 Good afternoon, everybody. I'm very pleased to welcome you all today to the webinar, the IIA webinar on the future of EU and NATO Defence Cooperation. You are almost welcome and I am particularly glad to welcome today Ambassador Pavel Harchinsky, who is the Managing Director of the CSDP and Crisis Management of the European External Action Service. He has been very kind to take time out of what is a very busy week for him in Brussels to speak to us today. I think most people know the system and procedure because we've had ample practice over the last two years of the COVID online Zoom, but let me just run over the system for today's event. Ambassador Harchinsky will speak to us for about 20, 25 minutes or so, and then we will go to the question and answer with the audience. You will be able to join the discussion with using the Q&A function on Zoom, which will be on your screen. And please feel free to send your questions during the course of the session and we will come to them when Ambassador Harchinsky has finished his address. We would appreciate if you could give us your name and affiliation when you're posing your questions and also if your questions could be succinct and in that way we will get through more of the questions. With regard to the topic there could hardly be a more relevant discussion at this time than we are about to have at the moment. The horror that has been visited on Ukraine has changed everything in Europe in terms of security policy. It has changed for NATO, it has changed for the EU. NATO after a bruising conflict and exit from Afghanistan has now regenerated its policy and its forces. And the EU which has been over the past few years trying to develop a more muscular defence policy has now also produced a more stronger foreign policy development where there will be back up in terms of military and defence policies. The strategic compass has now been approved by the heads of state and government which has considerably enhanced security and defence objectives in that. Ambassador Harchinsky has been at the centre and forefront of EU security and defence policy for very many years. He was formerly director of conflict prevention and security policy in the external action service and he previously served as ambassador to the political and security committee of the EU. He's also served in Polish representation to the United Nations and to NATO. And as of now and managing director for common security and defence policy and crisis response, he has an extremely wide brief. He is responsible for coordinating and managing the external action service overall contribution to addressing external security threats and implementing supporting efforts in the security and defence area to implement the EU global strategy. And this includes work on strategic issues and defence policy. It includes cyber security, hybrid maritime counterterrorism, disarmament, non-proliferation, as well as cooperation with other organisations such as NATO. There is much more but I will lead that to Ambassador Harchinsky to develop that further. You are most welcome Ambassador and we look forward to your address. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much, Marie. Thank you for your very kind introductory remarks. Let me focus my intervention on three points. First, of course, ongoing war in Ukraine. Second, our efforts on security and defence. I'm really glad that you have mentioned strategic compass adopted last month. And third, our cooperation with NATO. Let us start immediately with a horrific war going on in Europe. Russia's military aggression on Ukraine has changed the world we knew. The unprovoked and unjustified invasion clearly marks a tectonic shift in our strategic environment. The implications of the ongoing war are more far reaching than the Ukraine itself. We are faced with threats to the international rules based world order and order that we have jointly as international community that we have been developing for the last 70 years. There are also conflicts and crises in our neighbourhood, hybrid threats, cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns and much more. European Union and our member states, we have condemned in the strongest possible terms Russia's military aggression on Ukraine. We stand firmly by Ukraine and its people in this unparalleled situation and we provide political, financial, humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine. We have adopted massive sanctions packages against Russia and its accomplice Belarus. We did it in full coordination with our partners, including the US and UK. We also, we have unlocked a massive support package for the Ukrainian Armed Forces through one of our initiatives called European Peace Facility. At the moment, we are talking about one billion euro that member states put up jointly in order to support deliveries of military assistance, including military, including little military assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This is of course unprecedented in the history of the European Union. At the same time, intensive work is ongoing to tackle Russian disinformation campaigns, because the war in Ukraine is also a fierce battle of narratives. In the latest conclusions of the European Council, so the meeting of EU heads of state and government from last month, our leaders have called