 Give it another two minutes and then we will start another two minutes and then we will start. There was an echo there call I don't know. Yeah, that was me I've taken care of it. Okay. Okay, I'm going to get started. Probably most everybody is in but but more will come. And just to say it's good to see a number of old and newer friends who have joined us that's very nice. I want to welcome you on behalf of Massachusetts peace action and code pink. And I want to thank you for joining our session today, the negotiated settlement of the Russia Ukraine conflict with Anatoly Levin is our featured speaker. Anatoly is joining us from the British countryside of Leicestershire. My name is Joseph Gerson. I'm a member of the mass peace action board and president of the campaign for peace disarmament and common security. The Russia Ukraine war is grinding on. And despite today's are yesterday's diplomatic session in Istanbul Tuesdays actually it does not seem likely that war and the killing will end anytime soon. And even as Moscow has announced that it will be pulling back from the region near Kiev. As the war goes on, the greater the danger that an accident or serious miscalculation to trigger escalation into a broader and potentially even a nuclear war a ceasefire and successful negotiations with us all the more important and urgently needed. Every war for better or worse ends with a diplomatic agreement. What would an agreement ending the Ukraine war look like what are Russia's goals and its bottom line. Russia and and Ukraine sacrifice in exchange for peace. What can Ukraine and Russia, I'm sorry, what can the US and NATO, what were their goals and and are the mediation efforts by Turkey France and other countries at all useful. And what more is needed. And what can we as US civil society do to press Congress to help bring the war to an end to answer these questions. And, or at least begin to answer them. We've turned to anatole even extraordinary British political scientists journalists and writer is now senior researcher on Russia and Europe at the Quincy Institute for responsible state craft, newly created Washington think tank, which promotes ideas designed to move us foreign policy, away from endless war and toward vigorous diplomacy in pursuit of international peace. Anatole is deeply involved in helping to develop diplomatic solutions that can bring the Ukraine war to an end, and to build a reasonably just and enduring piece. Anatole served as a journalist in the former Soviet Union and South Asia from 1985 to 1998 is the author of Ukraine in Russia, a fraternal rivalry that goes into the details of the complex ethical and political relationship between Russia and Ukraine. The most recent book is climate change and the nation state. And although anatole's accent informs us that he wasn't born in Boston or Brooklyn, his most recent article focuses on what 20th century US intellectuals can teach us about humility and restraint and war. Also just to say I was happy to see that he began that article, as I often do with wisdom from a US Nobel laureate Bob Dylan. And then first just a few housekeeping details. Our session today will go on for an hour until 2pm. 2pm here on the East Coast, and a total will speak for between 15 and 20 minutes. After that we'll move into our question and answer period. Without the benefits of a Q&A button at the bottom of your screen. Please post your questions in the chat with help from others I'll do my best to keep track of them. And if you can keep your extraneous comments there to a minimum that would be helpful. I should also add that this session is being reported will be posted on several websites, first and foremost, that of messages is peace action. So much for preliminaries. And it's all thank you for joining us and the floor is yours. So much for inviting me it's it's a pleasure. And especially because as you said, our two organizations, you and the Quincy Institute for responsible state craft we have I think very much the the same goals. When it comes to the promotion of peace, the reduction of militarism and searches for international compromises, which are not of course, either simple or, you know, necessarily always ethically clear cut. But unfortunately, we may wish it wasn't, but it is. Well, I'll begin by sketching what I see as the situation on the ground, then talk about the, the present peace process and the agendas of the two sides and then, yes, at the end, say something about what the United States and the West should be doing. Well, firstly, I think that we can take the Russian side as sincere up to a point of course, in the present peace negotiations in so far that is as they want a compromise piece with Ukraine. Naturally that favors what they see as Russia's essential goals for two reasons. The first and the most important is that clearly Russia's invasion has not gone according to plan. The, we cannot say of course for sure what Putin's original plan was but certainly by from the disposition of Russian forces. The first look as if the intention was to either topple the Ukrainian government or to persuade it simply to bow to all Russia's demands. That looks a totally reckless, impossible, unfounded goal. But perhaps we should remember that at the start of the war, that the United States offered to evacuate President Zelensky from Ukraine. And he to his immense credit said no, no, I'm not going to run away I'm going to stay with my people and fight. And if of course he had run away then