 Hello and welcome to the latest Lowy Institute event. My name is Jonathan Pryk, Director of the Lowy Institute's Pacific Islands program. Let me begin by acknowledging the Gadigal people of the Eora Nation, on whose land I speak to you today and acknowledging their elders past and present. It has been a busy few months for the Solomon Islands. The leaking of the draft text of a proposed Solomon Islands-China Framework Agreement on Security in late March has sent alarm bells ringing across the Western world. Facing domestic and international pressure, rather than backing down, the Sogobarei government rushed to sign the agreement just a few weeks later, potentially setting Solomon Islands onto a course that could upend the security and geopolitical landscape in the Pacific. Concern has been particularly acute in Australia, where these developments have crashed into a hotly contested federal election campaign that some have tried to frame around the issues of national security. A topic my colleague Richard McGregor discussed in detail in another Lowy Institute event today. There has never been a time in recent history when the Pacific has factored so heavily in an Australian election campaign, with the narrative descending to who has dropped the ball and to red lines, and with many security analysts fearing the Solomon Islands is now locked into a trajectory of eventually hosting a Chinese military base, a prospect that would fundamentally change the way Australia looks at its own defence and security. But through all of this noise, what does the Solomon Islands-China Security Agreement really mean for Solomon Islands and the region? How is it being perceived in Solomon Islands? What were the drivers behind Sogobarei government signing the deal? And what are China's ambitions in Solomon Islands and beyond in the broader Pacific? To try and answer all these questions and more, I am joined by a stellar panel of experts on Solomon Islands. Dorothy Wickham is a highly experienced media and communications specialist with an in-depth understanding of Pacific Island politics, cultures and effective communication practices. Dorothy was a long-standing host of what was Ramsey's National Radio Talkback Program Talking Truth and managing editor of the One News Television, founding editor of social media site Melanesia News Network and coordinator of SeaChange Solomon Islands. Dorothy is a trusted voice in Solomon Islands and the Pacific. Dorothy, it's great to see you. Thank you. Thank you for having me. Next is James Batley. James is a distinguished policy fellow at the Department of Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University. James joined ANU following a distinguished career at DFAT, where his career highlights included postings to Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Indonesia, as well as head of mission in Timor-Leste and Fiji. Most importantly, James was high commissioner to Solomon Islands from 1997 to 1999 and returned as coordinator of the regional assistance mission to Solomon Islands from 2004 to 2006. James finished his career at DFAT as a deputy secretary. James, thanks for being here. Hi, Jonathan. And finally, we have Graham Smith. Graham is a fellow at the ANU's Department of Pacific Affairs and is Australia's leading expert on China's engagement in the Pacific Islands. He has a particular focus on how Chinese infrastructure contractors adapt and influence the business and political environment in Pacific Island states, a subject quite pertinent to it for today's discussion. Graham also hosts the award-winning Little Red podcast with former NPR and BBC journalist Louisa Lin, which explores Beijing China beyond the Beijing Beltway. Graham, hello there. Good to see you, John. All right, Dorothy, I would like to get started by asking a simple but big question of you. How are things on the ground in Honiara and what are the major concerns or opportunities people are sharing with you about this deal? I think there's a sense of people are fed up with it now and tired and they want to move on with the subject. But as you know, the overseas media is still very much covering this issue, which of course some others see. And that's the benefits of having internet and social media. So the discussion is still ongoing. You see people commenting on Prime Minister Sugovara's comments on the floor of parliament in regards to this security treaty. So it's an ongoing subject. Thanks, Dorothy. James, this story has obviously been big news in Australia. What's got people so animated? Is this all being overblown and inflamed by the election? Or should we be genuinely concerned about recent developments? I think it's a genuinely significant and important development in terms of the way that Australia has always looked out into its immediate region. It's always been a really important element of Australian policy to or perhaps a better word to use is it's been an ongoing anxiety of successive Australian governments about the possibility of hostile powers or potentially hostile powers establishing themselves in countries and territories that border on Australia. That's an anxiety that goes back in fact to before Australia became a country, to before Federation. So I think this agreement, even though it's as we I guess we should agree, it's not necessarily an agreement to establish a base, but it may provide grounds for that. It seems to me the other thing that seems to me is that even though China has established some form of security cooperation with a number of countries in the Pacific over the past decade or so, this agreement seems to me to be qualitatively different in terms of its scope, its open-ended nature. So I think the Australian government, I think its concern is well. But James, just a follow-up, I mean, you raise that there are unique elements of this deal, such as, you know, the police in arrangements and the agreements on the request of Solomon's government for Chinese forces to come and protect Chinese citizens and assets. But does this logically lead us to a base? I mean, it