on Russia to stop war crimes immediately. Those responsible and their accomplices will be held to account in accordance with international law. The European Council reaffirmed our demand that Russia immediately stops its military aggression, immediately and unconditionally withdraws all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respects Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within Ukraine's internationally recognized borders. Our leaders also expressed their readiness to move quickly with further coordinated sanctions and precisely this is what is going on now. Member states are discussing another package of sanctions targeting Russia. They also have stressed that any attempts to circumvent sanctions or to aid Russia must be stopped by everyone. And once the Russian onslaught on Ukraine is over, and I hope this moment will come sooner than later, we as European Union, we have expressed our readiness to provide support for the reconstruction of a democratic Ukraine. At the end, the European Council set up a Ukraine Solidarity Trust Fund and called for an international conference to raise funding. Last five weeks have been really unprecedented. European Union stands strongly with Ukraine. We cannot let President Putin win this war. This is why our comprehensive support to Ukraine, including military assistance. This is all happening in a broader context of increased efforts by the European Union to play a stronger role in security and defense. Those efforts have been going on for several years now, but we had a key moment last month with the adoption of strategic compass. The adoption of the compass marks a historical moment for the Union's security and defense policy. It is the first document of this kind, concrete and actionate, adopted by the member states with the aim of guiding our actions in security and defense in the next five to 10 years. It is a very strong signal of our unity and of our resolve, of our determination to act better and to act together. The compass draws a clear and sobering picture of the world we face that is shared by all EU member states. It is based on the first ever EU threat analysis. Of course, the ongoing war in Ukraine has shown even more how challenging the international context has become. The European Union needs to become a more credible and more capable security provider, and the compass should be instrumental in order to achieve those objectives. The compass proposes over 60 concrete actions together with concrete timelines. This is a novelty. It should allow us to take a quantum leap forward in security and defense. It should help us to step up our ability to act in defense of our interests and our values. It should ensure our union and European citizens to increase our resilience to invest in the required capabilities, but also to strengthen our partnerships for our own and our partners security. The main actions are within act secure investment and partnership chapters. When it comes to acting, we need to be able to act more rapidly and more robustly whenever a crisis erupts. Our missions and operations worldwide are a proven asset. Since 2003, so over nearly last 20 years, European Union has launched more than 35 missions and operations. At the moment, we have 18 of them. More than 4,000 men and women deployed across three continents under the EU flag. We will be setting up a rapid deployment capacity, allowing the swift deployment of a modular force of up to 5,000 troops in a non permissive environment. We will also do more advanced planning, conduct life exercises, strengthen command and control structures and step up military mobility. The second line of action is to secure. We need to enhance our ability to anticipate and to respond to hybrid threats and cyber attacks. We need to secure European Union's access to strategic domains such as maritime space, cyberspace and even outer space to better protect our citizens. That's why we will build better tools to fight hybrid campaigns, cyber threats and foreign interference and manipulation of information. We will create a hybrid toolbox, work on a cyber defense policy framework and on a foreign information manipulation and interference toolbox. We will also strengthen our naval presence in key maritime areas of interest and develop a space strategy for security and defense. The third line of action is to invest. Defense spending has been on the rise and is likely to rise further, especially in view of the ongoing war in Ukraine. While the increase in defense spending is welcome, we should be careful that it does not lead to more fragmentation, but to more cooperation. We need to invest both more and better in capabilities and innovative technologies, fill strategic gaps and reduce technological and industrial dependencies. EU heads of state and governments made this very clear in Versailles when they met a few weeks ago. We need to make the best use of our EU cooperative frameworks to overcome fragmentation and increase interoperability. Now the fourth and the final line of action to partner. The compass clearly reflects the importance of the transatlantic relationship and our strategic partnership with NATO and with the United States. A stronger and more capable European Union in the field of security and defense will only help to strengthen transatlantic security and