 I'm Linda Jacobson, the East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute. I'm here with Chris Johnson, the China Chair at CSIS, and we're here to discuss China. Hi, Linda. It's great to see you today. Let me start off by asking about what we've seen going on with Xi Jinping as China's new president. He's now been in office for about six months and just received the presidency in March and now, of course, has all of his formal titles and is fully empowered. What's your sense of how he's been doing so far as China's new leader and what do you expect coming up in the future? I think, Chris, Xi Jinping has rarely, during these first six months in office or at least as party chair, raised expectations. He's wavered to the public by speaking very ordinary Chinese, speaking about anti-corruption. He's spoken about the China dream, the renaissance of the great Chinese race. He's also made the PLA happy by talking about a strong China. But as you point out in your latest essay, Thoughts from the Chairman, I think he's sending quite a lot of mixed signals. And so it's really very uncertain, unclear where he is actually heading. I think it's just too early to tell. What's your sense? I would agree with that entirely and I think the big challenge for all of us who are observers of the high level Chinese leadership at this point is trying to figure out where are these guys going and what do these mixed signals that we're seeing really mean? How much of it is a sort of grand strategic design, if you will, by the Chinese leadership moving toward a defined objective, whether that be moving ahead on economic reform or some broader domestic plan? And how much of it actually represents some potential maneuvering within the party and possible areas of disagreement between different groupings within the party? One thing I think that is clear about Xi Jinping so far though is that he has consolidated power, I think it's fair to say, much more quickly than some observers would have thought. Do you agree with that? Yes, and of course he had a rather easy task considering that his predecessor did immediately step down from chair of the Central Military Commission so he immediately had all three most important posts, the party, the military and the government. So I think he was certainly in a better position but I agree with you also as a person, I think he comes across as someone who shows that he has power, whether or not he really has it, that remains to be seen but he's certainly giving that impression. Yeah, I think that's absolutely right and especially this key point of whether or not he really has it and I think where we'll see some of that come into play is at the party plenum this fall where obviously they are considering some fairly major adjustments, mostly in the economic sphere. Political reform seems to be off the table for now but it will really, I think give us a better sense of what Xi Jinping's personal priorities are and how much of ability he has to be able to get the system to move in that direction that he wants it to. How would you say, what's your thinking in terms of Xi Jinping's foreign policy strategy? How does that play into the overall picture and what does it mean about his domestic power? I think we're seeing a continuation certainly of China's foreign policy in a certain sense. The good news is, of course, we haven't seen even a greater level of tensions with Japan so there are obviously some people who say that he's actually doing his best to manage the tensions with Japan. But I'm very intrigued to hear your views on this new type of power, major power relationship that he keeps talking about. He already spoke about it as vice president when he visited the United States. How do you see that playing out as a relationship with the United States? I think it's very important. It's interesting in that clearly for the Chinese side anyway, for lack of a better term, they're somewhat stuck with this concept. Xi Jinping, as you pointed out, uttered this during his visit here to Washington last February and now the Chinese, as they often do, are looking to make it sort of the catchphrase for the bilateral relationship. I think the problem for the U.S. side so far with new style great power relations is that the Chinese have been reluctant when we've pressed them to define the concept more fully. And so that leaves the U.S. side sort of wondering what this may be about and what the Chinese may be looking for. If it's another version of what we saw in 2009 between the two sides where the Chinese were effectively looking to the U.S. side to agree to spheres of influence in managing the world globally, I think that the U.S. side is going to have a difficult time signing onto that. What's your impression of where the Chinese are at on this? I think, I agree with you, we don't yet quite know what they want with this. For me, in general terms, it seems as if it's a new way of expressing we want respect. This is what the Chinese always come back with. They want the United States to see them as an equal. They want them to be treated as an equal with respect. But these spheres of influence, I think it'll be very interesting to see, does that creep in to any definition of this new term? What I do think is interesting, though, is that Xi Jinping made his first overseas visit to Russia. And also the head of the, I would call the most prominent influential think tank in Beijing, the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, now has a president which is a China specialist. The previous one, Sui Li-Ru, was after all a U.S. specialist and that very much reflected China's, the importance that China attaches to the United States. Now we have a Russia specialist leading the think tank under the Ministry of State Security. What do you make of that? I think it's an important development. I wouldn't go too far in terms of interpreting at this stage because I think in that particular area he was the next in line, if you will, to move up. But I do think that what we are seeing, especially from Xi Jinping's side, is this idea toward the United States that we welcome solid relations with the U.S., but we also have options. And I think what the Chinese are trying to convey with their recent behavior, the Russia visit and other things, is that they're already acting like a great power. And as you pointed out, they're looking for the U.S. basically to endorse that under the umbrella, I think, of this new style great power relations. And with that being the case, I think we're going to have to watch and see going forward how China's definition of great power diplomacy unfolds for the globe and what implications that has for the U.S. Well, thanks very much, Linda. I think this has been a great conversation and it's been great to see you. And I hope we can do it again in the future. I do too. Thank you, Chris. Take care.