 As I mentioned, and most importantly, Arno de Borga of my boss is actually the one who came up with this project idea. Just about a year ago this week he had dinner with General Petraeus. The two of them sat down with their wives discussing a number of issues, and the general spoke to Arno about the new supply routes that were being put down across Russia, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and Arno engaged them in a discussion of what the geopolitical implications were of these networks. What would it mean by putting these lines through there? What would it have for an effect on the larger relationship? What might it mean for trade and for the future of Afghanistan? So Arno brought that to us, Dave and I, and we sat down and engaged Andy on this and said, we need to stand up a working group and look at what all of the implications are on that. So at the time of that discussion we had just established the Northern Distribution Network, the second corridor for transport into Afghanistan. Obviously complex relationships between the United States and the transit states coupled with an expanding Taliban insurgency in Pakistan, resurgent militancy in parts of Central Asia made us concerned, made us nervous about what these new supply lines might mean. And what security would we have both on a political level but actually on a logistical level? So over the course of the research we realized that these were significant risks but the long-term potential of these supply lines were tremendous and that gets to the notion of the modern Silk Road. And as we'll show, the new supply lines are the first step in a broader effort to develop Afghanistan's economy by integrating it more fully with its neighbors across greater Central Asia. This presentation will be broken up into four parts. The overview that I'm doing right now and will do on how the U.S. military actually gets its supply. So just an understanding of how we move these massive amounts of supplies into Afghanistan across very perilous routes in some areas but over very stable routes in other areas. Then we will go to the geopolitics of the NDN, the Northern Distribution Network and the transit quarters that come into Afghanistan. Then section three will discuss the broader strategic implications and opportunities that are created by the NDN. And that's really the heart of our study here is what do these networks promote and what do they stimulate for the long term. And then we'll talk about our recommendations to policymakers. Incidentally this is, as I mentioned, a three-part project. This is the culmination of the first phase. We're going into the second and third phase. I'll let Andy make a couple of comments about that and that Steve Betzen will bring in his component, as I mentioned here, on the modern activity gap. So why don't we go to the slides. So to sustain the growing level, force level in Afghanistan and the current level, United States and ISAF, again, 42 nations in Afghanistan, have to bring in a tremendous amount of material into the country. This is a national tasking. That means each country is responsible for bringing in their supplies. We are not bringing in supplies for those 42 nations. We bring in our own. And countries take care of bringing in the rest of their supplies for their own forces. The bulk of nonsensitive, non-lethal U.S. supplies are routed through Pakistan. They enter the port of Karachi and then they go up a single line that then splits into two other lines. One that goes into Torkham Gate and one into Shaman Gate in Balochistan. Torkham is up at Peshawar. These supplies are handled entirely by commercial carriers. These are not U.S. military trucks, two-and-a-half ton trucks that are carrying these supplies. These are local trucking contractors that provide the transportation for these products that come in. In 2008, to give you a sense of how much it was brought in, just in 2008, this is before the first increase in troops by President Obama and, of course, before the 30,000 latest round, but it included 28,020-foot equivalent units. And if you've seen, if you look at the cover, you see the containers that are brought in. So a 20-foot equivalent unit, one of those containers, filled 28,000 of those, made it through that single supply line from Karachi up to those two points of entry in Afghanistan. So a tremendous amount that was brought in. So as I mentioned, as the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan intensified, those roofs came under increasing pressure. We've all seen the pictures. We'll show you one right here of what happened to some of the supplies that went in. And again, these are non-lethal supplies. These include vehicles, but nonetheless, these are not some of the more sensitive pieces of equipment, night vision goggles, weapons, ammunition that are being brought in on these lines. These are supplies that are considered non-lethal. But 450 vehicles were destroyed in an over a dozen attacks between September 2008 and March of 2009. This particular picture shows 100 trucks that were loaded with ISF supplies that were destroyed by militants just outside of a shower in December of 2008. So a lack of projected surplus capacity along the Pakistani routes in conjunction with the attacks you see here. Hill fridge, trucking strikes, the exorbitant costs associated with airlifting supplies into Afghanistan prompted the United States to consider new supply routes coming into Afghanistan. And ultimately, the United States decided after a series of discussions on routes that connected the Baltic and Black Sea ports with Afghanistan. And we'll take you through some of those maps now. The first line in the main line, I think we would call would be the Northern Distribution Network North. And this begins in the port of Riga in Latvia, crosses Russia on Soviet-era rail lines. It's up to the individual commercial companies to choose the routes that they want. There's not one single line that we send our supplies on, which of course is excellent for security, but also just allows the commercial carriers to take the best routes possible. From Russia goes into Kazakhstan, obviously, in Uzbekistan. Once in Uzbekistan, you can see down at the bottom of the aqua-colored country obviously Uzbekistan. It enters, ends at Termez and enters Afghanistan at that point. That's six, please. NBN South enters the Georgian port of Poti, goes across Georgia, into