 Good afternoon everybody. Hello and welcome. I'm Susan Collins, the Joan and Sanford Wildein of the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, and it's wonderful to have all of you here with us this afternoon for a very special event. We are particularly pleased to be hosting a book release of launch for Assistant Professor Joy Rodie. Well, today's event, as some of you may know, is part of the Ford School Centennial Activities. We are showcasing a number of our faculty and the impact that they have on various dimensions of public policy, but it's always really a pleasure to celebrate the publication of some of our faculty's research, and I'm delighted to have all of you here to join us for that because of that reason as well. And in particular, it's a special honor when it is a faculty member's first book, and so today we have the special benefit of learning about armed with expertise, the militarization of American social research during the Cold War. Joy Rodie joined the Ford School's faculty just this past fall, but actually it was a homecoming of sorts because she had previously spent two years as a postdoctoral fellow in the School of Science, Technology and Public Policy Program, or STPP, and we're delighted to have her back. Specializing in U.S. national security policy and the history of science, she brings a historian's perspective on research and teaching, and that's particularly valuable for the kinds of issues that we grapple with at the Ford School. She's taught a number of courses, including science and technology as well as values and ethics, and she is frequently has appeared on the Ford School's teaching honor roll, and so I think that you will have a taste of her really engaging presentation style later this afternoon. She previously spent three years as an assistant professor of history at Trinity University, and in addition to her postdoc here at the STPP program, she has had research fellowships from the University of Virginia, Harvard, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She received her PhD in history and sociology of science from the University of Pennsylvania. All around, a great addition to our faculty. So before I begin, or before we begin, I would like to thank the Department of History, Science, Technology, and Society program, and in particular, its director, Gabrielle Hett, who is with us and will be speaking just in a few moments with you. They are post sponsoring today's lecture, and we're delighted to partner with them. Just a quick note about the format today. So in a moment, Gabrielle Hett will be introducing Joy's work and really situating it for you in the broader literature and providing some context. And then the main event, and Joy will be sharing some of the insights and the main points and highlights and implications of her work. She'll then take questions from the audience, and for those of you who are watching online, we invite you to tweet in your questions using the hashtag policy talks. We'll have a reception right after the event, and I hope that you will join us. There will be a book signing, and you can have your own copy of Armed with Expertise available for purchase and signing. And so with no further ado, I will invite Gabrielle to the podium, and then we will have the pleasure of hearing from Joy. It is indeed a pleasure to welcome Joy Rody, Professor Joy Rody, to the University of Michigan and to our STS program. The STS program is administratively housed in history, but it is a program in science, technology, and society, and it's actually an interdisciplinary program that attracts students not just from the Ford School and LSA, various LSA departments, but also from SNRE, the School of Natural Resources and Environment, the School of Information, even the Architecture School, and we've even had a nuclear engineer as part of our community. So for those of you who aren't familiar with STS, the acronym, or what our activities might be, STS is actually a global, interdisciplinary field that has been active since approximately the 1960s, that draws and brings together approaches from history, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, even on occasion literary studies and public policy, of course, to think about the ways in which science, technology, medicine, health are shaped by social factors and in turn shape our social world. So there are programs throughout the United States. Some of them are freestanding and grant their own degrees. Others, like ours, aim to be more multidisciplinary and appeal to kind of broad constituencies. There are also programs throughout Latin America and in Europe and now increasingly in Asia and even one now starting in South Africa. So it is really truly a global and growing field. And this is part of the field in which Joy situates her work. And so I thought I would take advantage of this moment to tell you a little bit about how Joy's wonderful book contributes not just to the discipline of history, which is, of course, a home discipline that she comes to, but also to the interdisciplinary field of science and technology studies. Now, first and foremost, and I think most strikingly for me, because I study nuclear things and so you'll see why this was most striking for me in a moment, Joy provides really a radically different view of the role of social science in the Cold War from the view that we are accustomed to having. Most work, there's been actually quite a lot of work on what social scientists have done in the Cold War and what their role in shaping the Cold War on both sides of the so-called Iron Curtain War. But most of that work really focuses on issues like modernization theory or looks at institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, other kinds of development institutions. Now, of course, I'm not saying that's not important work. It is important work. But what Joy has done here is to show us how social scientists became entangled with the U.S. military as part of its all-front strategy in the Cold War. And I think, so, you know, it's such what they were, they were tasked with focusing on the human side of this battle for hearts and minds that the Cold War was. But in essence, what Joy's arguing here is that it was social scientists, at least as much as nuclear weapons and nuclear weaponiers, and perhaps even more than nuclear weaponiers who were tasked with keeping the Cold War cold. And this, for me, is a major finding and something that really gets us to rethink the whole Cold War dynamic in important ways. The second, for me, major contribution of this book is that Joy shows the contradictory and even sometimes counterintuitive process by which this militarized social science came to undermine democratic debate about the role of expertise in policymaking. She does this by showing really the complexity of scholars' motivations, reasoning, ethical dilemmas. And she does it by focusing on ordinary social scientists rather than the high-profile policy analysts and social scientists that we are accustomed to seeing in these stories. She argues that it is amongst this rank and file of social scientists that we can best understand the dilemmas that they faced about confronting the garrison state and what their role in the garrison state was. So it turns out the contemporary debates about the roles of experts in democratic decision making, of which there are many, and which I think is one place where STS of the field kind of overlaps really productively and has really productive things to say to public policy as a field. But these contemporary debates about the role of experts in democratic decision making have long roots in the anguished doubts and self-reflections of these social scientists. And what Joy shows, she shows this really profound irony, which is that those who felt that funding from the military, funding from the Pentagon, compromise their scholarly ethics, retreated into the ivory tower, they retreated into the university, and expelled, in essence, colleagues who continued to get funded by the military, social scientists who continued to get funded by the military. And this had the deeply unfortunate effect of isolating those militarized social scientists from public scrutiny, from peer scrutiny, from peer review, in many cases, and thereby ironically eroding democratic control over the public policy that emerged from this scholarship. And for me, that is also a really profound finding. I recently had the occasion to review another book manuscript by anthropologist Joe Masco, who's at the University of Chicago, which explores the links between nuclear fear, the nuclear fear that was generated during the Cold War and our current war on terror. And what Masco does in that book is to trace continuities in how the national security state cultivated a sense of permanent existential threat, which in turn served to legitimate and also create a demand for a state apparatus that operates in this kind of permanent state of, you know, alert, open end of the alert. What Joyce manuscript does is really kind of broadens this story in some really chilling and compelling ways. She shows how the civilian social scientists that accompanies the US Army to Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, have a much longer history than most of us anticipated. So that today's counterinsurgency came from yesterday's counter communism efforts. So to my mind, this is really engaged scholarship at its best, engaged history at its best that will reach peers, not just in history, not just in STS, but I think a very broad audience indeed. So really, it's a pleasure to welcome you back to campus and to hear more about your book. So much Susan and Gabrielle for those comments. I would like to just stand here and bask in them, but I am tasked with taking you through the book with a little bit more detail. I'm so delighted to be celebrating the book here because as Susan mentioned, I was here as a postdoc and I slaved over this manuscript in this building for two years. So it's really meaningful to be celebrating it here. There are times columnist Nicholas Christoff set up a little bit of a commotion in academia with a column entitled professors, we need you, exclamation point. In it, he argues that too many academics have walled themselves off in the ivory tower, churning out turgid prose or as he called it gobbledygook, while the world waited for answers to pressing political, economic, scientific and social questions. Now scholars of course, hit back. My personal favorite was as a blog post by political scientist, Corey Robin titled, Lacuna Christoff is saving now. There is ample evidence that many people share Christoff's concern that academia is too far removed from the needs of policy. So a recent evidence from political scientists, Michael Avey, Paul Avey and Michael Dash is quite interesting in this regard. They surveyed top foreign policymakers from both Bush administrations and the Clinton administration. And what they found this slide is really up here to make us historians feel better. Not surprisingly, policymakers when they assess the disciplinary usefulness of the various social sciences found economics useful, but they ranked areas studies and history as more useful to them than political science. More to the point of my talk today, they also found that policymakers found least useful the kinds of methodologies that have the most prestige in