration, the work plan that was laid out, Prime Minister Vajpayee went to the minority Pakistan, first time an Indian Prime Minister had done that. He signaled that India accepted Pakistan as a state, not calling into questions all of that history. Nawaz Sharif demonstrated with that visit that he could be a willing partner in a peace process. So fast forward, actually not fast forward, it got derailed in cargo. I won't go to cargo right now, but having been at Blair House when Nawaz Sharif was here for that, I think he enjoyed himself more in Lahore than he did that day in Washington on July 4th. That got derailed. And even though Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had said that he wanted to go to Pakistan during his time in office, he never got there. I think that the possibility of a new government, BJP-led with Mr. Modi, can return to the spirit of Lahore. I think this is eminently doable. And would answer questions on both sides. Clearly there are questions about Mr. Modi and his relationship to the Muslim community. Reaching out to Nawaz Sharif, traveling to Pakistan, rekindling the spirit of Lahore, I think is something that is within reach. Some have said that if Modi takes that kind of step, it will be like Nixon going to China. Great. That was a great success. Changed the world. So I think this is something that could be done. And I think this could also be the opportunity for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to do what I think is fully teed up and is ready to go. And that is most favorite nation trading status. You have that kind of burst of activity at the beginning. This could be seriously a game changer for them. My final comment would be that they could also, with that, there are other issues that will flow from that. One of which is one that I've been personally involved in of late, which is Afghanistan. I was to have been in Afghanistan for the recent elections. Unfortunately, our NDI, National Democratic Institute mission had to be canceled because of what was taking place with attacks. They've been there in December for a pre-election assessment. There will be a new leader of Afghanistan, whether it be Abdullah Abdullah or Ashraf Ghani, we'll see. This is also going to provide opportunities. And this is an opportunity that India and Pakistan need to seize right now. They can't be timid if there's going to be any kind of peace in Afghanistan that's going to require some degree of cooperation, accommodation between India and Pakistan. Again, I think Mr. Modi in a new government has that opportunity. I think Nawaz Sharif wants to have relations with Afghanistan that they have not been able to have with Mr. Karasai for a whole host of reasons. So I'm very hopeful that over the next several weeks, we're going to see possibilities for moving ahead with the new government. And one that if it is Mr. Modi, if it is a BJP, can draw on the kind of outreach that Atal Bahari Vajapal just wants to say, Rajesh Mishra and others demonstrated during our time when we were in office. Okay, thank you. Ray, looking at the business side of things here. Well, I feel a little bit in this position after coming after such imminent speakers like Governor Huey Long did when he came home dead drunk one night in Louisiana and he was trying to get in the door and his key wouldn't work and all of a sudden the door opened and he fell down on the floor and he looked up and his wife was looking and straightened the eye and said, now Governor, what do you have to say for yourself? He said, well, I finished my prepared remarks, I'll take questions from the floor. I do have a few memories that I'd like to pass on. I had just left the Department of Commerce when the BJP came into power. Rather than go back to the practice of law, I was so interested in U.S.-India relations that decided that hang my tangle out. Well, I hadn't read the manifesto closely enough about inducting the nuclear option because no sooner had I hung it out than the bombs went off and nobody was interested in doing anything with India at that time. Fortunately, the good people at the U.S.-India business council, including Rick Rosso and Michael Clark, took pity on me and they let me work with them. And we did go to work immediately on the sanctions question. And one of the things that I learned quite quickly, I think, from working on that sanctions issue from the point of view of legislate action, was that the BJP government was very sophisticated about how to deal with Congress, about how to deal with Americans. And a lot of the image that you had of BJP as people who didn't speak English and wanted to only talk about religion just was not so. They were very much attuned to economic issues. Immediately, they saw that there were members of the Senate who had an economic interest, particularly Senator Brownback from Kansas who was exporting engine, airplane engine parts as well as wheat from Kansas. He was the chairman of the subcommittee and immediately there was a lot of movement in the whole and the kinds of statements that had come from the president and the White House initially about how this was going to be a great retaliation, got very much initiated because of the sophistication of the BJP leadership. And so I think that in spite of what you hear that there is a lot and this is a new generation, but I think it can make a great difference. I have in my portfolio U.S.-India economic relations and I'm working right now on a book having to do with India energy and the struggle for power. And in going through research papers having to do with the background and looking at the president's trip in 2000, I was looking at papers that came out from the BJP administration at that time. And I thought that this statement was very interesting. This is called emerging opportunities in the oil and gas sector. And I want you to think about this in the context of what the present government might say in that regard. The government of India has taken a conscious decision to gradually reduce the size of the public sector by withdrawing from slash directing its shareholdings in many areas, thereby throwing openly to protected sectors to privatization. Now that's a word you haven't heard in a long time from an Indian government. Opening up the economy by progressive dismantling of the licensing and regulatory regimes, liberalization of procedures and policies, drive towards market