it is possible that you Ukrainian resistance or at least much of it might have collapsed but of course he didn't and the Ukrainians didn't. And they have fought it out above all they fought it out in the cities of Ukraine. And as a result, the Russian invasion has run into very serious problems. Russia deployed about half of its already quite inadequate forces to try to capture Kiev and they haven't captured Kiev. But as a result of doing this they had completely inadequate forces for all their other operations. It's difficult, you know, adequately to express how badly planned the Russian invasion was they attacked a country of 230,000 square miles from six different directions with fewer than 200,000 men. You know you don't have to be a military expert to see that that's unlikely to go well. But as a result, they've been fought to a standstill in some areas and in others, notably Mariupol have been making only very slow progress. They've also been suffering very heavy casualties now we can't say for sure because of course there's propaganda on both sides. But Ukrainians are claiming to have killed eight Russian generals and I think they probably have because if they hadn't the Russians would have produced those generals alive. They haven't. Now that indicates two things. Heavy casualties and low morale generals don't lead from the front in that way, you know, unless their soldiers really need inspiring. Putin today or yesterday announced that he's calling up another 130,000 Russian conscripts to the colors. Now that is a really serious indication of difficulties, because initially it's clear that the, that the Russians tried to avoid as far as possible using conscripts in this war for obvious very good domestic political reasons. The Russian offensive is faltering. And in consequence the Russians, of course with a with a show of making this about, you know, the search for peace are calling off their offensive against Kiev and in order to redeploy their forces to do something which they have not actually managed to do yet in all the six weeks, which is capture the whole of the Donbass and the Russian government of course at the beginning of the war, recognize the independence of the Donbass separatist republics. And not only in the territory that those republics held but in the whole territory of the provinces of Danetsk and Lugansk which so far Russia has not actually been able fully to occupy. So yes, the Russian offensive is in difficulties. And now perhaps just one word here about atrocities and war crimes. I have no doubt that Russia has, you know, has displayed criminal, you know, indifference to civilian lives. It must be said that the Ukrainian defense has very largely depended as it must do. I'm not blaming the Ukrainians for this in the slightest, but clearly their defense has involved digging in into urban areas and defending them street by street. Now, if you do that the attacking force has the choice either of simply calling off its offensive, or of course traditionally surrounding the city's concerned and starving them to death which is not exactly a humanitarian option. Or of course using massive firepower to blast the defenders out of their positions, which is what by the way America has done again and again in its wars. Now, this, I'm afraid, according to the laws of war does not constitute a war crime. It is the invasion of Ukraine could well be called a crime of aggression, which is of course one reason why the Russian government has, like America, by the way, as well has chosen not to describe it as a war but as a special military operation. But I think we must be careful of double standards when it comes to, you know, accusations of deliberate atrocities and war crimes. If well for two reasons one is because it does obviously raise the issue in much of the rest of the world, particularly of course the Muslim world where I lived for many years. Hypocrisy as far as America is concerned but also because of course the threat to bring Russia and Putin before the international criminal court could become a major obstacle to a peace settlement. Here once again is a case where one's, you know, moral desires, and by the way I should say that I absolutely regard this invasion as a deeply criminal act, both from a humanitarian point of view but also under international law, conflicts with the interests of peace. Now as a result of the problems that the Russian military have run into, Russia has, I said it modified its original political goals but it has also scaled down its demands to the Ukrainians. Russia is, has dropped its demand for the demilitarization of Ukraine, maybe some categories of missiles, it's dropped its demands for the denazification of Ukraine that was also always a very vague demand. And it seems to be willing not to drop its demand for recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea and recognition of the independence of the Donbas republics. But from what I gather, Russia is prepared with unfortunately one huge qualification, probably to follow the Ukrainian proposal that these issues be compartmentalized and made the subject of future negotiation. What this would mean, more or less, is what happened in Cyprus, you know, after Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and carved out the unrecognized internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This has been the idea, the prospect, the hope of Cypriot reunification has been the subject of, oh I don't know how many rounds of