 There we go. This should be better now. Well, hey, good morning, everybody. Thanks so much for coming to this roundtable. It was hard to get to, hard to find, and I know there's a lot of folks that are probably going to join us in the middle here. My name is Rick Breckenridge. I'm the Deputy Commander at U.S. Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia, and it is an indeed pleasure and honor for me to be here today to lead this August panel on a discussion about the future of our Navy and about the challenges that are going to be different as we look to the future and how we need to adapt to that changing environment, and we'll tee up the theme in just a second. While I'm doing my clerical duties as the moderator, I just want to let the panel know that there's going to be two signals that you're going to hear during your remarks. I hit the timer as you get started, and when you're at the, what I consider, timeout, you're going to hear the following sound. This is a hint. So if you hear that, that means you've got two more minutes to wrap it up, and after that two minutes, you'll hear this sound. That means you're really done, and no matter what, we're going to turn off your mic. So those are the ground rules as we get started. I will mention that last night we had dinner together at the Bonefish Grill. My time is up. If the moderator gets out of line, you're going to hear that sound. It was just a wonderful evening together, getting to know each other, sitting around a table, enjoying a glass of wine and a meal, and just having a chat. It almost seemed like it was a round table discussion, and we sort of played off each other. There was playful repartee, and we really are out there. And I said to myself, wouldn't it be special if today at the quote-unquote round table, instead of being in a panel sitting straight in front of you and going sort of down the row, that we just got into some comfortable living room chairs sort of in a circle facing each other and just had a conversation. And if I had been a better moderator, I would have probably set that venue up because I think you would have found it more exciting. But if we stick to the discipline of the time, I think we're going to have some opportunity at the end here to play off each other, to have that discussion, and sort of challenge some of the hypothesis that you'll hear today. But let me go ahead and kick it off. We have a new chief of naval operations, Admiral John Richardson. He promulgated for the Navy this design for maintaining maritime superiority as we look ahead to the future. From yesterday, Admiral Richardson was quoted as saying, America is a maritime nation, and our prosperity is tied to our ability to operate freely in a maritime environment. Today's strategic environment, Richardson said, is increasingly globalized and increasingly competitive, which I think is the CNO's polite way of saying times have changed, and we now see a return of great power competitors who are actively engaged in controlling the seas and denying us our freedom to operate in them. So unlike the last 15 to 20 years, as we look ahead to the future, the seas are going to become much more highly contested, and this is going to present some unique challenges for our Navy and for our country. In a sense, sea denial is back, and it's back in a big way. And, you know, we've had this sort of unusual period in our Navy history. I would tell you that the last 20, 25 years is an aberration and not the norm. When we were able to operate essentially from sanctuary with immunity and project power and influence as we saw fit or as we were tasked by our nation's highest authority. And that past is not indicative of the future that we're going to have with much more contested maritime seas. So the challenge is many of us that are on active duty have grown up in a different paradigm than that in which we're going to have to fight in the future. So the theory of the fight must change. You know, we're not going to be able to remain in the safe zone, outside the keep out zone of a contested sea denied environment. You know, that's one hypothesis is, well, hey, if we grow longer arms, we can continue to stay out here where we're safe and have this kind of influence reaching in to a regional contested space. But the problem is the adversary also is growing longer arms, and this approach will never work. The reality is we're going to have to go in. And, you know, if you look at sort of our intolerance for casualties post-desert war in the Middle East, there's a lot of friction associated with this kind of approach to naval war fighting, of going inside operating within the contested battle space and putting pressure on Red, changing his calculus and optimizing the effectiveness and efficiency of our force. So the blue line of effort within the design, there are four lines of effort. The blue is strengthening naval power at and from the sea. And in the design it says combat at sea must address blue water scenarios far from land in a highly informationalized and contested environment, one marked by the threat of long range precision strike. So the challenge before us is how do you aggregate, coordinate your force to go ahead and maximize in that type of future environment. And our hypothesis is a new fleet design is going to be necessary for us to prevail. And by fleet design, I mean how we fight and win, fully leveraging the advantages inherent in our force that could be potentially untapped if we combine it in a different way with an integrated fighting force. So how can we run the table with a total systems approach to sea power and sea control in this new advanced technological era? So our panel today will examine the nature of how we should organize an employer-enabled force to fight in this dynamic environment. This highly contested, highly informationalized, high-tech, long-reach, kinetic punch environment. Our hypothesis, naval operations, distributed in nature, capitalizing on maneuver warfare, integrated for greater battle space awareness and amassed effects will be key to putting red on his heels as we change the calculus to our advantage. So with that, I'd like to introduce our first speaker, General George Flynn, United States Marine Corps retired, brings a wealth of knowledge and experience in national security, strategy, and international relations. He retired after 38 years of distinguished service to our country in the Marine Corps. A couple of highlights from his career, he created the Joint Forest Development Directorate for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shaping the fighting force through development of operational concepts, doctrine, and training. He is an experienced warfighter with the challenges of leading a multi-force, multi-national coalition, while serving as the Deputy Commander General, multi-national force Iraq. And as commanding General Marine Corps training and education command, he guided the Marine Corps training, ensuring they were prepared for global operations. He's an advocate for the expeditionary warfighting approach, that we can rapidly establish operational posture within a contested environment, ensuring secure maneuver, logistics, and command and control advantages for our U.S. forces. Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to introduce General George Flynn. Hey, so good morning, everyone. Last night, as we were drinking wine and eating dinner, what we were about to say made a hell of a lot of sense. I'm not sure I'm missing at least one of those ingredients that will come off as well as it did last night, but I'm optimistic for the future here. I'm not here to give you a lecture or to tell you how this is going to be, but maybe to give you some ideas to think about as we enter this new environment. The reality is that we live in a dynamic and obviously a complex world that requires in our warfighting capabilities integration across five domains. We also have some, you know, unique fiscal realities. We live in a world where you can have anything you want. All you have to do is ask for it, but you can't have everything. So you have to make choices. And the choices that you have to make will be guided by your operational needs. You're going to have to decide what capabilities you can field in what capacity and also sometimes, you know, the debate over presence versus posture. In the world we live in right now, we're not at peace, but we're not also at total war. There is a competition ongoing in the global commons. Conflict is ongoing around the world. We are fighting radical Islamic ideology and naval forces and the ability to project power from the sea from our warships have been a key to that fight. We're also engaged in the cyber domain, defending our networks and protecting our information and critical infrastructure every day. Naval forces have also been key to this effort. And at the near-peer level, we are in a high-stakes competition for economic and security advantage. In this competition, there will always be winners and losers as in the past. We have to realize that several states have entered this competitive state and have clear ends in mind. Some of these ends are in direct conflict with our own