Azerbaijan, to Baku, across the Caspian Sea on a rail ferry, up to Aktau, the Kazakh coast, and then takes the same route, or same general route coming down through Uzbekistan. A third route, KKT, Russia, and then into Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, avoids Uzbekistan completely, again, providing redundancy to our routes. According to Transcom, this is an essential route, but the roads through Tajikistan are problematic. I was on some of those roads recently myself, and they range from roads that are as bad as Washington D.C.'s roads, to roads that are like a billiard table. They're perfectly smooth, so a real range that somewhat limit our capability. From a purely logistical standpoint, NBN has been a resounding achievement. We have moved a massive amount of material, not only through the Pakistani routes, but through the NBN routes, very important. Currently 320-foot equivalent units are transiting NBN per week, so 300 of those containers transiting per week, though the cost, we should note, very importantly, is two-and-a-half times as much as sending them through the Karachi route, through the Pakistani route. But that's a price you pay for redundancy and security, and for capacity. The number of TEUs that could go through this route, through all the NBN routes, could be expanded to 500 per week if needed. As of November 2009, the NBN had brought in 4,500 TEUs, again 20-foot equivalent units, into Afghanistan. This represents 12-and-a-half percent of the total number of TEUs shipped through Pakistan in 2008 and is additive to the supplies currently entering Afghanistan for Pakistan. As you know, with any introduction of forces, there's a bow wave of initial supplies coming in to set up facilities to house the new troops. Now, those amounts are not going to be constant, but to set up for the initial forward operating basis, the expansion of other bases in Afghanistan, you have the initial supplies coming in to actually create the infrastructure for those forces. So there's a huge push at the very beginning of any new troop increase in newer country like this. Over to you, Andy. More concise than I expected. So I guess I'm ready. Good morning. Delighted to be here, and I'm really delighted to have taken part in this project, which has developed into something far larger than I certainly first imagined when Arno and Tom approached me back in March. And I'm very grateful to them that they did, because this project has really been for me one of the most interesting projects I've been involved with since coming to Washington and before that in my career of trying to do policy-relevant research. And it also afforded me the opportunity to learn about a lot of new things that I was not that familiar with. I think one of the first gacha moment for me on this was when in May we went down to Florida for a briefing with the CENTCOM guys about the NDN, and they were very, very happy to see us, to see that there was somebody that was interested, actually, in this project. And they also understood the much larger, I think, strategic implications and potential for the NDN. And for that reason they were especially glad to talk to us. And at one moment in the conversation they turned to us and said, so as we're talking about this kind of larger vision of what kind of gets us to the modern Silk Road and the role of trade and transit in the region and this importance for Afghanistan, and how NDN demonstrates how the possibilities to some extent for this, they asked the question, so where's the belly button in Washington for thinking about this in a really strategic way? I said, we looked at them and said, you're asking us, where is the central node that is kind of trying to put all this together? The economic implications, the strategic implications, obviously the military supply implications, which drives the whole thing, which occupies their time. They could see a much larger picture, but of course their hands were entirely full with simply trying to get the logistics job done, which is a massive job. And I had not really any familiarity with logistics, but I came rapidly to appreciate the comment that I think Steve Benson said to me, Andy, strategy is for amateurs. Logistics is for professionals. So with that, I have the responsibility in our presentation for talking about some of the various geopolitical interests, which is the subject of the report that just came out this week, Geopolitical Challenges and Opportunities. And so I get the chance to say all the controversial things that are going to piss various people off, but that's a role that I relish. We knew that the creation of the NDN was going to create, have an impact on Eurasian geopolitics. That was obvious. It was going to make the U.S. and NATO dependent on different transit countries and in turn giving those states some leverage with us. We also thought it created a real opportunity and that there were common interests of many states involved in the region regarding the stabilization of Afghanistan. And the creation of the alternative supply routes created a concrete opportunity for cooperation on a real security priority for the United States. A tangible mechanism for transforming those common interests into actual cooperation. I think this is particularly true and important for Russia and the Central Asian states involved. And it's kind of part of the larger notion of reset. Reset is typically only applied to the Russia relationship. But I think the notion applies here as well in that this gives us something really concrete that we can work together on with these states. And this is particularly true with Uzbekistan, which is really the linchpin in Central Asia for this. So over the next few minutes I'm going to briefly survey the primary interest and points of leverage for the NDN transit countries as well as China and Iran. And I'll try to do this as telegraphically as possible. So we leave as much time for discussion as possible. Next slide, please. So with Russia, the country I know most about purportedly. Well, not surprisingly, Russia's interests in the NDN and Afghanistan more broadly are extremely complex and mixed. If I were to boil it down to one sentence, I think that as you can see from the list of bullet points there, there are clearly interests that the Russians have in stabilizing Afghanistan. But Russia also has brought other interests in maintaining influence and control to the