seems like it's still a mental stretch to see that that's the next step. I mean, there surely must be many more steps in between and many more steps that the Solomon Islands government would have still been a driver's seat on. In and of itself, not necessarily. There's a couple of questions there, though. One is, you know, what might a base look like? And in some respects, this base discussion is a bit misleading because it's, I think the broader issue is access, not necessarily a base. But I think also we need to see this agreement in the broader context of a pattern of Chinese behaviour over the last few years. And I think it's that pattern of behaviour that that leads me and I think it leads a lot of other people to conclude that the intention of this agreement is not simply on the part of China to help Solomon Islands domestically with its own security issues, that there is a broader geostrategic agenda at work. And indeed, one that is that is designed to undermine what we might think of as Western interests in this part of the world. I do think there has been a debate in both government circles and academic circles, etc., about what exactly China's intentions are in this part of the world. But I think this agreement has given us those of us that don't have access to confidential government information, a much better steer about what China might be up to. Probably Graham is better qualified to comment on that, though. Well, that's exactly where I wanted us to lead next. But yes, it's certainly hard for those who've talked about the China's benign interests in the Pacific to still mount that argument. But Graham, you and I have been talking about China's interests in the Pacific for the better part of a decade. And I know you've been looking at it for even longer than that. There has been a lot of talk about what the steel could mean for Australia. But what does the steel mean for China? What are China's ambitions in Solomon Islands and the broader Pacific? And a final question, I mean, back to focus on your research topic here, is how does China build that influence? So what are the levers that it is using in a place like Solomon Islands to try and build that influence and achieve its goals? Yeah, I mean, it's hard to say on the first question of what their ambitions are in the South Pacific, because unlike Solomon's, the Chinese government doesn't leak much. So we're unlikely to see a document framing out exactly what their ambitions are. And it is a long way from their shipping lanes and things of commercial interest to them. So compared to Djibouti, compared to Rim in Cambodia, it's not the top of their list for places to build a base. And I absolutely agree with James' skepticism there. But as he says, it's about access. It's about can you dock your ships there? Can you sort of have the sort of support you need to be a global Navy? Because that's the ambition is eventually they want a Navy that has similar prestige to that of the United States. And you don't have that sort of prestige if you don't, you know, have places at the very least rather than bases. In terms of the levers, which is a really interesting question. The levers for a long time in the Pacific have been companies. Generally state-owned companies with the exception of Huawei, which is a nominally private company, but these state-owned companies are probably the ones to watch if you're looking at something approaching that red line of a base. And as James alluded to, this whole question of red lines is a little bit dubious because as Obama discovered, you know, during a red line and then not acting on it is, you know, catastrophic for your credibility as a global power. But in this case, if you look at the actors who are leading China's push in the Pacific, they're the same ones you see in Djibouti, they're the same companies you see in Cambodia. It's these big Chinese companies such as CCDC, China Harbour and something approaching a base would be great for them because it's work, it's a commercial contract. And it's something that they have people on the ground to to promote. So, you know, whereas they might not be briefed in on national security meetings and so forth, they know very well what the intent is from the top and they know responding to signals makes them more likely to get the nod on projects. Yeah, we always we debate what China's ambitions are in the Pacific over and over and over. And as you say, we're never going to get the elite strategy, but, you know, it could be natural resources, it could be access, it could be basing, it could be political influence, it could be UN votes, it could be counter in Taiwan, it could be commercial interests. It could be private private sector interests. It could be, you know, getting a contract and making money or it could be all of the above. I'm of the mind that it's all of the above, you know, China is so big there are ambitions that that span the span the spectrum. So and all of them, I think, are coming to play in Solomon Islands right now. Dorothy, I want to come back to you here. There's clearly been a Chinese presence in Solomon Islands long before 2019, but what does the Chinese presence look like today in Solomon Islands and how are the Chinese viewed in Honiara? I know that's a loaded question because there are a lot of varying perspectives. But how do people talk to you about China and in Solomon's? There's a general consensus that. They've they've moved in and they moved in fast and big. Their aid, as you know, here is a very physical you can actually see and touch and for the last 40 years, I think we've not had much big infrastructure projects, especially if you you're looking at donor assistance, apart from New Zealand's big, huge work in the Western province with the International Airport and also the road from Munda to Noro, which are two big, huge projects that people in the rural area can see and actually say, yes, this is this is aid coming from a particular country. And I think this is where Australia I won't use the term fail, but I think the misunderstanding