 Now, we would like to explore in detail what are the problems of ethical naturalism. Let us have a quick recapitulation of what we have talked about. We have talked about ethical naturalism which meant that ethical facts or moral claims can be reduced or understood wholly without any loss of meaning in terms of natural or empirical or non-moral facts. Now, let us take a look at it. Why is this a problem? Why is this such a deep profound metaethical claim? Now, it is a metaethical claim because it is a metaethical foundation because it is very implicit in our thinking, in our thought and yet it is a very crucial assumption determining the direction which are thinking on moral claims takes. Now, let us take an example. Let us take an example that well, war is evil or there is something wrong with war, right? Why would we say such a thing? Now, let us try to threadbare analyze. Why would we say something like that war is evil? Now, let us take a look at the template to see why to jot down the points that we are saying. Well, our claim is that war is bad or evil. Now, a perfectly innocent question that can be asked is why? Why do we make such a claim? Now, what could various answers to this claim be? Well, first is that say it causes a lot of suffering. It causes suffering, death, loss of property. It causes a lot of suffering, death, loss of property and etcetera. Now, what kind of claims are these? Now, well, let us take a look. Now, if it causes a lot of loss, monetary loss, loss of property, loss of lives, disease, death, relative stagnation of growth and development in the coming years, why I can still innocently ask or naively ask that why does that make it evil? Is that sufficient enough to make it evil? Well, the answer is determines which direction our thought is going to take. If now, if I am an ethical naturalist and I believe that the metaethical claim that moral facts can be understood in terms of natural facts. So, loss of property, disease, ill health, death, these are all natural facts, right? Now, these are all examples of natural facts. Natural, as we talked, can also be understood as empirical facts. Now, the question is, what makes these natural facts get a moral or an ethical color? That is the crucial question that is raised, that what makes these natural facts get a moral or an ethical color? Why is suffering bad? So, when the fundamental question we ask is, why is suffering bad or wrong? Now, this is a question that is talking about ethical naturalism, that what makes suffering bad? What is wrong with suffering? Now, to most of us, perhaps the answer would be immediate, that well, in fact, we would perhaps be taken aback when such a question is asked and we would perhaps be disgusted or disappointed with the naivety or even the insensitivity of the questioner. But let us bear with it and ask, why can the questioner ask this question? What is wrong with suffering? Why? What makes suffering bad? What makes death bad? And consequently, what makes war bad? Now, that we do not dispute, that war brings about death and suffering, those are empirical or natural facts. But what makes war having these facts or these properties, the same thing as having a moral property or natural property is the same as moral properties. We need to pay attention to comprehend, what is the moot question here? If x has y property, which is a natural property and it is also the e property, let me write the conventional alphabet of e, e property, which is a say an ethical property. Now, does having y property make this question have the e property too? That is the question that we need to tackle. Now, coming back to the question that what makes suffering something gives it a moral color, gives it a moral property. The same question which I could ask or one could ask is that what makes happiness have a moral color, that happiness is something good and suffering is something bad. Now, these are two very obvious assumptions that we have and through which we go through life. But still, nevertheless we ask the question, we can ask the question that what is it that makes suffering bad and what is it that makes happiness good? Now, this is this exposes are the are meta ethical foundation for somebody who does not find this question meaningful also or finds this question irrelevant, not even trivial or finds this question as something incorrect, then it betrays a very strong foundation meta ethical foundation of ethical naturalism. So, for them if we take a look suffering turns out to be bad and happiness turns out to be good. Now, suffering and happiness are natural facts, good and bad are moral claims, suffering bad and happiness good. Now, these are moral claims and these are natural claims. Ethical naturalism is the relation between these two domains, how are these two domains linked? Now, ethical naturalism claims that well these two domains are linked, in fact that they have the same property. Now, let us look at what could be the problems here. Now, if we are clear about what is the question, mood question over here, which is how are natural facts related or made equivalent to non-natural facts or which are moral facts. Now, this goes into the very assumption of our and the way we or assumption or our framework in the way we approach the world. Now, if we have a very strong ethical naturalistic assumption, then we go ahead and find these two domains of suffering and suffering happiness and bad and good as equivalent, that is they are connected with each other. But if we question this, is this so, then we are questioning the metaethics of ethical naturalism. How can this question, how can we question such a claim? Now, coming to understanding the very the basic problem of what ethical naturalism is all about, perhaps the utilitarians as we talked about assumed that suffering was equated with happiness. Now, let us come to these are the claims of ethical naturalism. Let us try to assess it. Let us see what kind of a