extent possible in Central Asia. And sometimes clearly these interests come into conflict. And I think the most obvious instance over the course of 2009 of that was the dispute over the Manasseh air base and the role that the Russian government had, in my view, in their preference in that we not have access to that base, which of course now has been renamed to a transit center. To what extent does Russia want to see Afghanistan fully stabilized, I think, is also a question worth exploring. Because I think the interests are mixed. And certainly some of the Central Asian states, most notably Uzbekistan, would argue that the Russians don't want to see Uzbekistan fully stabilized because they see that if Afghanistan is stabilized, they understand that this will open up trade, transit, economic corridors to the south, giving the Russians less control over the direction of trade and transport for those states. And also many in the region argue, not only the Uzbeks, that sometimes this is used by the Russians, the threat of terrorism and insecurity is used by the Russian government as a justification for the maintenance and expansion of Russian military presence in the region. And I think that was also very well demonstrated this summer. And the dispute between Russia and Uzbekistan over the proposed new CSTO, which was to be a CSTO base for the Rapid Reaction Force in Osh, which eventually the Uzbeks opposed, and eventually the deal was, it was a bilateral deal between Kyrgyzstan and Russia for that base. This while impossible to quantify for sure, I can't help also but thinking that the memory, the experience of the Soviet war in Afghanistan back in the 1980s and the role that the United States played in directly undermining Soviet efforts is a memory that is not too far back in the sort of the collective memory of the Russians. It's hard to say what the influence there is, and I'll just leave it at that. Let's go to Central Asia. For Central Asia, and I'm going to speak telegraphically and therefore somewhat collectively, and obviously the interest of the various states differ to some degree. But first note what I said at the outset, the centrality of Uzbekistan, all of these new routes established go through Uzbekistan at the point of the Uzbek-Afghan border. And I think again the notion of reset, especially for Uzbekistan, their relations with the United States have been on a roller coaster to put it mildly for the last decade. This really is an opportunity to reconfigure the security relationship and also the more broadly the bilateral relationship to some extent. So interest, well first of all there's interest in balancing the partnership amongst regional and extra-regional powers. By contributing to the Afghan war effort, the Central Asians are currying favor with the United States in NATO and to some extent weakening the leverage of other states in the region. Secondly, money. Well, U.S. military needs represent a source of revenue for local shipping companies, service providers, farmers, manufacturers, rent-seeking governments, and others. And certainly there's a strong interest in those states in greater local procurement along the NDN. And we have a number of recommendations there in the report that we probably we're not going to get to in the presentation, but you can look into. And obviously the issue of stability in Afghanistan, increased stability in Afghanistan reduces the flow of drugs into Central Asia, deprives other regional terrorist groups of historically important operational hub. And again, in the larger picture, a stable Afghanistan opens trade routes potentially south and also reduces the rationale for Russian military presence in Central Asia, which is of interest to some. Let me just say one to go back on this revenue question and back to Russia for a second. You don't need to go back on the slide, but the revenue flow, this drive for Russia is quite significant. And one of the interesting data points that emerged in our research was learning that in the wake of the war with Georgia in 2008, when the U.S.-Russia relationship virtually came to a standstill, one of the only pieces of cooperation that continued was the role of Russian heavy-lift air carriers, Volker Dnieper, other companies similar to that, in supplying material into Afghanistan. It's a big business. They're making about a billion dollars a year. And that was not discontinued by the Russian government in the wake of all of the tit for tat back and forth after the Georgia war. And that's a pretty significant point you might want to return to. Okay, central, the caucuses. Well, let's look at Georgia first and foremost. And certainly there is a strong U.S. interest in strengthening security ties with Georgia as well as Azerbaijan and generally in the caucuses. And obviously this is a higher, this is a more urgent matter in the wake of the Georgian war of 2008. And just to put the back to the larger picture of N.D.N., it is true that the N.D.N. is considerably more expensive way of getting material into Afghanistan than through Pakistan. And in fact, in the southern route is even more expensive than the northern route of the N.D.N. getting material for various reasons. Certainly if Turkmenistan were to sign on to the N.D.N., which they have not as of yet, that would help to diminish the cost somewhat of the southern route. But it would still leave it considerably more expensive than the northern route going through Latvia, Russia, Kazakhstan, et cetera. And there's an important political rationale for the southern route. You know, one, generally the N.D.N., the transit quarters, more or better, more alternatives, more redundancy is better. That gives the main client, the United States government, U.S. military, more leverage, more freedom of opportunity. And that's all good. But I think also in the case of the N.D.N. south, it's important to keep in mind that there is an important security rationale for N.D.N. south and helping to strengthen the ties of those states involved with the U.S., particularly in the wake of the Georgia war. The, I'd say in the case of Azerbaijan, I'd also want to point out that, I mean, Azerbaijan and particularly President Aliyev has a broader vision of the future of Zari economic development in which Azerbaijan's role as a trade and transport hub is a major, major piece of, and that's part of the larger economic diversification strategy of Azerbaijan and