of a lot of every Solomon Islands is that aid has to look like a concrete building, has to be a bridge, has to be a wolf. I think Australian aid, as we all know, has focused a lot on governance and as the work with Ramsey has always been in the background, strengthening government institutions, especially in terms of our finance, debt collecting, taxation, policing. And it's a it's the kind of aid that if you if you talk to an average Solomon, they wonder where all the money goes. And also, you know, that term boomerang aid, that's also one that is always referred to when they talk about Australian aid. So I think it's also a language thing and also an understanding of how our aid works. And I think that's where we have that issue in the Solomon Islands, that the Solomon Islands don't appreciate how much we get out of Australia. I think but one of the biggest classes for Australia over the last few years is the seasonal worker scheme that ordinary Solomon Islands feel the effect, they see it, they see the benefits in their neighbours, somebody in their village, somebody they're related to. So that's a that's a a support that Australia I think should use, leverage, because I think that's where I have said social interaction between our countries needs to be enhanced, I think. We've always, I think, taken for granted Australia's presence in this country. And I think that needs to be worked on. And maybe, as I've said before, narratives need to change and maybe focus. It's something that the Australian government and people will need to relook and maybe adjust. Jonathan. Thanks, Dorothy. Thanks, Dorothy. I mean, you're preaching, I think, to the choir on labour mobility in this panel, because I think we all agree that it's definitely a really important initiative to expand and to that can really underpin, I think, future relations in the Pacific. You know, James, coming back to you here and talking about Australian aid, you've, of course, had a lot to do with Australian aid over many years in Solomon's. What do you think about Dorothy's assessment here? I mean, you know, governance first infrastructure, the flag flying and, you know, being present and showing to have like big these big flagship infrastructure initiatives, as opposed to like, you know, the nuts and bolts and working on systems of government. Is there should Australia be recalibrating, doing a bit more in that space? Or is or should we also be concerned about the longer term here about, you know, the white elephant projects that do, you know, we do see littered around not just Pacific, but around the rest around the entire region? Yeah, I think Dorothy certainly put her finger on a broader issue in the in the relationship between Solomon Islands and Australia. I think for a very long time, it's been very narrowly based on government to government relations. There's not, for instance, there's not a lot of trade between Solomon Islands and Australia. So there isn't a strong business lobby that's got a stake in the relationship. And there's a tiny Solomon Islands community in Australia. So again, that that the people to people links are not nearly as strong as they could be. Now, with I agree with the labour mobility, that is building a much stronger foundation for the relationship. It's broadening that relationship out. So I think looking in the medium and longer term, that's going to be a really, really important part of of relations. If we're thinking about the aid program specifically, it's clear that Australia is already making moves to to to broaden the focus of its work. So I think I saw an announcement just in the last few days of Australia being part of a group of donors involved in the major being a harbour development in Milita. Of course, Australia has been helping with the Tina River hydro project as well. These are major national projects. I do think, Dorothy, the the Japanese government might be feeling a bit that you've neglected their their really big contribution in the infrastructure area over the years. And I I think perhaps in the past, Australia has seen that countries like Japan or organisations like the Asian Development Bank have looked after the infrastructure side of development, whereas Australia has really focused on strengthening government institutions. I think for Australia, it's always been very important that to support government institutions in Solomon Islands. Having said that, I think Australia has learned a lot of lessons over the course of many years in understanding that, you know, just just strengthening central government institutions based in Honiara doesn't necessarily have a kind of trickle out impact on the lives of Solomon Islanders, the 80 percent of Solomon Islanders that are living in villages right across the country. I think that's one of the real take home messages of the Ramsey period. You know, for all the good that Ramsey did, I think in restoring law and order and restoring government finances. But that that impact at the grassroots level, I think, is something that I know that Australian policymakers and planners wrestle with that question and are asking themselves, you know, how do we have that that broader impact on the lives of ordinary Solomon Islanders? So to sum all that up, yes, I think we can see some evolution in the way Australia is thinking about these approaches in Solomon Islands. Thanks, James. Now, Dorothy, there is one as James alluded to, there is one missing pillar here with Australia's relationship in Solomon Islands, that is the commercial one. But of course, China has extremely strong commercial ties in Solomon Islands. How does that look on the ground? You know, I've been a Honiara many times and you see all the trade stores, of course, but there's but I would say more business interest coming in after 2019. And that that that is an area that really, really needs to be addressed by the government and also its donor partners. I think that the trade between Solomon Islands and Australia is a difficult one for a country like us. Meeting the requirements for exports into