problems do the ethical naturalists land up into. Now, there are mainly two philosophers who have objected or found folly with the ethical naturalist claim, and the first one is Hume, and the second one is G.E. Moore. These are mainly the two philosophers who are credited with critiquing ethical naturalism. Let us go step by step and find out how do they do such a thing. Now, let us take an example. X is killing Y. This is an act in progress. X ought not to, ought not harm Y. This is a value claim. This value claim comes from the general principle killing or harming is wrong. Now, in Hume's parlance, this is example of an is claim. This is an example of an ought claim, and so is this an example of an ought or a should claim that well, these two claims are ought claims, and this is a fact, and this is a moral judgment. Now, can we, Hume's fundamental question was this philosopher called David Hume, who has made many fundamental counter commonsensical questions, which question our fundamental assumptions, questioning causation was one. But what we are concerned now with is David Hume's is ought problem. Now, is for Hume statement of fact or what according to ethical naturalists is natural facts. Now, ought on the other hand is a value claim, and it is not empirically observable. That is, it is not natural. Hume says that well, one cannot infer or arrive at an ought claim from an is claim. Now, that is the fundamental point of Hume, that one cannot arrive at an ought claim from one, from an is claim. Now, let us look at it that what is Hume trying to say? Well, let us say you step into your friends room, and you find that well, somebody who is not your friend, not that particular friend or not the owner of that room is in that room, and is opening your friends cupboard, and has put something in your pocket, and is about to go away. What is your immediate reaction? You immediately stop him, you ask him that who are you, and why are you taking it away, you try you judge him as a thief, because he is taking away something that does not belong to him, and you know it, because it belongs to your friend. Now, you catch hold of this thief, summon your friend, call your other friends, and now you sit or you corner this thief in the room, and try a limb that well, stealing is wrong. Then, let us say you have a philosopher friend, who points out or who starts up and questions that my dear friend, how do you say that stealing is wrong? What this, let us call this thief as X? What X was doing is taking something that does not belong to him, but where did you make a charge, where did you make a jump, a leap from inferring that he was X is a thief, to X is doing something wrong? That is the jump that Hume talks about, that well there is, there are the domain of acts and facts and actions, and there is the domain of value judgments, and one cannot logically arrive from the domain of facts to the domain of judgments. Now, that is the claim that Hume has talked about, that we have the world of facts, and we cannot arrive at the judgment from the world of facts. Now, does this seem sensible? Let us take a look. So, the claim is that well, X is a thief or X is stealing, this is the fact, and the judgment is X ought not to steal or X is doing something wrong, X is wrong in stealing. Now, this is fact, and this is judgment or value, so what we are talking about is that X is a thief or X is stealing, X is wrong in stealing. Now, how do we make this claim that X is wrong in stealing? X is wrong in stealing because of our general value claim, stealing is wrong, and this value claim does not come from, this is not an inference, from any established facts. It is just our value judgment. Now, before we go on to talk about the consequences of this kind of a revision in our metaethics, I would like to sound you out a little bit on what are the likely problems with ethical naturalism. Now, ethical naturalism, well, first it is the perhaps more desirable side of it is that it is more objective, because well, the standard utilitarian claim that well, we have an indicator, an objective real indicator. When we talked about moral realism as an ethical naturalism is a form of moral realism. So, there is an objective indicator that well, to know whether something is right or wrong, we need to look into the world out there. If it is causing, for instance, if it is causing suffering, then it is wrong. If it is causing happiness, then it is right. Now, we therefore, have a parameter or an indicator. Now, number two, if we deny the ethical naturalist claim that well, there is no connection, as Hume is trying to deny, there is no connection between is a not, then our question is that well, how does we arrive at what is right and wrong, then right and wrong perhaps, or all our moral judgments become subjective, or where are, or where else are they grounded on. Now, they could be, as we saw examples of objectiveism, moral objectiveism, or realism, not subscribing to ethical naturalism as Ross, Deontological Rules, or Kant's universalizability, that we know something is right and wrong, not from facts out there, but from understanding that well, where are, that if the act is universalizable, then it comes out to be wrong. Then it does not. So, ethical, leaving the umbrella of ethical naturalism does not mean that we are leaving moral realism or ethical objectivism. So, these are terms and its uses that you must be aware of to make sense of the ethical engagement. So, all ethical naturalists are moral realists, or ethical objectivists, but all ethical objectivists or moral realists need not be ethical naturalists. Examples of moral realists who are not ethical naturalists, well, are, for example, are Kant's universalizable theory, that well, there is a criteria of objectivity, but it is not grounded on natural facts. It is on the structure of the moral claim. So, the humane claim is that well, ought cannot be derived from is. So, that means, what humane