national interests and our national security objectives. This competition is real and is ongoing right now. In many ways, some of our competitors have already moved from phase zero operations to phase two. They also seem to be well aware of how far they can push us in their phase two actions and activities. At times, it seems that we still believe that we're in phase zero and are shaping the operating environment, when in reality we need to be deterring our competitors and seizing the initiative from them. Being actively engaged, forward, and present, where the competition is taking place, is one of the principal keys to achieving our desired ends. We do not have the luxury of shaping the environment when some of our competitors are already in phase two operations. We must recognize the reality that the operating environment requires parallel rather than sequential phased operations. The goal of our naval efforts is to constantly challenge our competitors' operational understanding and risk calculus by creating greater uncertainty through ever increasing operational complexity and innovation on our part. This requires better thinking on our part, better education, better training, and equipment to field the capabilities that we need to stay ahead. As a maritime nation, there will always be advantage to using the sea as maneuver space, with the goal of creating a depth problem for adversaries assisting in changing the calculus of our adversaries' escalatory postures. The good news is we have seen this before and we have won, and we must use the lessons of the past to inform our way ahead. When the Navy and Marine Corps operate as a naval team, we are hard to beat. Has in the past an integrated naval approach that fights an integrated multiple-domain fight using all capabilities the naval force will win. Our most recent example of successfully executing a naval campaign is the maritime strategy developed during the Cold War. Key tenets of this strategy in supporting operational concepts were it was a naval effort. It was designed to fight forward in all domains. It was designed to seize the initiative, create multiple dilemmas for the enemy, both real or perceived, and to make a clear linkage between strategy to tactics. The example I use in the Marine Corps, having the maritime strategy allowed us to develop the naval operating concepts that led to us creating the operational maneuver from the sea, which then guided our capability development, which you see today. We also had a clear linkage between power projection and sea control in this example. For example, as we pressed the fight forward, Marines would go into Iceland to guard the airfield there with an infantry baton and hawk missiles to create another carrier for the P3s that they could control the GI UK gap. We also pressed forward into Norway where we could operate from the Fords, with the Marines occupying the space to protect the carriers. So it really was a naval effort and it was designed to complicate the enemy's targeting. It was designed to seize the initiative and it was designed to press the fight forward. We were also able to fight at rage, developing capabilities that allowed us to outrange the enemy. And we were always found ourselves on the right side of the cost to kill chain. The current commandant and CNO both understand the challenge that we face and the opportunity that is ahead of them. And within months of taking command, they have given guidance that enables the naval force to seize and maintain the initiative in a combined and competitive phase 0 to 2 environment. Cooperative Strategy 21 stated that there is a linkage between sea control and power projection. In the past, we tended to think of this as a one-way relationship where sea control enabled power projection. But history is full of examples where it also works the other way around. If you go back to the Solomon's campaign of World War II, the reasons the Marines seized Guadalcanal was for the airfield so that we could operate airplanes out of the airfield to extend our sea control. That is the essence of some of the ideas that we have to have in the future if we're going to take this fight to the enemy. We need to update this linkage by developing and testing the new operating concepts needed to achieve the necessary integration. And it must, as I said, be a naval effort. All right, what would be the key elements of this new maritime strategy or this new fleet doctrine and new naval operating concept? First of all, it has to be the employment of an integrated naval team that more effectively applies sea control and power projection together in order to penetrate, maneuver, and persist within contested battle space in a manner that complicates adversary targeting, mitigates his precision targeting, and holds at risk his security and economic interest. An example of this would be the forward basing of Marines on certain islands, on the outskirts of the contested space, moving around, whether they be high Mars with the anti-ship missiles on them, or just occupying places to use the temporary airfields to, again, complicate the enemy's targeting capabilities. The other part of the new strategy is that when you come up with these new ideas and concepts, is that you have to exercise them with purpose. And the purpose is to send a message to your adversaries. It's that part of being able to deter, to show that you have capabilities, but also to show that you're willing to seize the initiative. You also have to understand that it's a campaign that begins with shaping, carries on to deterrence, and leads to seizing the initiative. All actions have to be linked, not sequentially, but in parallel. We have to be able to use the sea, again, has maneuver space. We have to be able to get more out of what we have so that we can stay inside the enemy's decision loop. We have to not cheat at solitaire, meaning we have to know ourselves and we have to know our capabilities. You know, you can't make a capability sound bigger than what it is, or you have to realize just what you're bringing to the table. You have to strive for disproportionate results because we have to be on the right side of a constant posing strategy. You have to always demonstrate capability and resolve. You have to understand your competitor. Do we really know what our competitors worry about? But we need to find that out because the goal of this new strategy is to make them worry. We have to be able to do cross-domain operations that are linked in the achievement of operational objectives. And we have to use what we have in ever-increasing innovative ways. Four actions are going on right now where we should see what these new concepts are going to look like. One is the Joint Access and Maneuver and the Global Commons doctrine being written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The other is a naval effort between the Navy and the Marine Corps on Latoral Operations in a contested environment. And then we have distributed lethality. Another great idea that is being spearheaded by the Navy to, again, increase the enemy's idea of what we're going to come at. Use all the capabilities we have. And the last one is expeditionary-based operations. So, again, in closing here, the key thing is, you know, we have to realize that we're in a competition. And we have to realize right now that the way you win a competition is to be ahead of the competition, be ahead of your competitor, understand what makes them worry and make them worry. And that's the way you seize the initiative. Thanks for having me today. A round of applause. Very good. Well ahead of the clock. Three minutes, seven seconds. An overachiever. He was buzzing me under the tail of her. Let's see the cattle prod. Well, George, thanks very much for just the clarity of that discussion. And again, sort of the shift in the environment and the way we're going to have to adapt as a naval team, the Navy and the Marine. You know, I think you really, this expeditionary fighting will of going into sort of the scrappy laterals, not being shouldered out, being able to go and operate and put the disadvantage on red. I think for me, as I look at the future, this boundary of the littoral battle space is going to have a blurry line. And I think it's going to head further and further out into the open seas as our adversaries that are interested in shouldering us off their coast and in their regions develop weapons of greater range. And so a lot of the principles, I think that you brought from history, is again, we've seen this movie before. And we are not a country, we are not a Navy that's going to be barred where we choose to operate, even though there may be risk. We're going to design a method with the expeditionary fighting will to get inside demise of the things that you mentioned. So thank you very much for teen us up and getting the juices flowing. Our second speaker today is Admiral John Hill. He is the Program and Executive Officer for Integrated Warfare Systems. Surface Warfare Officer, Engineering Duty Officer, VAS Leadership Experience and Acquisition brings expertise in the development and deployment of advanced weapon systems, sensors and platforms as the technical director