Australia, it's quite difficult and also volume, I think volume is one key and access to the markets, to getting where it is located to a port. And as you know, we only have two international ports, CSC ports, which is Noro and Honiara, then the rest of the country has to feed into these two ports. So it's it's a it's a difficult thing, I think. But it's one that's maybe something that can be discussed. I mean, if you have the right people sitting in the right place, talking and facilitating trade, I think it can be done. But of course, we sit here in Solomon Islands, we always seeing announcement of taro, we mean put it to Australia, cassava to New Zealand. And it's a bit appeal to solo because this, as you know, every Solomon Islands is a landowner owns land. And I think that's the biggest resource that we have that we can claim and how to utilize that and benefit from it. I think that's that's the key. Some somebody said to me, I think it was the former CEO of the Development Bank of Solomon Islands, Mr. Tukana Bovaro. He said, the the willingness to work, the work ethic to work. If you're talking agriculture, fisheries, we have it here in the Solomon Islands. But it's it's also the financial education that is very much lacking on the ground. And I think those are the areas that maybe Australia could look at and help facilitate through Australian funded projects like Strong Business. They've done done quite good work in that regard over the last few years that Strong Business has been established in in the Solomon Islands, helping ecotourism and other businesses strengthen their foundations. But I want to speak on what James was saying. I agree that Australia has focused on the nuts and bolts and which is the governance issues. But then there's that I always use this argument. How can you educate Solomon Islands on what it means to have a good government system, a good governance when education is lacking on the ground? That's why I keep saying over and over again in every platform that I can use that education is our key. And of course, that for us, you know, health health is the next one. And I think this is where one area where maybe Australia can boost its support into Solomon Islands. We need we really need funding pushing 100 percent, 110 percent education, I think that that would be the key. I mean, as you know, education comes, everything else follows. You don't really have to work too hard to talk issues of crime, prevention, issues of governance, corruption. When you have an educated society who understands these issues. And if you look at Fiji, I think Fiji is a good example of that on average, education is free for them. And which means on average, you have a pretty well educated society who is aware and understands issues of governance. And I think that that's where I really feel strongly that if Australia and New Zealand are to help here and also that could be part of this people to people enhancing of relationships between Australia and the Solomon Islands is through education as well. Could I come in there? Could I come in there, Jonathan? I mean, I don't think this is one of the challenges that Australia faces because there are so many demands and expectations. Australia has very significant aid programs in both education and health in Solomon Islands. Alongside the work in the economic side, strong in government, alongside the security work, the policing support and general governance support. So I mean, that is there. But as I say, I think there are so many demands that inevitably choices have to be made. There are we have Solomon Islands PhD students in Australia. Those are very expensive scholarships. Of course, they produce high quality scholars. But then that's the trade off, perhaps the primary education end of the equation. So I mean, I just think governments on both sides need to keep talking about those issues to get the balance right. But it's it's not it's not easy. Clearly, a lot more we can discuss on on the aid fronts and clearly a lot of unfinished business for the Australian aid program. But before we jump away from the. And of course, Australian aid is dwarfs that what China has been providing since 2019 in the aid space and looks like set to continue. But I do want to touch back, Graham, with you on China's commercial interests in Solomon's. And I use this commercial interest very broadly in that you have the trade stores and I don't think that the Chinese sitting in their tennis umpire chairs in the corner bossing around the local staff really help build influence in the country. But then you also have the state and enterprise. You have private sector investment. You have the logging industry. And of course, you have the major SOEs you touched on earlier that and you see these MOUs coming out every almost every week now, talking about creating an airline industry in the Solomon's or or leasing the two light the island of Tulagi. And could you kind of unpack that a bit for us? Like, how does how does China use this these broad and like and loosely connected commercial interests to exert its influence in a place like Solomon's? Yeah, I mean, one thing, a helpful starting place is probably the Belt and Road Initiative and how they define that. So they have this thing called the Five Connectivities, which covers a whole, well, basically five areas that they're looking to exert influence in. And one of them actually is the shopkeepers. It comes under people to people relations. And that's been a huge problem from the past. I mean, they had a report after the 2006 riots where they said, we've got to do something to stop these people leaving our shores because they're destroying China's reputation. They're actually talking about stopping them going to Solomon's at the Chinese border because their quality was too low and we shouldn't let them out of the country. And they're costing us so much because they cause all these riots and that the agency, the overseas Chinese, the overseas Chinese Affairs Office blame them for the riots in 2006. They said, look, these guys brought