 Okay, so here we are, beginning with something that I sense there was some sense in the group might not actually work, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't try and start with it. And that is achieving a near-term political solution. So let's quickly look at the slides that frame the thing. Great recent successes by the Assad regime. The military conflicts largely stalemated, with most experts predicting a protracted war. I personally had a lot of conversations with people in the region who are talking 10 years, not a year or two years, and I think that's an important framework there. And we talk here a little bit, and again, you've got these slides in front of you, so I'm not going to go through them in great depth, but that the country is currently divided into multiple zones of control, with competing factions growing increasingly entrenched. The Syrian government has gained some important ground, rebel groups themselves splintering into multiple groups have become somewhat more entrenched, and indeed the Kurds have become entrenched, and that's become an issue unto itself. Next. So this is probably the most simplistic slide we have, because to suggest that we could even draw a breakdown of alliances is an act of great hubris. I've seen analyses of individual battles here where there have been a hundred different combatant groups. This just simply says here are some of the key supporters of the regime, here are some of the key supporters of the rebel groups, here's how it breaks down, here are some unaligned groups that are also extremely important. You know the key players, we mentioned them in the preceding session. Next. The Assad regime has expressed willingness to attend Geneva, but holds firm in its unwillingness to relinquish power, and you know, it's talked about a no preconditions approach to the discussion, and of course when we turn to them, they will reemphasize that Kristen is hurling technology across the room. There you go. And so that's, you know, they're going in position there. Next. The supporters of the regime, Russia seeking a negotiated peace, maintaining a Syrian regime. Now again, here's a critical question, when we say maintaining the Syrian regime, do we mean maintaining Assad, or do we mean maintaining a regime that carries forward some of the elements of the Assad regime? And I think that's an important question. And then there are some regional powers, clearly Iran, obviously then Hezbollah, and Iraq, who are also supportive of the Assad regime. Next. Then of course there are the forces opposing the Assad regime, national coalition and the Islamic front, via the lead of fragmented rebel groups, while the unaligned Kurdish groups attempt to establish an autonomous region, which is a bit of a replay of what we saw in Iraq. The national coalition has agreed to attend Geneva, given that humanitarian aid is allowed in, that the end to the government offensive takes place, and that Assad cannot participate in a transitional government. The Islamic front seeks a new Syrian Islamic state. Again, you can look at these slides as we go forward, but this gives you a sense, even at a high level of fragmentation, next. And then in terms of supporters of the opposition forces, you have Western powers aiming for a transitional government, which would include an end to Assad stabilization of Syria, and preventing further regionalization. And that includes the traditional Western powers. And then there are regional powers that have diverse interests, for example, Turks and the Turks and Qatar, supporting some factions that are somewhat more inclined toward the Islamic state idea, the Gulf state supporting more moderate factions. Next. Is that the last of the slides? Okay. So that gives you some brief overview. And now let's just take five questions to the group and everybody to just get a sense of where we are. How confident are you that there will be progress at the next round of Geneva talks, material progress, not sort of papered over progress? Highly confident is A through E, highly not confident. And so we're kind on the negative side of this thing with 80 percent of people on the highly not confident to not confident end of the... So maybe we can just skip this session. Next. What is the most likely outcome of the Geneva talks? One is no agreement. B is ceasefire with humanitarian aid. C is a comprehensive peace agreement. And D is postponed or not attended by critical actors. So once again, the cheery optimism that you have demonstrated early is continuing forward with postponed or not attended by critical actors is the leading candidate with zero percent of the people in this room, meaning no one in this room, thinking a comprehensive peace agreement is a possibility. And then very small, I mean, if you add to this that no agreement is one of the options, you've actually got almost nine out of ten people thinking this is going to be kind of a futile exercise. Next. Which Syrian group has the most leverage to influence the Geneva talks? The Islamic front, the National Coalition, the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Kurds or the Assad regime? And 80 percent of you got this answer correct with the Assad regime. Next. Which country will wield greater influence in Geneva or countries? Western powers as a group, A, B, Russia, C, Gulf states, D, Turkey, and E, Iran. We can ask a separate question about when Western powers becomes an oxymoron. Look, folks, pay attention to this in terms of the outlook of this group. You have pessimism as point number one. You have no peace process working out, the Assad regime having the most influence, and of the Western powers, Russia having the most influence. I think you can sort of see where the mindset of everybody in this group is heading. Is that the last one or is there one more? Okay. What is the most significant hurdle to negotiations? And if you don't think this is one of them, again, I'll ask you what you do think it is. Parties to the conflict believe they can achieve military victory, be refusal to participate by key parties, see parties are entrenched in contradictory positions, or D, there's a lack of consensus among key international players. Which of these is the most significant hurdle to negotiations? Clearly all of them could be hurdles. So, parties entrenched in contradictory positions is just edging out, in your view, parties to the conflict believe they can achieve military victory. Does somebody have another big obstacle that is not on this list that they would like to flag? Anybody here? Okay, Steve. Complete lack of consensus among the parties to the conflict about the terms of Geneva. So, C, it's a way of saying C. Others? Others. Okay, so, oh, there is. Oh, sure. There's a microphone. Another way of saying A is that parties lack a will to compromise. Okay. Thank you. So, okay, Manon. Hit the button. People benefit from the status quo. Which people? Regional actors, international actors, local actors. The status quo is. So the status quo is, if you're the Assad regime, it's fine. If you're Russia, it's fine. If it's Iran, it's fine. If you're the Islamists, it's fine. If you're civilians. So basically, it's only if you're the opposition, this is not so good. For the civilians. The civilians are screwed. Okay. Yes, go ahead. Yeah, it had perhaps the lack of U.S. interest or influence on the course of events. Well, that's interesting. If we think that's a critical factor here. And I think that's something that we ought to address. Okay, well, let's talk about this in our role playing perspectives a little bit and see what happens as we sort of get into a political process. We, you know, at one point in the drafts of this thing, this was referred to as Geneva, we sort of took Geneva out because we didn't want to get too hung up in the specifics of what is exactly happening. What we want to talk about is the best possible political process, whether it's Geneva or some other political process like that, we have a framework being brought to it by the United Nations. So if somebody here from the United Nations, let us know. Maybe Esther, you can lead us with that. What is the framework for this political process that we're hoping for going forward so that we can set the parameters, because then I want to go to the individual actors and say, what's your going in bidding? I would first suggest that you pick up some of the elements that were actually in Geneva one, which includes elements of a ceasefire in order to try to stop the actual direct violence, which includes the use of heavy weapons and other other aspects of the actual military games. We're going to freeze the military situation, the ceasefire portion of it. It then has some element of the political process has to be in there, and we'll talk in greater detail in a moment about that, but that will have to include something about elections, whether it's the existing 2014 elections or some other process for a selection of the next political leaders and who that is and who gets to say that that will have to be another element of it. And there will have to be an element that then lays out what are we the roles and types of power sharing in the future. And then what will be the international guarantees for that structure? I think it will be parts of the process, parts of what would be discussed in Geneva, Geneva, if you want to call that. And then what would eventually have to end up in some form of security council resolution at some point in the future, which then codifies the relationship among the outsiders in support of what's agreed by the insiders. Okay. This is not because I think they're more important, but because I think if we go and start with the Syrian actors and the regional actors to this process, it will blow up all the hopes of the international actors. I would like to start with the international actors and what their hopes are, because otherwise it's going to seem like it's mooted. So here we have Europe. Are you speaking on behalf of Europe? Okay. So you're going into the process. What is it that you want out of the process? Okay. So you're going to want to end to violence and UN legitimacy blessing, some sort of UNSCR. I mean, for the Europeans, the multilateralism piece will be critical. They're going to want Iran included in any sort of dialogue that occurs and ensure that there's a regional element to it, that all of the regional actors are included in the dialogue. Okay. Multilateral process, Iran included in the process. Where's the United States of America? Oh, I've walked by the United States of America. So what do you want out of this? We want Assad to go. It has part of a condition of a process. The United States policy in the meantime is containment. And to the question of Iran, perhaps the United States position is eventually maybe Iran has not accepted the Geneva principles, which is the position that