 who is director of the Asia and China program and senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. As well as that, he is non-resident, senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington and was earlier a professor in Paris at the National Oriental Institute and Sion's Pole. And he is an external consultant to the policy planning staff in France. He's going to speak to us on who is China's priority partner in the new global order. A very interesting question. I've decided on what is a decidedly pragmatic and realist topic when most of the talk about China today is about China and the global order and its overall vision. In fact, I've written, published at ECFR brief on just that part and I don't want to repeat the brief which is one of the reasons I shifted the topic somewhat but I'll nonetheless start from the global order. And I'll start from an analogy also. You know, I was born with trabism because of the way I arrived in the world. So I'm best place to know you can have a binocular vision if you're lucky or you can have a monocular vision if you're unlucky but you can't have both. You can't shift from one to the other. That's it. The question about China, the interesting illusion perhaps that we have more so than with the US because we're very used with the US being slightly diffident to aspects of the global order and maintaining its own sovereignty and even extending it in sometimes in very harsh ways as we discussed of a lunch in finance is that with China, we regularly think of it as a country that has a global vision. We treat it as a potential global partner. A lot of the Chinese diplomatic effort given the huge staffs which they maintain with international organizations, for example, and the huge attention they give at home including their knowledge of international law which is not completely new. This is something when they were defensive in the 1920s or 30s, they also developed quite competence on international law to make up for their practical inferiority. So we have that vision of China that has very strong and these would be the prevailing views in their foreign policy. How these views about the preferable global order that has been given new credence by I think you alluded to it, the sitting pink speech in Davos in early January which some people say by the way was written by an American PR agency in practice. It's so well phrased, it chimes it so well with our expectations that somehow without proof I think that might be true. And this is as you mentioned clearly a moment of opportunity for China in this direction. But on the other hand, China is the expert in bilateral relations with almost all countries writ large or writ small. In that aspect it's very close to the motto that sitting pinks predecessor Houtintao introduced the theme of the democratization of international relations, the internationally equivalent of one man, one vote whether a state is small or whether it's large it deserves to be taken as seriously as we shall see of course it's only part of the Chinese view clearly. But it has been working on this assumption very strongly. That's where it appears by the way to back at least one aspect of the international order which is the post 1945 creation of the UN and institutions of the UN. Block stuff within the UN as others have done but it wants to go through that particular system which suits China. On top of that, there have been strong changes in the way foreign policy and strategy is operated after it hasn't been exactly half a century as Tang Xiaoping had predicted. It's been less than that but I think even Tang Xiaoping could not predict the speed of China's economic rise as it has happened. The, what was supposed to be more or less a 50 years interval when China would manage to bid its time and hide its talents, buy its time, sorry, while hiding its talent, e.g. be relatively passive and non-interventionist on global issues and just seize what was good for its domestic and international development. That time seems to have passed away. I have an index for that on the scholars I follow in Beijing. Those scholars who were more internationalists and believers in the international order in my view are less representative of official views today. And the one scholar who to me seems the closest when you want to, in a few words, just cap what is China's behavior is the very well-known professor from Tsinghua, Yan Xuetong, who has been advocating alliances who has been advocating bases. You notice that Djibouti has just been declared base by the PLA and new development and who's also been advocating the notion that China can reward and punish its international partners, which is something that was pretty much taboo in the previous era where separation of economics with politics was much more the dominant motto. So we're in a completely new period and that means that we have to pay even more attention to China's practical relations with some of its partners. The answers vary also a long time. If one looked again at the preceding period, one would say that what really mattered for China was the anchor in the neighborhood. That lasted also 30 years. It was partly protective, partly a way to avoid what the Chinese strategically termed encirclement or the risk of encirclement by the West. And you can see that we're in a new era where on the contrary, the neighborhood tends to take the brunt of new Chinese power, including the coded word that we all use, assertivity. Assertivity when we use it is a way to say a thing without offending directly the Chinese or implying that there is armed conflict at the end of it. So the term, the codename, assertivity reveals as well Western intentions and limits of Western intentions as the reality itself. But to return to the question, it's clear that the neighborhood has taken a hit. If I had done that expose 20 years ago, I would have tempted to say that Japan was actually the main partner of China for economic reasons. And Japan indeed, for a very long time, had a huge importance for Chinese development. That's no longer the case. For a number of reasons, which are not only political or strategic, and therefore we can almost dismiss Asia, except of course that China's attitudes may cause Asia to gang up and try to resist the Chinese. Again, there is a coded word for that. It's hedging, not resisting. We are careful, or they are careful with the way they express themselves. And in itself it also shows an ambivalence to China but reluctance to go to conflict. And that's of course an interesting factor. The only problem that exists with this is that when one party becomes sure that the other is really reluctant to go into conflict, that of course bolsters its tactical opportunities since it's pretty