of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense. For the Missile Defense Agency, he dealt firsthand with the growing threat from potential adversaries and the challenges we face to maintain our warfighting edge. As Major Program Manager for the Aegis Combat Systems, his insights into the warfighting grid, particularly the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Grid, is shaping the future of naval firepower. Now as PEOIWS, he ensures the future fleet will be equipped with highly capable combat systems. And so at this point in our discussion, we're going to look at how do we stitch this fighting force together? What does the architecture look like? How do we go ahead and run the table on this asymmetric advantage that is our current advantage and that is the Integrated Fighting Force. Ladies and gentlemen, Admiral John Hill. Great. Thank you, Admiral. It's a real pleasure to be here this morning. And what a great panel. You're going to see we're a pretty diverse gang of folks up here today, so I've been looking forward to this for a while. As you can tell by the description of what I do for a living, I really believe that the statement that our systems reflect our organization is absolutely true. And if you look at how we're organized with PEOIWS, we have ship systems, we have missile systems, we have radar systems, and if we just produce those in a vacuum on their own, we'll put some great capability out there. What we're really talking about today is the power that comes from a full-on integration of those systems. And so I'm going to talk to you about something called cooperative engagement modes. And these chems, as I'll call them, is a real way for us to provide more options to the warfighter. We're going to leverage multiple capabilities. We're going to walk across all the domains. And if you start to look at distributed maritime operations, whether it's from the Fleet Forces concept or Amarons Distribute Lethality, multiple operational concepts are really about placing the sailor at the center of those operations. And it's an area that we all too often will forget. And so you'll hear me say sailor, well, if you can, it'll probably be at least 10 times by script. It's because I really believe that as we develop, we have to make sure that training systems and maintenance and operations are included in that. And so I'll harp on that a little bit. I'm going to talk to you about something called the Fleet Tactical Grid. You'll hear it referred to by some as the cube. I've got a slide that'll talk to that in just a bit. But it's really about bringing all of our communications together, our command and control, our computers, our sensors and weapons, and our officers and sailors together to fully operate in a very, very tough environment that was described by the Admiral and the General. So the grid's going to facilitate a very intelligent exchange and analysis of data to provide our warfighters actionable knowledge. And for me, because I'm in love with the fire control loop, it's all about precision fire control, precision engagement. So I'm going to be Timmy the geek on the panel here and walk you through a little bit of geekdom. We all have our screens. Thank you, sir. So Francis, next slide, please. So you may have heard of naval integrated fire control counter air. We call it NIFCA. And it was really, it's a great example of a clear warfighting need to kill overland cruise missiles. So cruise missiles coming in. How do you go do that? It was developed by leveraging the expertise across multiple CISCOMs. You see their logo up in the right hand corner of this chart and the warfare training community. It was based on a concept of employment first. The General mentioned how you have to really understand what the warfighting need is. And then on the systems development side, we go off and we develop that architecture. We test it and then we adjust as required because sometimes the technology doesn't always get you there. Sometimes you have to load the sailor work. Sometimes you can relieve the sailor some of that work with a very strong operator machine interface. So if you look at the NIFCA architecture in the upper right, there we knew we needed an airborne sensor. We had to have it up high so we could see further. We were going to pass radar data because we're going against very fast moving targets that were flying low. So we use the cooperative engagement capability which allows us to move radar directly, radar information directly off that aircraft right to an eGIS combat system and allows us to really realize the extended range of an SM-6 missile. That's what NIFCA in a nutshell is, but we didn't get there overnight. And if you looked at every one of these programs, they were all separate programs, separate program managers, and they spanned across the different SISCOMs, which again, our systems will easily reflect the organization. You could find seams all over that architecture had we not taken it seriously based on that operational concept. So we're very proud of the fact that we have deployed NIFCA. We're learning to use it now and working on it. Now one of the key observations that we take away from it when we look at it is the planning and the training tools were not something that we worked on in stride with the development. And that is definitely a lesson learned that we have to apply as we go forward. Our fleet tactical training systems should deliver warfires with the environment to regularly develop and train integrated tactics, techniques, and procedures, whether you're pier side or if you're underway, and we got to do it on a regular basis. So building out that strategy to kill a surface target, you could take the same architecture and then you can say I need a different kind of sensor because now I'm looking down on the water and I may not need radar data moving as quickly. I can survive off of hits that are coming and I can take that covariance data. So using the tactical data links was absolutely fine in this architecture. And that's what we've used to go off and sink surface ships in another version of NIFCA. So if you look at the cube on the left of your weapons and your payloads, those platforms can be ships, that can be an aircraft, that can be a U of E, it could be a submarine, sensors, critically important, most of our sensors are designed to go against a very specific place in the battle space so they can't be leveraged for everything, but what you can find is that many of your weapons systems and sensors have a lot of margin in them. And so it's about taking advantage of that margin and finding the right way to bring them into those systems, which were referred to as nodes, but those are the critical real-time functions of the combat system. How you bring in sensor data, how you connect that to the weapon, how you control it to make sure that you've got a precision engagement, and I'll talk about that here in just a second. So when you take a look at what we've done on the lower right of that chart going against a surface ship or a high-value unit, that has been tested and it'll be ready to deploy later this year. We're pretty excited about that. We're also leveraging yet another sensor. We are capturing data off the F-35 metal link and we're taking that in from the aircraft as they're coming off the production line. We are assessing that data for controlling the fire control loop with the NEGIS. Pretty excited about it. Next chart, please. So here's a busy one to wake you up in the morning, but I will point out the sailor in the upper left-hand corner. This is all about command and decision, whether it's the sailor or the pilot. You can raise this to whatever level is required to understand it. My message to you is that you have to very carefully allocate the critical real-time functions, and it's extensible across all platforms, payloads, and sensors, but understanding and parting the concepts of integration, distribution, and maneuver across a fleet requires a concerted effort. It's going to continue to be something that crosses across all of our SISCOMs, multiple systems, and it's going to be required in the training community and working closely with the fleet. Just to point out a few key functions, I started with the command and decision piece at the front. This is a different view of detect control engage. This is about what the control system requires of the sensor on the left. You've got to test that sensor. It's got to be in the right mode. You have to do track management. You have to evaluate the threat. It doesn't matter what mission you're talking about. From a command and decision perspective, you're going to lay down your engagement parameters. You're going to set your priorities. You're going to determine whether you're going to use a soft kill or a hard kill weapon. You're going to initialize, and you're going to control the launch. From a weapons perspective, what we expect from the weapon is that we're going to command guide it, whether that's a wire or an uplink downlink, or if it's a pre-program maneuver, you're going to command it. If you're talking about it, doesn't matter if all those functions reside on a single ship, an aircraft, a UAV or