NATO. This is one of the pillars of the compass. The need to ensure coherence, close coordination and complementarity of efforts is ever more salient in the current situation. The compass is very clear in that regard. A stronger and more capable European Union in the field of security and defense will contribute positive to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which by the way remains the foundation of collective defense for its members. We need to go hand in hand that transatlantic relationship and EU NATO cooperation are key to our overall security. Furthermore, our partnership with the United States is of strategic importance, and the compass calls for further deepening our cooperation in security and defense in a mutually beneficial way. We are already working with the US across a broad range of security and defense policy areas and in the field. Building on the EU US summit statement of June 21, we have launched a dedicated dialogue on security and defense, which is an important milestone in the consolidation of the transatlantic partnership. Our coordinated response to Russia's war in Ukraine is a concrete evidence of how European Union and NATO can work together in a mutually beneficial manner. We have demonstrated total political unity and complementary since the first day of Russia's unprovoked and unjustified attack on Ukraine. President Biden's participation at the European Council last month was another clear demonstration of transatlantic unity. The European Union and the US have made clear to the whole world that we will act on defending our shared values. Friends, allies and partners look to us to lead further on opposing aggressors and authoritarian regimes, on making international structures delivered, on building a transatlantic bedrock of peace, freedom and prosperity, and of responsible governance. It is Russia against Ukraine. We want to leave other potential aggressors in no doubt that their actions will lead to serious consequences. Putin wanted to divide us. He achieved exactly the opposite. We have never been more united. And it's not only the West. It's a broad coalition of some 140 UN member states standing together to defend the key principles of international norm enshrined in the UN Charter, as well as in other documents that regrettably Russia has violated. Marie, many thanks. It was 20 minutes. Back to you. Very much indeed, Pavel. That was a very crisp ending in the time we allocated. Thank you very much indeed for that. Well, what was really a passionate address and also very clear and outlining that the EU has moved very strongly forward in response to the situation in Ukraine and promoting the new thinking. I have many questions, but I just want to ask you one of my own before moving on. So many members of the EU are also members of NATO. So the same military forces belong, you know, to member states. They are acting as NATO. When will they act in the EU military arena? What type of tasks will they be dedicated to in complementarity to NATO, using of course the same forces. Yes, that's of course a very clear point. There is a so called a single set of forces principles. So our member states have only one set of forces, and it's up to them to use to deploy those forces as they wish. They can do it on national basis. They can do it within the NATO framework in case there are allies. They can do it under EU flag. They can do it under the UN flag in UN peacekeeping operations framework. Or they can deploy those troops in different coalition of the willing. As I have tried to underline, there is no competition between us and NATO. So all we do in order to improve those forces, the better for our member states, and in case there are also allies, of course the capabilities that we would develop jointly. The forces that we will help jointly will help to better train and better equip those forces that might be also used in other organizations. And it's of course up to our member states to decide. There is also no competition because NATO is responsible for the territorial defense of its members. We are not competing on this. And actually if you look at the Lisbon Treaty, it's clearly stated that NATO is responsible for territorial defense of its members. And what we are trying to develop is crisis management. So we are trying to develop a possibility to act outside of the European Union, where there are crisis happening and where we are called in order to act. And if 27 of our member states decide jointly to do this, this is why rapid deployment capacity, one of the key initiatives included in the strategic compass. As I mentioned, at the moment, we have 18 missions and operations on three continents, with 4,000 men and women in uniform. And we want to be in a position to act more robustly, to act more quickly, whenever there is a need. And what is very important, our clear preference is to always act with our partners. First and foremost with NATO, but there might be situations in which our partners for whatever reason will not be interested of evaluating to act together with us. In that case, as European Union, we need to be in a position to act on our own. And this is why all these initiatives in the strategic compass. Yes, I can see your meaning that we have a wider brief to look where there are crisis that are not necessarily being dealt with