determination of prices by the working of demand, supply, forces, our characteristics of a new era. Now that is something you just wouldn't hear. And in the manifesto there is not that kind of state, but there are reflections of getting away from the top down command economy, which I'm afraid that this second term of the present government has slipped back toward rather than wealth creation of wealth distribution. So I think in that regard, there is hope. And if you look at particularly just taking energy area, it was the BJP who put in the new exploration and licensing policy, which for the first time opened up oil and gas, did away with the administered pricing mechanism and in production supply contracts actually use market pricing kinds of language in it. Now there has been retrogression from that. Of course, you have to take all of that with a grain of salt when you look at the manifesto that says we're against an investment in multi-brand retailing. We're not going to allow that. On the other hand, when I was last in Grisrott, and we were talking about solar energy, the idea of having local contact restrictions was done away with. The folks in Grisrott said, look, we don't really care, it comes from the US. What we want to do is get solar power in here. So I think that if you look at the track record of what happened with the energy sector, there is some indication that you're going to get back on track some of the kinds of reforms which were instituted ironically by a Congress-led government in the early 90s. I'll give you another indication of that. In 2003, under the leadership of a man who Rick and I worked with very closely when he was first the minister of chemicals and fertilizers, Suresh Prabhu, he became the minister of power. And the greatest reform ever made in the energy sector was made under that government, namely the Electricity Act of 2003. Now, that was the good news. The bad news was that minister Prabhu was then fired for being too honest. He was not, and there was no going around that. That's what had happened. And it indicates to me the constraints that there will be on any BJP-led government by coalition partners, because it's not going to necessarily be the people at the top who are calling the shots in regard to who can stay in power. I'll give you another example. One of the things that Rick and I worked on, and we were out in Seattle for 1999, WTO Ministerial. People dressed as turtles is the only thing I remember from that. People dressed as turtles. There was a minister. People in the back are sad they can't hear it well. We're getting protests on the Twitter feed. That's going to help it. There you go. Pick up with the turtles. Okay. And Minister Marin at that time, Mercily Marin was the Minister of Commerce and Industry. And I thought we'd had pretty good talks about what was going to happen and being able to go for in trade liberalization. Well, when we got there, Mr. Marin, who is, as you know, DMK and very much a part of the coalition at that time, he had other ideas. And what he had in mind was that no way, no how, are we going to go along with any of the program that was being advocated by the United States government. And that continued over into the Doha round in 2001. Now, if you had talked with Jaswan Singh, as I'm sure you may have mentioned Ambassador and one of these refreshment fuel conversations, I'm sure that he would have been very willing to say, yes, we're willing to compromise and so forth. But it wasn't, in fact, the BJP government that was calling the shots completely in regard to WTO. It was a number of member of the coalition who did that. So it seems to me that that is a cautionary kind of warning that we need to take into account. I just to sum up, I think that that this election itself is hopeful, thanks to Rick published a piece that I wrote in more than a year ago about this election in which I made the argument that things were in a state of stalemate really. And from what we have seen, it seems to me that either way this goes, that we should have some impetus and some window of opportunity to move forward on the economic front. And the economic front, in my view, will be a driver in terms of the relationship. Thanks, Ray. Well, Don, a long tenure at two different perches, National Security Council and over at State Department. So please. Well, thank you. Ray, unlike Huey Long, I do have my prepared remarks. So let me just begin by saying that there was, in my view, a confluence of factors on the U.S. and Indian side that made the BJP government a good one for strengthening U.S.-India relations during its six-year term. But as they say in a stock prospectus, past performance is no guarantee of future results. And a great deal of that progress was driven by personalities, and those are personalities that are no longer on the scene or at least are not likely to be prominent in an upcoming BJP-led coalition. But it is encouraging to remember how fast the relationship progressed from its nadir in May 1998 of the nuclear test to Bill Clinton's rock star reception in Delhi in March 2000. That's some reassurance today, as we confront the aftermath of Debiani-Cobrigade and IPR and other differences. Now, my fellow panelists have dealt pretty covered in detail the Clinton administration's dealing with the Vajpayee-led government. Let me pick up, therefore, with the arrival of the Bush crowd. One thing I remember from the U.S. election period is the strong and ill-disguised support in Delhi policy circles for a victory by Al Gore. There was a sense that India and the U.S. had turned an important corner during the Clinton administration, and that Gore would carry that progress forward. This was despite Bush's efforts under the tutelage of Condi Rice and Bob Blockwell, two of his Vulcans, to make the case that India policy would be a high priority in a Bush administration. And as we all saw, the Bush administration did carry the relationship to new heights. From the U.S. perspective, from the Washington perspective, I should say, we were dealing with three Indian leaders who had rather unique strengths. Atul Bahari Vajpayee seemed to us to delegate a lot of the details to his staff, but was strongly committed to better relations with the U.S. Part of it may have been simply a reaction to the Congress policies of the past. But remember, he was the author of that quote about natural allies, which may be the last