 For more videos on people's struggles, please subscribe to our YouTube channel. And now just a quick question on the legislative council as well because this body was supposed to put some kind of a check on the military. So what is likely to happen with that and will the SCP have a membership there as well? Look, what is clear for us, even the legislative council will not be the same legislative council which was stipulated in the constitutional document. And as such, for example, the person who was given to the forces for freedom and change, they were speaking about 67 percent. This 67 percent will not be given to this force. This is one. Secondly, today you can hardly speak of a freedom and change organization similar to the one established in January 2018, 2019. And that's why there is a whole new situation going on in the country. And that's why I don't, I personally, the issue was not yet discussed, but I doubt very much that the SCP would join hands or join such a legislative council based on the new political document. The only way out is to have a legislative council on the same grounds and based as proposed and stipulated in the Paris constitutional document. This is one. Secondly, yes, we agree it should, the forces within the legislative council should reflect the development which took place since April 2019. But here comes what is the development? While the military speak about development in the sense of the peace agreement they have reached in Cuba, which I think was a big crash and a big lie, while we are speaking about the presence of the, for example, resistance committees, trade unions and so on. And this is a very important thing which we have mentioned, which we have to mention is that within the components of the blocks of the freedom and change were the block of the organization of civil society. And this block left today left the alliance. So the alliance even is getting weaker rather than stronger. And a new alliance, a new alliance is gradually appearing in the state. And this is where we feel that there is the possibility of change. Absolutely, right. And in this context also, you mentioned the role of the international community and its play and the various players in the region. Now, one thing that during the Sudanese, the protests that are taking place, one demand was also regarding a change in foreign policy. But what has happened is in fact that Sudan is actually normalized ties with Israel. There has been a lot of engagement, for instance, with Africa. So could you talk about what exactly the current establishment is working in terms of what is its direction in terms of foreign policy? And how does this affect domestic policy as well? Let us break it very clear. From the very beginning with the intervention of foreign forces, especially the United States, Britain, Germany and some others in Russia, China, with all these foreign forces plus the regional forces. Sudan became fell as a prey to the different interests of these forces. The more the advance of the people is going, the more contradiction becomes clear between the internal, let us say, interests of the big majority of the population and the interests of the minority inside, which is aligning itself with the outside powers. That's why one of the things the military council and later on the sovereignty council, which under the full control of the five military was to hijack the file of foreign policy. And whatever, I mean, for example, from the very beginning, the Charter of the Freedom and Change, which was established in January 2019, speaks very, very openly against Sudan being part and parcel of political or military action. And in that sense, it was interpreted that one of the important steps to be taken and immediate steps to be taken is the withdrawal of the Sudanese troops from Yemen. However, this the military refused categorically. And despite the fact that even the civilian government formed after that time demanded this, it was never ever implemented. And this is shows from the beginning, the foreign file or the foreign policy became the domain of the military. And here it started this meeting in Kantebi or Uganda between Nyaho and Burman attempts to link the idea of repeating the name of, deleting the name of Sudan from the list of countries supporting terrorism linked to the recognition or normalization of relations. It was never ever discussed in any civilian platform. Always hitting things outside the country in United Arab Emirates or in one of the African neighbors of the Sudan. And we usually, we usually till today, we usually hear about these meetings from the Israeli press, from the Zionist press, never, ever news came from the government of Sudan. Even the recent visit by the head of the Israeli intelligence service was never ever declared in the country, but only through the Israeli mass media. We came to know about it that he was here and so on and so forth. So when you speak about foreign policy, we understand very much that now Sudan, because of its, I don't know, geographical location because of the richness in it and so on. And because of the investment made by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, really the foreign policy is not implemented to the interests of this country. It was hijacked by the military and it is under the control of this alliance of the military and the foreign forces. Normalization of Israel, for example, I don't, even the UMA party, even the UMA party is against, which means that nearly three quarters of the freedom and change parties are against the normalization of relations with Israel, but still it is a process going on. Who is driving it? It's a military. The idea of Africa, this goes against the document of January 2019. Sudan today is requested by the Africa to play a major role in the U.S. intervention in Africa. A military base is being requested. On the other hand, Russia is requesting also enable base at the Red Sea. China is still playing behind the scenes demanding compensation for the losses it incurred for the oil industry in the country. So Sudan is under pressure from different forces. These forces