by NATO internationally. I have a couple of questions, Pavel, in relation to how the rapid deployment capability is different to the battlegroup concept. Both you and I in the SC live through many battlegroup exercises, but the battlegroup was never used. And will the strategic, I have a question from Derry Fitzgerald and John Bigger, former military commander and also former foreign affairs official on how is the military. Is it different to the battlegroup? And will it be any easier to reach agreement, its use and deployment than the battlegroups, than it was in the case of the battlegroups, which have been training for so many years but actually, when it came to the point, there was no political agreement to use them. Yes, shall I answer one by one? Yes please, yes. So, behind every decision, there's always a political will. And when it comes to common security and defense policy, we act based on unanimity. So, what we are trying to do with the rapid deployment capacity is lower the threshold for member states actually to decide to deploy. In case of battlegroups, it's true. They have never been deployed. And we were trying to figure out why. What were the issues? One of the biggest challenges was that the concept of a battlegroup was for a new battlegroup for every six months. And we have came to the conclusion that maybe six months standby is too short in order for this battlegroup to be deployed. We are also increasing the size of the force. The battlegroup was around 1500 troops. Now we are talking about 5000, which is more than three times more. Battlegroups also meant a very heavy burden, including financial burden on countries that were participating in any particular battle. And now we are trying to extend the so-called shared costs. So, the costs that would be covered by all EU member states and not only by those who are participating in a particular battlegroup. We are also decreasing the readiness of those forces. And we are also making sure that those forces that participate in rapid deployment capacity would actually train and exercise together, which was not done before. So these are elements that hopefully would make this new instrument easier to use by member states. But to answer your question, behind every decision to deploy, there is a political will. You know, whatever we come up with, this we will not change. And I really need to remind all our viewers and our listeners that those decisions need to be taken by unanimity. So at the end you need a joint decision of 27 member states. Thank you. Just an addition to that, Pavel, do you ever see that changing to majority decision? We had this discussion within the strategic debate phase that led to the adoption of the compass. Of course, on our side, we have put several proposals. Maybe not going to Q&V, which is a bit too far, but so-called constructive abstention that would allow us to move even one or even a small group of member states that does not want to join. But it was too much for our member states, at least at this stage. And member states insisted that unanimity rule should apply. Right, yes. I have a question from a board member in the Institute, Peter McLoone, saying, are there any grounds for hope that international pressure will force a Russian withdrawal in the short term? Or will we be forced to rebuild current international institutions without Russia as a response to this barbaric act? So the question is about the future of Ukraine. And honestly, I don't know. It's really difficult for me to say. What I know is that we cannot let President Putin and Russia to win this war. And it's not only about Ukraine. It's also about rules based international order. So what we are doing on the EU side is trying to support Ukraine as much as we can politically by isolating Russia economically by providing huge financial assistance, including micro financial assistance to Ukraine. Helping refugees that are leaving Ukraine and entering European Union. The figures are massive. You know it all very well. And also by providing military assistance to Ukraine. Look, European Union is providing military assistance to the Ukrainian armed forces. Hopefully, this will end soon, as soon as possible. There will be a political solution. There will be a diplomatic solution. But what we are trying to do is to make sure that this solution is as close as possible to what the Ukrainian side wants. And this is why we very strongly think that the Ukrainians should have our backing, our support in order to be better positioned when it comes to negotiations. For the moment, I don't think there is an end in sight. We need to be ready to sustain our assistance to Ukraine, including military assistance. This is what we are doing. And this is what we will do with the support of 27 member states, working very close, cooperating extremely close with like-minded partners. First and foremost NATO, but also bilaterally with US, UK. I was attending yesterday together with HRVP NATO ministerial with the participation of four Asia Pacific partners. Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea. So it's a joint effort. It's a common effort. And let's hope that it will bring to a positive result, a negotiated result, ceasefire. And let's hope that the end result will be satisfactory to the Ukrainians. Thank you, Pavel, for that very comprehensive reply. I have three questions, three-part question from Irish journalist Cormac O'Keefe. He's a journalist with the Irish newspaper, the Irish Examiner, and a number of them touch on Irish interests. But the first one is that Ukraine foreign minister, Mr Kuliba told a NATO meeting yesterday that it urgently needed more weapons. He said that three times, I think. And it did not get, if it did not get those weapons that more atrocities against civilian could happen. And since then you have had the Kramatorsk train station massacre. Will EU countries respond through the European Peace Fund is one question he has asked. And then the second part is, does neutrality in some member states like Ireland limit involvement in deepening EU security and defence cooperation and EU cooperation with NATO? That's Irish neutrality bringing that into question. And the last one, you mentioned that strengthening a naval presence in key areas was a priority. And does that include Irish controlled waters off the west and southwest coast, where the Russian Navy had positioned itself and has been operating, posing a possible threat to undersea's cable? You may be aware that we have had a Russian exercise off the southwest coast, which brought firmly into focus the Irish, a possible Irish involvement in these geopolitical movements. So I'm sorry, three quite different ones in some ways, but I would be grateful for your views on those. Yes, of course, thank you for all of them. I was yesterday, accompanying high representative, Vice President Joseph Borrell to the NATO ministerial with the participation also of Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister Kuleba. And, in fact, he said loud and clear that what Ukraine needs now, and now means immediately, he said three things, weapons, weapons, weapons. We have heard him loud and clear. And this is why European Union is doing our utmost in order to support Ukraine, Ukrainian armed forces with arms delivers very early into the war. Our member states have decided to use so called European peace facility, an instrument that we have only implemented last year in order to provide military assistance to Ukraine. Recently, our member states and in a record speed have decided to spend 500 million euro, supporting Ukrainian armed forces, 90% of it legal assistance, 10% non-legal assistance. After the meeting of our leaders in Versailles in March, this figure has been doubled to one billion euro. I can share with you that at the moment, there is a reflection ongoing among member states in order to, again, increase this figure to 1.5 billion euro. How does it work? Member states provide military assistance to Ukraine on bilateral basis, based on the needs expressed by the Ukrainian side, and then they are entitled to be reimbursed from the European peace facility. This has been going on since the beginning of the war. The mechanism has been working very well. European Union military staff is responsible for coordinating the needs of the Ukrainians and the deliverance provided by our member states. The figure is big enough also to incentivize member states to increase, to continue and to increase those deliveries. And we know that these deliveries are reaching the Ukrainian side. So I'm really proud that we have taken decisive, robust and immediate steps in support of the Ukrainian armed forces and these efforts continue. Second point on neutrality of some of our member states in the context of EU NATO cooperation. Here I have to reassure you that EU NATO cooperation is supported by all EU 27 member states. Very clearly, 2016 we had the first joint EU NATO declaration, 2018 second joint NATO declaration, and we are working now with NATO counterparts in order to sign a third EU NATO joint declaration that should set the level of ambition even higher and enlarge our cooperation to new areas. This has been always supported by all EU 27 member states. Of course, this cooperation, EU NATO cooperation is based on certain principles. And one of the principles is inclusivity. So on our side, as well as on NATO side, it brings all EU member states and NATO together. One of the principles is also the issue of our decision making autonomy. So we need to preserve our autonomy when it comes to the decision making process, but based on this guiding principles, full support from all EU member states. Of course, there are some sensitivities involved, especially when it comes to delivery of military assistance to third countries. I mentioned before the European peace facility. This is why we have designed two assistance measures. One focusing on little military assistance. The other one, much smaller, focusing on non-little military assistance. And I know that in case of some countries, they want to focus on non-little military assistance due to the limitations that they have, and we fully respect that. What is important is that all of us, 27 member states in a very solidary way, support Ukrainian armed forces. Now, the third and final question on maritime security and the increased role that the European Union is playing in maritime security globally. For the moment, we have two naval executive military operations. One is in Central Mediterranean, its operation Irini. Another one is of the coast of Somalia, anti-piracy operation Atalanta. The new concept that we have developed