 Thank you very much, Achiro. Over a decade ago, Achiro came to Paris to work for the Development Assistance Committee on the digital divide, and he made a fantastic contribution there. He hired a young research assistant who is today one of the world's experts on the governance of the internet, and in fact, he's gone to join ICANN at the moment and is working through all these very difficult issues right now on the governance of the internet. And, Achiro, it seems as though China wants to make the digital economy one of the big themes for the G20 next year, so we may need you again in Paris. Now, I want to thank Fintarp and Tony Edison for inviting me to write a paper on China's aid, because I think we can't discuss this whole issue of development, cooperation, development, finance today without discussing what China's doing. And I often have to say, look, China is the elephant in the room or not in the room. Actually, it is. Justin Lerner's with us here today, and he is tremendously engaged in this whole question, because I want to argue that China is having a huge impact on the way in which we see the development process, on the way we see development financing. And I want to, I've written this paper, you get the paper, but I'm not going to track through the paper today. I want to connect the issues up with some of the intellectual and economic history issues that we've been reviewing over the last few days. I want, first of all, to talk about creative destruction in the development finance industry today. Then I want to look at what the China story is telling us about the role of public entrepreneurship in trade and development. I want to look at the financial engineering behind China's superfast growth, and then how these two things are making China kind of global entrepreneur today. And then finally look at China and the SDGs. So, creative destruction in the development finance industry. China has two parallel development financing systems. The first is the traditional aid program, been going since the 1950s, has funded out of the national budget. That budget officially is at three billion. We know it's probably quite a lot more than that, because some departments, some ministries aren't joining in the system of reporting numbers. And so forth. And then we have another system, which is basically the finance being generated for developing countries by China's policy banks, the Export-Import Bank and the China Development Bank. These are funded by bond issues on the Chinese financial markets with sovereign guarantees. These policy banks have sovereign guarantees. And these funding flows are making China the largest single source of development finance in the world. Now, I can't give you the numbers. Nobody can give you the numbers, but when we check on balance sheets and so forth, that is emerging as the case. And we don't know the numbers why, because they are generating commercial operations. And commercial operations are not reportable, neither by DAC countries nor anybody else in reporting systems. So that's why there's a statistical void. Now, let's look a little bit deeper here, what's going on? What's the difference between the DAC concept of aid and Chinese concept or South-South concept? The DAC concept is of a welfare transfer, the 0.7 idea that you transfer resources and you get no commercial or financial return from that. And the rules are very strict, you know, you're kind of prevented from doing that. And the mutual benefit philosophy of South-South and of Chinese aid, that is we're engaged because when all this was worked out, we were all poor countries, we weren't transferring finance between each other, we were doing something else. And so the mutual benefit philosophy is fundamental in China. Now, there's another contrast that is very important right now, that is the difference between fiscal transfers that comes out of a budget and financial engineering. That is financial engineering where you get money out of financial markets and you turn it into the development finance with your raising bonds on the bond market or whether you are getting market-based official finance. Market-based official finance is coming from the multilateral development banks and it's coming from these Chinese policy banks because they have a sovereign guarantee from the Chinese government and they can lend, they're lending at a rate that is more or less like the World Bank rate is. Now, what have been the impacts of this? Well, we've had a reform of the odor definition to tighten it up so that it excludes any financial engineering and only focuses on financial transfers. Richard Manning has played a very big role in getting this reform in and making sure that the aid money is focused on poorer countries in ground four. But we've also seen the revitalization of development banks because the example of the Chinese policy banks has reinvigorated the idea of development banks. It's a very strong element in the Addis Ababa action agenda and in the multilateral development banks, the rising level of ambition has to a large extent, I think, come from the example of China. They've written this report on from billions to trillions and in the Addis Ababa agenda they are asked to review the scale of their operations, etc. And in debt sustainability frameworks moving from a loan-by-loan process of looking at low-income country debt accumulation to looking at borrowing aggregates and looking at over a 20-year time horizon, etc. So these are quite big impacts and China has brought the whole idea of transformation into the debate. And in the high-level group on infrastructure of the G20, they argued for the concept of transformative infrastructure that would change the debt capacity of countries in a way that meant that the lending growth process would be dynamic and sustainable. Now, next point here is what are we learning from the China Transformation argument? And my co-author, George Ren-Zu, whom I should have mentioned earlier, who has made a big study of the whole Ida replenishment process in the World Bank and will publish a book about that next year along with a book by Justin Lin that's coming out next year also called Beyond Aid, which is the subject really of what we're talking about here. Now, what is public entrepreneurship? Public entrepreneurship is the public action needed to create and sustain a dynamic market economy. And the public entrepreneur brings vision, action and innovation. And we've seen that in the emerging countries. That's what the successful emerging countries have shown us. And some people call it the developmental state. Some call it the learning society. Justin calls it the facilitating state, but it's a proactive state. And our trade and development models have left this out. They've left this out, and they've been seriously incomplete and wrong. And I think we heard that story the other day in the trade sessions. Needs often hard infrastructure plus human capital. Ron Finley says he thought of this many years ago that it's in Adam Smith, if you read Adam Smith properly, but we have seriously underestimated it. And we left Africa without any of this investment for two decades. We opened the way for the predatory leaders and elites who set back the whole agenda, caused huge misery, who are still there in many countries. So that's, I think, one of the key things we've learned from China and the other emerging markets. Now, what about how did China finance its superfast growth? Well, in the 1980s, the whole thing started with a land reform in one village, one small village, which allowed peasants to make some money for themselves. That produced a huge production response. And Lee Co-Chien said earlier this year, you know, the century's old problem of hunger in China was solved in two years. And then there were rural economy incentives. So the rural economy grew. The on-farm investment was basically family labor. And then at another level, because to begin with China didn't have any resources, there were odor loans from Japan, other donors, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank. And China was a tremendously fast learner. It learned a lot, absorbed a lot from all these donors. This was a real example of aid effectiveness. Now, in the 1990s, the policy banks were established. 