is simply saying that well, ethical naturalism is false. That is, ethical claims categorically separate from natural or empirical claims, and more importantly, there cannot be a logical connection between logical or more accurately a deductive connection between the two. So, this is briefly what is Hume's claims. So, Hume is prominent critic of ethical naturalism, separating moral facts or moral claims from value claims from natural facts. Hume goes on to give his own ethical theory, that how, what is the justification of moral claims, and where do, where can they find their justification, but that is not our field of enquiry for the time being. Now, we need note a second objection, or a problem with ethical naturalism, and that is of put off by a philosopher called G. E. Moore. It is called, he used something called the open question argument, and he is talked about open question argument, and is called, his fallacy is called as the naturalistic fallacy. Now, let us briefly, before we note down what Hume means by the naturalistic philosophy, let us briefly look at what Hume is trying, or what Moore is trying to point out. Now, Moore's claim is that well, we have moral properties, we have natural properties. The two can be correlated, but cannot be made equivalent, but more simply it would mean that well, let us say an object has a property x, and a property y, but having two properties cannot be the same thing as having one property. Let us make it simpler. Let us say this particular writing instrument is black in color, property 1, and is 6, says 10 centimeters in length, property 2. So, it has a length, and it has a color. Now, if we keep on seeing in this world, that all objects which are 10 centimeters in length, and have the same color, we tend to equate the two qualities. Now, imagine we always find that this pen comes out to be, or this pen is always in black color. Now, if this writing instrument is always in black color, are we bound to think that well, perhaps being black and being 10 centimeters long are joint, inseparably joint, and perhaps definition of a single entity. Let us take a frequently referred example by philosophers. This has been pointed out in the problem of induction. Now, most of us would have seen crows. Crows are quite prevalent in most parts of the world, and they have survived the human, the massive changes caused by human beings in the planet, in the planet's environment. Now, we have seen black crows. We have seen crows which are black in color forever. Since we are born, we have been seeing crows which are black in color. Some are jet black, some are ash colored, but let us sum it up as that all crows are black. Are all crows black? That is the question that Hume asks, and even to a certain extent Moore reformulates it, and that is what is the problem of induction that was also the metaethics of the metaethical problem that is ground, which requires the grounding of ethics. Now, we have seen that all crows are black, but can we infer deductively that all crows are black? Now, if this is the case, why am I talking about this example? Because when we say that well, when we are inferring that all cases of suffering are bad, are we also making a certain kind of inductive claim, not a deductive claim? Let us take a look at the board. If I say that crow 1 is black, crow 2 is black, and we go ahead to is black, which you can put to your heart's delight. Now, if there are so many crows that are black, can we infer all crows are black? Inductively yes, deductively no, definitely no. Now, if on the equivalent we find that well, suffering is bad, well let us say a human X suffers, a human Y suffers, a society K suffers, a society N suffers. All of them call it bad, so can we then infer that suffering is bad? Because please understand, we are making a crucial difference, we are making something natural or empirical and something ethical or a value claim. Now, what makes this jump possible? Well, it may be inductively valid, but it is not deductively valid. So, as we see the question is that well, most of the people and most of the societies, if not all, would regard suffering as bad or evil, but does that give justification enough to call suffering as something bad or evil in general? Now, that is the question that we would like to address, that well, suffering as bad or evil. Now, let us go ahead with the Moore's questions. Now Moore asks a question that well, let us say it is called the open question X is right, if this is a claim, in the question form it is X right. Now, what could this mean? X is in accordance with nature or X is universalizable or X makes us happy or X is pink in color or brings about more pink things than orange or that X is prescribed in the law books or religious books or the mood point is by authority. Now, when we say that well, let us quickly number them too. Now, we let us call this 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 property 1, property 2, property 4, property 5. Now, X is an act, now the act X has 5 properties and let us call X being right as the 0th property. So, X is right, this is the 0th property, let us call it P 0. Now, the 0th X has 6 properties and these 6 properties accompany X and from that an ethical naturalist or any ethical claim infers that P 0 that what makes X right. Now, having these properties, is it the same thing as being right? If let us take a look, if the 1st property reads that X is in accordance with nature, so if it is in accordance with nature does that make it right, X is universalizable, X is right. Now, when we say these are 5 people who have different reasons for calling, for arriving at the same conclusion, the same conclusion being that X is right. Well, the 1st person says that well, X is in accordance with nature, so I think it is right. The 2nd one says well, X is universalizable that is, I would like to do X and I would like others to do X unto me, so X is universalizable and therefore, it is