in recent years is called CMP, Coordinated Maritime Presence. It's a lighter form of cooperation among navies of our member states. We have developed this concept in the context of Gulf of Guinea, so West Coast of Africa, where we had a very successful pilot project. And now very recently, member states have decided to extend this Coordinated Maritime Presence concept to the Northwestern part of Indian Ocean. It's up to member states to decide what maritime area they would like to have as a maritime area of interest. And there was not a discussion and not a proposal to have southwest coast of island as one of those maritime areas of interest. But of course, it's always up to our 27 member states to decide by unanimity. Back to you. Thank you, Marvel. That is very clear. And with our very extensive maritime area, there will be certainly a lot more interest taken in that in the future with various movements above and below the sea. In relation to the first point, I think I have a follow up question from Alan Dukes, who's a former finance minister here. And he says in the event of an attack on a member state of the EU, which is also a member of NATO, where would the focus and responsibility of military decision making lie? I presume in NATO, but I pass that question to you. Well, in case you have a country that is both member of the Alliance and member of the European Union, and in case this country is attacked, I would immediately say that Article 5 of NATO is the way to respond. And this is crystal clear. At the same time, you might also have an attack on a member state that is below the threshold of Article 5. And actually, such attack has already happened. In 2015, when France, which is both member of NATO and member of the European Union, was faced with massive terrorist attacks. You can also imagine massive cyber attacks or hybrid attacks. And then it would be for that particular country to decide if this country wants to invoke Article 5 using NATO, or would like a reaction of the European Union within Article 42.7. This is a resistance clause that we have in the Lisbon Treaty. In case of France 2015 and terrorist attacks, France has decided to act in the framework of the European Union, and has invoked for the first and only time, article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, a bilateral held on part of most of EU member states. So at the end, it's a sovereign decision by any particular country. But if the question is military attack, I would say that NATO is the primary, would take primary responsibility for the territorial defense of its member states. Its member states. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you for that. I have Matteo Fontana, who is Joint Research Centre at the European Commission, asking a provocative question. It's certainly provocative in Ireland and has been in the past. Do you see how far away do you see a European army? Would it be a positive outcome in your view? Is there any idea that there would be a European army? Well, I don't see any prospects for European army anytime soon. And actually I find this notion of a European army rather unhelpful. There are 27 armies of 27 member states. And what we are trying to do is to make sure that armed forces of our member states work as closely together as possible that they participate in our CSDP missions and operations. But I don't think that a vision of an EU army is a realistic vision. I know that it has been flagged by some politicians in some of our countries, also in the context of electoral campaigns. It's a catchy phrase, but we are not in the process of the development of the EU army. We are in the process of strengthening 27 EU armed forces and making sure that they are working together, that they are interoperable, and that our member states are ready and willing to deploy their armed forces within EU CSDP missions and operations. Thank you, Ambassador. I think we took very clearly cooperation and complementarity were the particular words. I have a very specific question from Colonel Dorka Lee, a member of the Institute who says that Kaliningrad is the Achilles heel of the Russian Federation. And would the ambassador comment on a general script checks called last Friday that Poland should reclaim Kaliningrad? That might be something from a bit of out of the blue you may not have heard about, but Kaliningrad is obviously a source of some political difficulty at the moment. I don't quite understand the question Kaliningrad Oblast is part of the Russian Federation. And I don't think that anyone in the European Union has any plans to attack any country, including the Russian Federation. So, the question is very difficult for me to answer. Yes, that's as apart from it being a certain vulnerable area. I have a question from Sulagna Mitra from the University College Dublin. She mentions that you have said there's no competition between NATO, UN, EU and coalition of the willing. But is there a risk of confusion that there was the oven overlap in the case of mistakes made in Iran where lines were blurred with the various organizations trying to do humanitarian construction and combat. And we all felt that the end result was not very satisfactory. So the question of can you keep the lines clear between the various activities of the organization and work carefully for cooperation