the N.D.N. helps to demonstrate that for them. Points of leverage that the states have are similar to what Central Asia and Russia has. Of course, they can turn the off button, but I think in the case of Georgia and Azerbaijan, it's less likely that that would be a concern as opposed to Central Asia and the Russian cases, but I would also want to point out that there is some concern about the so-called frozen conflicts, particularly the role of Nagorno-Karabakh if something were to happen there, or if something were to happen even in Napausia and South Assyria and another military conflict in Georgia, that would be a severe problem for the N.D.N. Okay, quickly, move on to the next slide, Latvia. Latvia in the Port of Riga is the entry point for N.D.N. North, as Tom pointed out. Latvia also sees this, its role as a trade and transport transit hub in the future is extremely important for its economic development, and of course this is also a way for the Latvian government to strengthen its security relationship with NATO and bilaterally with the United States as well. Let's turn to China. China is not currently a transit state for the N.D.N. When we first embarked upon the project, there was, I think, greater optimism that the Chinese government would sign on to the N.D.N. and open up a route coming in through the East. In our latest discussions with the folks at the Pentagon, apparently the Chinese government was still studying the proposal and has not signed on to it. You know, broadly speaking, I think that there is some degree of strategic ambivalence on the part of the Chinese government regarding Afghanistan. I don't think that the fact that U.S. military forces are bogged down and heavily deployed in Afghanistan and and Iraq takes some of our attention away from areas and theaters of direct interest to the Chinese. I think, as was pointed out in a very, very good article a week or two ago in the New York Times about the INAC coal, excuse me, copper mine, which the Chinese are making a huge investment in about three and a half billion dollars. To some extent, I think the Chinese interest principally in Afghanistan and Central Asia more broadly, of course, are accessed to natural resources, energy first and foremost, but not only, INAC coal mine is a good example of that. The Chinese have been active in developing infrastructure to some degree in the region. But I think as our non-present star, Fred Starr, commented in the article about the INAC coal mine, I think there may be a feeling to some extent that the Chinese let the United States do the dirty work of bringing security there and we can pick up the fruit and the goodies, the economic goodies for ourselves. There's, I think, well we also talked to some extent about Japan's interest, I think it's interesting to contrast the roles that Japan and China have played. Japan has been the largest provider behind the United States of assistance to Afghanistan since 2002. And in fact, the levels of Japanese assistance to Afghanistan are about 10 times, for example, what China has provided to Afghanistan. And of course, when President Obama was in Tokyo last November, just before that, the Japanese announced the new aid package for Afghanistan at $5 billion over the next five years. China much less involved in that regard. We can talk about that more later if you want, because I've gone on a bit too long. Let me say a couple of words about Iran. Iran certainly is not a member of the NDN at this point, but when you talk to the logistics guys, SETCOM, Transcom, DLA, their eyes brighten when they look at the possibility of supplying forces in Afghanistan through the port of Chabahar in the south. This is the most direct, shortest way of getting into Afghanistan. And at least I think as the NDN was initially conceived, or these alternative routes have conceived, Iran has been thought of as a possibility if the broader political relationship were to significantly change. Iran's interest in Afghanistan, and given the geographical and cultural proximity, the longstanding warfare between Sunni Taliban and Iran, stable Afghanistan is pretty directly viewed in Iran's strategic interests. They're also deeply concerned about drug trafficking, about 30% of Afghanistan's drugs flow to Iran. Balance of power in the region, they are concerned again about that their regional arch-rival Saudi Arabia would be able to stabilize and secure Afghanistan through its proxies. And of course Iran and Afghanistan have a significant trade relationship, a broader economic relationship. More directly with the United States, and there was a considerable amount of cooperation between Iran and United States and the international coalition in the fall of 2001, which I won't go into. But on the other hand, it's true that Iran has been supporting the Taliban and training Taliban fighters. And I think the larger picture here for Iran is that in the relationship with us, it is the threat, the latent threat that they have that they could destabilize Afghanistan, de-stabilize Iraq, if we are to push that much harder on the nuclear issue, sanctions, et cetera, that's in the background. So mixed geopolitical interests, but some of this all is, is that what really came clear to us in the project is there really seems to be an absence actually of a regional strategy for Afghanistan on the part of the U.S. government in our view. And we have, we think there are very broader strategic opportunities created by the provision of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. And the argument's very simple. So let's get to that, I'll rather that very, very fast. And it's basically the economy. With international assistance of county for roughly 90% of all public expenditures in Afghanistan, we have to ask ourselves whether we can achieve our long-term goals there without developing the country's listed economy. And while we rhetorically acknowledge that we cannot, it's not clear to me and I think my colleagues that in fact in our policy that that is demonstrated. So the obvious question is how best to foster economic growth. And we think a key piece that is missing or not adequately addressed in the U.S. strategy toward Afghanistan is this vision of the role that Afghanistan would play in the development of a modern silk road. And here it's our colleague Fred Starr who's been the guru on this for years. But this development we think, A, it's happening and