time that an Indian leader had the temerity to talk about an ally, the word ally in respect to the United States. Joss Wan Singh began the long process of improved relations in his intense dialogue with Strobe Talbot. His memoirs, like Strobe's, eloquently described his efforts to move relationship forward, and I saw an article he published just a few days ago. India must move beyond non-alignment, which testifies to his willingness to look forward, not back. But after his expulsion from the party earlier this year, it does not look like a Modi government would tap his skills, although stranger things have happened in Delhi, so we can hope. Rajesh Mishra was in a new position as national security advisor, had great access to Vajpayee, and was also the counterpart to Khande Rice, who was the most effective cheerleader in the Bush administration for better ties with India. Vajpayee by most accounts gave Mishra a lot of leeway in pursuing India's security policies, and he used it in dealing with the United States. Let me talk about three decisions by the Vajpayee government toward the U.S. that surprised me at the time. It surprised me because I had been watching U.S.-India relations for a long time, and I thought I could anticipate sort of establishment India's response to most major U.S. foreign policy decisions. The BJP, however, did not act like establishment India, and it did not adhere to NAM orthodoxy. The first decision involved George Bush's very controversial speech on May 1, 2001, early in his presidency, announcing his plans to develop missile defenses, and his willingness to contemplate withdrawing from the ABM treaty. This was greeted with something resembling shock by much of the world. Our allies were at best tentative, and some quite negative. The reflexive India response would have come from the traditional disarmament manual. Instead, India was, I believe, the first or one of the first to support that idea within 24 hours of the speech. Nothing. Nothing could have endeared India to the Bush administration at that stage more than that public support, which, of course, owed a fair amount to India's own role outside that clear establishment. Let me read just part of the MEA statement issued within hours of the Bush speech. President Bush's address is a highly significant and far-reaching statement of U.S. national security policy. It seeks to transform the parameters on which the Cold War security architecture was built. India particularly welcomes the announcement of unilateral nuclear reductions by the U.S. We also welcome moving away from the hair trigger alerts associated with prevailing nuclear orthodoxies. My guess is that was written by Jaswant Singh. It sounds like him. Now, it is true that Khande Rice had called Mishra the night before to give him a heads-up on the speech and offered to send rich armitage out to Delhi as part of his world tour explaining the president's plan. But Bajpayee Singh and Mishra did not hesitate to take a rather heterodox view and they took plaque from India's chattering classes for that stance. The second decision actually surprised me less because it came in the immediate wake of 9-11. India, like virtually everyone else, had rushed to our side and offered assistance. Our proposal to India was a precedent-setting one to help provide security for U.S. Navy ships transiting the Malacca Straits. India, up to that point, had only participated in U.N.-sanctioned multinational operations. As Rajamohan put it, writing about it later, much of the civilian bureaucracy was aghast at the prospect of India being seen as serving America's security interests. But the Bajpayee government bucked the naysayers and sent two Navy ships to help protect U.S. ships from terrorist attack over a long period of time. And that whole terrorism issue was highlighted, I would say, as a common threat when, of course, India's parliament was attacked on December 13, 2001. Bob Blackwell went to the scene, went to the Lok Sabha a day later, and famously labeled it India's 9-11. The third indication that the Bajpayee government wanted to take a different approach to the United States was the coming of the Iraq war. India, like much of the world, took a very dim view of U.S. acting without a Security Council mandate. And when it was clear that the U.S. didn't intend to invade, the press, public, and political reaction was strong and intensely critical. When Bajpayee had been in Washington in September 2002, as things were beginning to heat up on Iraq, Rice had had a side meeting with Mishra and urged him to hold your fire on criticizing U.S. and Iraq. And he told her that India would not lead the charge. And overall, he kept that commitment. The government statements in 2003 were critical, but they did not lead the charge. They tried very hard to take a middle ground, supporting our objectives, but deploring the lack of legal cover from the U.N. The Congress Party at that time introduced a resolution in the Lok Sabha condemning the U.S. invasion. The BJP countered with a weaker one, which still deplored it. But the story doesn't end there. In May and June of that year, the U.S. put on a full court press to get other countries to contribute to a multinational Iraq stabilization force with the aim of making the effort there more of an international one. If I'd been asked at that time, and I probably was, I would have said, don't bother with Delhi. There's no government there would contemplate sending troops to Iraq without a U.N. mandate. In fact, we did ask them. And Singh and Mishra did by most accounts give a very serious thought. We proposed making Kurdistan the Indian area of responsibility, and Delhi sent officials to Kurdistan to check it out. The Cabinet Committee on Security consulted on the issue and deferred a decision. It became an issue in the Indian press, which was strenuously opposed. Advani discussed it in Washington with the President. And by July, the Cabinet Committee on Security finally took a decision that it could not send troops without a Security Council man, a resolution. But my point is, they did not reflexively dismiss the idea. They rather took the U.S. request very seriously and tried hard to accommodate us. Why did the BJP government take a new approach, I would say, to the U.S. on all these issues? And what did they think was in it for them? First, I give a lot of credit to the previous administration. President