the public position in the United States has right now. But I think that if you look at the United States, it's number one priority in the region is the nuclear deal with Iran. And it's going to resist the synergy until there's progress on the nuclear front. Wait a second. That seems contradictory to me. If it's number one priority is the Iran deal and it's going to help them by giving Iran a bone here. And that's the number. Why wouldn't they sort of use this to help get that priority? I don't think the politics here in particular, there perhaps, there's not enough confidence that the nuclear deal is going to work to begin the larger rapprochement that includes cooperation. So I think from a U.S. standpoint, the nuclear deal comes the confidence-building measure that allows the larger conversation to begin. I just don't think the U.S. wants it to be transactional. I don't think they want connective tissue between these two issues. It's better to keep them separate. I'm sure that's true on the surface. What I'm suggesting is that behind the scenes, you know, there's a little give and take. It's hard to disconnect these things. It's similarly like the United States with regard to the Assad regime as they want them to go. But a year and a half ago, the statements from the United States were much stronger on that than they are today. So there's some sort of right? Is there some kind of shifting going on? So the U.S. does not have a settled opinion. We'll tell you when we do. We have established a red line that Assad has to go. But we're beginning to have second thoughts. Red lines in Syria. I wouldn't use that terminology if I were you. We're beginning to have second thoughts about that red line. And that's in part because we're becoming increasingly worried about the jihadist element in Syria. And so internally we're trying to implement what it means for the region and for our equities within the region. Meanwhile, our Israeli friends are telling us stay away from the Iranians. Our Saudi friends are telling us stay away from the Iranians. And we're trying to facilitate a process that is going to bring the Iranians to the table and potentially bring representatives from Assad to the table. But given the United States is always divided within itself, I would say just from a political calculation there's absolutely no way the United States can come off of its of the strong position from the present on down that Assad has to go. Whether inside the discussions of the government that there's a recognition that there's maybe something developing that's worse than Assad from a political standpoint this has to be the most significant element of U.S. policy. That's a strong view and all I can think of is the 14 red lines that were crossed prior to taking no action the last time around. Do you want to make an intervention here? Well, you shouldn't be that differential to everybody else. It's just in the context of the going in bidding here though. That's where I want to stay. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you for representing international peacekeepers. I want to make a distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The U.N. has been moving in the direction of peace enforcement. We mentioned sending in a U.N. stabilization force which has been used by the U.N. and the U.N. for the first time is moving into this territory of peace enforcement. It's been very adept at peacekeeping multi-dimensional peacekeeping establishing peace once there's a peace accord to establish. The U.N. is not particularly good at peace enforcement. We have to decide whether or not we're going to move away from that. Right now we're going into talks and I'm going to take a couple of the outside views and then I'm going to do the inside views of people who have stakes in this. Let's go to Russia and then I'm going to go to Iran, Iraq, and Saudi in quick order. Let's do this fairly quickly. You're going in bidding. I'm going to go to the Iran, Iraq, and the U.N. as has already been agreed in Geneva the first time. An end to external support for the fighting, bearing in mind of course that we would exclude our own support as being external support because we're providing support as the Russian government to the legitimate government of Syria. A strong central government that can maintain stability in the country and that government should have an important role for the alloites and if there is some kind of a U.N. Security Council resolution that codifies all of this, we would not want some kind of military enforcement mechanism from the outside. Okay, what about Iran? If I can just add just very quickly, I think that the chemical weapons agreement has shown that the Syrian government has complied with this, is a responsible actor, and therefore I think that from the Russian point of view the Syrian government has proved it's bona fides so we have to go forward through this process including the current Syrian leadership. Okay, what about Iran? Iran is probably just as divided as the U.S. is internally over what to do about Syria generally and maybe specifically with regard to these talks. We thought about it in terms of three broad priorities. First, preventing the defeat of the aloe government and perhaps doing what we can to help the regime through these talks. Preventing the West and the Gulf states from helping their proxies in Syria and then ensuring that Iran goes forward. Okay, Jim, did you want to provide an Iraqi perspective here? Bill and I have an Iraqi perspective. Most importantly no strengthening of the Sunni radicals who present an existential threat to Iraq. Within that context of that, an end to violence Assad doesn't necessarily have to stay. He's not a friend of Iraq's or of Maliki's but again no strengthening of Sunni radicals. No regional Sunni Shiasism not having to choose between Iran and the U.S. and particularly for the Kurds. The Kurdish area is somehow protected not subject to significant violence and attacks. Okay, Daniel, did you want to add something? Consulting with my other colleagues in the Iranian government such as it is, I think we want to emphasize that from the perspective of Rouhani the faction within the government that's identified with pragmatism and is ready to endorse certain kinds of compromises and perhaps a second-order acceptable outcome for us would be Assad is not represented himself personally but there might be sufficient representation to guarantee that his regime endures in some form or the other. So there is some dissonance within the Iranian position in terms of the different interests in the Iranian government itself. And then the kingdom? Yes, I think we're very disappointed in the U.S. failure to come to work out a deal with the Russians and we're certainly very worried about an invitation to Iran to a seat at that table. We're frankly concerned the U.S. has not taken a more leading role to play in this and we're not so worried about the Jihadist in fact we would really like to see much more effort to build up support among the traditional elite. Okay, last two international actors before I sort of get inside the borders of the country, Turkey? Can I just add one thing to what he said? I think Prince Bandar has all of those views but my personal view is that for Saudi Arabia itself the regime is much more focused on its transition and its internal survival, frankly than on anything in Syria. Okay. Turkey? Okay, Turkey's going in position is that Assad must go because he is an obstacle to peace in Syria and as the perpetrator of so many war crimes the possibility of him and his inner circle remaining in power would be an insurmountable obstacle to peace so it must come out of Geneva that he has to go. Our second position is that the critical elements in the Syrian opposition that have support from the people, particularly some of the Muslim Brotherhood elements must be represented and have a role in governance. Third is that the international community must urgently address the humanitarian assistance part of the puzzle in Geneva and that all the parties on the ground but particularly the Syrian regime need to allow international humanitarian assistance to reach those that needed. The fourth is that any agreement must honour the contracts from before the war in order to help resuscitate the Syrian economy and the international community needs to address the Kurdish problem and ensure that it is contained and that it doesn't represent a further threat to regional peace and stability. Okay, we're going to take one last comment here from Jordan. Excuse me, Lebanon. Sorry. Microphone. We are the country of perhaps the greatest proximity both in terms of social, political and also historical terms with Syria. Although you're also the country with the least influence over the outcome. Yeah. That is true but if Lebanon falls apart I assure you it will be the country of the greatest headache also. There are a few points that I'd like to make. One is radical elements and extremists especially have began to sow their seeds if I may say so in Lebanon. So that's a primary concern for us in anti-settlements and we know that all parties of the conflict here have an interest in dealing with this issue but also refugees and the role that that plays in a country like Lebanon but also throughout the region in destabilizing the political consensus in neighboring countries. So the return of refugees and possibly the creation of safe zones on the border areas perhaps even with an important role to play there is a key element. Also a regime that is at peace with all components of Syrian society but also that does not project force onto its neighbors. We have a history of that and most important of all in the last point I think that encompasses all that is a Syrian, a Saudi-Iranian detente because really it is the interest, it is the Saudi and the Iranian regional confrontation that is playing out in these countries from Baghdad to Beirut and we in Lebanon respect the role of both Saudi Arabia and Iran as important players in the region who have a lot of influence in Lebanon we'd like to see both of them come to the table and talk things over. That raises by the way an important question as we talk about this dynamic which is there will be some things that are on the table as discussions about Syria but there will be some things that are essential to that that are actually parallel discussions how do you balance Saudi and Iranian interests for example in that kind of thing Jordan. We're on weak states but we in Jordan are actually somewhat ambivalent about Assad's survival we're going to take our cues from the west mostly from the United States and Saudi Arabia we're a little concerned because we're on the Security Council and there might be a vote that puts us in a very difficult situation because we are leading patrons particularly United States and Saudi Arabia we