submarine, you're going to have those functions. If you don't do them, you're not going to get precision engagement. Mission set up, control and training has to be a part of that overall iron triangle of precision engagement. In fact, it has to be at the top, which is why I have it at the top there, because the sailor is going to play depending on what mission you're trying to do. It will be required to realize a fleet tactical grid, and every one of these functions are required for precision fire control. Next slide, please. My other message to you this morning is that no platform, no payload, no sensor is perfect. In the engineering geek world, we refer to those imperfections as errors and biases. In the end, we've got to close that outbound weapons vector. That's what's on the lower part. Can you back it up, please? Back up one chart. There you go. Next slide. Okay. I'll tell you what. I was getting really excited about closing the weapons vector to the target vector, so I'm going to finish what I was going to say, because you've got to do that, and just to kind of give you a sense, the environment is really important that we operate in, how the operator sets up the system. They won't be perfect every time. There will be error there. You could be working in a jamming environment. Your sensor may not be perfect, but you've got to do that. You've got to be able to see the biases in the system, and then you've got to go verify that all those functions are being exercised. Now we can hang on this chart here for just a bit. Realizing that distributed maritime operations in the fleet has begun today. In fact, if you look back, those of you naval officers, and you look back on your career, you'll see pieces of this and how it's been realized throughout the entire process. We've started off the discussion here with NIFCA and variants of that architecture. We're going to continue to explore variants of the architecture. Every architecture I look at, I will always walk away and say we're sensor poor. That's why I talked about leveraging an E2, leveraging a P3, leveraging the F35. We're going to continue to look for new sensors and capabilities. The hypothesis is the fleet tactical grid. If you look at payloads, platforms and weapons and the sensors, and you bring those together, the more of that integration that we can do, the more of those cooperative engagement modes that we've developed, the bigger that fleet tactical grid grows. The prediction is that we'll have increased sensor contributions, we'll get spectral maneuver, and we'll have distributed engagement options and expanded battle space. Finally, we always have to measure whether or not we're going to be able to do that in a precision engagement. It is about capacity and reaching that war fighting edge. The other thing I forgot to tell you is that I did link my iPhone to Admiral Breckinridge's iPhone so I turned off the buzzer so I'm going to keep on going for another 10 minutes. Actually, sir, I'm done. Thank you, sir. Thank you. Thank you. I think we deleted a slide to speak about. We have to use some trickery to stay on schedule. So, ladies and gentlemen, Timmy the geek, was that the term you said? Yes, sir. What I want to emphasize is as we look at this new fleet design, it's not about technology alone. As John mentioned, we're doing a lot of things that we're testing and employing with carrier strike groups, other fast-forming teams today. The challenge is the number of these chems is sort of a finite number with the way that this construct has evolved with this integrated fighting force. The question is can we get an architecture in the future that results in an infinite number of chems where we have these fast joining partners, these nodes have better battle space awareness and better mass effects in the future fight. So it is, as he said, a disciplined systems engineering approach that extends beyond just technology. Technology is going to be critical, but there's these other aspects of it, this cognitive domain, more decision time given in the hands of our war fighters that are central to this operating concept. One of the key aspects of technology is sort of this very steep part of the curve one right now where Apple develops a new iPhone 7 and it's only six months later before Samsung was able to jump through the same hoops and do the same tricks. Whereas in the past with technological advances we could buy a decade or two of superiority against an adversary, that's just not going to be the case as we move forward. One of these pieces together that are greater and stronger than the sum of the parts and that's what's behind this operating concept as we go forward. So thanks, John, for keeping us at the right level. You didn't blow me away with some of the geek speak and I really appreciate your presentation. Our third speaker this morning is Admiral Mike Menazer. You know, when you're asked to be a moderator of a panel, you quickly reach out to your friends and Nasty and I have been partners in crime, long time friends. We fought many a battle in the Pentagon. I see Admiral Terry Blake ducking in the background. We're sort of Blake trained converts and so if you really don't like this round table, please see retired Admiral Terry after our session. Nasty is a combat proven naval aviator, intimately familiar with the complexities of naval operations at the tactical, operational and strategic level. He's commanded a squadron, a deep draft auxiliary aircraft carrier and a carrier strike group. He's an expert in the training and operational employment of ships and aircraft. More significantly, he's an expert at leading our sailors at the point of the spear. Most recently he has been advanced to become the newly appointed director of warfare systems, the new OpNav N9 in the Pentagon. Probably one of the most influential deputy CNO positions in the building and a right-hand man to the CNO to realize this future to make sure that we're doing the right things today with experimentation, exercises and developing and delivering capability in the hands of our warfighters now, as well as the right investments for the future to increase the nodes, manned and unmanned to have this knitting architecture that meshes them together in this cooperative, integrated manner. So ladies and gentlemen, it brings, brings, gives me great pleasure to introduce to you Admiral Leichmann-Azer. Thanks, Rick. Real honor to be here on this panel today. I'm humbled by the intellect that surrounds me. I'm a fighter pilot. A fighter pilot with a little bit of knowledge is very dangerous. Luckily, Navy Nucer Power trained me to ask the right questions and so I do a lot of question asking. The panel today, I was particularly energized as well by the dinner last night where we sat around and debated back and forth. The coalescence of ideas that General Flynn started that John Hill just talked about and that J.D. is going to challenge us with at the end here is the kind of dialogue we need to have. There are four forces that we must face in this truly competitive world. Rick started to talk about them, but the force of globalization world trade flows are in our maritime domain. 95% of American internet traffic is on undersea bed cables. It is clear that 90% of our trade goes across the sea, so this domain is one in which the Navy must continue to be able to operate where it matters, when it matters. The information flow that comes with globalization information such that the information developed every day, IBM says 2.5 quintillion bytes of data developed every day means that 90% of the data in the world today running around was created in the last two years alone. That information technology is digital, exponential, and combinatorial. How do we grab a hold of that information piece? And then the speed of technology. As technology gets faster and better and smaller and the swap sea that goes into putting systems out there gets better and better, how do we innovate in those systems that John Hill just talked about to get what we need in his geek charts to get the war fighting capability to track the threat. And then the fourth force we have is our budget. We can no longer continue to acquire weapons systems like we have in the last 15 years. Our budgets are going down. The costs of our programs are going up and the threat is taking advantage of those information flows and technology to try to outpace us. Our program today with about $2.5 billion less each year than PB14 is a PB14 program and we're trying to buy a PB14 program with a PB17 budget and all that goes with it. As the costs come up the budget goes down and the requirement for our war fighting capability and capacity continues to exceed our dollars how do we think differently? And so listed up here are focal points that I like to use in the 98 and now into the 9 about how we fight. They're not platform specific. I'm very happy with the conversation we've had already this morning. At least the monologues that have come to you with John Hill going into the what that we're doing out there cooperative engagement modes. What we're doing in the 9 though is trying to determine how you put these capabilities on to the battle space. We must