Clinton's doggedness in pursuing Nawaz Sharif over Cargill demonstrated that U.S. goals in South Asia could coincide rather than conflict with India's interests. The Clinton visit to India and his tone-perfect speech to the Lok Sabha, and his tough talk to Pakistan five days later, reinforced that feeling. And I also believe that they saw the potential early on for a substantial payoff from the Bush administration. Mishra and Rumsfeld met in Munich within the first month of the administration. And Jaswant Singh came to Washington and the White House in April of that year. Bob Blackwell arrived in Delhi in July and began a dialogue with Mishra by October on the trinity of cooperation with the U.S., nuclear space and high tech cooperation. And very soon, Bob Blackwell was papering the airwaves with his enthusiastic advocacy cables to Washington. Now, Bob Blackwell is yet to write his memoirs, but I'm sure he presaged a future with Mishra that included U.S. acceptance of India's nuclear program. The State Department was at that stage not quite ready for this. Under Secretary John Bolton, in particular, was an ardent defender of the non-pro treaty and held off any substantial progress. We finally started negotiations on nuclear space and high tech in 2003 and, of course, concluded the nuclear deal in 2005 after the BJP had left office. But Vajpayee Singh and Mishra saw this coming and they responded in current. Now, let me conclude by just saying what we now see in both India and the United States is a common perspective that both countries have shared interests, shared values, and I think sufficient to make us confident of the future despite the problems we encounter along the way. In the U.S., we've had three presidents in a row now promoting the importance of US-India relations. And in India, we've had governments from both the BJP and Congress who shared the same approach. Narendra Modi is a mystery in this and other respects. And the revocation of his visa in 2005 both complicates the situation and adds to the puzzle. Any hurt feelings aside, however, I am reasonably confident that Modi's inevitable push for Indian economic and infrastructure development will draw him inevitably toward nurturing the relationship with the United States. And I am very, very confident that, as Dick says, this administration, any administration, will be happy to work with a Modi government if that's what we have in the future. Thank you. Thanks, Don. Thanks, Don. Well, before I open it up, I just thought I would ask a couple of questions as well. But first, a couple of things I'll mention. Professor Inderforth talked about the manifesto. Hopefully, he'll plug his ears for this. If anybody wants the CliffsNotes version, we just put out on the CSIS website a short summary of how the Congress and BJP and also the regional parties treat some of the key issues on FDI and trade and things like that. So certainly not as robust as the full version, but if you want the CliffsNotes, check the CSIS website. Rest of us, thank you for that. Also, Ray talking about the lobbying work that was done after the nuclear tests. One other difference that we'll have between then and now, I don't know why this popped into my head, but the number one company that was there in the front row on that, because of course, US-IBC, we were working hard on it, was a little company called Enron. So if there is another nuclear test in sanctions, we're going to lose the stalwart that worked as hard as the Mung Equals in getting those sanctions rolled back. So that's one small instance where I think we can all say we missed Enron just a little bit. Now, looking more strategically, I think everybody would agree that there was... Could I add an Enron story? Yeah, always, always. But when you were appointed to positions and you have to go through seven confirmation, you have to fill out financial disclosure forms. And so I filled out mine, my wife's, we had our portfolio and the rest, they came back saying that I had to divest myself of one stock to be Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia. Enron, thank you so much. I may be the only nominee to ever thank the process for getting me out ahead of something that then collapsed. So the best investment advice ever received. It was wonderful. So a real coming together that took place the last time that the BJP was in power. I wonder if you can each touch on what was it that drove them to make that decision? I mean, I think at the time we still looked at the inclusion of the hyphen, India, Pakistan, and certainly as it was referenced, the fact that we finally really kind of broke the hyphen by choosing India's side and Cargill. But the BJP's driving force, I mean, was it breaking the hyphen with Pakistan? Was it that they viewed China as a strategic competitor? What were the kind of forces that you think that really were behind them, pushing them, you know, a bit more in our direction than we'd seen in the past? Are you looking at me? You know, I really don't know what was inside their heads at the time, although I believe, you know, if you wanted to distinguish yourself from the Congress party, being more favorably inclined for the United States was one easy way to do it because we had had such a problematic series of issues vis-à-vis Congress going back to, I remember in the 1960s when I was there the first time, I mean, and shortly thereafter, Mrs. Gandhi throwing the Peace Corps out. I mean, you know, we had a troubled history. I think that their first place, the BJP was a more confident party about India and its future. They had a sense of its place in history, and I think this made them less defensive in their sort of architecture of foreign policy. They were willing to join in a vigorous debate. We saw this repeatedly with John Swanton Stroll, and so there wasn't a kind of defensiveness about India's posture. But I don't know. I'm going to tell a story which is not recorded, I think, anywhere although Condoleezza Rice may have written about it. I accompanied John Swanson to Washington in his visit in early April of the year 2001. Colin Paul had asked me to stay on. And we met with all of the senior officials, and while we were in the cabinet room meeting with Condoleezza Rice, there was a schedule walked through by the president just to shape John Swanson's hand. And President Bush came in, and he went around the table, and he shook everyone's