sure that it's gonna be still going to be able to avoid conflict. That is a lesson I heard from Russian friends talking about President Obama in retrospect, shaking their heads and saying well, he was just too predictable. That's what neighboring Asia to a large extent has become. So we are left with the other partners and without going through the whole list, obviously the candidates are the US as always, Russia as a reappearing or mutual support club for China, and optimistically the EU, which does capture a lot of the economic relationship but cannot pretend of course to be a strategic partner. So in a way this is a foregone conclusion but since we're Europeans, I will end up with some European perspective. Let's start by the US and what strikes me looking at the expert community in China in as much as it's ready to talk in looking at official pronouncements or press pronouncements is how different their expressions about the current US administration and from the president himself are from ours. We're full of irony, we're full of skepticism, we're full of doom and gloom predictions about what this will all entail. The Chinese are careful, fairly respectful, attentive. It is extraordinary with all the opportunity that the president himself offers that almost literally nothing has been taken up by the Chinese press except in very general terms or in trying to point out to commonalities with others vis-à-vis America. It is very striking and it may be an illusion, I have thought for the last six months that it was an illusion but we shall see that on the contrary there has been a conservative realist analysis probably going to the fore in China saying Trump is a realist, he's a pragmatist, he's a businessman, he wants to deal, he could be our man. In spite of the overall extraordinary campaign from the right-wing Republicans on both the strategic dangers that China poses and the even more important campaign to the Chinese on economic and trade issues because this is the better and better of China's economy, the export and the maintenance of free markets on the other side of the fence if I dare to say. So that contrast is quite impressive, is something that we take on because either we are mistaken or they are but we can't all be right. In practice this has means that there has been under reaction to the Trump administration's early pronouncements, the tweets on Taiwan and on one China policy were really the worst possible thing that could happen to the official Chinese diplomatic community but I managed to treat it in a very underhanded way. Their reactions on the ground so to speak were extremely moderate, up to very recently, up to just the last two weeks. One could cite before President Obama left office a skirmish near the Philippines with a submarine drone, an American submarine drone captured by the Chinese and Trump's remarkable comment let them have it which could work both ways, you know. But on the whole things moderated in the South China Sea the Chinese did not press on for quite a number of months. They on a skirmish, on a semi-permanent skirmish with the Philippines decided that they would suddenly open the contested area that's a bit technical, inside Scarborough Shoal to fishermen from other nations. Very ambiguous position because they both in this case implement what is clearly an international request that this is open ground for all but at the same time since they are the policemen, the enforcers who can say yes or can say no, they do assert sovereignty in the same breath. But still what I would call an interval, a moment of pause and they've watched Donald Trump they've noticed the backtracking on Taiwan, they've noticed the new accent on North Korea and the trade-off with trade and the extraordinary thing is they've essentially dealt with President Trump as they were dealing with President Obama which is giving surface acquiescence, yeah we'll do, we'll make efforts and I almost want to say as usual, not delivering, instead trying to gain others including Europeans by the way in the direction of further engagement with North Korea as an alternative to sanctions. The results are demonstrated on the ground and in fact North Korea as you know has a higher rate of growth currently that he has had for the past decade, this with a supposedly tight sanctions regime along its neck. So probably they knew it wouldn't last forever. In the trade-off about trade they have been watching and this is where I'm gonna shift immediately to Europe as a party. It would have seemed intuitive that if you have a major trading problem looming ahead with the US and a US president who tends to shoot from the hip and to fire in various directions including in the direction of Europeans from time to time especially about Germany, you would sort of sneak up to the Europeans, arrange some deals, move forward, try and so to speak by insurance that there's not gonna be a joint front on trade. That's if you think that you really need to be strategic about it. What I see of the past few months is after an initial trend which everybody in Brussels by the way describes as having existed of more positive speech, getting closer to talks, exploring good intentions to move forward on the investment treaty for example, essentially shutting up about Europe's very daring stand not to enforce market economy status but to stick with the previous restrictions and in a way to move away from the path that WTO planned 15 years ago. Yeah, the trend happened for some time but I think since early 2017 it dissipated immediately and at the summit recently after some visible hesitations and contradictions among the Chinese themselves including the delegation which sort of raises also the issue of factions or camps or authority within the Chinese system at this point on these issues and in particular to me the question of the prime minister the prime minister's actual standing is open but he may have also let himself be used as a kind of stooge moving forward in the direction of Europeans and then moving back or letting himself be moved back visibly. There's no concession at all, none. So no possibility for agreement, very slim chances of moving forward on the investment treaty in spite of the good intentions that have been portrayed earlier in the year and to me moving back to the global order the refusal of the Chinese to stand together with Europeans on the climate issue which would have been of course the soap to Donald Trump and to his recent positions on climate while they turned it down. They turned down an opportunity to make remarkable good soft power propaganda about themselves which they would undoubtedly have gathered and we would be seeing many more op-eds about China's leadership of climate issues if