innovate, experiment and do demonstrations that continue into incubator units more than we do now. We must fail and understand what that failure gains us. Test a little, learn a lot, fail on the way to the warfighter. What we can't fail is at the leading edge of the warfight. We can't give the warfighter a technology they try to go use that. We have to fail on the way. But you and I both know in the government industry, academia congressional dialogue that we have that people don't like failure. If we spend millions of dollars against a study and it ultimately fails well that money was a waste. I'd argue with you it was not a waste. What do we do with the X-47B unmanned system that landed on aircraft carrier and demonstrated how we refuel? If we stop using that, is that a failure? We could say it's an opportunity cost we should be looking at as an advantage. But we learned a lot about unmanned coming off of a carrier. How do we do that? We've got to accelerate that innovation. If I have a program of record that's proceeding it's based on DOD 5000. It's based on a J-SIDS requirements basis. How do I then innovate inside that program? IBM's computer Watson in 2011 beat a couple of champions at Jeopardy. And at that time it was 10 refrigerators big. Today, Watson is the size of three pizza boxes and is 2700% faster. We have a ship self-defense system that's installed on our Nimitz class carriers that's the size of 10 refrigerators. There is technology down right now that I can take a box that is about the size of that podium right there and allocate the information capability, the digital capability on our carriers and on our ships or SSDS. But we're not acquiring that because that's not the program of record. So how do I take advantage of the technology advances that we all see out there and roll them into programs that I have right now? If I go to the acquisition community and say, I would like to have that, they'll come back to me and say, well, in accordance with this DOD 5000, you need a new set of requirements. We don't have to do that. How do I innovate while I already have a program of record? That's a challenge we have. We have to do a systems-to-systems approach. We built an integrated warfare capability into Nav-Air Cisco where integration interoperability is the coin of the realm. As you know, we have delivered weapon systems, Aegis and SM-6 an airplane system and they didn't talk to each other very well. And in fact we had a bunch of baselines in many of them. We have recently realized that we need to align those systems so we can do integration interoperability to do the cooperative engagement modes that John just talked about. It is an engineering challenge to take a bowing product in the front of an F-18 and align it with a Northrop Grumman product in the back of an E-2 so we get a weapons quality track shared across a network. And right now our network is based on link-16 technology and all of you know what the limitations of that link-16 are. How do you take that information and put it on top of the new waveform? But we have to be able to do that to track the technology advances that are being made by many of you and I have to figure out a way to afford them with the budget that we have. Interoperability is the key to the kill chain mindset but there is a way to do these kill chains. So the line there that says independent all the way to interdependent. I flew with Tomcat a long time ago and I had an Phoenix missile, a Rio in the back telling me where to go and I had a target out in front of me I was going to shoot. When I gained that information I pulled the trigger and shot the Phoenix at that target that was my independent kill chain. I go fly a Super Horn and I'm getting link-16 data from another airplane next to me. He's given me weapons quality tracks. The cooperative engagement mode that John talked about means I can share data between shooters and sensors such that I can put a system together that is just an independent kill chain. If you integrate something though there is a chance when you pull apart the integration a piece of that integration that the system will come apart. If it's interdependent that means that the system is put together interdependently if you pull it apart it will not work. So we have to be able to go across that's why the double arrows are there. How do I keep an independent kill chain where I can roll in on something with a weapon on my airplane or shoot something within visual range of my LCS but also be able to provide information up into the grid so that somebody else can take advantage of that targeting data. How do I turn a kill chain into a kill web? So if you picture an air to air kill chain up here we'll just do it geographically and you picture a surface to surface kill chain across here and the picture is an undersea surface kill chain. What if I start to draw lines between the sensors the weapons and the shooters in those different domains and I draw a line from the air down into the subsurface. You saw a picture of a P3 showing surface track data back down to a blue shooter. When you start to connect those lines you don't have a kill chain anymore you have a kill web and if we can connect those nodes together now you have a resilient kill web that we can use to target different entities to be able to share data across advanced networks and to be able to make our information better for us and worse for the bad guy. In order for us down on the bottom live virtual constructive LBC we've been doing live virtual constructive type of operations in testing for a long long time. Our advanced capabilities before we send them out to the warfighter we go on ranges and we use some simulated immersion constructive scenarios to be able to deliver high capability high end capabilities to the warfighter fifth generation capabilities we also need to migrate those to our training mindset so right now we have the ability to link simulators together in a high end constructive fight I can do live constructive pairing where I can do a constructive simulation onto the displays of an airplane flying live and simulate for that pilot flying a live airplane that he or she has a high end surface to air threat high end air to air threat and if I can share sensitive compartment data down from a live airplane through an NSA certified waveform to a ground facility which we are working on right now I can now have a live airplane on the range flying with a simulated wingman who's in a simulator down in the facility down there. This type of training this ability to connect all of our systems across an open architecture construct will give us the ability to extend the geographic capabilities of our ranges and will also allow us to train to the high end and we have to get after this for training. Next slide. So I have three fifth generation questions that I think about. It's not just fifth generation platforms like the Joint Strike Fighter with stealth and the ability to fuse data it is all of the ability to fight in an information-asized domain how do you do air dominance I would argue with you we can't do air dominance anymore in a high end fight. The verb to dominate means that you own the entire space and I think that our competitors just are not going to allow us to do that so you have to establish local and temporal air superiority you have to establish when you need to do the mission in the air at the time and place you're choosing and then be able to then withdraw we've got to move from a linear type of war fighting to high tempo we have to make the effects that happen across those kill webs it has to be networks and capabilities not just the platforms we're fielding so I focus on capabilities not platforms I don't as much care about buy me this many JSS or this many Super Hornets or this many Latoral Combat ships or this many DDG flight 2s it's what are we going to do to connect those platforms and then ultimately get back to the platforms that we would buy people complain that the range of our aircraft now has gotten shorter than they were before and therefore we're not as good as we were before I'll argue with you that's the reach of the network not the range of the airplanes that makes sense so if we can capitalize on the range of the network with weapons and sensors and and nodes and use those airplanes where optimized for the range of each individual type model series you will get a better effect and again we talked about information we talked about live virtual constructive I have become a fan of John Boyd's Oodaloop it's a cliche I know that the Oodaloop itself is the cliche as I'm inside of the decision speed but everything that goes into orienting yourself is what's most important to this fight so the orientation phase two more minutes keep going, two more minutes first guy to exceed the time limit now I know what happens and it just shocks you too we talked about unmanned is where this is where my head is on Oodaloop people say you need an unmanned platform okay to do what? survive and you don't fly when I think about unmanned I think about machines, man machine team what if we could have the machine do the OO part of the Oodaloop the machine at machine speed can orient for you, we buy