the social science disciplines. So high level theoretical analysis, quantitative analysis and formal modeling they report as less useful than contemporary and historical case studies. Now in a stark signal that Congress too is skeptical about the value of a lot of social science pending reauthorization legislation for the NSF legislation that's passed through committee would cut funding for the social sciences by 22% or $50 million next year. Now from a historical perspective, this concern about the relationship between policy and the university is really just the latest incarnation of an ongoing relationship between the social science and the state. The social sciences themselves, of course, arose in the late 19th and early 20th century in the context for a quest for empirical knowledge to solve the pressing problems of rapid industrialization and urbanization. The relationship between scholars in the state has never been an easy or straightforward one. So as Gabrielle says, my book examines a crucial moment that I'm going to argue today has had lasting consequences for that relationship between social science and the state. The book tells the story of military funded social science research that took place during the first three decades of the Cold War. It's rise in the 1950s, it's fall from grace in the context of the Vietnam War, and it's unexpected resurgence in the 1970s. And in the process, I examine how Americans have understood and debated the relationship between expert knowledge, the national security state, and democracy. So for the next 15 minutes, I'm going to take you briefly through the main points of the book, I'm just drawing out a few things. During the Cold War, the social sciences mobilized more extensively than ever before for the military. While Rand theorists, of course, were busy thinking the unthinkable, other social scientists worried that communist political and ideological expansion was as dangerous as nuclear war. And so comparative political scientists, area studies scholars, social psychologists, and anthropologists joined forces with the military to try to win hearts and minds. This mobilization seemed to them to require the creation of new institutional forms, a middle ground between purely academic social science, which didn't seem relevant enough, on the one hand, and in-house military research, which seemed too applied and couldn't attract the right experts. So this led to the establishment of a series of new research institutes in the early years of the Cold War. These were situated in what I call in the book the gray area. They're halfway between academia and the military. They seemed to, they were funded in part or wholly by the military, depending on the institution, and they seem to be able to tap into cutting edge social science and yet remain relevant. So of these institutions, Rand is the most famous, but it's also different in that it wasn't allied with the university. Most of these were located on university campuses, but Rand itself was thought of as having a university-like atmosphere. I've listed a few others here, the Army, which wasn't known as a real bastion of social science research, had three of its own social science research institutes that were placed on university campuses. So the operations research office founded in 1948 was at Johns Hopkins. The Human Resources Research Office was located at GW. The focus of my book is the Special Operations Research Office, which was located on the campus of American University. These are less well-known sites of Cold War social research, but it's at these sites where hundreds of social scientists who are the rank and file of an emerging military industrial academic complex worked. Just to give you a sense of the kind of work that they did at SORO, they sought to identify and test theories about the laws of social change. How did social change happen? With the goal of predicting Communist Revolution and circumventing it before it could happen. If you're familiar with Project Camelot, Camelot came out of SORO and was a project exactly along these lines. They also set the laws of communication, cross-cultural communication as fancy term for psychological operations campaigns, but how you communicated especially with non-literate populations in order to enhance U.S. outreach for hearts and minds. And finally, they wrote dozens of area studies handbooks that made their way into embassies and military bases around the world. Now, at the time, the people who did this research didn't think of themselves as hired guns or servants of power. They thought of themselves as people who combined scholarship and relevance. Their work embodied an immense confidence in the ability of experts to find technical solutions to the social and political problems of the Cold War. Historians like David Hollinger and Jessica Wong have argued that science and democracy seem to march in tandem. They seem to be in symbiosis during the Cold War. Social scientists believed that their research could provide universally valid, impersonal, non-ideological solutions to pressing political problems. So they thought that their work promised the reasoned application of knowledge to policy. They also conceived of these institutions not as growing some kind of military-industrial complex, but as serving as a bulwark against the growth of the national security state. Americans viewed the growth of the national security state in the Cold War with ambivalence. On the one hand, it seemed very necessary in order to protect the United States against the dangers of an expansionist enemy. But at the same time, they worried about the effects of militarization, which historians basically defined as the