find, and usually the historian in the Sudan, usually whenever the military are in control, this is where it becomes much easier for the foreign forces to implement their plan. And this is what is happening now. So we don't see, we don't see that there is a big change, for example, between Al-Bashir and Al-Burhan in the sense that both are following the same foreign policy, which was being followed. And they are really working hand in hand with imperialism, with Zionism and so on and so forth. Recently, we don't speak only of the visit of the Israeli intelligence service head, nor the African, but there was the minister of foreign affairs from Britain. There was the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. All these, they are coming here not to help in the transitional period, but really to confirm that Sudan should adhere and become a part of the international legacy, to become a part of the policy of big capital in the world. We lost, let us put it this way, our independent foreign policy. Absolutely. Right. And one major final question in terms of how there have been reports that sections of supporters of Al-Bashir have been mobilizing again and on the streets as well as demand putting pressure on the new system. So how are the progressive forces such as the Sudanese Communist Party and the resistance committees actually countering these remnants of the old regime? Look, I mean, if you take the Sudanese pound, when on the 11th of April 2019, $1 equals 80 Sudanese pounds, 80 Sudanese pounds. Today, $1 equals 320 Sudanese pounds. And this shows the deterioration, inflation, call it whatever you want, but it affected the Sudanese citizen. To the extent that you can hardly speak about a normal life, a decent life for the Sudanese. That means you will face it everywhere, from food to education of the children, to health, medicine, everything, everything. And that's why the discontent in the street is very, very, very real. And for the normal person in the country, it is unbearable. I mean, this is hell itself. However, and this we must also stress, in the demonstration organized by the resistance committees, there is one of the slogans which says very clearly, I mean, this is a translation, living in hell better than living under the Muslim Brotherhood. And this shows the difference. In the last demonstration, on the 21st of October and last year, and then on the second anniversary of the revolution on the 19th of December, the Muslim Brotherhood or the remnants of the previous regime tried to infiltrate the mass demonstration. And even some of them came and burned the flag of the Sudanese homeless part, but they were very strictly and clearly isolated and being sent out of the demonstrations. Today, it is the same thing. Now, for example, they are using children, and we can see it in the streets. They pass through motorcycles distributing oil or petrol so that they can burn. For the children, it is a game to burn tires. But then if you speak with them, and this is what you are doing as a Communist Party or as opposition, speaking to them and trying to convince them this is nonsense. So what they are trying to do now is to create a kind, and this is the Muslim Brotherhood, to create a problem. And because for I think four or five times they try to organize demonstrations calling for the army to take power, to take full power. The issue is the following, which they don't know or they don't want to know, that the army is in power. So the idea of a coup, I think it is really far-fetched, because I don't think the army, the general, maybe if there is a coup, it would be an internal coup, a power struggle within them, but not on policy. Because the policy is determined not only by the army, but by the international community in cooperation with the army. So these policies are there. So when you speak about the foreign policy and its reflection on the economy, it is very clear what is happening now is the full implementation of the instructions of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which the previous regime was doing. So in terms of, I don't know why they need a coup, they don't need a coup. What they are trying is to save the next, next of some of the previous heads of the regime, but not to force the army into action. The other forces, especially the professional and the trade union and the resistance committee are organizing them, they are trying to establish a platform, a new platform, an alternative to what is going on based on the document of January 2019. The original program, minimum program, taking into consideration the change of time and the change of course. And this is being discussed among these forces, including the Sudanese Communist Party. Absolutely. Dr. Farri, final question in terms of, you can briefly summarize what is the path ahead as far as the Sudanese Communist Party is concerned, the key slogans and the key actions that are being planned in the coming months. Yesterday was a plenum of the Central Committee of the Sudanese Communist Party and I'm coming to rest from that meeting. Anyway, the main thing on the national level is that we have been calling for a new realignment of forces, new lines for quite three or four months now. So we're advancing in that direction. We still maintain the idea of a broad front. However, there are certain changes on these tasks because before we're trying to implement certain policies. Here now we start from trying to change the policies which are being implemented in the differences, in the economic field, in the foreign affairs, in the so-called peace agreements, the second thing on the representation of women and young people. I mean all the principles which were betrayed by the present regime and by the present leadership of the forces of freedom and change, we are trying now to repeat and change. And this is one. On the other hand, we are trying to really pose certain discussion within the framework of what is here now in the center. What we mean by that, the resistance committees, the professional alliance, the trade unions, the workers representatives, the peasants, women, students, youth, and