want a solution that doesn't alienate Jordan from its golf donors we don't want any more refugees in fact the UN Security Council seat is a good opportunity for us to charge more rent and we will try and make as much money off this as possible but you shouldn't be so in addition we are concerned about Sunni extremists and terrorism but like I said we have no dog in this fight other than some security concerns and refugees do you want to make a quick comment before I go to the you need this very quick though go back to the Iranian situation it's very important while there's no direct linkage there is obviously no formal linkage there is obviously a political linkage between the two because if the United States is able to get in agreement and get the Congress on board and so forth that will then affect the interests of a lot of countries particularly Iran Iran also will have some constraints because it will have to balance its desire to get the thing ratified from the United States with its interest in Syria and the more that the issue becomes ratification the more they are going to have to hedge in some way about Syria so these things are the same with the United States the Saudis are not going to like it but the fact is that we will be entrapped in a certain way and have our freedom of movement limited because we will need to get the votes to be able to have the thing ratified okay alright so no but doesn't mean you won't have a chance later if you bathe but first of all I want to go and get the rest of this in so the Assad regime going in bidding for the political process that might take place I'm going to just annunciate some overarching views and I think Murhaf is more up to date on the particulars but I think Assad has to be going in feeling very confident right now he's going to send his foreign minister in a delegation he's going to coordinate closely with the Russians because he knows he can never quite trust the Russians to not throw him overboard at some point if it serves their interests but he's going to try to keep them as close as possible and he's feeling very good about the fact that he's got his preferred opposition he's got the jihadists now as the bogeyman out there and therefore he believes that the west and particularly the US will eventually come around because they don't want a jihadist regime in Syria any more than Russia and if he can get Russia to continue to back and the west is going to have to come around so he can he's going to go into this with the idea that the opposition is splintered they're not going to be able to get their act together if I just let them go at it with each other boycott etc I won't have to be the bad guy in all of this maybe I'll give allow some humanitarian aid to go into certain areas that I control and the like but I'm certainly not going to do anything to compromise the good military position that has been won and indeed the hardliners within the regime are going to be watching me closely and I'm sure I don't give away anything that they want on the battlefield with those 40,000 casualties that you've indicated we've suffered upon the board by the way I want to congratulate you I was just in Israel last week and a very senior official said to me that the Assad regime's campaign to communicate to the world that their principal opposition was al-Qaeda was the greatest PR triumph of the past couple of decades they considered this to be a real coup so well done much like our congress chooses their voters more and more rather than the voters choosing our congressman I think Assad has largely engineered the rise of the jihadists yeah well when you've got 100 opponents you know pick the one you want to focus on Assad is the symbol of Syria's unity and sovereignty he has shown that he's a responsible leader he's complied with the security council resolution regarding chemical weapons his regime is fighting his secular regime is fighting radical Islamists who are out to eliminate minorities including Christians therefore Assad will lead the talks the outcome of which he will remain as president of Syria and you said earlier behind the scenes behind the scenes he will allow his delegation to talk and negotiate as long as it takes while in the meantime he makes sure that he can crush this thing militarily inside knowing full well he has the support of Russia Iran and Hezbollah while the opposition has allies that are one foot forward and one foot back okay gentlemen the core concern of the SMC is to secure the commitments it has received from its principal western backers to provide the military support that would permit it to establish itself as a meaningful presence among the armed opposition and to enhance its capacity to play the role of the sort of principal interlocutor in relations between the international community and the armed opposition on the ground and its principal concern is that continued delays in honoring commitments from the international community threaten to transform the SMC into an increasingly irrelevant actor within the armed opposition and one whose capacity to wield influence either on the ground or at the international level is becoming increasingly compromised. The FSA SMC is under considerable constraints many of the armed groups that are the most powerful in the country and they very do not want to go to Geneva they do not believe in a negotiated outcome they can't see it and those that do quote touch this process come under considerable criticism and so that really constrains what it is what the FSA and the SMC can do. Anything else? Does Hezbollah have a going in perspective here besides whatever Iran says? Well first I would say that our minister will go to Geneva if he is invited with a very detailed brief of what he can say and what he cannot say so Hezbollah going into these talks will be feeling confident that military defeat of the Assad regime is no longer on the table. Nasrallah has been calling for since the beginning of the uprising for a political solution involving the regime and the rebels so Geneva will come across as a vindication of what he has been predicting all along since the beginning of the uprising Hezbollah would definitely like to see Iran involved in the talks sitting at the table and will be hoping that this takes place however Hezbollah will be fighting on two fronts continue to be fighting on two fronts so while a ceasefire might be desirable in the interim Hezbollah would like to make sure before there is a ceasefire to secure the Kalamoun area the other parts of Kalamoun have been a direct source of carbons that have targeted Dahye so they want to make sure that Kalamoun is under control of the Syrian regime and of Hezbollah forces before there will be a ceasefire although they will pay lip service for ceasefire at the same time Hezbollah will be looking at these talks through the Lebanese lands so worried about what's going on inside Lebanon the growth of the Salafi groups but at the same time Hezbollah still believes to date that the situation in Lebanon with the Sunnis is still manageable and the death toll that the party is incurring in Syria is still also manageable vis-à-vis its own community Islamic may not be invited but you're probably of a going in position so Yeah, our going in position as the only Armenian jihadist you'll probably ever meet in the commander state in any rock in Syria is to say that our going in position is there should be no process we want to smash the table and everybody sitting around it and we will do everything we can to sabotage, scuttle any potential talks gaining any sort of momentum in particular by ensuring that armed groups will lose any credibility on the ground if they attempt to participate in these talks Okay I want to go to one more actor here before we talk about the first meaty issue which is what's the political power sharing discussion that we end up having here the political process that comes out of this do you want to say something on behalf of the moderate Arab regimes not right now but in a second okay but I want to talk to the media here okay as we're going into these talks what is the sort of expectations that are being said is it very low or I mean I just want to get a sense of the stakes in terms of the public I think normally you would say that the media in a case like this would probably play the role of downer except that the expectations universally are so low which I think has been demonstrated all too clearly by the votes that everybody took here that I don't know that it's really going to matter very much of course the media wants to have Geneva because it's just something fun to cover but the story at events like that is almost always the story of failure and I think it will be enormously difficult for the actors who do choose to engage in this process to be able to construct a narrative that the media would then want to pick up as a positive narrative so I think the likeliest thing would be a kind of self reinforcing process in which an extremely shaky Geneva like event and if you want you could think about other kind of global conclaves which wind up looking bad like a climate change conventions and things like that it would be very hard to construct a narrative out of an event like that that the media is not going to see as failure and therefore if anything reinforce the likely failure right although I think the flip side of this is it's easy for the media to write a story about a process like this it's hard for it to write a story about anything that's less focused and so sometimes a little bit more pressure is put on for processes like that simply because they end up being covered and therefore having political consequences do you want to talk about the going in bidding of yes okay go on going into Geneva this Syrian civil society would like everyone to think of three words humanitarian crisis the protection and representation the humanitarian crisis is not sustainable and there needs to be a strong role in parallel to the political process that really responds civilians are bearing the brunt of conflict on both sides and there needs to be a solution that goes into protection there needs to be specific programs designed for protection again civilians are at the forefront and on both sides both the rebel controlled regime how protection will be an issue and finally representation it's important that the opposition and everyone at Geneva represent the diversity in the Syrian civil society and Syria at large particularly again emphasizing the role of women and the role of minorities being at the decision making table not just at the front lines okay so we now have everybody's going in position we've got to get into the discussion themselves and what are the critical issues within the context of that discussion and you know I think almost certainly the first critical issue or the one that comes to mind first is what's the