static all the machines and the nodes that are in the air that machine gives you SA on your SA page or in TFCC in the carrier so if the machine is doing OO then the man is doing the DA part the algorithm for AlphaGo was just developed and beat the Korean that is the champion of the game Go Go has 10 to the 270th moves so there were neural networks put into that algorithm but the machine also learned through a bunch of games that a human had played so it took man machine teaming inside of that machine to get to a better result if we put man machine teaming in there we will get to what the Oodaloop actually wants us to get to so at the bottom how do we turn a kill chain into a kill web that's what I'm after and as we look forward to buying our platforms we have to figure out how to buy them differently so we get to these kind of capabilities thank you we are still on schedule JD so unlike our prediction last night you will get your full time our final speaker JD McCreary is the chief of disruptive technology programs at Georgia Tech Research Institute and every round table needs a strong closer much like the Boston Red Sox to succeed you need to bring in the closer he's the highly regarded subject matter expert on emerging technology specifically in the electromagnetic spectrum he had served 20 years as an EA-6B Prowler electronic countermeasure officer with combat flight and operational experience he was pivotal in the 2006 establishment of the counter radio controlled improvised explosive device combat support units the training and equipping ground forces with the most capable assets to counter the growing IED threat in Iraq as a red team lead for an OSD technology task force he outlined linkages between emerging technology trends and US economic and education imperatives he is a technical expert in the field of emerging technologies man-machine teaming reconfigurability and digital wireless and its impact on national security and commercial access ladies and gentlemen, JD McCreary are you still with me so I'm going to take a little bit different spin I want to talk about everything they said is terrific if some of you folks went to the IW session before this I want to point out some things that I observed obviously maneuver in all domains right, is EMS going to be a domain we'll talk about that so not necessarily just defend our networks network is a weapon system itself technology as a terrain what does that mean and how do we visualize that how do we operate in that kind of environment Admiral Norton reiterated something that's very important to the CNO we need to be experts at not going to war so non-kinetics are going to play a key role in that in phase 0, phase 1 we don't want to go to phase 2, 3 we have a responsibility we the DOD has a responsibility to win the wars that it's tasked with but hopefully we never get to that so can we do non-kinetics in the early stages to dissuade, deter introduce doubts maybe even escalate to de-escalate how do we think about that cybercom talked about enabling operations and obviously it's very challenging to talk about non-kinetics and non-classified environments and so I'm not going to talk about cyber need W operations per se but what is it going to take for us to do that successfully so it's really about what's the future look like we can't think about a future force without understanding the future environment and the future environment is today when we talk as a military we tend to think about chips and tanks and satellites and what does our force structure look like to do the six war fighting functions and then you take the uniform off and you go home and your kids are in a totally different technology environment or you look at the TV and you look at we're boiling the frog we resist robotics and we resist artificial intelligence because it's scary and look at all the western movies it's always a disaster and yet you're starting to drive cars that are highly intelligent hundreds of networks inside of them and automatic we went from ABS you're not a very good breaker so I'm going to help you figure that out to really not a good breaker I'm just going to do it for you I don't care if your foot's on it or not so I'm going to park it so I'm going to avoid collisions we're almost in a driverless car we've just slowly boiled the frog to do that right and so we embrace that how do we embrace that in our environment in our culture how do we get people to think that I'm not going to be replaced man-machine teaming is actually as Admiral Hill talked about and as Admiral Menazer talked about it is about the human but how we're operating in more and more complex environments and how do we actually leverage the value of the human being and offload certain things to intelligence intelligence systems and we have to recognize that our adversaries are already there so we in our doctrine don't really value until very recently non-kinetic effects as a prouder guy I was always go away you're bothering me kid you're making it really bothersome for me to do my training because you're jamming my links you're jamming my comms that's the point non-kinetics can make it really painful to operate and we have to acknowledge that if you look to the press reports about what's happening in Ukraine Russia has a deep and established from World War II doctrine that says radio-electronic combat now to include cyber warfare is integral to all their operations and they were the opening salvos in Ukraine right they attacked lots and lots of systems and they enabled kinetic operations through the use of cyber and electronic warfare capabilities China integrated network and electronic warfare has been talking about what does this mean and how do we take it to the adversary they understand our dependence on the EMS right so 2009 integrated capability an initial capability document was signed by the chairman talks about what does it take to advance our ability to leverage the EMS and deny the adversary the use of that and we start talking about contested and congested environments well that contested and congested is not just the adversary trying to impose their will upon us it's the commercial world right so technology convergence a lot of people get uncomfortable with the term cyber W convergence I actually helped coin that and what we meant by it when we were drawn on that whiteboard is the intersection of technologies and how that suddenly enables wire we used to think about cyber as wired and going after desktop computers well now a ship a satellite a plane is not trailing a wire but it is highly dependent on the EMS and that affords you opportunities to different kinds of networks and so we have to think about that technology terrain and from a targeting perspective what are the key nodes that we want to influence and how do we introduce doubt in phase 0, phase 1 well there's discussion now the vice chairman is considering is spectrum an additional domain obviously that will lead to more discussion about well is it cyber, is it spectrum how do we converge those two do we converge those two it doesn't really matter we don't definitively say well air is over here in space we're not going to do anything in between those they're all things that we have to think about leveraging all the capabilities all the time and think about the entire information decision cycle and all the paths to influence that whether it's them to us or us to them the other thing to understand about that is the technology environment is and we hear a lot about acquisition process DoD 5000 how it lags so badly how do you inject capabilities existing program records the commercial world is laying out a map for technology and understanding investment why technology is developing very very important for us to understand not just to inject into our systems but actually to understand our future operational environment we have to understand so this emerging technology hype cycle the Gartner curves that come out every year you can see technology migrate and you could overlay that curve with if anybody's read innovators dilemma and crossing the chasm the adoption curves and so we always want to gain military advantages to do that you're going to have to take risk you're going to have to take technology risk you're going to have to understand where the technology is going in the commercial world and how you could leverage that because their R&D eclipses the DoD R&D and we need to figure out what are the unique things that the DoD needs to invest and how do we figure out lead follow from an R&D perspective obviously I'm not here to solve DoD 5000 but even if it's not an influencing program's a record it's understanding our operational environment and that disruptive innovation so I didn't pick my title it's disruptive technology programs if I were to pick it I'm much more interested in disruptive innovation because if I go into the medical community the undersea mining community there's all kinds of communities out there that have incredible technology and it's the convergence of those and bringing those together disruptively in ways they were not intended a la 2006 RCIDs nobody thought we were going to be fighting cell phone enabled IEDs that wasn't