encroachment of military values, military institutions, into domestic politics and intellectual life. They worried about what Harold Lastwell famously turned to the garrison state, centralized, secretive, dictatorial bureaucracy that could grow in the quest for American national security and that could reach into intellectual life, political life, and even personal life. The gray area seemed to mitigate this problem because the gray area mobilized private scholars working outside of the national security state to work on military problems. Now, the idea that the gray area could neutralize the dangers of militarization or that it could produce neutral knowledge that protected and extended democracy was very short-lived. In the late 1960s, the gray area came under heavy attack in Congress, among student activists, and among public intellectuals. It was labeled an incubator of the Vietnam War. It came to be seen as exactly the opposite of what the people who built it thought it was. So, for example, in 1968 and 1969 Senator J. W. Fulbright held some very public hearings that rhetorically tied military-funded social science to American failures in Southeast Asia. Noam Chomsky and other intellectual critics labeled the men and women who worked in the gray area a technocratic intelligentsia and accused them of using their expertise not to protect democracy but to circumvent it and to empower a growing garrison state. These men and women argued that the military social scientists didn't protect or expand or embody democracy. They were direct threats to it. New Left student groups and anti-war faculty on campuses across the country where these kinds of institutions were situated, held sit-ins and rallies, attacking the presence of military-funded science and social science on university campuses. Critics had three interrelated goals. One, they wanted to demilitarize universities. Two, they sought to dismantle the gray area but above all they wanted to reign in the power of what they called the warfare state. They wanted to restore democracy. The outcome of their actions, as Gabrielle hinted, is not what they intended. These institutes were by and large kicked off of university campuses, not just at American University where Soro was exiled at GW, but this happened across the country. Stanford, University of Chicago, Princeton, Columbia, military sponsored science research and social science research was kicked off campus in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By and large there are some exceptions. However, these institutes simply reconstituted themselves as private either non-profit or for-profit research institutes and they continued the work that they did before. So for example, American University and the military severed their ties in the fall of 1969. But Soro's researchers continued going to work. The Army simply created a new contract with American Institutes for Research or AIR and so Soro's researchers, they called themselves Sorons, continued performing their research into counterinsurgency, nation building, and psychological operations just under the auspices of a private non-profit research outfit. Similar events happened elsewhere, the Human Resources Research Office, another Army product, became a non-profit standalone, it still exists today. The Operations Research Office was purchased by General Research Corporation, a for-profit research institute. So the final chapters of my book detail the consequences of these events for the relationship between social science and the state. I'm just going to talk about a couple of the consequences today because we want to get to the party. But the first of them, which is extremely important, is the loss of transparency. Once these research institutes left their university settings, their research products and their very existence became more opaque. Soro, for example, had been nominally attached to academic lives at American University. Researchers published their research in the peer-reviewed literature, they attended professional conferences, they trained students, but once they were ensconced at AIR, they lost that contact with academic life. They stopped publishing in open journals, instead they published in the gray literature, which is a very tightly controlled circulation, and they did this partly to avoid scholarly and public scrutiny. They had been burned by the events of the Vietnam War. And I think the result of this is problematic from a research standpoint. The work that came out of these institutes suffered in quality as a result. So one example is just modernization theory. Modernization theory, the darling of American social science in the 1950s and through most of the 1960s, was largely discredited by the very people who had come up with it by the early 1970s. But modernization theory maintained its salience within the gray literature well throughout the 1970s. A second consequence that's also troubling is that once these institutes privatized, they also reached out to domestic agencies for research contract funds. What that meant was that people who spent the 1960s honing expertise on counterinsurgency, understanding say Vietnamese communist self, applied that knowledge to American leftist movements. And so student movements and also racial unrest in these studies treated basically as if it were identical to Third World Revolution. And so counterinsurgency experts advised domestic agencies, police departments, the justice department about how to control leftist social movements in the 1970s. Now at the same time as the gray area faded to black, as I say in the book, academic social science also retreated from public engagement. This isn't entirely true. I'm drawing with