role of the Assad regime going forward or what is the political process going forward now I think we know the position of the Assad regime on that what's your position with respect to the SMC with respect to the political process within Syria in other words you're at the table you're working the international community you're trying to get an outcome what's the outcome you want with regard to the future of the Assad regime from yes okay fine thank you from the perspective of the opposition participants in the negotiations I think the first and most significant requirement that would define an acceptable outcome is a demonstrated commitment by the Assad regime to the implementation of the principles that were defined in the Geneva 1 framework and my sense is that unless we secure a commitment unless the opposition those principles include a transfer of full executive authority to a transitional governing body that would be constituted by the opposition delegations to the talks and the regime delegation to the talks but with each side having veto power over participants from the other side in order to secure a delegation that both felt was acceptable met their minimum requirements in the event that the Assad regime is prepared to honor that commitment and to transfer full executive authority my sense is the opposition feels that it will have secured a commitment and that the foundations will be in place for a meaningful political transition to be negotiated in the course of future iterations of a Geneva process without that core commitment by the Assad regime my feeling is that the opposition is very likely to conclude that the Geneva framework offers little hope for a negotiated settlement to the conflict okay from the others who are likely to be at the table at such a discussion in other words the other international powers and those with influence on the outcome is that the going in alternative position to what the Assad regime's position which is thank you very much we'll keep doing what we've been doing I hope I don't want to speak for you but that's roughly what your position is I mean are you supporting the position that was just articulated yes is Europe supporting the position that was just articulated yes so in terms of the major western powers you're supporting the position that was just articulated okay you guys are supporting that position as well that we're moving into a different as Steve articulated yeah I think this one of the Saudi goals is to see Assad out so that would be a first step okay well yet absolutely absolutely yet this is just absolutely unreasonable all together that the Assad government is the legitimate government operating on chemical weapons it's not promoting terrorism abroad the way others are promoting terrorism in Syria so now this is a non-starter we would remind our Russian colleagues that in fact the Russian government did accept the principles of the Geneva 1 framework and to withdraw from or to retreat from those commitments now raise serious questions about the commitment of Russia to a negotiated settlement of the conflict well it's a question of how one interprets those principles certainly what you outline in terms of the Syrian opposition being able to have a veto power over the Syrian government's delegation no that's just not acceptable at all it is an element of the Geneva 1 framework mutual consent of both sides to participation in the transitional governing body mutual consent within reason yes did the United States would like to speak and undoubtedly will solve everyone's problems as we always do well I think the there's a one vehicle that might behind this in a side room within a Geneva process might be whether there's the ability of the United States to convince Russia to convince Assad to announce a run for reelection in 2014 which then allows his regime to compete through a transitional process to continue to govern the country the side room we're in a side room that seems reasonable he's offering that to you Kapiti you're having a nice conversation how do you feel about that you know this would be a major concession for Russia to make and I think that that sounds like a yes to me well what we want to know what we want to know is how are we going to be compensated for this concession other words that we don't have to do anything we can just continue to do what we're doing we're not going to change course because you think it's the right thing for us to do you know again we feel that we have the common goal of preventing the jihadists from coming to power and so I'm not sure you're going to have to convince us that convincing Assad to step down will advance that goal what makes the Russians think they can convince me or convince Assad to step down I think I could win a free and fair election in the areas I control wait you're not in this room just yet we'll invite you into this discussion David I would only point out that it is now understood by all parties that it is not required that Assad step down from his current position as president commander in chief of the armed forces and secretary general of the Baath party in advance of negotiation it is required that he transfer his authority executive authority to a group which is then responsible for managing the negotiation process but he can remain as president he can keep that title no one is demanding otherwise you're not in the room either yes but secretary ghost is in the room so go ahead so I think this conversation thus far raises a process issue for the United States we had as is now public knowledge pre-conversations with our Iranian counterparts with respect to the nuclear deal and now the question arises how much can we cook up in advance of Geneva in bilateral conversations with Iranians potentially with Russians for sure with Saudis for sure and that and if we can't pre-cook it should we even go to Geneva in other words as we get into January do we want to go into a process that is doomed to fail or do we want to revisit it at this point you know you're now that's right where we are right now is that you're trying to pre-cook this deal and the initiative was opened up and there's some discussion about this we've heard the Iranian I mean the Russian response to this is there an Iranian view on this you know would be yes well several yes between the two of you at least three views but so what you know you're hearing this buzz and who knows the Americans may be having secret back channel conversations with you about this what's your view well sure the responding to are the remarks from Comrade Katz Comrade Yoast we don't insist that there's any formal linkage with the Geneva nuclear talks but point of fact we want to be cooperative and we want to demonstrate that we're ready to be helpful on the Geneva front with Syria providing that there is progress on the nuclear negotiations and beyond that we join I just want to underscore this again I don't want to overimpose my views on this but it seems to me pretty obvious that you're going to make this point whether it's explicit or it's not explicit and you're going to play this for every bit that it's worse is there unanimity among the divided Iranian delegation on this point and look we have to start by saying that we don't certainly and probably we will have no sense there where the supreme leader is going to come down on this what guidance he will give to the delegation and even then whoever represents the delegation whoever dominates the delegation the other side is also going to try to play as hard as they can against whatever the supreme leader says there is a strong sense that the hardliners may be trying to play against the moderates within the Geneva Syrian talks play against the nuclear talks I think they will be as hard over if not harder over than the Russians are in terms of no concessions Assad is winning we have to help him to win and everything about Geneva is simply designed to undermine him but again there's also this element of they will also be playing against their own moderates and they are having to deal with the upset associated with the attack on their intelligence chief by sergeant Nicholas Brody in last night's episode of homeland oh sorry spoiler alert spoiler alert forgive me there's a discussion going on with the Saudis about all of this what do you think will come out on this well I'd like to say that first of all you know that we always favor consensus and we do have consensus even though my colleague who's not a member of the El Saud is a little bit worried about the future trust me we're not now we recognize we're in these private rooms now yes in our private rooms we recognize that Iran and Russia have certain vested interests whatever happens in Syria in terms of who governs you have interest you've developed friends you want to protect we understand that so let me ask the Russians since you introduced this first what do you want what will it take to have you give up a Saud if you could have say a say in or know that your interests would be protected whether those are people or no use of a port whatever and we know that or possibly a process whereby they could be assured that there would be a successor regime with sufficient Alawite components exactly I'm thinking of the friends that they've developed both among the Alawites and others in the important security and you know whatever communities and the same question I would address to my Iranian friends you've just said Zarif up and down the Gulf I think it was probably Mr. Rouhani second proposal that not just with the U.S. but improving relations restoring relations with us and our GCC colleagues and a good idea and you know that we've supported your civilian nuclear programs we want them to and we understand your concerns about oil and a lot of other issues so my question to you as well is what price is a Saud to you and is there some way we could find say a consensus or a way of bringing this together is a Saud that important is that what we're really arguing over okay so here's the deal okay a Saud you know can stay until there's a political transition that we've all agreed to and in that transition there is going to have to go but we're all for democracy but how much do we need so we'll set up a process whereby you should feel fairly confident that there will be a successor regime that will have a sufficient amount of power and that successor regime will at least control a sufficiently significant part of the country and the institutional apparatus of that country or port etc will be protected that's the deal you were going to cut right how do you feel I think the first thing Russia would say is a Saud is not ours to give up okay again that sounds like you're done but go on for the Russian government to make that case to a Saud we would lose whatever leverage we have over a Saud as soon as we start telling a Saud that he needs to go so I think