it's going to happen. It's gonna have, and it will have a transformative effect on the region. And it's also something that the Afghans have explicitly identified as a core of their strategy in the Afghan national development strategy that was put forth initially in 2006 and then again in a more developed form in 2008. We also think that the development of this modern silk road is, this is a real win-win situation for all, for Afghanistan and all regional countries involved. So if it's so good, why doesn't it exist? And why isn't it a larger part of our strategy? And our research preliminary shows that there are various obstacles, they're political, they're bureaucratic in nature, there are infrastructure problems, those aren't the most significant problems. And we don't even think the security problems are the most significant problems necessarily. But I think the fundamental point I want to emphasize, to me this is a classic collective goods problem. Because when we've talked to US government officials about in fact we were disappointed that in the new strategy announced in early December by the Obama administration, that trade transport transit issues, this idea of the region as the hub of this, which would be the key to its future prosperity, was not, it is not a major priority in US strategy. And the argument that we get as to why that's the case, and it's understandable to some extent, is look, we have our hands full of the security situation, we are allocating massive resources for this, it is already extremely controversial in the US political, in the US politically. It's just, you can't sell it, and we understand that. And also it's those countries that will benefit from it from the most are the ones that should take the greatest initiative. Well, that's true to some extent, I can understand that too. India and China are the foremost drivers of the beneficiaries along term of this, but the Central Asians, the Russians, the Iranians, the Pakistanis of course, everybody is a beneficiary of this. The problem though is that all of those countries have rather specific interests regarding Afghanistan. And often competitive interests regarding Afghanistan. And it is hard for me to envision actually that the stimulus for this could come directly from one of those players itself. It's a collective goods problem. And this is the key role that we think the United States can play. And we don't even necessarily think that this would cost so much money. It may be more of an organizational, political organizational issue. That really is sort of the essence of what we would be doing in phase two and now embarking on the project is thinking more carefully about how you would develop and implement this strategy. What this means for first of all, what the U.S. government should do. First of all, trying to get it higher on the priority list for the U.S. government. Secondly, thinking about how the strategy is developed and how the U.S. government needs to be organized, actually it's implemented. And thirdly, which is sort of phase three for the project is we think of think about is what needs to be done internationally. What other regional players need to do and how do you mobilize other regional players to act in a way which is more beneficial for the collective good, if you will. I've gone on too long. I think on that point I will stop and turn it over to Steve. Sorry, yeah, excuse me. I'll do those policy recommendations now then we'll turn to Steve and wrap it up and open it up to you folks here. And we look forward to that. So moving on to policy recommendations and you can find them on I believe page 12 of the report with the trucks on the front. The pictures are very similar so they're a little difficult to tell apart. But let me run through some of those policy recommendations and then we'll turn to Steve Benson. They fall into two categories, near-term recommendations intended to help the United States maintain the flow of supplies to forces in Afghanistan. Again, page 12 of the NDN report. The second set focuses on how the United States can build on the opportunities created by the NDN. Again, we look at the NDN as stimulating these long-term trade and transport networks that can bring Afghanistan into long-term economic relationship with its neighbors. So first and foremost, we feel that the US should recognize the potential benefits of the modern Silk Road and make its implementation a strategic priority. So looking ahead in the future, develop that immediate strategy or immediately develop that strategy for the modern Silk Road, promote the MSR and US strategy and understanding that this cannot be a unilateral action to be successful. We obviously have to bring in the other nations. One of the first things that Fred Starr told us is do not play, do not ever leave the impression that you are playing a game over the heads of any of the states. You absolutely have to make this a partnership project and bring everyone in from the beginning. And as Andy said, identify and empower a lead US government entity that is explicitly identified and empowered by the administration to do this. Ellie Krakowski, who's sitting in the front row here, is leading a major component of that phase two effort and we have gone around the US government to the NSC, to state, to DOD and USTR to discuss with these individuals this exact point. And so that is a tremendously important element of it. Let's go to the second one. Okay, stimulate alternative corridors. Given the extent to which the NDN has served as an incremental step towards this modern Silk Road, US planners should seek access to other areas. Again, redundancy is key, but also spreading out the benefits and showing other nations what's possible is important. So we suggest the following routes be considered Iran and Afghanistan, China, Central Asia to Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, additional routes out of Guadar, for example, through Balochistan and then India, Pakistan, Afghanistan. There are obviously major challenges associated with these routes. But then again, who would have thought two years ago that the United States was sending military supplies across Russia in Uzbekistan, given how difficult the relationship was. And now we're sending thousands of units across these countries. So just because it sounds ominous and difficult does not mean it's not possible. Focus resources on the key problem. The