broad strokes here there are exceptions. But by in large, there were a few events that led the university to turn inward. First of all, some by events of the Vietnam War, some scholars intentionally stopped producing knowledge that they thought could be used by the national security state. Here specifically, anthropologists who had specialized in Southeast Asian village politics, for example, turned towards studying spoke life and musicology in order to explicitly to avoid producing knowledge that could be used by the military. At the same time, many social scientists, wittingly or unwittingly, intentionally or unintentionally, retreated into internal disciplinary debates. So intellectual historians like Thomas Bender have described the 1970s as an era in which social scientists got engaged in their own specialized concerns and spoke less to each other and less to the world outside the university. Now, there were still scholars who called on each other to speak truth to power and to provide relevant knowledge. For example, a younger generation of South Asian area study scholars called on each other to create radical critiques of American-born policy. And they did that, but those efforts had salience mostly only within the discipline itself. In other words, radical intellectual movements tended by the late 1970s to matter within their disciplines, but not so much beyond them. So we can think of the 1970s as an era in which the social sciences themselves became more self-enclosed and faked less towards politics. Here's my book is one of unintended consequences and bitter ironies and what historian doesn't love a declensionist narrative. But it has some implications I think for the present moment and this concern about a divide between policy and academia. My story indicates there was no golden age that got the relationship between social science and the state right. The 1970s, much of academic social science retreated from policy engagement. There are exceptions to this in security studies. This is also of course the era of the rise of policy schools. So we have this proliferation of competing institutions and competing orientations. But at the same time as many social scientists withdrew the gray area faded to black. It was insulated from academic and public critique. So researchers working for the military and other agencies found themselves ensconced in private research institutes that produced knowledge that circulated only through tightly controlled channels. And in these institutes they were now insulated from external critique. And so they were less likely to wrestle with the possibility that their research might be technocratic or anti-democratic. They remained responsive to military and other agency needs and they still do today. The war on tariffs put a premium on secrecy in national security policy. People have talked about a concern that we have a hollowed out state, we have a contract state where contractors are providing services and research to the military. And it is true that it's private contract researchers more than universities that are providing the bulk of the intellectual work on which the military still relies. So we're confronted with the fact that the current national security apparatus I think continues to reinforce this policy, this boundary between policy and academic social science that I argue in the book emerged out of the events of the Vietnam War. So with that I will take your questions. Thank you. I suppose that you could argue that it was, but it was very short lived. Perhaps longer than a decade. I think another way of thinking about it is it's hard to say from our current point of view, one, how we could go back to that. And I think, two, the idea that this research was actually neutral and value free wouldn't get much traction today. And so I think in that sense it wasn't as golden as it may have seemed to the people who were involved in it. Josh. Yeah, it's a great question that I don't know the answer to. I have no idea. And Richard. Oh, yeah. Yes, right. Yes. Absolutely. So the same story happens in the sciences. And that's typically been the story that people have talked about historians who work on Cold War science. Absolutely. There was huge debate within the physics community. You know, there's this label of the War Physicists, the Jason's who had advised the Defense Department become the sort of incarnation of evil. And there are huge risks in the physics community that really remains through the rest of the 20th century over whether or not people worked on nuclear problems. With physics and with other kinds of weapons research in particular, this story that I told about university divestiture is a little bit different because that was such lucrative research that what so universities like MIT would take that physics research weapons research, move it off campus physically, but maintain those contractual and classified relationships with the institutes that produce the knowledge. Richard. I'm wondering if there's a phenomenon now, and I don't know how I spread, but do you see it like Trey is getting himself to be reacting in the room? Yeah. Is it the same kind of phenomenon or is it sort of different because they're only there temporarily and can't get to compromise? It's a great question. So the Defense Department, I mean, especially with this turn towards counterinsurgency operations and Petraeus have mobilized to try and get social scientists, particularly anthropologists and area studies experts to work with them. And so, you know, famously the counterinsurgency manual had PhD anthropologists contribute to it. Now, within the anthropology community, that's hotly contested. And the result of that has been