hand and he got to me. He said, Hi, Dick, what do I call you? Do I call you Governor or Ambassador? I said, Mr. President, do I call you Governor or Mr. President? He said, I'll call you Ambassador. Then he turned back to John Swanson having started with him and having shook his hand. He said, Have you ever seen the Rose Garden? John Swanson said, No. He said, Come on, grab them by the arm and walk right back into the Oval Office and out to the Rose Garden. I grabbed my counterpart, the Ambassador, Condoleezza Rice brought up the rear. And we went into the Oval Office, and there's John Swanson. The president has his arm around him pointing to the roses, and they walked back into the Oval Office. The president said, Do you have some time to sit down? This wasn't supposed to happen. So we sat at that nice little seating arrangement in the Oval Office. The president's here, I'm here, my counterpart here, and Condoleezza Rice. And the president looks at Condoleezza, turns to John Swanson, look at Condi, she's really worried because I don't have any talking points. I kid you not. I mean, it was, it was, he said, you know, I just want to say to you, Mr. Foreign Minister, that I believe the relationship between the United States and India is absolutely critical. And I'm going to, I'm going to tell you the three, three reasons why. He said, in the first place, you know, India is the world's largest democracy. And as the world's oldest democracy, we have a vested interest in their success. He said, in the second place, since the early 1990s, you've opened up your economy, and an economic relationship between our two countries is vitally important. He's talking without talking points. And he said, and the third reason why is there's a, you know, I was governor of Texas. And in Austin and across Texas, there's a vibrant Indian American community, and they helped me in my campaign. And he said, so I, I just want to say, I believe that this relationship is a critically important relationship. And Jocelyn Singh's response is, Mr. President, the United States is the only superpower in the world today. There's enormous responsibility that is in your hands and the leadership of your country is vitally important for all of us. The president said, well, there are a lot of people who envy that, you know, it's not easy. And he said, let me just give you an example. He said, for example, we're in the process of trying to think through what do we do about this issue of missile defense and what it could mean for our country, but for other countries around the world. And the president, President Bush went on to describe a bit of that. When he finished, Jocelyn Singh said, you know, Mr. President, it's interesting that you raise that. Now, these people without any script, he said, you know, it's really interesting that you raise that. I just sent a working paper to the Cabinet Committee on Security saying that we should take a serious look at where this goes. So even at the beginning of April, the president on his mind, the foreign minister and his on their own without notes, engaging on this. So I think, you know, where did it come from? It came from a deep sense of history and of India's place in the world. And, you know, I don't know enough about the leadership of the BJP today about Narendra Modi and the people who will be around in my foreign affairs. I think it's interesting that in the manifesto, there is so little about engaging with the rest of the world. So I don't know whether that's still the spirit today, but it was certainly the case. I mean, when without prompting, Prime Minister Vajpayee at the Asia Society used this phrase, natural allies. I mean, back home, people were saying, where did that come from? I call this period from the nuclear doghouse to natural allies. That's a great response. It really is contrary to what I think most people's reaction is, which is, you know, it'll come when they feel that there's a weakness and they need partnership rather than strength. But yeah, I think let me just add very briefly, the timing was right. Vajpayee, Jaswant Singh Mishra, were globalists in their thinking. We'd gone through the period of a strange democracy. Dennis Kux's great title for his book. There was already a recognition that Clinton was reaching out. He had already met with Gush Waal in New York in 1997, where they both talked about missing opportunities and turning the relationship around. The timing was all right for this. And keep in mind that it was not only reaching out to, I mean, the Cold War's over, economic reforms kicking in, all of that coming together. Stars were moving into alignment. But keep in mind that it wasn't just the natural allies with the United States, and I was actually in New York for that speech. There was also a move toward establishing a more normal relationship with China. One little piece of that was Mishra himself took over the portfolio of talking to the Chinese about the border issues. They recognized they needed to move to a more normal relationship with the rising China as they saw themselves as the rising India. So these were the big power relationships. Interestingly, I'm going to bring you back to the document of the manifesto. Interestingly, in this manifesto, on page 40, the last page, talking about the international orientation, it says that instead of being led by big power interests, we will engage proactively on our own with countries and the neighborhood and beyond. There is neither the United States nor China are mentioned this entire document. Not to say that they're going to write them off, but I think that they're putting down a marker that a proud party with tradition, with confidence, is going to assert itself and not be led around, not be a junior partner to anyone either in the region or beyond. Maybe I might just pick up on the second and third points of what George W. Bush said as Ambassador Celeste has indicated, the economic point and the Indian American point, I think they dovetail into the first point in terms of security. If you look at the economics of it, the Congress government really going back to neighborhood looked to Soviet Union as an economic model as well as a political, that there was going, there are going to be five year plans, the whole top down of ministries, the license rise. The BJP didn't have any stake in that approach to economics. Now it may have had its own protectionist problems, but