United States and other partners, stakeholders, should partner with local governments to tear down the bureaucratic obstacles. We've worked closely with the International Road Transport Union out of Geneva on this. They, from their trucking associations, tell us of unbelievable obstacles to go across these countries. The bureaucratic obstacles, the corruption, getting through all of the different checkpoints takes a tremendous amount of time. So the U.S. should push the efficiency, corruption-resistant procedures, most notably at the border crossings, to make this a possibility. Obviously we understand that with the United States entering into agreements for the Northern Distribution Networks that things move smoothly and quickly across these countries. That's not the same story, obviously, for commercial carriers. United States military and the United States as a whole brings a lot of weight to these negotiations. And so countries see it in their interest to facilitate this and make it go like that. And in many cases it goes very smoothly and very quickly. But we should demonstrate that this can be possible for commercial shipments as well, and should push that. Give Afghanistan the tools to harness the modern Silk Road, and enter into that to lock into it. Any increase in listed cross-border commerce will not help stabilize Afghanistan unless there's a capacity within the country to levy official taxes on what's being carried in and out of the country. And that is very important. The U.S., Japan, as the second biggest donor and other donors, should work with the government in Afghanistan to build this capacity. So it marginalizes the informal economy and discourages corruption, which we know obviously is very high. Recognize that the MSR will benefit all of Eurasia. This again is not just about Afghanistan, it's not even just about Central Asia. This is about Eurasia, and in fact benefits accrue to the United States and to the world, generally speaking. We should push that, we should show what those benefits can be, and we should bring individuals in and be able to articulate how that modern Silk Road can do that. By doing this, you would close what Steve has identified as the modern activity gap. And at that I'll turn it over to Steve so he can discuss that point. Thanks, Tom, and thanks, Andy. I'm gonna, my words are gonna come back to haunt me here, because having been a logistician, basically providing warfare supplies to troops land and sea over my career, I'm gonna venture into the strategy piece where I will be an amateur. But in order to do that, I'm gonna stand up and go to the slide. What I've done over the past four or five years is tried to find in my studies a new dominant strategic feature that tends, that would replace or the Cold War's Iron Curtain. I tried to find it, I looked for it in terms of a barricade, in terms of a corridor, and I've come to this particular construct called the Magi-construct, which you'll find in the publication. And if you'll turn to page two, you'll see a graphic in there that I'm not gonna show, but put your eyes on that and find Afghanistan and then we'll come back to that. Can you hear me? So I used to use this graphic when I was in the Navy to emphasize how the world is so intense in terms of the literals, seeing clearly on a white piece of paper, over one day, what's put down here are the telecommunications around the world. This is a common graphic that's been shown since for the decade, past decade. I moved to Syracuse and became landlocked and I started to change my thinking about this graphic. It tells a lot. What you have here is a northern corridor of modern activity that's been developed over thousands of years and you have a gap in the middle here. And the gap is right smack dab in the middle of the gap is Afghanistan and you have the march of modernity on both sides and you also have, you can find all the activity that's going on around the edge of this gap that deals with infrastructure in terms of transportation, road, rail, airports is significant. You'll also find that the major sovereign wealth funds with the huge trillions of dollars circumnavigate this gap and you'll find that the key players in the closure of that gap and that gap is closing. There's I think 10 million more cell phones in Iraq today than there was eight years ago. That gap is closing. And if you looked at it a thousand years ago, and you used footprints instead of telecommunications, it would be the negative of this graphic. And what you're seeing is a vice and it's closing down on these vulnerable countries. And the MSR, the catalyst for the MSR being the demand signal, unlike any demand signal for supplies that's ever been in this area is pulling from both sides. And that can be leveraged. What would it be like if this gap were closed? What was it like in the US in the mid 1800s between the coasts when we looked to close that gap? So that's the fundamental construct behind the Magi. The end of it is that if you look at the way the arc of instability has been depicted over the past decade or two decades originated by Zignu Brzezinski. If you look at that, the way it's been depicted and evolved the Marine Corps strategies that are a problem they're showing now show this gap, this instability area coming and then coming up in here like this and then down here like that. Covering the whole basic south of the northern corridor of modern activity but expanding up into this gap. And then if you look at the way the Muslim extremists depict their caliphate, you'll find the same thing. And that's the arc of instability as it pushes up into this region. So there's a lot of forces that are coming to play and a lot of key players that have significant interests in this dynamic and I'll close it back. End of your move. Thanks, Tom. I just wanted to add one thing to what Steve said because it was more than two years ago that Steve came to me, my office, with this graphic. I was very excited about it and we've been thinking over the last two years about how you would, what to do about it, frankly. And what was exciting when Tom and Arno approached me with this project is that I saw, I could see that there was the connection here with this. The one thing I want to point out and add in conclusion is that in getting, why getting back to our fundamental point that looking at a regional strategy for Afghanistan that places greater emphasis on