international negotiation, which of course have never led anywhere. But on the other hand, there has not been a return to war. And interestingly enough, despite Cyprus being enmeshed in this partition and territorial dispute, the Republic of Cyprus or Southern Cyprus was able to join the European Union, which is rather an important point, of course, a very important point as far as Ukraine is concerned, because something else that Ukraine absolutely correctly is insisting on. And Russia appears amazingly enough to have conceded is that any Treaty of Neutrality should leave Ukraine free to join the European Union whenever this should be possible. So a Treaty of Neutrality only applies to NATO as a military alliance. By the way, it also applies, we should remember this, it would rule out Ukraine being brought into a Russian-led security alliance, which was Putin's hope, obviously previously. So it does cut both ways. So you have, I think, you know, genuine moves from both sides towards a peace settlement. And the Ukrainian proposals are, I think, very wise and sensible. As President Zelensky has said, since NATO repeatedly ruled out, refused, not merely to admit Ukraine to NATO immediately, but even to provide NATO with any timeframe for admission to NATO. Clearly, there is no NATO willingness to fight to defend Ukraine, and therefore a Treaty of Neutrality makes excellent sense, as long as it is accompanied by very strong guarantees, of course, international guarantees of Ukrainian security sovereignty. And of course there are good international precedents for this. Several countries in Europe are historically neutral, either by treaty or by internal consensus, Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland, and of course since the Second World War, Finland and Austria. And the Austrian State Treaty provided for the mutual withdrawal of Soviet, British and American occupying forces from Austria, and together with a guarantee of Austrian sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also interestingly enough had a provision, obviously in the wake of the Second World War, for Austrian laws banning neo-Nazi parties. The Finnish Treaty of Neutrality was not part of an international agreement, it was a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union. There are two interesting features of the Finnish Treaty of Neutrality. The first is that, as has often been said, and I think rightly, the reason why Stalin did not, even after winning basically military victory, try to incorporate Finland in the Soviet Union. Finland was the only territory of the former Russian Empire, as it existed until 1917, that was not incorporated in the Soviet Union by Lenin or Stalin. And the reason for that appears to be that the Finns put up such a tremendously hard fight against the Soviet Army, that it convinced the Soviet government that it would simply be too much trouble to incorporate Finland as part of the Soviet Union. Well, that of course is precisely what the Ukrainians have now done. They have shown by their tremendous resistance and courage and loyalty and the fact that, of course, and this is of critical importance, resistance to the Russian invasion has been shown by ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the East and South of the country, which is pretty clear the Russian government expected would welcome the Russian invasion. They didn't. They have stayed loyal to Ukraine. This is a matter of tremendous importance. So, I think that in the end, look, no international treaty ever by the very nature of the international system can provide for absolute security. There is no absolute security in this life, or in this world. Treaties can all can always be broken. I have to point out America has done that rather often over the past generation. But on the other hand, I do think that given the resistance of the Ukrainians, given the casualties and losses that Russia has suffered, it is highly unlikely, highly unlikely that if Russia signs a peace treaty with Ukraine that any Russian government would want to repeat this in the future. That is the greatest security for Ukraine. Of course, it must be backed up by other things. It must be backed up by the cast iron guarantee that if Russia does break the treaty and invade again, it will be subjected to the full range of western sanctions. I'll come back to that in a second. But I think it is also worth perhaps pointing out that contrary to many warnings at the time. The Soviet Union did abide by the terms of the treaties with Austria and Finland and did not use their neutrality to invade them subvert them try to promote revolution and so on. In fact, the Soviet Union even withdrew its military base from Finland 40 years before it was obliged to do so under the Finnish Treaty. So, you know, there is a record there. So we have movement, you know, on both sides towards a peace agreement. What is the chief remaining obstacle? Well, that I'm afraid is the Donbas because, as I said, Ukraine appears willing to treat that like Crimea and subject it to basically, you know, a long international diplomatic process. While, of course, demanding but also guaranteeing that there will be no attempt by either side to change the situation on the ground by force. So, you know, one can imagine, you know, scenarios of a demilitarized zone, a United Nations peacekeeping force patrolling that zone, you know, there are plenty of international presidents for this. The problem is that as I say to date, Russia