in terms of having to look to something that was a top down socialist model, the BJP, they didn't have to do that at all. And so who do you look to if you're not looking for that, you're looking for a more open model, you look to the United States. Dick had previously mentioned Y2K. Well Y2K just happened on that watch, but it was a tremendous driver in terms of the relationship between the United States because you had thousands and thousands of people over here as well as in India who were making their livings from a common kind of endeavor. If you look at the reaction in terms of what happened in December 13, the 9-11 of India, you would have thought under almost any circumstances there's going to be war because of the zero tolerance you're talking about, zero acceptance, but there wasn't. And one of the reasons that there wasn't is because of really economic interests that were pointed out to the India and to the BJP government in terms of taking a more reasoned and moderate approach to it. So I think the second point, a lot of people look at economics as sort of a make way. It's what you do after the guys with guns and bombs talk about all their great geopolitical things and then maybe you'll throw in the economics. I'd turn that on its head. I think that the economic foundation had a lot to do with it. Now the third of President Bush's points, it seems to me, is also very strong. The Indian American community had shown in regard to what happened after the sanctions. Many of us here know Swadesh Chatterjee, the people who were involved across the spectrum in terms of making a real difference in what U.S. policy was. So that Indian American link, it seems to me, was a very important part in the driving of the relationship as President Bush recognized. I would just go back briefly to the Clinton administration because I think that President Clinton and of course his distinguished representative in New Delhi really played an incredible role in sort of setting the foundation. Both his role in Kargil, in pressuring Pakistan to withdraw and saving, by consequence, a lot of Indian lives in the battle on the Kargil front. And his March 2000 trip to India. We shouldn't forget that at that point he was, by far, it was the high watermark of India-U.S. relations since probably the Kennedy presidency, Jack and Jackie in there and the impression they made throughout India. Bill Clinton was received in a way that in both in the Lok Sabha and in the streets of Delhi, Hyderabad, and Mumbai that no President has been received before or since. And it became, it no longer was politically problematic to be pro-American in India. And I think that helped a lot in the coming in the later years. I just remember the scene in Hyderabad, thousands of school children lining the streets with American and Indian flags. And it was quite a thing. Do you know what happened when he first arrived? There was nobody. Yeah, the Indian government had cleared everything back, all the streets were blocked off, and after about eight hours of this he grabbed a badge by and said, Mr. Prime Minister, I know there are a billion people in this country, where are they? I want to see them. And so by the time he got to Hyderabad they let the people come close. Let me open it up to the floor here. I know there's probably a few questions, so we've got about 20 minutes to take a number of them. And please keep them short, concise, and we'll try to get you a good response. And also let us know who you are. Thank you very much. From India Globe in Asia today. Thanks for this panel. My quick question is that Modi coming means tsunami for Pakistan. They have a campaign against Modi and BJP in Pakistan and also in India. What is the future of India-USA because they have a campaign against Modi? And finally, how Mr. Modi will take U.S.-India relations because of visa. He had been denied visa. Everybody got visa in the U.S. but Mr. Modi for many occasions. Thank you. What was the first question I missed part of that? Pakistan has a campaign against Mr. Modi in Pakistan and also in India because they think it's a tsunami coming if Modi comes in power. Thank you. My feeling is almost everybody's had a visa problem with the United States. His was a little more intentional. But when you become the head of government, you assume a new role. And I am sure that both our own government and his, should he become Prime Minister, will address that. And I happen to agree with Rick Endefurth. I think that if Mr. Modi becomes Prime Minister, he in a way is uniquely suited to actually make progress with Pakistan. But I don't want to crown anyone the next Prime Minister of India. I'm more skeptical than everybody sitting here that how this election can turn out with 80 million people who never voted before and all the wonderful surprises that the people of India can work on us. Let's not forget there are three very strong women who will have voices that range from east to north central to south and what the future looks like for India. Could I mention that on the visa thing the U.S. was too slow to figure out how to deal with Mr. Modi? Just as I think that the U.S. made mistakes in how it dealt with the Koburgati affair, I think on those two issues, the best way for the two countries after the elections are over, the new government is say, let bygones be bygones. Don't try to relitigate either one of those mistakes on both sides, including that of the U.S. Only question of Pakistan, I actually had dinner a few nights ago with a former finance minister of Pakistan. They are looking forward, if it is Mr. Modi, to dealing with him. I do not believe and I've spoken to the ambassador here. Pakistani government has never suggested to me that they have reservations in terms of can we deal with this person, the history here. I think, again, I don't know anything about a campaign that you mentioned, from those that I've spoken to both in and out of government, I think that they will do what we will do in this country. We will deal with the person and the government that is installed. I think the fact that the business, even through this period too, has maintained excellent relations with the state of Gujarat. So we've maintained a very strong bridge. It's not the government bridge, it's not the State Department bridge, but there's been a very strong bridge. So that will make sure that it remains even. Let me add on that there was a