they had signed that. But try to think for a second what went on through their head or what went on through the head of the top leader. Can I afford to insult Donald Trump publicly, internationally by siding up with people who's supposed to be American allies against the US or will I reserve my fire so to speak and maintain what is the primary negotiating issue I have which is dealing with the United States and to me it's very clear that for the time being Mr. Xi Jinping chose the second option, not the first and he sacrificed in spite of the January Davos speech in spite of all the mileage that China would get he sacrificed the first issue for the second which is interesting and couldn't mean two things among which I cannot choose at all. One option is that he really fears the US that China really has a fear of the very serious protectionist measures that the US and the Trump administration might take. And there are signs of that after all you know aggravated use of section 232 of the Foreign Trading Act in the US that is using national security as an excuse for trade sanctions or trade denial or investment denial and other measures. The other possibility is that he thinks that he'll deal that the US will deal that the resolve of the US will fade and that China just has to keep a steady head not insult the US and wait for natural events to run their course that would be the hypothesis of US decline brought on by itself by political events and political trends inside the US and the least you do about it. The Putin example is a good example but if you meddle with it you actually hurt yourself instead of help yourself just let it go its course. That's entirely possible because China has become quite sophisticated about American politics and Chinese diplomats are also very sophisticated about American politics. Conclusion of that first theme and I have to stop very soon is that US retains primacy even now and even as we tend to ride my colleagues at ECFR want to write about the post-American world and so on I sort of fight them because I think you can't reduce country to one president especially in the democracy but that's the way it is. Russia very quickly of course the best description that has been made was made by Bobo Lowe a few years ago the access of convenience though he himself admits he's written a rather convoluted piece in Australia more recently which I'll say yeah moving a little beyond that there is more strategic connevance but still and yes not hard to document the mutual mistrust not hard to document that China has taken advantage of Russia's need with the European sanction and American sanctioned policy by essentially making oil and gas agreements on the cheap getting I mean signing a 50 years deal on oil at future gas at future spot prices was a brilliant idea even the way spot prices have been going and it's so brilliant that there is not even enough money probably to finance the whole scheme inside Russia now it's almost too brilliant. It got the weapons, weapon systems which Putin had been very skeptical about don't forget that Putin is the guy purged because Khodorkovsky was the guy who was making the deal with China and put the policy back towards deal with Japan as well that is playing a level balance he had a clear mind on that and suddenly of course the pendulum swung again in favor of China but my description for it is not even the access of convenience it's mutual support when it suits Russia and China one problem Russia has it's at its positions its international positions are systematic so it probably seeks support more often than China does which puts it again in the demanding in the camp of those who request rather than those who deliver and for China spotty agreement with the Russians with a view to signal to the West through these agreements it's displeasure on something I look at Syria, UN votes on Syria where Russia has been extremely consistent in its vetoes and I note that China's track record is a little more patchy and you can identify for example over the past years over the past year moments when China has no big underlying conflict with American or European views and it abstains or the beginning of the testy period this year with Trump's remarks on Taiwan and other stuff where suddenly China is able to join Russia to veto humanitarian intervention of all things into Syria takes a hard line position but my take about this is that the votes are hardly about Syria beyond a preference for governments in place and so forth they are much more a way to signal to the West displeasure fascinatingly in the past few weeks the Chinese participation with two Russian maneuvers in the Baltic with quite modern ships this is of course a quick pro quo for Russian participation to maneuvers or they're not even joint maneuvers they're sort of one following the other for example in the streets around Senkaku Diaryu facing the Japanese a kind of halfway Russian support and participation it deserves some payback but it's also and I find it almost hilarious that this happens one month or two months after Mr. Xi Jinping went to Finland and celebrated with Finland the 100th anniversary of Finnish independence which the Finnish takes stock and that support and take it serious but there you are the contradiction is there only two months later but in my view they don't do that to make fun of the Finns or because they would have mixed views they do this because they know the chips are about to fall down on Korea that we're getting at the end of the passions period for China to implement sanctions that some kind of polymix and conflict is inevitable and they begin to show their teeth so one day for the first time in many months jet fighters intercept American EP-3 and they don't do it over the South China Sea they do it off the Korean coast which is very interesting and almost in the same amount of time suddenly they show the flag and very strongly in the Baltic together with Russia saying if you want to create enemies well we're ready to become enemies that's a very open and flexible diplomacy it's one that's getting ready to stand up to the US but it doesn't make Russia the top priority in Chinese policy the remaining problem for Mr. Putin is that three quarters of his interests are with the West especially with Europe economically that the sanctions hit that China is no substitute economically for this kind of thing and that yes he gets the occasional life support and he gets some degree of international legitimacy by not being alone by the way he's very careful but he phrases things about the South China Sea the Russians are not giving blanket approval to the Chinese they also understand they might want to move back but they have to understand they are not a priority