that some of the experts that Petraeus is able to reach out to are not very well respected within the disciplines. So I think that there are a lot of questions about the quality of knowledge that's being provided to the Defense Department. I mean, another example is the human terrain system, which, right, which embedded anthropologists and area studies scholars in military brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they were not able to mobilize people who knew the language for the most part or had the kinds of expertise that were necessary. And I think that's partly, you know, fall out from the serious acrimony that remains in this post-Vietnam moment. You know, people who consider themselves experts in their fields won't do this kind of work. Now, as to whether or not this is a movement, this moment in the military is going to last, I don't know. I mean, Minerva has been defunded. So and as we draw down, perhaps people will lose interest in the cultural side. Yeah. So just to put neither side on the next one to change? Well, I wouldn't, I don't know that I would say that they don't want to change, but I would say that the, that there are now certain structural barriers that keep these groups isolated from each other, for sure. Susan. Yeah, he's focused on military kinds of research. What are 15 raw parallels with all the government funded in social science? So. So domestic agency research, for example? I don't know what it is. I think the National Security Council has some kind of sensual simulations of the State Department, CIA, Commissions Report periodically. So I've thought I don't have the university kind of details. Yeah, no, you're absolutely right. I think that this does, the State Department is an interesting case because it had so much less money for research and it was conceived of by the military as being, or it's conceived of by social scientists as being opposed to social science research in the time period that I'm talking about. And when it finally did get the money to be able to do this kind of research, the contract research institutes that existed that had the expertise were these same institutes. And so what you see is that they're drawing on that sort of already militarized set of experts, for sure. And as far as the intelligence community, so most famously the intelligence community supported the creation of MIT's Center for International Studies, which went through the same kind of experience in this time period. So I think it holds, as far as the domestic story, I think it's a little bit different and I think that a lot more work remains to be done to kind of figure out how those things play out. Yeah. So what is it where there are flow from soldiers into social science? It sounds like there's stories about people being sort of hired who are already social scientists. Is there a sort of long-out scenario? Yeah, there's a few different things. So one thing to say about these institutes is that they were also places where career military men would go after they retired, they would go get a PhD or a master's degree and they'd bring their expertise. So that was another way in which the sort of gray area was supposed to create this really relevant knowledge. These researchers would, especially in the context of Vietnam, try to do a lot of work to maintain the knowledge that people gained on the ground and preserve it. And they would comb intelligence files. But you see a lot less of that kind of fine-grained experiential knowledge and a lot more of the desire for formal modeling and the kinds of things that now, at least this one set of policymakers are saying they don't find very useful. Alex. Thanks for that question. Is it possible to talk about the personalities of people who are doing the gray area of research and if there was a monitoring of when you're reading some of their work, there's more that's particularly rigorous for that you found yourself wrong too? Because I'm kind of curious about the background. Yeah. So their backgrounds are a little bit hard to trace because these aren't for the most part people who say left personal papers because they really are this rank and file. Mostly what I've looked at is their different orientations towards the relationship between their work and ideas about democracy. And I would say that by and large most of them bought into the sort of general Cold War vision of democracy is something that's guided by elites that should have expert input. They were really, they were Cold War liberals. So politically, they're sort of centrist. But they really, I mean, they really believed in the march of democracy along with social science. So that's the most I can really say about their personalities. And some of them, they really believed in the products that they were producing. So one woman who did leave her records. Initially, she had worked for the Dutch in Indonesia until she realized they weren't going to decolonize after the war. And she said, forget this. And so she was really kind of devoted to decolonization and saw this work as a place where she could really do that kind of thing. Yeah. Carl. So more reminisce is not in 1970 in Berkeley. I was a co-organizer of a informal seminar that felt like why you wouldn't want to do military research or have anything, not military, but anything sponsored by any military connections. I had two pieces of that. I think the fellow who really started the year before was a guy named Ted Kozinski. I sort of figured you had some connection. I do need to notice that the other co-organizer, another fellow with strong, strong mission connected to that name, Steve Smale, a field fellow mathematician and chatting with him a few months ago, I