it on themselves because they're such trash. Now, obviously, this group didn't really welcome the switch. When I talked to them in 2009, they were very much, no, no, we're really happy for them to stay with Taiwan because if they switch, there'll be more competition. There'll be more Chinese businesses coming in and it's going to be bad for our business, which is, of course, what has happened. So at the top level, you have these big companies. CCECC is really leading the way in Solomon's. They basically pitched the switch to Sogavari and his entourage. You also have China Harbour, which is a really significant state-owned enterprise. So the thing about these companies is they're so big, they actually outrank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So in terms of deciding what happens on the ground in Solomon's, you would assume the ambassador has a leading role, not really. He has to listen to these companies because they're more powerful than he is in a political sense, not just an economic sense. So they are really the ones to watch in terms of what happens in the future in China. And then you have this other really interesting category that what you might call the ideas entrepreneurs like China Sam, who kind of pop up and are behind a lot of these MOUs and a lot of these funny things that get leaked. But if you, China Sam kind of sounds like a joke because of the name. But if you look at their securities, they're exactly the kind of entities you would be looking to to build a base abroad. They are connected to companies that have the license to sell, for example, weapons abroad, which definitely isn't the case for many companies. So it's an interesting, if you like, melange of Chinese commercial actors. But the thing they have in common is they have skin in the game and they're looking to promote their own interests. And these days, because of the BRI, they're looking to align those interests with signals from the top. Thanks, Graham. I mean, we may laugh at all these MOUs that just, you know, because we know these countries seem farcical. I remember the one in Western province and Daru in Papua New Guinea for a major fishing refinery, which, you know, there's no there's no tuna in that part of the country and also Daru has major TV issues. But, you know, but all China needs is for one of these to stick, right, and to get interest from Beijing and someone to buy it and the money to flow. And, you know, the person pitching gets gets their cut and but and it can upend the whole the whole like strategic framework in the Pacific. So they are they are still very important to watch. James, I'd like to zoom out again and focus again on the Australia Solomon Islands relationship. Now, we talked about the aid, the aid side of things, which, of course, has been a really dominant part of this relationship. But I was hoping you could help us unpack some of the complicated history of Australia's engagement with Solomon's in the last two decades and help us help to explain what what Australia's long term interests are in Solomon's. Yeah, I was thinking back to when I went to Honiara as High Commissioner, which was quite a long time ago now in 1997. And I have to say back then, I remember doing my rounds of government departments in Canberra before I left for that posting. And there was really, I have to say at the time, very little knowledge and understanding about Solomon Islands. At that time, our aid program with Solomon's was very small, something in the order of $12 million a year, I think. It was it was pretty much a, I think, a neglected relationship. I think it started to become, to come into focus over the course of the Bougainville crisis when we had, there was those spillover effects of Bougainville into Solomon's. And also Solomon's became a, in a sense, a back door for humanitarian supplies and for people to move in and out of Bougainville. And I think from a Canberra perspective, that's when Solomon started to come into focus. And it underlines one of the, I think, the key interests that Australia has. It is that relationship between Solomon's and Bougainville and Papua New Guinea more generally because, of course, that border between Papua New Guinea and Solomon's is an artificial colonial creation. I guess what really brought Solomon's, of course, to attention in Canberra was the outbreak of the tensions. The, or the, called the ethnic tensions in, I guess, 1999 through to 2003. This is the period where you saw the rise of armed militant factions based in Guadalcanal and the response from militant factions and really the disarming of the police force so that the state lost the monopoly on violence. And there was a serious breakdown in law and order and in the effectiveness of government. And this certainly grabbed the attention of the Australian government and to cut a long story short led to the start of Ramsey in 2003. But I guess it took the Australian government quite a bit of internal thinking and debate to move into that very assertive, that strong leadership position that it took in Ramsey. For I think for a long time Australia was trying to support the police in Solomon's. It was trying to support non-government organisations like the Red Cross to help manage this period of the tensions. But it was a real sea change in Australia's approach in the middle of 2003 when Ramsey was deployed in response to a request from the Prime Minister at the time. So of course that wasn't Australia by itself. It was Australia and other members of the Pacific Island Forum. But the great bulk of personnel were Australians, whether that's military, police or civilians. And in a space of a very short period of time you had hundreds of Australian personnel rotating in and out of Solomon Islands, interacting with, meeting with Solomon Islanders working in all different parts of the country. And again from a Canberra point of view, quite quickly Solomon's became a major government priority. And I guess the overall objective was can we help to firstly to bring about peace between these war infections, to