Russia is not very likely to make that case to a Saud in an effective way secondly however I think the broad parameters of what was outlined by the Saudis and by our moderator is basically what Russia is looking for let me just add one addendum there's been a suggestion of Russia taking a Saud I think highly unlikely we'll get to that in a second so Iran what do you think well let's start with the Saudi offer which of course is always very interesting to us because they're right we certainly do have a price for the Saudi Saudi we don't know what that means but we'll let you know when it's good enough for us free elections in Bahrain and support to Syrian and Iraqi jihadist groups stop support for the Hariri Network in Lebanon should I keep going now because you're not going to get any of those things yes go on from the perspective or at least the rev guards where the spring leader comes down ultimately is not obvious on this but certainly from the point of view of the Javad Zarif and Rouhani and their political career to some extent is going to be based on resolving these problems then they know it so we would while trying to let's say deal with the pressure from our own colleagues among the revolutionary guards we would consider some sort of compromise formula by which down the road it would be clear that the Alawite regime would survive in one form or the other but President Assad would step down and get out of the way could I just add one Saudi point which is you're distracting attention away from the Palestinian cause and that's wrong right good point we need the Israelis to make peace with the Palestinians on Palestinian terms I forgot and we are ready to accept any solution to the Palestinian Israeli totally acceptable to all Palestinians of course they're sort of discordant notes to the nature of this exchange which I'm just going to set aside for a second I'm sensing you know and you guys can you know correct me if I'm wrong but before I go forward correct me I'm sensing you know the way the chips are falling here most of the world would be okay with or could probably strike a deal where you move to political transition you throw Assad under the bus you provide some provisions for these folks here and you could at least get to the next stage which is saying let's set up elections at a certain point let's move in that direction now we're going to have a problem here because I don't think these guys are going to love this what did is that roughly what you're hearing here the question is whether or not anybody really believes that everybody's going to carry out the agreement that they're suggesting and here it does seem to me that the opposition in Syria before it goes to Geneva has clearly set out a certain set of conditions and it may want to see some of that put aside the question of the transfer of executive authority for the moment and there are two other conditions one is that they in fact have humanitarian access to their besieged areas because that's what they need in order to in a sense keep the faith of their people and stop it seeping away to the jihadi groups and the second is release of some political prisoners and if they don't get something it's going to be very hard because they know that the transfer of executive authority is not going to be done ahead of time it's going to be a very nebulous kind of decision that they're not really convinced that is going to happen even if they see Russia sort of winking about it and the U.S. talking quietly to Iran about it they're not going to be really convinced of what's going to happen let's just take that okay there are these other issues he brought up two but what if we cut you like a deal and there's a certain amount of cash that enables you to have a certain amount of humanitarian something or other and we'll worry about the political prisoner stuff later you know I think there's been a lot of discussion about whether one of the potential outcomes of an initial round of Geneva that might then pave the way for a more substantive process is success in a number of confidence building measures of precisely this kind one of the critical questions that the opposition faces is whether entering Geneva with all the political risks that entails would would make those very modest kind of payoffs sufficient for them to be able to go back to their constituents and say that the Geneva process is worthwhile and my feeling is that whatever these side agreements or supplemental kinds of deals or sweeteners might be part of a Geneva conversation unless there is movement on the critical issues of a meaningful political transition that will lead to a government in which Hafiz Alasa does not play a role that's going to be a very hard sell what you're saying is that's the most important thing these other things are nice to haves not neat to haves Kristen I think what you're hearing from our participants if you have a problem make it bigger and what we're hearing here today is that Syria is not a big enough problem but we need to deal with the issue of an Iranian Saudi detente which would help significantly and with a US Iranian detente or at least a deal so if those issues can be addressed what our participants are suggesting is that it may be used to overcome the opposition both from the Assad regime and from the Syrian opposition however unjust all the parties in Syria might find that David I think the way you summed it up in your question is exactly right a deal by outside parties is going to be necessary here but not sufficient number one number two given the relative power of the parties going into Geneva there's going to have to be a deal that some form of an Assad regime without Assad to remain in power and that's the only way you would then open up the door to a possibility of a ceasefire and the possibility of significant new humanitarian assistance if that power relationship shifts over the next weeks or months then you might have more leverage on the part of the United States and Europe to put more pressure on the regime but the way things stand now Assad Iran Russia should want Geneva to take place tomorrow and the United States might want to think about postponing which is not going to happen and Paula would like to if I could just add I agree with these points that I heard but I would just add two points one is you suggest in the plan about not only you know ways to achieve a more permanent agreement but an interim and so the issue is at least I heard around the table even with all the diverse viewpoints there were several common interests if you look at it one is the humanitarian another is protection which Manal mentioned humanitarian protection and even the issue of representation although there were different views to be sorted out so that's one point and then just the second point is the common interest certainly is a confirmed ceasefire and also having really all humanitarian points addressed it should be non-political one second, yes sir I think this is heading in the right direction in terms of which key players are going to be instrumental in the final outcome but I think as we discuss who sits in that back room ultimately the final decision will be made between really three external parties the United States Russia and Saudi sad to say but in reality I don't think the Assad regime or the opposition will be in that room when that deal is struck so the question is between the United States, Russia and the Saudis what are you willing to accept and what are you willing to throw out and I think as we progress this is in terms of my assessment this is I think where a deal will be made between those two parties let's deal with one dimension of that deal right now we're sort of brokering something here and it's something about a transition to a political power sharing arrangement which there's a significant role for an Assad regime that doesn't have a Assad in it and that's been put forth and certainly the US and the Saudis seem to agree with it and the Russians and the Iranians are willing to do some work on it so congratulations the Saudis and the United States are not going to have to present this to Assad you do so you're now in a room with them please explain to them how your continued support is contingent on them doing a few subtle changes before we do that could I just indicate I'm not sure Russia can I don't think Putin can do this I think that while he signaled that in fact he can live without Assad I don't think Putin can be seen to throw Assad under the bus remember he's got all these allies in Central Asia if he's seen as being willing to sacrifice Assad these guys all go over to China okay well how does that happen then you're willing to go along with this deal you don't want to be seen as throwing him out of the bus so what do you suggest two ways it seems to me it's the United States that has to persuade Assad to leave or and I'm sorry to say this something unfortunate has to happen to Assad to make it impossible for him to function as president has happened in Yemen the only reason why we had this deal transferring power in Yemen was because the president became strongly injured strongly injured sorry about that sorry my English isn't so great or let me just add or somebody inside the Assad regime needs to make this case to Assad okay well somebody's got to make this case and you guys are not you're copping out so who is going to make the case on behalf of the Russians I nominate France so I I what about Iran come back to them no thank you for bringing us back into the back room Europe's has some hurt feelings feeling a little left out but we France feel that we just don't have the leverage we don't have the influence over Assad we shouldn't be the ones to go to him it's really the Russians that have the potential relationship I mean even that I have to say Europe doubts the influence that the Russians have over Assad but if in a contest between France and Russia we'd certainly nominate our friends in Moscow to go deliver the bad news okay and they don't want to deliver the bad news that only leaves one other potential player of course you got a few chips in this game so maybe this could be to your advantage are you guys willing to go and cut this deal okay Turkey has played such a constructive role in this so far yeah go okay we're having an Iranian internal discussion here you know it so depends on who shows up at the table which depends on who the leader sends to the table the Revguards position is going to be and I think it's a nice echo there screw the Russians if they want to cut the deal let them get Assad out of the power take five or six motorized rifle divisions and good luck getting it there from the guards perspective we will back Assad you don't need the Russians we'll provide you everything that you need but again we keep making this point that we don't know where the leader is going to be it is likely