has not even occupied the full territory of the Donbas, on which it has recognized these otherwise unrecognized separatist republics. And clearly the Russian military strategy is now to do that. Finally, you know, weeks into the war. But it will be exceptionally difficult for Ukraine to, you know, not recognize but negotiate on the basis of a ceasefire line, which goes far beyond the ceasefire line where the war began six weeks ago in the Donbas. I fear therefore that in eastern Ukraine there will still be more fighting while Russia tries to consolidate that line. And on the one hand Russia will try to hold considerable territories beyond that, that it has occupied in southern Ukraine, the so called land bridge between Crimea and the Donbas. As a bargaining counter as a means of pressure on Ukraine and also if there is no peace agreement, simply to hold it indefinitely, the Ukrainians absolutely rightly naturally will are conducting counterattacks, especially in the north around Kiev and to drive the Russians out of those areas. So, although, you know, you could say that we have 90% of a peace settlement in place already, the 10% is still going to cost many, many more lives. But as far as the West is concerned, we clearly should be doing everything possible to promote a peace settlement, to end this war, a peace settlement that guarantees Ukrainian security sovereignty. And of course, and this is critical, Ukraine's ability to move towards the West in real terms, and, you know, membership of the European Union. But quite apart from membership of the European Union, just the westernization of Ukraine, economic reform, political reform, anti-corruption measures, and just the openness of Ukrainian society. Now, from this point of view, like, don't take offense, anyone who I'm looking at now, we're all a fear of a certain age. I am, I don't mean everybody in the audience, but I am old enough to have visited Finland and Austria during the Cold War. And of course they were not part of NATO, they weren't even part of the European Union during the Cold War. But if you didn't know that, if you had visited those countries without knowing that, you would never have known that they were not part of the West. They were fully part of the West. Finland in particular, of course, including during the Cold War, has always rated at the top or very close to the top for life satisfaction, quality of life. Austria, by the way, has also been very close to the top. The fact that they were not in NATO did not mean that they were not part of the West, that they were not democracies, that they were not successful social market economies. They were. So I think we need to keep that firmly in mind. And what I think we all have a duty to do, and if, you know, we actually do care about the well-being of the Ukrainian people is to make sure that Western sanctions, which by the way, I totally agree with that Russia should have been very, it was right, very harshly to sanction Russia for the war. But these sanctions were imposed, I mean the new ones this year, in retaliation for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. They must be directed towards the goal of ending the invasion, bringing about a peace agreement and Russian withdrawal. And they must not be used as it is absolutely clear, and many people, Elliot Cohen and others have made explicitly clear their goal, which is to use them for regime change in Russia, and not just regime change, but to weaken. There is certainly a very widespread suspicion in Russia to destroy Russia as a state in order to strengthen America's geopolitical position and isolate China. And, of course, that agenda would be pursued over the bodies of innumerable Ukrainians. Just as America's geopolitical agenda in Afghanistan in the 1980s war I also covered as a journalist from the side of the Mojahedin, but that American agenda was pursued over the bodies of innumerable Afghans, and at the cost of the destruction of the Afghan state, with consequences of course which came back to bite America itself terribly 10 years on. So, I think there is this huge obstacle of the Donbass but on the other hand, there are good grants for peace produced above all once again by the courage and resistance of the Ukrainian people and I think it is, it's our duty to support these moves that we can. Thank you. Thank you, Anatoly, for broad and I think very, very helpful presentation. I know I learned a number of things in relationship to the status of negotiations at the moment. Let me remind people that if you want to pose a question to Anatoly, please put your question in the chat box there. I hope from Cole and others here I'll be able to try and keep track of them. So please put your questions into the chat. Then maybe a question, which came in early and which maybe on the minds of many people who are here from Thomas Baker, is the US actually working toward a quick end to the fighting. Well, that is, you know, that is very much an open question. And there is deep ambiguity from the Biden administration on that. Obviously, there was a gaffe by Biden when he said that Putin could not remain in power. By the way, you know, that is a goal with which I have deep personal sympathy. I would also very much like, very much like to see Putin removed from power. But, you know, we have to recognize that, you know, America has used sanctions to this end several times over by now, in the case of Cuba for 60 years, in the case of Iran for decades. Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Venezuela, North Korea, the only cases where there is some suggestion that it might have worked a South South Africa and Serbia in the great majority of cases, it has failed as a strategy. There have even been strong arguments that this has set has strengthened the regime's concerned. And there are, by the way, signs of that in Russia as well today as the Russian regime consolidates its hold on the economy. It's grip on the elites. It's grip on the media. But also as there are, you know, there is evidence that this sense, you know, of the West being implacably against us is actually creating increased support for Putin in the population and even in sections of the elite who at the beginning of the war were absolutely horrified by the invasion. So, I think it is, yeah, I mean, once again, I am not sure that the Biden administration, let alone the wider American establishment is actually committed to peace in Ukraine and I think we need to really keep them up to the mark on that. Another question kind of following on around US policy several kind of relating to the question war crimes and international criminal court. Your one question is how can a war criminal make demands. And here, I mean, the kind of related question be with the United States not having joined the international criminal court. How can it be making similar demands on Russia. And the other is that when Russian forces deliberately target building sheltering women and children and the elderly or bomb clearly residential buildings, along with preventing innocent people from trying to escape these attacks. What do these constitute for crimes. Well, I mean the answer to the first is, um, you know, many people in the world thought that the invasion of Iraq was a crime of Gresham. But you still had to go on talking to the Russian government of Russian, I'm sorry, American government, because it was the American government and you have to go on talking to America. So I was a journalist in in Afghanistan. And then in recent years I since the fall of the Taliban I also made several visits to Afghanistan. I was part of track two efforts in Afghanistan I was also part of track to diplomacy efforts between India and Pakistan. Now, you know, on both sides in Afghanistan, both in the 1980s and then in a different way, you know, under us. And with very nasty people, at least on one side frequently on both sides, India and Pakistan both have, you know, a very long row of crimes to their name, regrettably. But, you know, this, I'm sorry to say this is the world. The Arab Israeli peace process was not made between nice people on either side, mostly, not that that led to anything in the end but it involved, you know, dealing with some profoundly unpleasant dictators. The world is not as we would wish it. And we're kind enough to mention Joseph that you know my latest book is on climate change and this is an issue I take immensely seriously if we are unit to promote serious international cooperation against climate change. You know, it won't only be with nice Western democracies. As a matter of fact, the countries with the worst record on a per capita basis for greenhouse gas emissions are in fact a row not merely of democracies but of Anglo Saxon democracies if you can call them that America, Australia and Canada. You know, we have to deal with the Chinese. We have to like it, but we have to recognize the fact and if we want, you know, if we want to promote peace in Ukraine, we have to deal with the Russian government. Otherwise, this war will go on forever. Then a question sort of following up on that from Melissa McClure. What additional strategies measures and so on. Do you believe the US and other countries could do to help support Ukraine and get Russia to withdraw their military forces right now. Well, Western military supplies to Ukraine have been enormously useful. You know, there has been all this attention to, you know, the need for a Western imposed no fly zone. That's not going to happen because that means NATO going to war with Russia. And that will be vetoed. But the Biden administration has ruled out the Germans, the British, everybody's rules out. But there's also been the suggestion of, you know, transferring war planes to Ukraine, which would obviously mean a drastic escalation. Which, you know, and all of this suggests that, you know, we haven't really been helping Ukraine. But in fact, the kind of weapons that we've been providing javelin anti tank missiles stinger anti aircraft missiles have been very much the kind of weapons that Ukraine needs for the defensive urban warfare that Ukraine has been fighting. We have clearly been enormously effective against Russian helicopters and attack helicopters and against Russian armor. That must continue. Of course, we must continue to supply, you know, these these weapons and ammunition for them. The other things we must do, of course, is provide economic aid to Ukraine. Maintain sanctions on Russia. But as I say, sanctions in support of peace, you know, not of wider US geopolitical agendas. Sorry, did you ask about war crimes. I think we think we had dealt with that with question there was was like you answered it in terms of how can the US be calling for Russia to be held accountable for war crimes, given what the United States has done and not being part of the ICC. I want to come to a question here, if I can from Carol Baum, who asked how does guaranteeing Ukrainian sovereignty work. How