noticed all this one day now comes from military. Yeah. Well, and especially, I mean. I can do a lot of things. Yeah. And there's been a move on the part of the military to try and reach out to more social scientists and to provide grants for research. And especially with NSF funding, being in this very precarious state, but you're going to have to tell me more about Ted Kozinski later. Howie. A couple of questions, George. There's been great stories about the Kosovo and him and kinds of questions. One thing I'm interested in, the first question is regarding the early period in which you say work is being presented in peer-reviewed terms. Also, on the basis of personal recollection, the campaign here in Michigan, as I remember it in the early 70s, was, again, classified military. And it was on the grounds, those grounds, that empty war act that was discussed, I think, of much wider support among faculty who are thinking on questions having to do with, norms of communication entailed in ideals of academic freedom. So I think there's a little bit more about the issue of classification. And the other question is earlier, if you argue, as you argue, that the attack, the political critique of military public research in the social sciences had the consequence of people deploying from that type of communication. How would you compare that to say the early 1950s in which, on the other side, as it were, McCarthyist attacks, particularly against people like Otto Latterhorn, might have had an effect on encouraging scholars not to get involved in politics and politics. Yeah, so to the second question first, I mean, you're absolutely right. So the McCarthy era attacks certainly had a chilling effect on the social sciences. And it's been, of course, widely written about. I think the attacks in the late 60s and early 70s, there I just see so much more irony. I mean, because the intention was certainly not to move people away, necessarily from producing relevant knowledge. But certainly, there was this retreat from the sense that the state could use this knowledge. Now, somewhat differently, many anthropologists argued that that would be the case for any kind of knowledge that you produced. And so there's also a sense in which the retreat, well, for some people, was crucially important. For others, they thought it was sort of senseless because what could you produce that wouldn't be used? So I think, I also think the reaction was much, it was a much smaller segment of the community. It was very specifically anthropologists. And what was your first question again? Just, oh, classification. Yeah. So it was much easier to keep research classified or to keep it contained from the institutes once they privatized. The research that got published in the open literature in the 1950s and early 1960s was always along the lines of these are the theoretical contributions that come out of this kind of research that we're doing for the military. So one example would be communications experts who take insights into how you communicate with people, which was done under the offices of creating psychological warfare programs for Thailand at SORO. But they publish in the peer-reviewed literature, here's our method for how you sample a nonliterate population and go door to door and actually figure out what are the meaningful symbols, et cetera, for these people so that they are extrapolating to a new kind of theory. And so I think it speaks partly to the classification issue. It speaks partly to this issue that they saw themselves as producing important theoretical knowledge. But the way that this got increasingly difficult in the context of the Vietnam War where the Defense Department, which would always look over what anyone wanted to publish, was increasingly unwilling to let people present their research because it could be so politically problematic. Another outcome of the scrutiny that happened in the late 1960s was the Defense Department sent out a memo to all of the armed services and the heads of these research institutes that said anything that uses the words insurgency, internal warfare, et cetera, will from now on be classified. So classification intensified immensely in the context of this scrutiny. I don't know if that speaks to what you wanted to know about classification, but that was what struck me most. Susan? Your really interesting story is focused on the implications for both research but also engagement. Of course, one of the other things that academics do is teach. I'd be interested in your thoughts in the different decades and as the story unfolded about the implications for some of the research training, academic programs, doctoral programs and whether you actually see that interface in terms of how they were structured what the focus of them was and how that might be a part of the story as an example. Yeah, that's a really good question. By and large, the people who worked in these institutes taught when they felt like, if they felt like it. So they weren't required to teach. They were contractors with the military but paid by universities. So the teaching that happened wasn't sustained, I would say. But one implication of this effort to remove all of this military-funded research from the university was that there was this sense that for people who had defense contracts they were training their Ph.D. students recreating themselves, creating people who would then go on to work within this warfare state. And so there was a real desire by getting rid of these contracts to not be training people who would follow in those footsteps. One place you do see these people doing a lot of education is doing education sessions for people in the State Department and people