right. The 3rd person would say X makes me happy and the 4th person would say that well, X brings about more pink things than orange or any other color. The 5th person say that well, X is prescribed in the law books, so religious books by authority. Now, these are various reasons for calling X right, now more genius is in asking or in reversing the question that well, is P 1 the same thing as P 0 that is, X is being in accordance with nature makes X good. Now, what is the question that is being asked here that well, X is being in accordance with nature makes X good that means, being in accordance with nature is good or in other words defines or we use the term right. So, let us use the term right to avoid any confusion, now this is where Moore puts the question that well, is this claim correct being in accordance with nature defines right and therefore, not being in accordance with nature makes something wrong or unright. Now, this is the catch that if you would carefully look at the screen that this is the catch that Moore wants you to comprehend that well, being in accordance with nature is right, but going one step ahead what we mean is that being in accordance with nature defines what is right. Now, therefore, not being in accordance with nature makes something not right therefore, being in accordance with nature is the definition of being right. Now, are properties which are correlated definitions are properties which are correlated definitions of being right. Now, let us look at the earlier screen that what are the various properties mentioned the first property mentioned is that well, X is in accordance with nature or X is universalizable. Now, is this second property is universalizability third, fourth, fifth now are these properties or any one of these definitional do any of these define what is right well, if they define what is right then the inverse of the question would be meaning less. Suppose looking at the next slide that well, being natural defines for brevity we make it precise that being in accordance with nature to be understood as being natural. So, being natural is being right now, being natural is being right is definitional so that means, what is not natural or can we ask the question that is it really so is it so that being natural is being right that if we can ask this question that being natural means if we can ask this question that well is being natural really being right then we can take a look if being natural means being right then is this definition of being right. If we can ask the question the other way round that well if being natural means being right or if being right is being defined as being natural and we can again ask the question that is being natural same thing as being right and yet this question makes sense because there can be people or there are people who would disagree that well being natural and being right may be correlated but are not definitional. So, the crucial thing to be remembered here is that that this is a relation of correlation and not definition so what mood tries to point out that P 0 correlates with P 1 or P 2 or P 3 or P 4 or P 5 or a combination of these but does not define it and that is the crucial claim that mood is trying to bring with the open question arguments when we inverse the question that well P 0 because P 1 but R is does P 1 define P 0 no we can it is always a meaningful question when we in inverse the definition question but by very logical understanding of format of logic that when we inverse the definition or we cannot question a definition for example let us take a look at the board let us say bachelor is an unmarried man now let us say this is a definition so bachelor is defined as an unmarried man now can we ask this question is an unmarried man a bachelor well this is not a meaningful question in the sense that well we have already defined that a bachelor is an unmarried man so when I talk about reversing the or inversing the question that is an unmarried man a bachelor it is a meaningless question given the definition now if this is to the case now Moores genius is in pointing out that well if I say that X is right because it brings about happiness this is a claim and if this is a definition that right is defined as anything that brings about happiness and now we invert the question to ask that is it the case that all happiness inducing acts are right and if you want to be careful about the details happiness for everyone because that is what we have sent as a that is what we have written as a definition so is this question meaningful or meaningless now this is where briefly the four questions that bring about the genius of Moores open question argument that well first we talked about we define that a bachelor is an unmarried man and then if we ask the question that is an unmarried man a bachelor it seems to be a meaningless trivial question because having given the definition this does not make sense however when we do the same exercise in the moral domain that X is right because it brings about everybody's happiness and then we ask the question that is anything or is it the case that all acts that bring about happiness for everyone are right well this does not seem to be a meaningless question because this is questioning the Metaethical Foundation of Metaethical Foundation of ethics now for somebody who is an ethical naturalist this could be definitional but everybody need not be an ethical naturalist so the binding power of this definition is not there in this definition so for Hume for Hume and further for Moore perhaps these are instances of correlation and not definition and if they are not definition then they are not complete so now Moore comes with this claim that well if you look at this that P0 or what we understood as a moral property good or right correlates with natural properties but does not define it because inverting the question we find that well it is not a definition but just an instance of correlation