trade, transport, and transit issues is important and why it's urgent right now is because the window is fairly short for us. You know, look, we are plusing up the troop presence over the next year. Already 18 months, there is the commitment to try to reduce that. The further plus up in troops, as Tom illustrated initially, is putting tremendous demands on the challenge of supplying the troops. You know, and what the Indian, we argue, is doing, it is yes, it's creating demand. Yes, it's more local procurement, it'll do more of that. Yes, and it is sort of demonstrating the potential for this modern silk road. It's demonstrating the fact that Afghanistan is actually more accessible, I think, than many of us conventionally realized, although we probably should have realized that with the flourishing of the drug trade out of Afghanistan around the world. But again, the point being the window is short. And while, you know, what's, you know, whether it's two years, three years, five years, you know, when the demand for the military goods to supply the troops reduces, then what's gonna happen? Well, if we're not thinking today about that and about the importance of these transit routes and how you develop them, both by building infrastructure more importantly by breaking down bureaucratic, bureaucratic barriers, then I'm afraid we really miss an opportunity. And it's an opportunity, meaning the punchline being that no matter how many troops we put in, no matter how much security we bring to the region, we conclude that it'll be short-lived if we don't pay much more attention to this side of the equation. Thank you, Annie, and thank you, Steve, for the presentation. Before I open it into Q&A, I'd like to recognize Senator John Warner, who's joined us today. I'm very happy to have you here, former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee who knows these issues inside and out and how important these relationships are. So before I call on you, please identify yourself in your organization. I was struck by what I think is the very correct analysis that for the people who are focusing on the Northern Distribution Network, the goal is getting supplies to Afghanistan. And because of this, I think there's going to be a natural tendency not to want to raise controversial issues with the states through which the network runs. And yet at the same time, you've pointed out that corruption, which is endemic and really part of the fabric of the states in Central Asia, is the main roadblock. So how do you see the United States government going about trying to attack this problem at the same time that it's trying to avoid causing problems in its relations with the Central Asian governments? You are very right to point out the corruption. It is very high in Central Asia and in other countries along this road. And we don't mean to point fingers, we have our own problems with corruption, but it's very significant here in the transit states. One of the ways we can hopefully reduce that is to show the benefits, both on a strategic level with the stabilization of Afghanistan, but on an economic level for the states by showing how more quickly trucks can pass through these areas, what they can do as far as increasing ties and stabilizing the area is one way to do it and bringing greater attention. Daniel Kimmich, one of our co-authors and others have mentioned the importance of providing some level of transparency into the increased business and into the networks themselves. That's very difficult where there's not a free press, but there are ways around it and one individual suggested that we pressure governments to put online all the transactions that are taking place across these countries. Again, we're not unrealistic here. This is very difficult to do in countries where regime preservation is the number one goal and money is coexistent with that. We don't recognize the difficulty, we don't have the solution for it, but to the extent that we can expand recognition of the value of the modern Silk Road and of the benefits of it and to bring US and international donor attention to it, then you do bring some amount of transparency to it. At least it's an improvement. It's a great question, Jeff, and there's obviously no easy answer to it. The only thing I would add to what Tom said at this point is that the same is true with Pakistan, with the routes. Who is controlling the trucking companies which dominate the transit corridors? They principally have strong ties to the Pakistan military. So it's not as though we're, this raises the larger point, I guess, that many people have pointed out that aren't you creating a whole new set of vulnerable vulnerabilities by opening up these new routes, I guess. Well, yeah, you are to some extent, but let's remember why we're doing that. We're doing that because we face significant vulnerabilities with the dependence upon this one route, and the one route actually shares a lot of the problems that you mentioned as well. All the way to back. Bob Castro with Lockheed Martin Readiness and Stability Operations. Something Steve raised, Resne, what I was going to ask to start with, can you all discuss the role of technology in facilitating this? Obviously, with cell phones and other things and other parts of the world, you can leap a generation. When you're talking about moving goods and logistics, sure there's tagging, tracking, databaseing, those sort of things that knock down barriers at borders and customs, but what other technologies can be brought to bear to make this a smoother transition across all these competing interests? You've hit on it, basically. It's the modern technology that exists around the world, around that northern quarter of modern activity expanding into the gap. And it's, in some cases, nothing more than providing rudimentary passport control. Nothing fancy, but, for instance, the Tajiks, they like that. They have a lot of immigration problems they'd like to control. They have a lot of transit trade that is illicit that they'd like to control. So a lot of this technology can serve both interests. Those of making the transportation corridor more interoperable and also making the countries themselves more able to control internally, what it is they need to control. In October, the IRU hosted a conference in Dushan Bay. I attended it and we drove down to the Afghan border and into Afghanistan. We crossed the Pond River Bridge, which the