1994, China Development Bank, Agricultural Development, Exxon Bank, sovereign guarantees and financial leverage in a repressed financial system. There were not big financial markets created. Now, the China Development Bank story is extremely interesting because it has financed the Lewis process in China. That is, the movement of people from rural economy, traditional low productivity, into a fast-growing, job-creating modern sector of the economy. So how did it do this? Well, it had a mandate to do this. It had a mandate to do this. But the actual mechanism that it found to do this, the local government financing vehicles, was found by accident. But then, like the agricultural reform, it was multiplied. So there are thousands of these local government financing vehicles around China based on land acquisition and sale. That's a very big subject, of course. But it was, I think, a very key, key element in the whole thing. Justin Lin will afterwards refine and correct and so forth. But basically, this is what was going on. Then we had also foreign direct investment plus export orientation plus urbanization, creating this learning by doing economy and dynamic capacity development. So we were getting the agglomeration effects, the learning economy emerging. So what does this mean? It means that China is coming forward now as a kind of global entrepreneur, I would say. Now, how do we understand China today? People say China is state capitalism. And I think this is really a very misleading way of looking at how Chinese economy works. Because it is today, it's a private sector driven entrepreneurial society. And it's not just me who says this. It's the economists last week read their business in China review. And they have discovered that after all, China is not state capitalism. It's this other very entrepreneurial economy with new business models that are beginning to have global impact. So it has an innovation based development strategy brought in this year. And then China is emerging as a new architect in the international system. Let's have a look at what it's coming up with. Four new development banks, four new development banks, the Asian infrastructure investment bank, the new development bank, which will be hosted in Shanghai, the Shanghai Organization Bank, Cooperation Organization Bank, and India and Pakistan will be part of that now, and the Silk Roads Fund. Three new regional initiatives. One about linking China and Africa in the modernization process in the decades ahead. A new Silk Roads initiative, the Belt and Maritime Road Initiative. And in Latin America, they have a new relationship with SELEC. And they are creating two new forums. One will be called an International Knowledge Center for Global Development and the other a Silk Road think tanks network. So these will be discussion forum and people will come to Beijing and discuss global development issues from that perspective. So China is in the business of creating new economic landscapes. It's thinking in very large terms of economic geography and it's thinking of working with others. So these are very fundamental developments. Has of course very important geopolitical dimensions as we've seen and the question of who would belong to the AIIB. It has very big implications for the governance of development cooperation as Richard Manning said. There is the risk. This public entrepreneurship posture brings risks of competition, of over indebtedness, et cetera. And Jia Jiu and Zoom, my co-author and I have have written a book on this, Governing Development Finance in the 21st Century, Harnessing the Role of Public Entrepreneurship. And that's in the Journal of International Development published in August. So those are very serious issues. There are risks that have to be somehow coped with. Now just finally China and the SDGs. China is going to support the SDGs. When it started out in the SDG process very cautious. But now China is now on a quest for a green economy. It's generating these green industrial capacities and solutions. Why? Because it has huge problems. And so if you, it's when you have a problem that you generate a solution. And that's what Albert Hirschman was telling us long time ago. Then it has capacities in the mobile internet industry. Huawei and other companies like that. Working in Africa, working in Asia, providing the backbone infrastructure. China itself is coming up with new internet models for providing all kinds of services on the internet. Including finance payment systems, et cetera. Now of course Africa is not a laggard in the mobile internet system. This is a leading industry in Africa. So there's lots of opportunities there for interaction. Finally, the capacities of China in the urbanization and industrialization field. Exporting the Lewis model. And that's where Justin is coming in with his new structural economics. Can now China help the industrialization process in Africa as wage rates in China rise, jobs move elsewhere. And the foreign investors from China are bringing with them the markets. They have the markets already. They're just shifting the production platform. So this is a huge, huge new factor on the global scene. And finally what China could bring is development, cooperation, transparency and reform. And there's a lot of discussion in China about how to do that. What are the reform options? How to be more transparent. And Chinese researchers are writing and proposing actively in these areas, including from the China International Development Research Network in which I'm involved. So finally I just want to make a plug for a paper that's coming out next week as an IDS working paper on towards a global reporting system for the SDGs based around a concept transformation potential and impact. That is, what is your intended transformation impact? And then how do you, how do you structure your programming evaluation around that? And it's a bit akin to what's happening in the climate change framework negotiations, bringing in this idea of intended nationally determined contributions, which were people will design layout, they'll be reviewed as they go along. And so the reporting system that we propose would build in incentives for transformational thinking and program design to create systemic capacities, do real-time evaluation to work with others and across the silos. Thank you.