so on and so forth. At the same time, we are opening a new front of dialogue, very strong dialogue, and we have a key set in that direction in discussions with the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdul Wahid, as well as the PFP North led by Al-Hilu. We are trying to bring all these forces together. Yes, there are a lot of small issues of differences existing. We are trying to patch up and see how it will happen. However, even what is the role of the Sudanese Communist Party in such a land under discussion? Because we think we were forced, and to some extent, we failed to play our role as a leading force within the society and within the revolution. And this is a principle which we hold today and which we are trying to really change it in the sense that to prepare the party to play a leading role within the broad alliance. This is very important for us, but we are not going to use the same arguments that the Congress should be the vanguard. No, we want to do it through convincing our alliance and through convincing ourselves, Paris, and our alliances of the validity of the programs we are presenting and the validity of the leadership we are giving to this movement. The last thing which we are trying to do, which we think is very important, is to appeal for an understanding of international solidarity with Sudan. Solidarity here with Sudan does not mean only on the level of governments and removing the name of Sudan from the terrorist list or canceling its debt and so on, which are also important issues. But the most important issue is the real struggle going on in the country. For example, there is a big danger today. Sudan turning into a similar situation like having, you know, we have minimum of two armed groups, which are now or three armed groups, actually, which are now within the government. The rapid support force, the Sudan Liberation Army, and the Muslim Brotherhood Organization. These forces are there and there is an agreement with the government. First of all, the rapid support force is part of the army, but really, it has nothing to do with the army. It is an independent force. It is a bastion of certain powers. They have their police, they have their secret service, they have their prisoners, even they became people. Recently, they killed a young man. So these armed rebels, armed groups, whatever they are called, they are really posing a certain danger to the a certain danger and a serious danger which can really jeopardize the future of the country, not only the future of the revolution. The most important thing, the peace agreement treats in Cuba, between them and the military component, stipulates one very dangerous clause, that they will maintain their armies till after the transitional period, that means during the election. And this is something which we feel that understanding this and demanding the immediate solution of these forces is very important, yes, to dissolve them, but to take the necessary steps so that they don't turn into bandits and so on and so forth. On the other hand, we feel that the role played by the EU, especially in support of the rapid support forces, should be seriously criticized. They are the, I mean, the EU during the Bashir regime, maintained, supported these forces and made them into a real train them, applied them with arm and money. Yes, they thought that they would protect Europe from immigration, from smuggling refugees. In fact, they did not do that. No, they just maintained this and they became, during the Bashir time, they were the most active and brutal repressive force. Today, the other two groups, when they speak today, when they say that they will maintain their forces till the election, till after the end of the transitional period, why? There is one thing which is clear. Both of them, the Sudan army and the Minnawi, they are fighting in Libya under Haftar. The Muslim brothers are fighting with the, the government in Tripoli. They don't have army in the Sudan. For example, who give you another example, when you speak, they speak about the government and the military, especially, insistence on the withdrawal of the Unemite forces, that of the United Nations and the African Union. The people in the area in Darfur were against this. The government promised that they will bring troops, then the army, police and so on to maintain peace and to replace these forces. These rebel groups also said they will join. The result, after the withdrawal of maybe 70% of the Unemite, look at the situation in Darfur. The last thing, forget about what happened before, but the last massacre took place in Guinea. This is the capital of Sudan, Darfur, whereby nearly 500 people were killed. Is it how they will maintain peace in the area? The last thing we want to say to the international public opinion, I mean, this peace agreement in Yuba, they celebrated the signing in Yuba. Yuba is the capital of Southern Sudan. Does Southern Sudan solve its own problems? It is still on civil war basis. Here they celebrated the agreement in Darfur. Did they go with the government, the military council or the rebel group? Did they go to Darfur? Did they enjoy supporting Darfur? I mean, these are the points. Because today, the refugees, those who are living in the camps, the nearly 2 million living in the camps in villages and so on, do not have a voice in the peace accord reach. And that's why we feel that we saw that the UN supported the peace agreement. The UN, I think, supported the peace agreement just to get rid of the expenses incurred by the UN and me in Darfur. And this is the point. I mean, people should really dig and see what are the real problems in Sudan and should listen to the opposition in the Sudan, and okay, and should listen exactly to the people in Darfur. And I think this is the step and this is the solidarity we need now. Because the come of life presented by Hangdok and Burhan, the problem is not the normalization of relations with Israel. It's not the withdrawal of Sudan name from the so-called terrorists. No, these are not our headache. Our headache are inside the country. And this is where we need support.