press report just in the past week, which I very much hope is true, that said that Modi had sent a team to Pakistan to sort of presage a possible Modi regime in India and to sort of establish relations. That would be a very smart thing to do and I hope it's true. My name is Abu Saleh Sharif. I work here in the U.S. India Policy Institute. Brilliant presentations. I'm a keen follower of Indian economy and polity. Nostalgic. It was wonderful to see how you dealt with Wajpayee and other ministers. But I tend to get an impression from your presentations today that you tend to feel that the policy discourses in India and even written statements do not mean much. In a sense that you need to read between the lines, it is written in this manner here, but actually they don't mean that. That's a bit scary to me because India does have written policy statement and they tend to follow the rules. However, assuming that we need to read between the lines, does it really mean that Indian government whichever comes to power next is maneuverable? Does it mean that they'll be more open to corruption? It's a very important thing because the UK government, if it loses, which is, it is on the corruption issue. The next one is, I'm afraid that I didn't hear much as to how the fringe nationalist parties who support BJP is going to influence the future policy decisions. I think that's the most important discussion we need to have because Modi doesn't have an experience of being a central minister or being a prime minister himself before. So he was the chief minister and now he'll be steered. The laggard like Advani and Jaswant Singh So who is going to train them, so to speak, to rule this country? The last one is the nuclear issue. You missed to say that Dr. Manmohan Singh brought this nuclear deal treaty. Is that not going to be taken forward because you're jumping from BJP time nuclear policy with this one. So you jump, but what about continuity? Thank you. So corruption, teaching ministers, nuclear policy. Great. Corruption, anybody think that it'll be resolved by a change in head and government? Can't hurt. I mean clearly there's two levels, of course, big corruption and small corruption and I assume that you're talking about the influence the central government could have on big corruption. Well I think you know Ray touched on that a little bit on coalition allies and depending on how. I'll just to refresh your recollection I talked about two instances from the past in which coalition partners acted as a constraint on the ability of the coalition leaders to be able to go forward and that is certainly true. I'm not sure who you're referring to exactly although I can guess, but there will be a problem with coalition partners because they're going to have claims on particular ministries and the system of putting together coalitions in India seems to be that whatever number of ministers I get they're my ministers they're not your ministers Mr. Modi if you're hitting the government as a prime minister and therefore I get to say whether they're going to go forward or back or whether they're going to do whatever that is. So that is a real problem. One hopes that but it's common to coalitions on both sides as we have seen with the present government one hopes that there will be a concerted effort and this depends on how many seats in parliament you get to be able to rein that in. You know I think it's very hard to say how people will behave when they move into government when we haven't seen them operate at this level before and I was thinking earlier Vajpayee, Daswant Singh, Advani that generation they were there was a moment in time when they were all congress Wallace you know and then and then the congress party began to disintegrate and change. So this new generation was born sort of post the dominant role of congress but there is a reality about the way India is governed and that is at the highest level among the dominant parties there is an ongoing conversation about key issues and those issues are discussed and even though they can be debated in differences on the floor of parliament there is a tradition of briefing the leaders of the opposition around key decisions and I will say I mean I listened to I.K. Gujarat when he was still in government talking to Madeleine Albright Secretary of State defending India's nuclear position. This is pre the test but saying he wasn't prepared to enter into any additional agreements at that point in time because he had a responsibility to defend his country. So we may overdraw some of the differences between what a congress led coalition and what a BJP led coalition will be like. The reality is the coalition dynamics are hard to predict and the BJP paid a price for that when they first were elected and Jaila late to pull the plug on them right. Now what was the last question the last question was. Nuclear policy. On the nuclear policy well there has been continuity on nuclear policy basically I mean you know the negotiations that went on when President Bush and his team were working with the BJP led government reached fruition under a congress government. So I'm not sure now the concern as Rick pointed out was whether Modi was signaling putting declaring we no longer will be bound by no first use commitment right. That was a very worse issue but apparently he has already said publicly that he would continue to support that. But there's also the question the civilian nuclear policy and that leads us to one of the great accomplishments was a civilian nuclear agreement which is still stuck hopefully whatever comes in as a new government. Hopefully if it is a BJP government they will look at what they have said in the past. They had some differing views when they were out of power although Rajesh Mishra to I think to his credit part of ways with the BJP in opposition said I support this agreement. Let's see what they do. The fact is that this is a lingering festering unresolved issue for our business community and more broadly you know you put that much time and energy into something fundamentally changed the way we're dealing with each other on such an important issue and then it just sets what's going to happen to. I hope that the new government will address that. Just let me chime in on that a little bit because I am very interested in it. It seems to me that on time has moved on in 2008 I was one of those who's saying how many jobs are going