that they're going to be two very different perspectives within the Iranian regime on what to do under these circumstances and at the end of the day it's going to be the leader's decision okay look we've got a problem here you started a process congratulations for that we're moving in the direction of the process we've heard I think an unvarnished and accurate opinion on the part of Yusuf here that the US or the Saudis or the Russians are really going to be the people with some muscle behind all of this thing we've already heard that the Saudis care but they don't care that much they want to play a constructive role but they're not going to put their shoulder into it the Russians are willing to cut the deal but they don't want to look like they're cutting the deal so what do you do? well we would be willing to offer substantial money to Assad if he wanted to go somewhere thank you well I think a couple of things first we will make John Kerry the starting goalie for the Olympic gold medal game against Russia that may help I do like the idea of Saudi Arabia providing medical care to an Assad who's strongly hurt from a US standpoint we will go to Geneva valuing a process and if that process takes a while to unfold I think that would be content I would be an acceptable outcome to the United States that the process has started and it will continue for an indefinite period of time as it ripens along the lines of perhaps a nuclear deal where some arrangement can be made a trade of Assad for some detail that's of value to the Iranians that the United States can live with so I don't know that we require an outcome that necessarily has to be resolved on January 22nd Julian or France since we're out of ideas can we call Brahimi and put him right here in this empty seat I think I would if I were in the US shoes and they take advice from the SMC all the time we know I would encourage those back channel conversations with Iranians I would build on Iranian concerns about the stability of minority ruled regimes I would make the case that it is in the mutual interest of Iran and the United States to have a moderate Sunni-led government in Syria with the capacity to participate in the suppression of the jihadists who are the principal security threat that both of our governments face by the way who said anything about a moderate Sunni-led regime in Syria close to that one of the contingent components of this deal is that there is a transition and that there is an Assad regime that continues on but this is a back channel conversation which may not be guided necessarily by all of the but the Iranians may be perfectly happy to have another government in there but that it may not actually be a moderate Sunni-led government is what I'm saying true this grows out of some conversations I've had with Iranian foreign ministry officials in which they've indicated this general framework is providing a potential basis for a back channel deal I want to move forward through this quickly first of all Turkey is seriously injured that you haven't taken this into consideration until now considering the fact that Turkey has a longest border if you look at all the jihadists in Turkey and the one place where the Turks can be influential is to talk to the Iranians in some ways the Iranians and the Turks are vying for influence over Syria and the Iranians are worried that the Turks will take if Assad falls that it's going to become a Turkish protectorate which it will be because the Turks have the money the way with all and everything else so if you want to send a message to convince the Iranians that in support for Assad the Turks might be A. the conduit and the Turks may make like a deal very very quickly Andrew is that if we have a deal that meets Iranian interests and ours then we can serve as the conduit we can both provide the bad news to him and we can also work with the Iranians to identify possible replacements that are the same regime but new leadership okay let's come back to that in a second Esther the different parts of the UN secretariat would actually come in talking to these member states because they're usually serving tea in the back rooms and say first off that we need to have the humanitarian corridors issue again so Valerie Amos is going to come up and say wait a minute make sure that you're working on the humanitarian side because you're going to come back to the UN on supporting for that so maybe as part of the Geneva conversation cross-border included you will have the secretary saying wait but you're all going to come back to the UN and you won't pay for it so we want to have something put in now about a trust fund to fund all of this that you're going to want to do and then of course High Commissioner for Human Rights Pele will be talking about getting access for the commission of inquiry and probably Ambassador Brahimi will probably come and say whatever happened to transitional justice and where is this going to fit into this picture again throwing something on the table to make sure that we can get access to the commission and then to provide some of the member states as well okay so here's where you guys are all this is going on and you have a sense of all this is going on and so you're now coming in knowing that essentially your biggest supporters are about to throw you under the bus we don't know that what you know what you're hearing is that they might be willing to throw you under the bus and that there seems to be a willingness to go to providing some continuity for the Assad regime but not for Assad and there may be some cash floating around out there and there may be some other elements of the deal before somebody has actually proffered the deal what's your view of how to handle the situation we can only smile at all this we're a bit nervous but we smile money has been offered and asylum has been offered early on and we rejected this we are confident that our Iranian friends know what a great stake they have in Syria not only them but Hezbollah it's the most enduring strategic alliance in the Middle East we don't think the IRGC the coup force and their leadership would throw us under the bus we also are confident for the reasons that professor Katz mentioned that Putin is not about to throw Assad under the bus because there is that effect on other leaders however we are a bit nervous and we are not born yesterday we know that there are backroom deals and so when push comes to shove and the knife is under our throat we would be willing to consider doing something about the siege but on the condition that we distribute ourselves the relief that goes into those neighborhoods that are under siege otherwise we will continue smiling okay so they're continuing did you have a comment that you wanted to make down here from the constructive please don't forget the extremists we may not be in the front room or the back room but we are there and we are forced to contend with so all of this has been happening we've captured a few additional border crossings we've picked off a few members of the SMC to show our displeasure and our recruitment continues a pace we have more and more foreign fighters coming and bolstering our ranks and we have many many youtube videos to show that so just to be clear we may not be in the room but we are very much on the ground okay this is an important point I'll come back to you in one second this is an important point the extremists are out there and the extremists who don't have any interest in a peace deal is by getting some kind of deal inside and getting everybody to isolate them and to try to do what's necessary to contain and weaken them is there a different view towards that yeah the only way to deal with extremists is to empower civil societies to empower local governance within their areas to sort of at least retard the increased influence of extremists I have to say that's very optimistic what I was thinking was that the way you deal with extremists is you take away their money and you kill them but I could be wrong about that let's hear more from civil society I'm gonna have to support my delegate in terms of it's definitely civil society and the short term it's a combination of approach where you suffocate the funding and access for them but as long as civil society or people on the ground are feeding and providing access they will always exist so it needs a combined approach otherwise you're just looking at a short term solution unless they're defunded and they're suffering then you've got a problem yes we simply do have to note you could have added funding there's a lot of money coming from Saudi Arabia and other pouring in from private sectors into that group extremist do you want to say something else? just to play the devil's advocate and all of this I think the more that yes funding is a great point skip but the more that we are out there showing our presence and that we are forced to contend with I think the more likely it is that the the reflexive response will be to bolster the Assad regime that this will increasingly be viewed as a counter-terrorism issue the more vocal and visible we are Karen you're nodding your head I just want to hear one I think she's exactly right the more the jihadists act on the ground the more the US resolve weakens to get rid of Assad you heard the US delegates say we can start this process it can take an eternity no problem for us but as Judith said for us there is a problem with all of this turmoil okay what did you want to say briefly though we're running out of time yes having just returned from the Turkey-Syrian border yes having just returned from the Turkey-Syrian border one other solution is stopping the jihadists who are all coming through Rouhanli and several other Turkish sites there's no obstacle to their being able to cross the border into Syria so the Turks also have to be engaged George my colleague was prescient when she said earlier that you're talking about now how we deal with the extremists now that you've got your nice little package deal here which involves who goes after the extremists and this sounds like a movie I've seen before where you strike your deal and then you turn it over to the Secretary General and his minions and say you guys are now not only you're actually going to go play the role of counter-terrorists and peace enforcers and you're going to have the responsibility of dealing with the extremists in some military kind of way I'm getting increasingly uncomfortable with that kind of a scenario okay very very quickly from the point of view of Rouhanli's government we believe that the Jihadists represent the single most dire threat to the political stability and we want to do everything we can to work with our colleagues to address that problem and we believe that we do not want to throw Assad under the bus that is incorrect but we are ready to support a solution that would involve his retirement