 And so along those lines and with the question about Russia in general, Russia doesn't seem to have been in the forefront of this, but Russia is a member of the Security Council, a permanent member, and Professor Ichi was talking about perhaps Japan feeling a little marginalized in this process. Is Russia marginalized in this process? And if not, what are Russia's red lines in this, if any? All right, thank you, Ms. Chair. You know, I've been watching Korea for more than 45 years, and it has always been like a pendulum, swinging from the extreme tension to some kind of detente. But these days, I think that the amplitude of this pendulum is really stunning. I actually knew comparatively well former leader Kim Jong-il, and he once compared his negotiation with the U.S. to a chess game. I believe that the current leader, his son Kim Jong-il, prefers poker, nuclear poker, and the stakes are much higher these days. However, now we have the most peaceful and promising period in the Korean situation for many, many years. And if you ask myself if this persists, this situation would persist, I would just get given Nobel Peace Prize to President Moon, President Trump, and Kim Jong-il. I don't know whether it can be divided on three, but anyway, we have now the most peaceful period, and that actually satisfies almost everyone, apart from conservatives who want to push down of Korea by sanctions and pressure. So is the agreements on the reach in Singapore, a reach between North and South Korea, are actually feasible? They are understood as complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of Korea in exchange for peace guarantees. The problem is that none of these girls are attainable in the first place, and in the short run for sure. What is the security guarantees on the part of the United States? I don't think that maybe Dr. Paul wouldn't agree to it, but I don't think that the U.S. system itself gives any possibility for the future government to keep the guarantees the previous government had given. And we see a lot of that kind of U.S. behavior, the latest being the INF Treaty, when obligations and the guarantees are withdrawn or reconsidered. And this is just the nature of U.S. political system, not ill will of this or other rule. So how in that case you could expect North Korea to give up its only guarantee for survival, that's the nuclear card? However, there is an answer. The answer is that the process is more important than the result in this case. As long as negotiations are going on, as long as North Korea, face-by-face, deny, declines its nuclear program, missile program, it gives up its ideas of developing new weapons, it gives up the danger of proliferation. And at some phase, I think that North Korea would only be left with a small existing nuclear arsenal just to be on the safe side. I think that would be a situation which would be better than the one that we had last year. And Mr. Im mentioned that with the constant nuclear tests and missile tests and danger of big war. I know that the U.S. side have already understand this kind of situation. I met with Ambassador Beggen last week in Moscow. And now they use the words, final, fully verifiable denuclearization. And you can argue what final means. Does final denuclearization includes peaceful program, for example, or not? And there is a lot of room for negotiation and reconsidering that. So, one more thing about North Korea. About them cheating and breaking their obligations. One rule I have acquired over years of dealing with North Koreans. You should understand that they will fulfill the obligations they have taken on them. Not the obligations you think they have taken on them. And usually there is a misunderstanding that they must do this and that. If they hadn't agreed to that, they mustn't do and wouldn't do it. So you should be very objective. And so far, I think that this negotiation progress should go on and on and on. And the longer it goes, the better it is for both regional cooperation and the international order as well. Of course, you can always argue that North Korea keeping its nuclear potential for a prolonged time would deal a blow to the nonproliferation regime. That's true. That's true, but at the same time, I don't think it would be a fatal blow. And in the current situation of the crumbling world order, interviewed to some new world order, which we don't know how it will look like. And actually, if you see Russian US exchanges of harsh words about nuclear containment, it's hard to predict how the situation in the nonproliferation sphere will develop. So maybe it would be better to have North Korea totally give up their nuclear weapons and have the Korean Peninsula fully free of all nuclear danger. That would be better. But as Mick Jagger said, you can't always get what you want. I think what we can get now is peace process. And this peace process should be guaranteed by the political guarantees of the big powers which are involved into Korean situation historically. I mean Russian idea on the road map starting from freeze, then negotiations, then multilateral guarantees. And here at this place, we have the countries which should be a part of it. That's China, US, Japan, Russia, and Mongolia, because Mongolia is also a part of the Northeast Asia. So if we reach this stage, I think that that would be a promising stage and it would take off tension maybe for a prolonged period of time. Thank you.