to be created in the U.S. and so forth and I'm very disappointed in what India has not done in terms of moving forward. I mean we were the driving force. We got the two sites and then this liability things comes up. But at this point we're now talking six years later. We have to move on in looking at energy policy between the United States and India rather than saying this has to happen or that has to happen. And we have to broaden that conversation from just saying hey you guys didn't do what you're supposed to do on civil nuclear. We've got to look at solar. We've got to look at wind. We've got to look at gas. We've got to look at LNG shipments and have a broader view because we're at a dead end and I can just and I don't think it's telling any tales out of school but when I was in Gujarat in January of 2013 the question about nuclear policy came up in conversations with Minister Modi and he said look we've got problems political problems with that here in India. People don't want it. People say it's too expensive. Well it's not that I'm against it you understand but we have these problems and so the United States it seems to me has to be able to to look at it more broadly in order to be able to address that civil nuclear issue. I think we have time for for one more. Bob we'll have plenty of time if people ever stick around for a quick reception. Thank you very much. Great panel. Bob Vastine Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy. A really crisp question. Can we expect India's foreign policies toward foreign economic policy foreign trade investment to change as you know they've been notoriously difficult in many contexts most recently Bali ministerial but also in the Doha round and in the other efforts to open up trade with India. All problems will be resolved in two weeks. I you know I think about writing a column just specifically on this so you know I just just with the realization that voters are so interested in economic policy you know every poll that's been done that's the number one issue when that first started to come out and realizing whoever gets elected will be fully empowered to move on things. So on a personal interest I actually put some part of my own personal retirement investments into an Indian extreme traded fund about three months ago and it's about 40 percent since then so for my own personal interest yes I think that it it it can't get worse it's likely to get better that's my personal just very personal. Let me add to that. How about that. We're gonna get I think that we're gonna have the same litany of problems that we've had and the only way to address them is not by a broad coalition that the Indians are all bad and we've got it you've got to have this complete change but to take them as we have and try to work each of those problems and I think in that regard we are going to have a if it is a BJP led government a how should I put it a more business like approach to the problem I if you go to Gujarat and you have a problem whether it be solar energy whatever I can just tell you from personal experience there's a night and day kind of distinction in terms of how it's addressed it is more business like I'm going to do this you're going to do that and this is the way this is this is going to work and I have every hope that some of that would be brought to a national level and help in the amelioration of kind of problems that you deal with daily. Can I just offer an observation we're talking about what's happening at the Indian end and what a new government would mean as someone who's been a very strong supporter of President Obama I have to confess that I'm disappointed that his leadership and his ability to move things forward has not been brought to bear more directly on our relationship with India and I would hope that you know he still has three years to go and I would hope that he would use some of his leadership as president to help build this relationship. Whoever the next government of India is and it's important because of these trade issues which have been very much on his agenda but he hasn't really focused on the India role there and in so many other areas as well so this is it's going to be very interesting to see what what new leadership and Belly's going to bring to the table and then how we respond and how we reciprocate. We hadn't coordinated this but could I just add comment on what what Dick just said. In terms of I expected a question on the US-India relationship where is it where is it going I read a great interview to sort of bring the circle back professor great interview with Jaswant Singh recently and he was asked the question do you think India US ties can go back to being normal especially given given the recent convulsions we know what those convulsions have been. Here is his remark he said they are normal but they are adrift I think there can be a course correction nothing is so irretrievably wrong with them but you do need an understanding and thinking and effort and when I read that I said understanding thinking and effort was exactly those were the key components of the nuclear dialogue so I think that was true then I think it's true now we need understanding thinking and effort to get this relationship moving in the right direction again. That's a pretty good place to wrap up you know again in two weeks from today we will know who won how many seats and hopefully within a couple of days after that we'll know what a coalition looks like that will be running the government of India I think we have a fair assessment about what a congress government would look like since we've seen them for 10 years and there will be some changes but a lot of the same but hopefully that's not a joke this is real but hopefully everybody here has a better appreciation for what the BJP was and maybe some insights as to what they could be and I think I think most importantly I think what Ambassador Schlesst has remarked that Jess Wansing comes and visits pulling him aside and allowing the courtesy of the president allowing the courtesy of pulling him to the Rose Garden having a personal conversation I think no matter who wins the election hopefully we'll be able to afford those kind of courtesies because it's in those side conversations sometimes the greatest things can happen to in our two countries so thanks all for showing up and we're going to have a short reception outside so I hope you're able to join