would that be different from Ukraine joining NATO. It would be along the lines of the Austrian State Treaty, all the participating powers guarantee Ukrainian sovereignty independence, guarantee non interference in Ukraine's internal affairs. And well, this is where the territorial issue comes in, of course, but that there could be. If there is enough diplomatic will, you know, if all sides want an agreement, then things can be fudged that, you know, there can be Russia guarantees Ukrainian territorial integrity bracket of the whole of Ukraine, minus Crimea and the Donbas area, which is the subject of international negotiation, but Russia guarantees firmly not to try to seize additional Ukrainian territory, which after all, you know, a lot of Russians would like to do. And the West commits itself once again to the resumption of the fullest possible economic sanctions against Russia. Now, beyond that, I'm afraid, you know, this Ukrainian demand for actual, you know, promises of the West to go to war to defend Ukraine. If a treaty of neutrality is violated. I mean, that has really shown the West up. And I laughed bitterly about my own country, Britain, after all these, you know, all this big talk of solidarity with Ukraine and resistance to Russia. And we've just had a statement by the British Deputy Prime Minister, saying no, no, we're not going to guarantee the security of Ukraine as part of any treaty of neutrality, because Ukraine is not in NATO, and therefore we have no obligation to come to the Ukraine. You know, I mean that really says it all about the hypocrisy of NATO and the moral cowardice that is shown since the beginning of this crisis, Ukraine is not going to get that guarantee from from NATO so we have to rely on a combination of you know diplomatic agreements international pressure and economic sanctions. I would also suggest perhaps that you know the neutrality would would mean and the guarantees would also mean that NATO can't be fully present in Ukraine. It can't be adding to what the Russians perceive as growing danger on their, on their Western flank. Yes, I mean, no NATO bases in in Ukraine, and possibly you know the certain limitations on Ukrainian weaponry you know intermediate range missiles for example, by the way, if if Ukraine guaranteed not to buy certain categories of weapons from NATO, this will be a gift to the Swedish military industrial complex since Ukraine could then buy it from the Swedes It's kind of moving back in time but partly part of the foundation for where we are now phase striggler asks, can you comment on the 2014 coup that brought in a government friendly to the West. Well, I wouldn't describe it myself as a coup it had aspects of a coup but it also had aspects of a popular revolution. And clearly what this demonstrated was that you know look it's always difficult saying revolutions because you know you have street power and then you have, you know whatever the mass of the population wants, but certainly what that demonstrated was that huge numbers of Ukrainians were absolutely determined not to join a Russian dominated alliance economic block or security alliance or anything of that sort. And you know they defeated the plans by Putin and the president Yanukovych to bring that about. Now, on the other hand, of course, Yanukovych was elected. He was the elected president in a election that was generally certified as free and he was overthrown by street power in the end by armed street power, in which it must be said that extreme nationalist groups played a leading part. They did overthrow the, the, not not just the elected government but also an agreement which Russia and the West had come to a very reasonable agreement which is that you would have early elections in Ukraine. And presidential elections, you know, leading to a democratic solution which I'm sure would have led to the, you know, to Yanukovych being voted out of office. So, you know, one has to recognize that this was a popular revolution. But I think, you know, at the same time, you know, you do to be fair, have to understand, you know why Russia was so angry and concerned about this, particularly given the, a number of things. The obvious hand of the United States in manipulating what happened in the famous intercepted telephone call by Victorian Newland. And of course the fact that this was followed by some fairly repressive, well some violent actions, you know, pro Russian protesters in Odessa were massacred. And also, I mean some pretty severe repression of pro Russian political parties and media outlets and businessmen. So, you know, look, none of this in any way justifies Putin's, as I say, absolutely criminal invasion of Ukraine. You know, once again, one does have to keep in mind that America whenever there has been any chance of a hostile military alliance appearing in Central America has it may not in recent decades have invaded, but it certainly use some pretty ruthless means to make sure that that does not happen. And it's, it is perhaps, odd to ask Russia to be less paranoid than the United States in that regard. I'm going to jump in and use the chairs of prerogative here. In the context of not legitimating the Russian invasion but recognizing to we need to look at Ukraine as it is and as we would like it to be be helpful if you could comment on both the your take on the strength and presence of the neo-Nazi forces and reports that that Zelensky House has outlawed opposition party or opposition politicians. Well, the Russian