in USAID. So there are a lot more involved in institutes in Washington and also at the military academies going in, you know, Ithiel Poole and others would go and give lectures about modernization theory to cadets so that they could understand how to think about the Cold War. So they have more of a teaching role in that sense. I guess I have one other hand, one last question, and then... So I work at the Institute for Social Research and we're very much oriented on data, collecting data, being data, mapping data, analyzing data. And I recall growing up when I was a kid, you can read in the data you just paid for a statistical summary of how well it would be and how well it would feel right. So our technical summary of is like chill ratios and body counts and percent of that would be a territory to capture things like that. So what I'm wondering is to what extent this transition in his encouraging social science and over the last few decades it's been used to be like that. It's very data for you and I'm wondering to what extent that can be used as defined by the influence of the monetary balance. I think that's a really interesting question. I don't think that it is that it's that causally linked. I mean, I think it's also, I would argue, the result of a sort of set of elite practitioners in the social sciences who are very wedded to the idea that social science can in fact be scientific and make clear causal arguments and clear, you know, to get beyond correlation, to get beyond description. That is happening around this same time period. It's actually part of what my next book is about. So we can reconvene in like eight years and I'll have a better answer for you. But I think the military's only one piece of it. I mean, those kill ratios that McNamara offered were, of course, discredited and that was partly why Fulbright and others could tie social science to these failures in Vietnam. So there's some internal disciplinary dynamics that I think there's still a lot of work to uncover. Okay, Mel, and then really it's the last one. So I realize you're concentrating on the military scientists. I thought I would just offer a comment on the civilian side since I, you know, I'm talking about the 70s. I worked in certain Moscow. I worked on U.S. Soviet bilateral relations and state departments. I did a variety of things in certain courses. Deputy Director of the Voice of America did a lot of programs. So on the civilian side, I have to say, you know, their books have been published about bridging the gap. I mean, bridging the gap between academia and policy. And I haven't seen the civilian side. I thought we did a pretty good job of this. Well, for one thing, we had academics coming over to the policy side. Brzezinski, Kissinger, you didn't think what you wanted about the experience with them. But there was this kind of, I wouldn't say it was a revolving door so much, but there was a lot of exchange between the two. INR, Intelligence Research and State Department, had a relatively small amount of money, but they sponsored studies that were not classified, for the most part, unless they had access to intelligence, classified intelligence. Secretary Schultz, whom I worked for for a couple of years directly, used to bring scholars over before he joined Moscow. And they had these Saturday seminars where they would get the points of view that might be different than what he was hearing. Policy planning in the State Department had a number of academics that would come in and then go back to academic work. So I think on a civilian side, frankly, as I read 70s and early 80s, I don't remember anything about whatever was being done in the Defense Department, especially with social science research. Nothing really seeped over into the State Department. I don't think I'm missing something. And so it may have been used within that defense complex, but as far as the overall policy toward Soviet Union, let's say, China, I think it did not permeate that part of the policy. Obviously, there was a reason to do this when you talk about psychological ops and things like that. Sure. But I always thought that this kind of synergy and the exchange of academia and the State Department had and the people that were working on these issues was a pretty useful thing. And I don't think anybody was compromised one way or the other. There wasn't any attempt really to skew the research. Right, right. And I think what, so there's a few things going on there. I mean, one is that there were certainly individual scholars who were very influential. And if you, one of the interesting things that came out of the avian dash research is that many policymakers cited Kissinger as being an extremely important social academic social scientists did not list Kissinger as someone who is extremely important or influential. So what you have, I think you have social scientists saying, wait, we're producing this knowledge and no one's paying attention to us. You have individuals who are influential. Then I think you raise another interesting point, which is I don't want to say that the divide is sort of like always in existence. It's this, or that it's always on people's minds. It kind of ebbs and flows in it. So there's a period for the 70s through the mid 80s where no one is talking about this. And by the late 1980s, people start worrying again, you know, gattus is writing pieces about how historians and political scientists aren't informing policy enough. You know, why isn't anyone listening to us? So it kind of goes both ways. It's on both sides and it ebbs and flows. So that's what I would say. But thank you so much, all of you. We have food and books. And I am happy to answer more questions. Thank you.