what we should have been thinking about it because it was obvious in fact we gave them all that technology because it was for economic purposes we wanted them to have an advanced environment well we gave them that technology they reversed it so we have to think about dual use technologies and again that early adopter we've got to take risk we have to understand the environment and take risk if we want to gain those advantages because the adversary certainly doesn't have the same restrictions we do next slide so everybody has to see talk, shoot and survive that is the function of militaries and even in phase 0 or phase 1 how do I understand my environment and how do I influence it and how do I preserve my use of all those domains to preserve my information decision cycle as opposed to the adversaries distributed force we need persistence we need pervasive access so as we think about unmanned it's not just about a collection of platforms at the end of a network the network itself is a weapon system it may not be a blue node at the end of that network it might be a red node so we have to think about the network not just as a way to connect all the things that we have but for us to connect to our adversaries information nodes cognitive net distributed different form of distributed lethality, distributed maritime operations but letting the machines do things intelligently and freeing up the human being to understand whether they're the ultimate decider or again they're the human on the loop in cyber and EMS so complex the speed scope and scale exceed human capacity to understand and so how do we actually contextualize that for those decision makers for the warfighters to take the actions or understand how to give new guidance to their unmanned force I specifically call out cyber despite the heroic attempts and heroic efforts and investment by the services through Stratcom to provide forces with the insufficient capacity and capability and speed of execution for cyber comm and the mission forces that are really designed to operate at the GTF and above levels so the fleet may be in the only position to deliver those effects and so how do we actually develop tactical cyber forces through the for deployed capabilities and apertures that we have out there what does that look like how do you do the command and control and people go well I'll never invest in that because I'll never be allowed to execute that there are title 10 responsibilities and when you're given an X-word you can execute those things the vice chairman has given guidance in terms of we must develop these capabilities for title 10 not for title 50 title 50 has its own responsibilities but we have to really think through how would you fight not just in defense of my network but projecting power from what nodes to what targets and understanding that space alright so the man machine what does the cloud look like what's the purpose of the cloud it's not just a place to park your data it's to inform and network together those machines that are going to help you understand how to make faster decisions it's about the speed decision big data analytics visualization R2D2 what if no longer there's no longer a Rio in his back seat it's an R2D2 and that R2D2 is linked to all the other R2D2s out there and you have instantaneous networked knowledge across the battle space and they're providing you feedback on where to optimize your weapons employment how to align your systems and how to make those smart decisions so I'll tell you where the industry is Google RankBrain they just changed over they changed the search engine used to be human devised algorithms it is now AI generated AI is what's driving Google search algorithms these days so they've switched over they're partnered with NVIDIA NVIDIA builds GPU general purpose units they're used instead of CPUs you can do faster games on GPUs they're using the money that they're gaining off GPUs they've invested $1.4 billion of R&D this money this year for GPUs purely for artificial intelligence that is where industry is going and then that's to offload the human expertise and workload we talked about that I know I'm out of time here so LVC, live virtual constructive Ender's Game a lot of you've probably seen how do we afford opportunities for tactical employment in highly complex mission environments with high levels of risk and high levels of capability that we don't want to reveal or it's developmental can I finish this line 30 more seconds Oculus Rift, HoloLens all those things there's a ton of virtual reality augmented reality capabilities that can be key to managing these complex systems and complex interactions Abelong Minority Report what you saw there is real it's a real system and internet of experience so we talked about it went from PCs to networks and we've talked about that but it's actually about that individual making decision space and accelerating that OODA loop that we talked about good job ladies and gentlemen we have 10 minutes still remaining really interested in your questions maybe some pushback challenge the hypothesis anything on your minds I'll stall as I see you start the thousands that are starting to stand up to go to the microphones John why don't you kick us off and then Nasty jump in so I can take lots of different formats and put them into something that we can actually use to close fire control so I'm very interested there I'll defer to the rest of the panel to continue on I think the thing I'm focused on is extracting the power of industry through open architecture and a common set of standards that the government can provide that you bring your particular expertise so there are companies that I'm used to working with that have specific expertise in certain areas and some very lucky companies have specific war fighting expertise against a lot of areas my challenge right now with the high nine resource sponsors is trying to take programs that were developed sort of proprietorily under a set of requirements and figure out how to put them together if we can collaborate with industry to find means to do exactly what was discussed on my right and my left the greatest power if we can figure out a way to collaboratively share ideas and technology and get past the limits of acquisition laws and rules and to the point where we can discuss how to go forward to the things that JD talked about that would be what I would be looking for if we can capture the innovation that you have in your houses and help us to go forward with making our war fighting capabilities better that would be a primary request just a foot stop so this distributed maneuver warfare enable warfare the future is going to be very dependent on integrating the pieces the nodes, the platforms, the payloads the sensors and that kind of common architecture to be fast forming teams that we're not trying to get across translation barriers between architectures is going to be vitally important if you can't quickly plug in and play and contribute it's going to impair this war fighting concept next question to the mic please my question is being a former RO doing the requirement stuff but more that you Admiral Breckenridge and the rest of the panel you're talking about all this stuff that you're going to network together you talk about Oodaloo how are you going to change ROE so that people wearing your uniform are going to trust R2D2 or an ensign or a seamen to actually act on their information that the network formed because if it has to come up to your level while you're sitting back making sure everybody is doing what they're doing Nimitz is rolling in his grave and we're not winning the fight yeah great question and I'll just say for the record when you mention RO I think of reactor officer and not requirements officer great question I'm going to turn that one over to JD McCreary because what we're talking about here is a fundamental shift in culture you know as we become more and more dependent on this man-machine teaming things are going to have to change all the way to the point of ROE rules and application so JD why don't you take a swing at this one well I'm going to cheat and the slide I didn't get to so if you'll go back a slide so to your point it's about trust right and it's speed of decision and it's about how do I visualize that because as a commander at any level whether you're you know on the bridge of the ship you're in the in the cockpit or you're at the mock or AOC how do you understand what is commander's intent how do I enable how do I make sure I'm through my PID matrix my ROE etc etc but remember we actually do some of this now when you pull the trigger on an AMRAM you have authorized that unmanned weapon that unmanned asset to go down range and you've put it into a position that it's going to make a decision on its own you gave it that authority we have robo mode in in the ages cruiser right we can go full auto somebody is trusted because we've done the workups we've done the visualization we've done the firing solutions we've done enough that we we've done the experimentation and demonstration to generate that trust but we need those tools that I talked about on the slide before you need to be able to display it you need