down the road and the emergence of a power-sharing government which the regime is solidly represented in the final analysis two words to reinforce what the colleague has said the elephant in the room is also the fact that there are non-state actors that are profiting from this situation as they were in Libya which means basically that we are only moving the post in terms of to the next process particularly those who are basically organized crime those who are funding these actors and getting strong the other thing is that the UN is not equipped particularly the secretariat in a house divided by the government that is not the point where we are at in this thing we can come to that but the point we are at is can one strike a political deal in this situation and we have an X factor here and the X factor is we are not going to resolve everything we know there is not just one scenario but I think the relevant X factor and I don't think anybody has disputed an extremist activity that might help the Assad regime in terms of people leaning back away from this deal if there were not such an uptick in that activity if things stayed a little bit more stable then what you might have is the ability to strike a deal and I want to just go and say I want to take this a step further how much pressure has to be put on the Assad regime to accept stay in power through the transition but after the transition the core of your brand may remain but you personally have to leave what could tip the balance other than being strongly injured or whatever the terminology remember that Assad learned about the Russians from his father which is you need them you take their help but you never trust them and therefore he understands that this is a scenario that's out there although he doesn't believe it's likely to come into play as early as this January meeting but he understands we're just in a process now and at some point in the process looming out there is this pressure and what I want to know just from the purpose of our discussion because we're not going to resolve it or play it out is to be put on Assad that would make him say okay I'll take that deal okay right now I don't think the Russians have that but you're fighting me you say I'm fighting you but I'm just saying the Russians aren't enough that's pressure and I'm saying the Russians don't have the ability to pressure Assad out of power if he believes he has Iran his Balla and the Alawite community behind him will argue he will let the jihadis he will let the jihadis get in territory what if Iran is not behind him well if Iran is not behind you which means his Balla is not behind you then he would go and consult with of course other senior Alawites to see if his position was still viable or not Ted I'm stepping on your turf support from within the Alawite community that's the one place that might lead Bashar to have to leave if he lost the support how does that play out well someone has to convince the Alawite community that it is no longer in their vested interest that he remain in power if they wish to be part of this new government part of the transition then they have to make some compromises and if that is getting rid of Bashar he will have to go but they will come from within that community and not I think from the outside I'm just getting out of my role and here building on what's kept but then somebody need to give guarantees to the Alawite community right now nobody is out there to give those guarantees and the behavior of the jihadis is definitely not reassuring for the Alawite community that's the kind of process which is as Steve referred to it is kind of a thought experiment here we're trying to do a stress test different elements of this thing and we've gotten to the point where there could be some pressure but one of the things we've just heard now is you need Russian and Iranian pressure and then we're saying if you had Russian and Iranian pressure and Hezbollah pressure and then you precook this a little bit within the Alawite community and now you're sort of closer to something that sounds like a deal right I think at some point also we have to also distinguish between we have to give room to the role that Hezbollah can play in also affecting the Iranian decision-making process partly is that right now the threshold that Hezbollah has suffered in Syria is still manageable but at some point there will be a casualty threshold in Syria for Hezbollah that will be hard for them to sustain and that's when I think that decision will have to be factored into the Iranian political calculus very quickly since the Emirates ambassador on forward one of the scenarios we've been looking at is Russia, Saudis, Americans try to cut a deal and the issue has been Iran and our Syrian colleagues said well look we can do without Russia if we've got Iran if Iran has a corridor through Iraq to continue to resupply Syria as long as there's a de facto alliance between Syria, Iran and Russia the Iraqi corridor is not that important because Russia can ensure that the sea lanes remain open et cetera but Iran needs Iraq if it wants to go alone if Russia is thinking of cutting a deal with the United States I think the real problem in Syria is that there is no Sunni Nelson Mandela who could reassure the minority regime that they're going to survive but getting into Russia one of the things that strikes me is if the threat is the jihadist threat as Mona seemed to indicate is definitely still there how can you convince Russia that that threat is better dealt with than with Assad I think that's the threshold now it strikes me that maybe that can be done but essentially before that can be done you have to have some agreement secret between the Syrian defense ministries Syrian security services and the so-called moderate opposition that somehow that alliance has to be put together and then you can maybe dispense with Assad but otherwise I don't see how the situation is going to be better off without Assad we've got five minutes left here I didn't quite finish my thought but the thing is I have something called G2 which is main's purpose is not to look after what Israel is doing it's to monitor the loyalty of the officer corps and the non-coms and so I'm looking constantly for that guy who wants to deal with the Americans or the Russians and strike this deal behind my back and if I find him I'm going to have him killed right away he will be more than severely injured he will be severely dead so and the other thing I'm going to be telling my community I'm willing to go but do you think you can agree on one leader one policy to speak with a coherent voice because we're the only ones who've ever spoken for the last 40 years for the Alawite community and so I think I can rally the Alawites I'm going to throw a curveball in here we only have four or five minutes left I want to throw a curveball in here and say to you that's what he's saying he's now Assad you're the rest of the regime you see the handwriting on the wall there is some pressure can we turn you can we find somebody within your group to throw him under the bus that's precisely the point I wanted to make that we are assuming here that the Alawite community is a monolith and that they are all behind Bashar al-Assad well the Alawite community is not a monolith and they are fragmented they are clanish there are some in the opposition there are others who are sitting on the fence there are still others who for them it's an existential battle for sure I think it is the Alawite elite that we have to be looking at the barons those heads of the striking forces and I think here the key is Iran if they see that Iran is going to be leaving Assad under the bus they will jump ship who will they jump ship for they will jump ship they will defect before it's too late when they sense that Assad the persona of Assad the house of Assad is finished well but the flip side of that coin is to say the international community we're more clever than it seems to be thus far but goes to the Iranians and says look we know a deal's got to be cut here the critical issue is getting Assad out of the picture pick who you think is your guy in that regime and help us with Hezbollah and some others to start peeling away the underpinnings of support not one at a time allowing Assad to kill them but you know to sort of sense that there's a tipping point within the core regime I mean that seems to be a critical issue these are the leaders of the striking forces these are the leaders of the divisions with heavy artillery the air force the intelligence the enemy leaders that sustain his power okay very quickly yeah I think Moroff's right you'd have to look at perhaps a non-Assad family non-mahluf the immediate ring outside of the core some of the intelligence chiefs and so on has a starting point but Ambassador Kutuf is right they're looking for those guys there's a lot of speculation that actually the assassination attempt in June of 2012 to get rid of some of those figures who were bargaining with the international community but unless you do that unless you find that group of alouis with guns and political power you're not going to have you're not going to be able to do this but just consistent with our overall goal here which is best possible peace what we're trying to do and this is the critical issue at this particular phase of the game we're trying to say what does it take does it take the Russians no does it take the Russians plus the Iranians well that's part of the way but actually it takes the Russians plus the Iranians plus some work within the Alawite community and within that regime in order to sort of tip the scale because it's too easy for Islamic extremist groups and others to support the case that you need aside you've got to sort of live with this okay very very very quickly because we're going through all of this Mona was next very quickly I mean my sense is unfortunately we've been trying for months years to peel away these levels of support for the Assad regime with no success and my sense is the situation on the ground only deepens their attachment as a community I would submit that if you've got Russia and Iran together to withdraw support from the regime that would constitute a key tipping point and for me the question is for both of those parties at what point is Assad more of a liability than an asset does it take Chechen large Chechen Islamist extremist units operating in northern Syria to scare the Russians to the point where they say okay Assad is now a liability for us this has now become a liability that to me is the question because the Russians could easily arrange that if they wanted anyway Ken quickly I just I want to go back to points that Rhonda made and everyone else is making it is the Alawite community it is the Alawite elite I actually think that one of the worst mistakes we've made right from the get go is this hyper