disarm those militant groups, to restore law and order, but then to restore the functioning of the efficient and effective functioning of government. And again that's I think addresses another significant Australian interest in Solomon Islands and in the Pacific Islands more broadly. I think Australia has always felt that instability or vulnerability or fragility as a range of words we might use in the region does directly affect Australia's national interests. It does so because it means that the governments in the region themselves could be vulnerable to organised criminal groups, could be vulnerable to or don't have the capacity to respond to natural disasters, don't have the capacity to serve their own service their own populations in ways that would raise living standards and reduce disease, child mortality or that sort of thing. So I think that was certainly the focus of Australia's interest around 2003. The Prime Minister at the time John Howard used to say one of the one of the justifications that he put forward in talking about Ramsey to the Australian Parliament was that if Solomon Islands did become a failed state at the time then perhaps it could become a haven for international terrorists. I guess we need to think that this was in the context of the war on terror. It's only a short time after 9-11. But if you think back to 2003 and I'll stop talking in a minute, no one back in 2003 was thinking about China. It really wasn't part of the calculation. Of course, Solomon's at the time had relations with Taiwan and that contest between China and Taiwan had been simmering for a number of years in the Pacific. But that, it doesn't seem to me, was a real driver of Australian policy at the time. So I think I hope that very long answer responds to your question about Australian interests in Solomon's. Let me just summarize that by saying I think in a sense Australia does feel a responsibility given that it is a rich developed country in a neighbourhood of poorer developing states and that in that sense it does have, it feels this responsibility to assist with development. But that also serves Australia's own national interests. Thank you, James. I think it's really important to remind people that our interests is Solomon's predate China and go far beyond China and will continue to into the future. And it's no country, the only other country I think it was Timor-Leste where Australia has had such an interventionist role in a country in the nation building effort. And so whilst Australians may not think about Solomon Islands every day, I guarantee many people in Solomon Islands do think about Australia every day and have had direct exposure to Australians in various capacities in their country. And whilst Ramsey was a success, James, you and I were both and Dorothy I'm sure you were there as well were all at the end of Ramsey celebrations in 2017. And it was a really cathartic moment it felt for Solomon Islands, for the region more broadly and for Australia and for Sogavare who we'll come back and talk about in a moment. But it certainly does mean that there must be some really complicated emotions about Australia in Solomon Islands. I mean Dorothy what can you tell us a bit more about that? Like how is Australia viewed? I mean I know there's varying opinions but there must be a range of perspectives in the community and are they at all different from views in Parliament? I think you're right in saying that Ramsey played a huge role in giving access to Australians, to people in our rural areas and vice versa, people in our rural areas having personal contact not only with Australians. You had the New Zealanders, the PJs, the Tongans, every single forum island country member and because of their postings into some of the most remote parts of the country it was a special time and I think a lot of Somalis still maintain that those personal relationships they've had with Ramsey, whether it's military police or consultants who came in and out of the Somalis during that period. And I think that's where Australia basically dropped the ball was when they pulled out from Ramsey or closed it down would be the right term. There was that sense of a gap left. It was funny because during that period of Ramsey it wasn't always a hundred percent a good relationship. There were times we'd had parliamentarians ranting in Parliament about Australia and Australia pushing its power around here and then as we went towards closer to the time they were leaving Somalis didn't realise that the withdrawal was done in such a way that you just started to see less and less of Australian police officers on the road and little posts in the rural areas started to close down and there were a lot of personal farewells between people who had become friends and it just slowly wound itself down. I think the Ramsey exit was done very well. So well the Somalis didn't realise that it was up, the Ramsey was finished and even though it was a long time people felt like it was just yesterday. But I think that's a lesson that maybe Australians and Somalis can really look or review and look back on and try and rebuild this relationship. I think we've gone through a few weeks of us really scrutinising and really looking at our relationship with Australia and I think Somalis, I seem to notice on social media there's a slight tilt towards Somalis being more appreciative of what Australia is doing and you see it coming out more in terms of when there's a post or there's a release on Somalis going out to work in Australia and that's when you see Somalis actually acknowledge and say yes we have benefited from Australia's assistance despite whatever it is issues we have with Australia as a long-term partner and a neighbour and as you know the unfortunate use of the term backyard has been taken totally out of next year now just over the last 24 hours it's just gone all over the place with the Prime Minister using it in a rant in parliament and it's just social media commentary has just been hilarious. I think James has been following that. No, I avoid social