to be able to play with it in live virtual constructive and develop the trust in the machine and extend and push that down right because aren't we always isn't our philosophy centralized planning decentralized execution how much can we decentralize that depends on the level of trust that we believe in nasty so great question I too believe that trust is foundational but I'm finding that we need in this era of being bound by DOD 5000 rules regulations legal rules and stuff that we need a lot more bold leadership and then empowered teams so bold leadership like Rick over who built nuclear power and push the barriers away bold leadership like Kelly Johnson out at the skunk works who pushed everybody aside so this is what we're going to do that bold leadership pulls hurdles out of your way what parts of DOD 5000 can we pull out of your way to allow to go forward and then the demonstrations that are brought forward so there's good ideas that we take out to exercises like like the flex series that fleet experiment series that was particularly doing in the cyber UW world that we can't go into in here but the ideas that are coming from our teams out there to say hey let's demo this capability and if you get a couple of like-minded executives together to say how can we pull our resources and go after this sort of capability by linking technologies that we already understand as JD talked about the Google self-driving car is a car map some good sensors and a fast computer so we already have technologies out there that we combine them in different ways we'll give you a demonstration back in World War II when they when they started to think about war fighting they started testing a lot more and creating incubator units so some of these demos we're doing kind of get done once and get put on the shelf what if we can take these with the empowered teams and go out to an incubator unit and put some more water under the keel as it were and some of the good ideas that are coming out of the requirements officer world and the industry lash up that's going on inside of John's world as well to go out and push a little harder here to get some early adoption going out yeah I think we have time for two more quick questions this mic please Sir attack pilot was converted to missile defense I'm concerned or interested in where we are with naval power at sea in our concept of operations and how our defense and depth concept for the protection of our battle groups at sea fits into all of this that we were talking about today okay anybody want to take that I'll jump in I just want to make sure I had the question concerned about defense in depth why we're also turning that focus on offense correct that's exactly right if we can't protect the forces at sea how can we run an offensive operation from that and so I saw a lot of talking about getting the weapons on target but not a lot of talk about defending our forces at sea with exception of the one diagram that showed the ship being taken out are we still in our battle various battle groups that go to sea thinking about defense in depth and taking these same concepts and applying them to the protection of our fleet forces I would say that we always start first with defending the ship in fact when we talked about the range of capabilities and interdependencies it really starts with what I call the fighting integer so we have to have full defense capabilities on that ship or on that submarine or on that aircraft before you extend into these cooperative engagement modes so that you don't become fairly useless if you pull a sense around on that network I would tell you that PO integrated warfare systems is very defense oriented in fact our big push right now is to get more offense oriented not that we've got defense looked it's becoming harder and harder to engage sequence and all those functions I talked about applied directly to the defense equation just as they do for the offense equation it is becoming more challenging and we are looking at hyper-velocity missile defense for example as an area that we've got to take on now so I don't know if that addresses where you're going the answer to your question is this isn't a ship where we're offensive only and we're going to take a lot of risk and defense there is going to be a balance but it's not going to be defense it's going to be the expense of offense stretching red making reds challenge more hard so it's a defense in depth by other means aside from just sort of this layered defense system with regard to changing the calculus with red last question please good morning sirs John Hooper with OPNAB N515 I am very very excited with the technology and the concepts that I see here but the other thing that popped in my mind here all of this technology is extremely expensive and as you know better than I we're in a diminishing financial climate and the other thing that concerns me is that this technology that is so exciting and has extraordinary potential becomes outdated within two or three years and so and we have an acquisition process within DOD that takes years to field them so how do you adjudicate the cost equation here and also the time equation with this technology great question there's always somebody who you have this killer round table and everybody is on this high and then the guy comes in and starts go ahead George so the reality of what you're talking about whether you take a look at the Department of Navy budget it's actually bigger than it has been in the past but the reality is things have become more expensive so your buying power is going down so you have to have a system where you make choices and I think we were circling around part of the idea a little bit before of we put this great network together and we get to the point where we can handle big data we can have artificial intelligence but the reality is what happens when a network goes down are you going to have the capabilities on the individual ships and platforms or units to be able to defend themselves and be able to continue to operate and that's the larger debate in this because you can field a lot of expensive capabilities but you're not going to have capacity so I think we have to go back to the past and realize that what drove our success in the past was that we had a concept of how we wanted to fight and then we found the technology that enabled it rather than found technology now and then figured out how to apply it so I think we got to go back to the basics about how do we want to fight forward how do we want to seize the initiative and then we ought to look for the technology to do it and so much of the advances that are taking place in the information age are taking place in the commercial world so why not leverage the fact that they're doing the R&D we can save money there and with a little help on DOD 5000 to be able to take what's already out there and apply it to a way that's how I think that's going to be one key way a way you're going to step ahead is to be able to leverage everything that's going on in the commercial sector to be able to increase your capability here just a real fast example of what we're looking at in shipbuilding and combat system modernization in fact Captain Drugin over there is my Aegis program manager if you look at the 30 year shipbuilding plan that is all new construction so then you have to look at what combat systems are going to be delivered to those ships and those time ethics the only way to deal with that fast moving threat is to modernize more other concepts that allow us to insert into the new construction shipbuilding insert into modernization modular pretested combat systems that can very quickly be updated as an example to touch on affordability technology turnover and pacing the threat it is a different way of doing business I think I want to add as well that we're our own worst enemies so we have to capture two ideas one it costs too much and it takes too long that's it it costs too much and it takes too long why is it that Moore's law has defined basic definition is the complexity for minimum cost doubles every year is still valid and it takes too much technology as it gets lighter and faster and less expensive we should not accept that in D.O.D so it should be a partnership okay it costs too much takes too long well your requirements admiral are too many okay how do I reduce my requirements I want to go down from 15 KPP key performance parameters to three and the derived requirements that go into that we've generated something that drives cost into programs our instability for the budget drives cost into programs costs too much takes too long in conclusion this new fleet design this new operating concept will I think help integrate investment decisions you know the same kind of things that we're already doing this is going to align activity this is going to bring sort of some a central impetus to how we build this fighting force to operate and integrate better together so there is an efficiency here by having a lining concept which we'll get behind as we face the real threat and that is Red's pace and challenge of the sea domain ladies and gentlemen thank you very much for your attention you have eight minutes to get up to lunch