personalization of Assad okay it is certainly true that you could get rid of Assad and the Alawites could decide to cut a deal it's also true that they could choose to jettison Assad as a way of getting rid of international pressure and continuing to fight if they do not believe that their security their safety the safety of their community will be guaranteed in a future agreement that's the key by the way as I listen to that and maybe Mark flashes back or Dan or somebody but I remember at the end of the Clinton administration we were involved in Kosovo and that conflict the tipping point was bombing the friends of Molosevic it was making the mess sending the message to the friends of Molosevic that continued support was hurting them and forcing them to go to him and say dude you know we got we got to cut us a break here yeah please that's exactly it so I mean think about our recent history of decapitation we got rid of Saddam we got rid of Qaddafi what has that brought us really in other cases where we've left a leader in power think about Hansen in Cambodia Molosevic in Serbia and also Al-Bashir in Sudan I mean there's something to be said maybe for having somebody to negotiate with okay Ronda in terms of reassurances to the it's picking up on what Kenneth said I think also the Syrian opposition is not doing a good job in sending the message to the Alawites that they are their partners in this country I mean when you have seen opposition group for example denouncing the listing of Jabhat al-Nusra on the terrorist list this was interpreted by a lot of the Alawites a Syrian opposition group in their mainstream standing by extremists who are you know bent on killing and destroying the Alawites ideologically yeah Turkey has something to say I think from the standpoint of Turkey there's a certain unreality to a lot of this conversation even more than generally the first instance is in terms of the Alawite community it's certainly a fine analysis that that's the important element to get rid of Assad but Turkey had excellent interactions with the Alawite community leading up to this war and matter of fact we were having you know cabinet meetings essentially with the Assad regime every week and we went in very hard on that question early in the war and in fact found as the Assad regime team told us that in fact there were very few cracks there to exploit we continue to do it but let's be realistic about what we can achieve on that front the second part is about extremists and here I think that the idea of a sort of back channel agreement that can somehow somehow where external actors can get a hold of the extremist problem without a strong and early contribution from Turkey is the height of unreality it's not just our border we have not been in the game of allowing extremists into Turkey but there are a couple of things going on here I mean it's a serious excuse me or Turkey there are a couple of things going on here first of all there is a sort of very loose talk about what exactly jihadists are in the international community and it seems to us from a lot of our allies that the main definition of that term is people we don't like and in fact I think that there is there would have to be a lot of agreement among the parties as to what exactly do constitute these spoilers and I think if we really got down to that conversation we'd find a lot of divides and we'd find frankly a lot of Islamophobia secondly one of the reasons why we haven't been able to control this border and why certain extremists do get in is because it's very important and everybody has asked us from a humanitarian standpoint to keep this border open and this has been an extremely difficult and generous act on the part of Turkey and we need much greater cooperation from other countries especially from Europe and the United States but from everyone if we really want to control this extremism problem we've reached out time and time again for help on intelligence sharing on this part and in fact we have no we have very little cooperation so I think it would need to be if we really wanted to control this extremism a strong international coalition with Turkey at its center okay which is by the way very accurate depiction of the Turkish government's world view at the moment that's my role I believe yes it is last comment do you have a last comment no no you we're gonna sum it up here very quickly in a second it seems to me that the US has a weak hand there is a determined Russian support for Assad I think a determined Iranian for support for Assad I fear that the deal is going to be the reverse in which Iran and Russia convinced the United States of the need to keep Assad in power not gonna happen who said inshallah okay wait a minute stay in Iran I mean I may agree that there's a rising jihadist problem back to you and say the solution to the conflict starts with the removal of Assad and I'll stand by that until I hear someone tell me the only card I can play is to suggest to Iran that I can begin to identify more clearly with the congressional view that perhaps a nuclear deal is not in our immediate interest unless you begin to show some flexibility on Assad's future okay let me say a couple of things here before I turn it over and I don't you don't all have to respond just one or two of you but let me say a couple of things one I think in this discussion of this portion of this scenario we reveal the strengths and weaknesses of this kind of an approach the strength is we can go and take an issue look at it from multiple sides kick it, stress test it really get into it and understand it and have a fairly subtle discussion about it but on the other hand we can't do with every issue this political process would involve many things beyond just the issue of transition and power sharing and so forth and we haven't gotten to any of those things power sharing formulas or timetables or other kinds of things and we can't hope to in the course of an hour and a half having said that let's focus on the strengths of the process there clearly seems to be a core issue and the core issue is what happens to the Assad regime and can you get to a political transition and it seems to me in listening to the course of this conversation that you know we didn't find a solution but we found a couple of paths that seem more likely than other paths okay and one of the paths you know that gets you almost to a solution is requires you know essentially you sort of pull a straight flush you got to get the Russians you got to get the Iranians you've got to get the Alawis you've got to be able to you know have the the Islamists extremists not upset the apple cart with a lot of behavior in other words several different pieces have got to sort of move together all at once in order to get to the point where you can get this guy to say yes I'll leave and so that's one possibility if you could get those things you could engineer that with you know P.J.'s you know approach coming through now the other possibility is you don't get those and that seems to me to be fairly you know strong possibility also in this situation because you could have the Islamic extremists the Iranians and the Russians don't particularly see that they want to go on every day further aside guest days in office his hand seems to strengthen not weaken the world has sort of pulled away from you know wanting to get him out he has you know framed this from PR and so you might not actually have as we talked work away to the best possible piece a negotiated political settlement be the best possible piece because it's not possible and so you then have to sort of work in terms of what is possible and how do you end up with an arrangement that is stable and peace like and the best case that you know you know you can post that at least that's what I'm picking up do you want to offer a couple more conclusions and by the way in the dinner tonight during the follow-up session at the end of the day tomorrow we'll be able to add nuance and so forth we're not this we're not leaving it to this session to cover everything we're going to go through these sessions cover a couple of key points to that Kristen David you suggested that if there were the kind of royal flesh of support for a political solution the Alawi community Iran and Russia that some kind of settlement would be possible rightly or wrongly I heard something slightly different from our group today I heard that of those three two if two of those groups could come together that that would be enough to pressure for a political settlement I also heard one other possibility admittedly remote but a real wild card and that would be Iran alone a deal with Iran alone could be enough to really change the dynamics of the region that's an important insight I think I have to go and go back to your royal flush I think you have to get Russia as part of that deal without without Russia I don't see it happening because I also don't see Iran coming along unless Russia is part of that deal Stephen I remind you that the Russians were most flexible at a time when they thought Assad was losing and so then they started saying well we don't always have to do Assad you could do something else so that was in the at that point the opposition looked much stronger and so that was very key I would say on Iran again if the new deal goes through you could see some more possibility on the Iranian side but if it doesn't go through and the hardliners prevail you're not going to get them to throw Assad under the bus I would agree with Kristen I'd hate to go into a card game assuming that I need a straight royal flush to win I'd rather carry a fifth ace in my pocket and what we have here is the possibility of two parallel and mutually reinforcing processes one is to add to the ambassador's point is a US, Russian Saudi but I'd add in Iran back channel that identifies a person or a bunch of people within the regime that we could agree upon because you have to know what's going to happen the day after you push Assad out and your parallel process includes the same parties but others on issues relating to a ceasefire and regime governance and all the rest I think those are your aces in your pocket okay alright thank you very much as we said this is an experiment we're sort of halfway through the first day of this experiment I gotta say I'm delighted you guys are terrific participants you've made a lot of great contributions you've played along with the roles you've been creative I hope we can take that through the next couple of steps of this thing but this is a really terrific start and to reward you for that start those nice folks at the US Institute of Peace have actually arranged for there to be food here is it up there? it's back here so there is lunch for you here enjoy it but not for too long enjoy it for about 45 minutes we'll be right back in here at 1.30 thank you very very much for a great start