U.S. built. And they had excellent technology down there, very sophisticated equipment. So that's a start, but that needs to be spread throughout the region and at the borders. Dave and I drove from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan about 18 months ago and we went across a border that was very rudimentary. And so they do need that. The truckers themselves have excellent technology, but the nations themselves need this assistance. This is another way in which the United States can help and donor countries and other partners. Eric conveyed in the Institutes of Foreign Policy Analysis. In early November, I was at a conference in Beijing and somewhat surprisingly, the Koreans and Japanese, maybe both, took the Chinese under attack with respect to Afghanistan or at least urged strongly that they get more involved, not in sending combat forces, but in training personnel and so forth. And I wonder to what degree Afghanistan is amenable to that sort of thing and maybe whether we are too. I appreciate your comment on that. I'll make a couple of comments since I follow the Chinese side a little bit and I'm heading there tomorrow to ask some of those questions in Shanghai. Obviously the Chinese are very amenable to investing in the country. I'm sorry, the Afghans are very amenable to the Chinese investment. They can bring in a mini-martial plan, the likes of which the Canadians, the Kazakhs, the Russians and the U.S. could not match for INOC. Of course there are allegations of bribery, but nonetheless they bring the complete package. When Andy and I interviewed Russian and Uzbek foreign ministry and other officials on our field trip there, they sort of described the difference between the Russians, the Chinese and the U.S., like Goldilocks and the Three Bears, the Chinese, the Russians were too hot. They came in there and they were too aggressive. The U.S. was too short term and focused only on security, but the Chinese were just right. They were quiet and long term. That's for Central Asia. I believe Afghanistan is the same way. As far as what would we be amenable to and what would the Afghans be amenable to as far as Chinese training, I don't know. I don't know, but at this point they certainly are not going to put any boots on the ground, but there are certainly some criticism to be put out there about the INOC deal in that the United States and our 42 partner allies are losing the lives to stabilize Afghanistan and the Chinese can come in and get the investment, but that investment is important too because it's employing thousands of people and providing massive amounts of royalties to the government. Now where those royalties go is another question, but nonetheless that investment is very important for helping to stabilize Afghanistan. If you think about David Kilcullen's accidental guerrilla concept of where the Taliban gets its foot soldiers, well unemployed people frequently. So the Chinese component, the investment is very important. Andy, anything to say? I would just add that first of all I'm glad to hear that I think the criticism is justified. To some extent, it was probably evident in my opening remarks. That's not surprising either. I think none of us are China experts so we're on thin territory, but I think first of all, I think what the Chinese are doing in Afghanistan with a focus on specific projects with INAC being the showcase, I think it's a demonstration of the core economic rationale driver of Chinese foreign policy across the board. I think what they're doing in Afghanistan is not so dissimilar from what we see in Africa and other places. And then added to that, I think there is significant reluctance to be militarily engaged in general in Chinese foreign and security policy. I think also that there are some, as I suggested earlier, there is some ambivalence about Afghanistan and our role there and being engaged with us there directly, I think. Think for a second. The Chinese are very concerned about Uyghur separatism in Xinjiang province, but where would you rather see, if you're in Beijing, where would you rather see Uyghur fighters engaged in Xinjiang or in Afghanistan or elsewhere? Thanks, Owen Sanderson, CSIS. I was wondering by ramping up infrastructure on this modern Silk Road, you're improving illicit traffic, but you're also creating capability for illicit traffic traveling across the gap. How do you combat that and ensure the sustainability for illicit materials? Thank you. I'll remark that the traffickers have no need for improved infrastructure for illicit because they've been moving this stuff very well, very quickly, often with a cooperation from officials in government across the region. There's no doubt about it. The governments in these regions have friends and others who are involved in the trafficking and narcotics trafficking. So improving the infrastructure is definitely has a greater impact on the illicit side. Will it mean that people are sending more on the trucks and trains and planes that are part of this potentially? But people always say it's impossible to set up a modern transportation trade network out of there. Nothing can be done. Well, they are doing things. They're moving 8,000 tons of opium heroin out of this country every year. So it's there. I don't think it impacts that significantly, though Andy and I did hear an interesting anecdote from one of our interviewees, and that was that there's a fear among some that by increasing the amount of train travel into the area that people who currently traffic narcotics on the airplanes will lose business to those who would then recognize the opportunity to traffic on the trains. So that is amazing, but unless the reality in some of the places we've looked at, but they have no problem moving that throughout the region. And one thing that's been a concern all along with the project for sure, Owen, anecdotally. You know, most of the containers that are coming into Afghanistan via the new routes are via rail. And recently raised the question with ascentcom and transcom, what happens to these containers when they get to Afghanistan, then when they go back, what do they carry? I mean, one of the concerns there being that they may be used for illicit purposes. Well, to this point, none of those containers are coming back because there's such a supply shortage of storage space in Afghanistan that they're all staying there and being used as storage space for now.