charge, you know that Ukraine was a sort of Nazi state, it was of course, absolutely grotesque as President Zelensky pointed out it is hardly likely that a Russian speaking Jew would preside over a Nazi state in Ukraine. And as far as electoral support is concerned, the absolute maximum vote gained by a far right party in Ukraine in 2012 was 10%, 11% about that. Since then it's gone way down. You know, if you put all the right wing parties together at the last elections they got less than 5%. However, what what is true is that the far right parties and their paramilitary wings do have a great deal of street power, which they have used. There have been many Western media reports of this to intimidate and in some cases attack political opponents and of course also cultural forces of which they disapprove including, you know, there have been a number of attacks on LGBTQ rights marches and attacks on media that have criticized them. In addition, these forces have gained both prestige but also weaponry from their genuinely very courageous fight in the Donbas over the past eight years, and of course, even more so today. The most famous extreme nationalist paramilitary group the Azov Regiment, they were named because they recaptured Mariupol from the separatists in 2014. And of course they are now a key part of the defense of Mariupol, the heroic defense of Mariupol against, you know, overwhelming odds. And this you see will undoubtedly also give them considerably added prestige in post war Ukraine. And, you know, we know a lass from the example well of the Italian fascists for example, after the First World War, whose electoral support was very small. And who did, you know, have genuine prestige because they had, you know, many of their members had genuinely been among the bravest Italian soldiers in the First World War. So, there is a potential problem here. You know, on the other hand, of course, something which is wonderful as I've written for Ukraine for Ukraine's move towards the West, and perhaps also even maybe, maybe one day for Russia, although difficult that may be to imagine the present. But the fact that President Zelensky has also emerged as, you know, as a great Ukrainian national hero, but also, you know, to some extent even for the some Russian liberals. You know, and Zelensky is of course, you know, they say Jewish Russian speaking by origin liberal by politics. Although, well, in circumstances of war liberalism does have a tendency to get thrown out of the window is I think, you know, a very, very good and positive and hopeful sign for Ukraine in future. And that said, of course, Zelensky like his predecessor has cracked down on pro Russian elements in Ukraine in, you know, in the months and year leading to the war. One can understand that, you know, given the threat to Ukraine, whether it was wise or not, given that it appears to have been another factor in, you know, motivating Putin to escalate the pressure is, you know, is another matter. Certainly, I'd just like to say strongly that there is a neo fascist problem in Ukraine, but it is nothing remotely as great as Russia may doubt. And by the way, once again, it does appear from Russian statements that the Russians have actually dropped that the demand for denazification so they, you know, they to appear, you know, to be scaling back originally, totally illegitimate demand. Thank you for that. I want to take a question here from Jeff Klein. Mass peace action wants to know what is the role of US NATO military aid to the Ukraine, other than prolonging the war and hindering diplomatic negotiated outcome. Well, it's to help the Ukrainians, the Ukrainians resist Russian invasion. Just that and obviously the aid given by NATO before the war helped, you know, did help fight Russia to a standstill outside Kiev and Harkov and Mikhailov. So, yeah, just that. Now, on the other hand, and by the way, I'm not saying that NATO should not have given that kind of aid to Ukraine, but before the war. Given that it was absolutely clear that NATO was never going to fight to defend Ukraine. Given that, as Zelensky has said, NATO ruled out any prospect of Ukraine actually joining NATO. You really have to ask two things. Why then, given that now every sensible observer, you know, with Ukrainian interests at heart says that a treaty of neutrality, you know, has to be part of a peace settlement. Why did we not propose a peace settlement with greatest possible guarantees before the war? Because I do believe that given that this was always the chief Russian demand. If the West had done that, I think, you know, obviously, the tensions were not gone away, Putin's ambitions were not gone away, but I do think that it would have been impossible for Putin actually to launch the invasion, the war itself. And secondly, given that every observer admitted, every person I know admitted in private, that it was going to be impossible to recover Crimea for Ukraine and impossible for Ukraine to reconquer the separatist bits of the Donbass by military force. What did we think we were doing by, you know, conducting naval exercises in the territorial waters of Ukraine, doing nothing to promote a peace process for the Donbass, not telling the Ukrainians that it was very foolish to blockade Crimea's water, given that there was no possibility, you know, of Russia abandoning Crimea once it had formally annexed it. In other words, you know, we should have combined support for Ukraine and help against a possible Russian