and complementarity and not have what seemed to be a very difficult exit from Afghanistan. Look, I mean here, of course, it's a very valid point. And the only answer is as much cooperation as possible. There are several places in the world where European Union is deployed, for instance, alongside the United Nations. Out of the 18 missions and operations that we currently have, 13 are deployed in the same theaters as UN peacekeeping operations. And what we are trying to do is to work as closely as possible with our UN counterparts, not only headquarters to headquarters but also to make sure that the missions on the ground talk to each other, sometimes coordinate, sometimes even help each other. Of course, we have different mandates. UN has different mandate, different focus. You also have places where we have ad hoc coalitions, where we have bilateral presence of some of our member states. So in order to have more effective and efficient presence, the more cooperation, the better. So this is the only answer. And if you look at the strategic compass, it's not only in the chapter dealing with partnerships. It's not only on EU NATO cooperation. It's also on EU UN cooperation, where we have a new set of priorities, where we have signed last year a groundbreaking agreement with the United Nations precisely in order to make cooperation on the ground between our missions and operations and UN peacekeeping operations as close as possible. So we should join efforts. We should make sure that we cooperate and not copy it. Thank you. Thank you for that, for that clarification. I just have a question that I noticed you mentioned recently that the EU was in close contact with China, which is an important part of the solution in Ukraine. Perhaps you could just give us an idea of what your contacts with China have produced, if hopefully something positive. Our channels of communications with China are open. We talked to the Chinese at all levels on the first of April. So only a week ago, there was a summit between our institutional leaders and the president of China. A month ago, I was co-chairing security and defense dialogue with China. This is an event that we have for more than 10 years on a yearly basis. China is a very complex partner of the European Union. We see China on three different levels. China is a partner, China is a competitor, but China is also a strategic rival. At the same time, China is far too important to be ignored. On the contrary, we very strongly want China to understand our position and we want China to play by the rules. The rules that we have developed over many years together as international community and the rules that have benefited China for many years. The summit that was held with China on the first of April was used by our leaders to pass very strong messages to the Chinese side on Russia's aggression in Ukraine in order to make sure that China does not put itself in a situation of supporting Russia. And we feel that it would be in the Chinese interest not to let the world to be divided again. And we hope that China would choose to be on the right side of history. Thank you. Yes, and we certainly endorse that and hope that is the case. I have a last question, Ambassador, that is in a different area, but it's asked by Valerie Hughes from the Ireland Action for Bosnia. What operational plans are being made ahead of the UN Security Council vote on UFO to replace troops due to rotate out of Bosnia Herzegovina? Are there plans to convert the force to a NATO mission given the possibility of a Russian veto? This is an area where troops have been for a very long time, including Irish troops still. So is there any thought given to what will happen after the vote? Well, operational TIA in Bosnia Herzegovina is one of the oldest CSDP engagements. It's a very important engagement contributing to security and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We want to stay there. We feel that there is a need for the European Union to stay. The situation is very fragile. The war in Ukraine has actually aggravated the challenges. As you rightly pointed out, our presence there is currently based on UN Security Council resolution that should be extended on a yearly basis. And we still hope that 15 members of the Security Council would see all of them, would see the value to extend the relevant Security Council resolution that enables European Union to be present there. Thank you. I think the war in the Balkans is not as well within our living memory and we sincerely hope that the situation there can be calmed if not solved. Mayor, thank you for sharing so much of your huge dossier that you have with us on giving us such an in-depth insight into the various issues and the problems and the solutions that are being proposed. May we wish you well because you still have a heavy load to carry forward. The situation is so grave but we owe you an enormous debt of thanks for sharing what you have done with us today. So thank you indeed and we hope that we can see you back in person sometime soon. Thank you again and thank you to our viewers and a word of thanks also to our background team of researchers and technical people. So thank you again and goodbye for the moment. Thank you very much. It was a great pleasure and the privilege to be with you today and thank you for all the questions.