media. Dorothy I have been following the social media over the last 24 hours following Prime Minister Sogovarra's colourful language in parliament yesterday. We won't repeat the language here but I encourage people to go have a look if they're interested in seeing the sorts of narratives we hear in about Australia and Australia language used about Solomons in Solomons parliament. Of course the man at the centre of all of this is one who is prone to a good speech in parliament that is Prime Minister Manasseh Sogovarra who has been a dominant force in Solomon Islands politics for two decades. Graham you famously or infamously got him on the Little Red podcast in 2019 talking about the upcoming swap. What did you make of the man and what do you think drove him to signing this deal? Look, Dorothy and James both know Manasseh much better than I do but obviously he's very charismatic, a very magnetic personality. He certainly almost has a messianic presence about him and a great self-confidence. But yeah, I mean if you go back and listen to the show it's clear even at the time a lot of his attraction to China was about the feeling that Australia at times pushed them around particularly with regards to Taiwan. That was sort of the first thing he nominated is that they had this policing agreement that they'd signed with Taiwan they were about to send the police to Taiwan and Australia came in and said no no that's not for Taiwan that's our business at least according to him that's how it went. So yeah, one thing I would like to note and I'm sure the other two know this better is you hear this sort of suggestion that he's autocratic because China's in the picture. If you look at his previous three terms autocratic is not new. It pops up every time he's Prime Minister so I don't know you can necessarily pin Sogobare's personality change as it might seem to some people on China this seems to happen every time. Thanks Graeme. I mean James you've probably had more to do with Sogobare over the years than any Australian official. What do you think makes him tick like what what do we need to know about Sogobare to better understand his decision-making. Wow. Well, yeah I think I first came across him when he was the finance minister in the government in the late 1990s. But I think the Prime Minister is a is a very nationalistic man. He's extremely proud to lead his country. He can be a very intense person. I think you know the sort of rhetoric that he uses in parliament. I've had to say to a lot of people in Australia you know since this is characteristic of of Prime Minister Sogobare's style. So you need to to to listen to that sort of rhetoric or to read those words in that broader context. I think a lot of people have found it difficult to get close to him in a personal sense. So they find him quite guarded and with a fairly closed or close circle of advisors around him. You know he's he's lost he's been Prime Minister four times but he's also he's lost power a number of times as well in motions of no confidence. So he doesn't he's clearly got enormous political skills. I mean he's the preeminent political leader I think of his generation but perhaps not always capable of keeping everybody on the on the boat at the same time. Thanks James. Dorothy one of the talk about the closed group around the Prime Minister one of the frustrations of this deal that you voiced is the secrecy that surrounded it. I mean with the final text is still being hidden from the public and we're unlikely to see it. You you have written for the Guardian about your frustrations with the transparency of the Sogobare government. I mean would you mind expanding on this point a bit. Yeah I think like James said this is this is not Sogobare as a result of China and I totally agree with that. This is Sogobare basically and that that's how he speaks and that's his political style you know and what we are used to him. I like James first met him when he was a minister of finance and I was just you know young cadet and I traveled down to the border as part of the western province delegation in relation to some issue we had with the with the Bowen villains and Papua New Guinea to Taru and Choizal but I remember him as a young minister very much sure of what he wanted and I think it frustrates him no end that he even after all these years in parliament he is unable to drive this whole development issue. I mean he comes from Choizal a pretty remote province which has so much difficulty with infrastructure and transportation communication everything that you could think of but then so very close to the Bowen villain PNG that has much better infrastructure and communication facilities but I think one thing one thing about Sogobare I think a lot of summoners tend to forget he is only one person in a cabinet and he's the face he's the face to this government but he has very powerful moves and shakers behind him who hold together his numbers and I think in all all the negativity that has been focused on him I think we summoners need to also take a look at the characters behind him and the reasons for the choices being made I think we really need to look at his his ministers and know their affiliations and their leanings and what are the demands on them from their from their voters and I think I think Sogobare leads a group of people you're talking the Malita and the Guru canal block who have faced a lot of issues in terms of development the western province block is a little different as you know the western province is economically a little bit more self-reliant than if you look on the other into the other provinces and I think the Gora canal the Malita block are the strongholds behind him including the three members of parliament for Honiara which also has positive and negative effects because that's when you have a lot settlements located in Honiara and every single right we have it's always been as a result of young people in the settlements with you know this illusion with what they thought they could have if they came into town just like in the other developing