invasion with serious attempts to reduce tension and, you know, and find, you know, a diplomatic solution that would have prevented the war. And I'm sorry to say that the chief reason why the West did not do this was a combination of geopolitical ambition and sheer moral cowardice. It would have been, you know, the Biden administration would have been accused of weakness by the Republicans. It would have required the Europeans to confront America, and nobody had the guts for that. I really appreciate that, and many of us made those arguments in the period leading up to the war. A question here kind of brings us a little bit closer to your home. A question from Steve Engel. Does the history of the Ireland conflict and its partial resolution provide any useful insights into the current crisis, especially in the Donbass? Well, there's one I hope positive parallel and one obviously not so positive parallel. I'm half Irish, by the way. The positive parallel is of course that from 1922 until the Northern Irish peace agreement of 1999, the Irish constitution continued to refuse to recognize that Northern Ireland was part of Great Britain. On the other hand, of course, in practice, this meant nothing as far as Irish state policies were concerned. When I was a kid visiting Ireland with my parents, the British pound was still legal tender in Ireland because of course so many of Irish people were working in Britain and bringing their hands back. Ireland was in effect part of the British economic zone. That changed as a result of Ireland and Britain joining the European Union. Now, of course, Britain's left the European Union again, unfortunately. I think what that does indicate, like the Cypriot issue, by the way, is that you can have international disputes that last a very, very long time without having to involve war. So that's the difference between the states concerned. But of course the, and, but the, the negative thing is, is of course that that didn't rule out civil war in Northern Ireland. But that was because of, you know, a population balance in Northern Ireland, which doesn't doesn't apply as far as Crimea and the separatist bits of the Donbas until this war were concerned. But of course, one reason why it would probably be better for Russia. to annex the rest of the, or not to separate the rest of the Donbas and certainly not to separate any more areas of Ukraine is that I think it is absolutely clear now that in these occupied areas Russia would face bitter discontent and unrest and possibly, you know, terrorism from from the populations that had conquered. There that you know there could be a Northern Irish lesson for Russia. As well. So thank you for that that's very, very helpful and you know, overall your your really broad and deep analysis here. I want to close here with a question. I'm realizing that most of our audience are peace activists are people committed to peace here in the United States. What would you advise in terms of what we can best do in terms of civil society to help help bring the war to an end, and as justly as possible. I would advocate strong support for harsh sanctions against Russia, but categorically linked to that these sanctions are to bring about peace to bring about a peace settlement. That's the first thing. I would strongly oppose this being used as an excuse for higher military spending by the US. And I wouldn't, by the way, I would not necessarily have said this six weeks ago, if told that Russia was going to invade. But I think, you know, what we've seen is if the Russian army cannot capture cities 20 miles from Russia's borders, then the chances of Russia invading NATO are zero, zero. The Russian army just does not have it in it to do so so there is no need for us to spend 10s hundreds of billions more dollars on defense. Now, obviously, the commitment to our allies in NATO must remain firm, but it can remain firm, you know, without plunging into, you know, a new round of colossal spending when, you know, climate change, among other things, you know, Robert Reich keeps reminding us as President Eisenhower, the greatest general, certainly in 20th century America reminders, you know, every warplane, every warship takes away money from hospitals, schools, essential domestic tasks. And it was Eisenhower, not a softy or coward or weakling. So I mean, I think that's the second thing, you know, that we should, we should firmly keep in mind. And so I want to thank you very much for giving us your time and sharing your wisdom and knowledge with us today. I also want to wish you the very best as you do your work contributing to both track to and and other discussions in terms of how best to move toward a negotiated conclusion to the war as soon as possible. I want to thank everybody who has joined us. I want to ask if Cole or someone else can put the mass peace action and the code pink websites into the chat. And I want to call people's attention to, to them, and to the numerous webinars and other activities that they they have planned so we'll close here but maybe ask people to hold on a little bit longer, so we can get those those web web pages up on your upon your screen. And just then to thank everybody for joining us, and to urge you to do what you can to help bring this war to an end, and to resist, resist the crimes of empire in order that among other things, we might be able to address climate change and and this continuing threat. Thank you so much. Thank you. It was a pleasure. Thank you for inviting me.