country and they left they left without jobs without education and without any much prospect but like I said over the last few years too we've seen that change mindset because of the seasonal workers program and I think Sogobare if you look at him as a leader he's a very well respected leader in his in his own province and his own constituency that's the reason he's still there and as a person like like James said he's a very intense man he thinks before he talks even that's not very obvious when he speaks in parliament he tends to get very emotional I've noticed that about him he gets very emotional very easily so I think that that's how I see him as a leader thanks Dorothy I mean James and I during the Ramsey celebrations 2017 saw saw that that emotion in full in full flight but it was in out of gratefulness for Ramsey and so it's I don't think we can really you know a lot of this is theatrics I think what we see in parliament so clearly but clearly you know here's as James said he's a dominant figure in Solomon's politics and the figure will have to continue to try to build and maintain this a relationship with for the foreseeable future Dorothy you touch on so many issues I would love to talk more about you know the riots I mean sure the swap may have been a spark but the underlying drivers are the all the points you raised about youth unemployment about economic opportunity about into rate into island tension that all these issues are still so prevalent it's so important to to talk about in Solomon Islands but we are I'm afraid running close to time and I do want to come back to James to ask the question of where do we go from here I mean how will this change the way Australia engages with Solomon Islands and you're a very on a specific point I mean it's a hypothetical one like how do you think the next security crisis if there is one the next riots the next time of unrest where you know Australia is where outside assistance might be needed should there be one which I hope there won't be how will that play out now that the steal has been signed that's a really good question Jonathan I I don't know the answer to that I think I do think one of the impacts of this agreement will be the trust between the Solomon's government and the Australian government will have been damaged whoever is in power after the Australian election nevertheless it does seem that Prime Minister Sovavari was at pains to reassure Australia to say that you remain our our primary security partner I think if there were to be a future security problem Australia would be called on but if China is called on at the same time the coordination between those groups could cause a real problem that could be a real challenge for security planners so I guess we need to cross our fingers that that situation won't arise and if I can do that I think one of the underlying concerns is the purpose and the nature of policing in China is very different to what it is in Australia the police are there to maintain social stability which is a very different goal to to solve in crime that they're pretty rubbish at solving crime you know they claim to be as safe as Switzerland I've lived there for a number of years it's not as safe as Switzerland the police are universally regarded with contempt there because their main thing is to keep a lead on social tensions and so you know if for example only they were called on I mean would Australia then have to come in and bail out the poor old Chinese police who find themselves you know unable to apply their methods or finding that their methods actually make things worse on the ground in Solomon's so there's all kinds of interesting hypotheticals there for us thanks Graham Dorothy any any last words to add I'd like to give you a small snapshot of what we might face I mean just recently in this right Australia of course led in a very small contingent of Fijians and Papua New Guineans and the policing in Papua New Guinea as you know is very different to how Solomon Islands police conducts itself and there were a few small you know spots of trouble in the way they dealt with Solomon Islands you saw it in social media Solomon Islands this is not Port Moes we don't come and push us around and Solomon Islands in that regard are very lucky with our police force even though we complain about them a lot but they're always very respectful of their relationship with the community even our rapid response unit gets hammered whenever they mishandle a situation so I think if we were to get to that stage and if they were to bring in Chinese police officers or under whatever arrangement it is they're going to have a big PR problem because Solomon Islands are more used to the the Pacific style which is Australian New Zealand regional assistance mission made sure it left that mark so whoever's coming after that really really needs to know how to handle this society if not it'll be an absolute miss and it would be something that maybe in the end we'd be asking for Australia to come and clean up again after that do anything yeah absolutely there's also a language issue like I mean in the middle of a Malay in Honiara these these poor Chinese police whose English is probably not that good are they even going to understand what's going on and they certainly won't have the language skills to talk things down and to you know de-escalate which is really as a policeman your most valuable skill is communication not not your riot shield well I think that's I think Dorothy that's a very important message to to leave for for any external power looking to come into the very complicated domestic context in Solomon Islands so you know I could keep talking with you all about for hours on these issues I'm sure we will offline and there's of course much more to unpack from this story as it develops in the months and years ahead and so please do keep an eye on low-institute analysis as the story unfolds but in the meantime thank you to our guests for joining us today and thank you to the audience for your time we look forward to seeing you again soon