 Okay, since yesterday, my enthusiasm in seeing so many people gathered together in order to discuss subject matters concerning gyna-logic has kept equally vivid and I will start my talk by warmly thank Peter Flughel and his team at the center of gyna-studies for having enabled this event. So thank you very much. So today my lecture is intended in the first part as a presentation of a classical controversy between the Buddhists and the gyna's concerning the nature and scope of the universal relations that are grounding inferences. In a second part, I will am at showing that it is possible to reconstruct a reply to the Buddhist criticisms from the Jain Manika Nandi's account of the way one is enabled to infer not only from apprehension of a given evidence, but from its non-apprehension too. So once upon a time the Buddhist Dharma Kirti addressed some very long criticisms against the Jain conception of inference. On the Digambar side, Akalanka is the first thinker to give systematic answers to those criticisms. But following his Buddhist opponent style, Akalanka gives very concise answer. Today I am working on Manika Nandi's Parikshamukham because it is so the introduction to philosophical investigation because it consists in a digest of the final and mature epistemology of Akalanka. So he explicitly states the disagreements between the two schools plus he is developing a very nice theory of non-apprehension. Plus I will present what can be considered as a tradition of Akalanka on inference such as it is found in the Parikshamukham and in the Pramaya Kamara Martanda, the son that grows the lotuses of the knowable that is a commentary by Prabhachandra on the Parikshamukham. Plus in this last work Prabhachandra is presenting Dharma Kirti's view such as it is found in Dharma Kirti's Pramanavartika Svavreti, so the autocommentary on notes on the means to require knowledge. So inference as you all know is an indirect faculty of knowledge that enables one to know some properties not knowable directly by the external senses. The general pattern of it is that one knows by this inference that the property A is present because one knows by another knowledge process for example perception that the property B is present. Plus one knows that there is a universal relation linking these two properties and this universal relation in terms is granting the fact that the first property can never be seen without the second one. Henceforth the first property is seen as an evidence for the presence of the second one. So one of the main discussions between Indian schools of thought concerns the nature of this evidence and of the invariable concomitance which is the name of this universal relation between the two. So first of all Manikya Nandi accepts four types of invariable concomitance. So invariable concomitance might hold between either two coexistence, between either a pervaded property and its pervasive property, either between a predecessor and its successor and either between an effect and its cause. Let us begin with the less problematic relation namely the relation that holds between a pervaded property and its pervasive property, Vyapa Vyapaka. This type of invariable concomitance defines the type of inference related to class identity. These cases are the less problematic ones since there are cases to phrase it in an anachronistic way of analytic inclusion of a class within another. So the example put forward by Manikya Nandi is the following one. Knowing that sound is a product is sufficient for one to know that sound in does change. So in this case, the invariable concomitance which guarantees the correctness of the inference is due to a relation of identity of nature between the property of being a product and the property of enduring change because a product is part of the things enduring change. So to this point with the exception of differences in the underlying theories, there are no major disagreements between Jain and Buddhists on one cons as a correct invariable concomitance. Another type of invariable concomitance is granted by the Jainists, is the one that holds between two co-existent, Sahachara. This type of invariable concomitance gathers together the cases in which something is never seen without another. For example, it is sufficient to see one face of a coin, say tails, in order to know that the other face will be hailed. So when presented this type of inference, Manikya Nandi uses what I call the mango inference which consists in saying that knowing that this has a taste of a mango is sufficient to know that this has visible properties of a mango. The Buddhists recognize that this is a correct example of inference but they deny that it belongs to the category of coexistence. Why is that so? It is so because when Dharmakirti introduced the different types of invariable concomitance is considering as correct one, he said that there are only two types of them. First of all, every types of invariable concomitance according to Dharmakirti involve the relation between a pervaded property and its pervasive property and there are two subtypes of such invariable concomitance, namely the identity of nature and causality. So what he calls identity of nature is the same that the general relation between pervaded and pervasive. And here it is important to understand that when you speak about causality, causality is in a certain sense a relation of class inclusion because in Dharmakirti's theory, causal relations are translatable in terms of relation of identity of nature because two things have the same nature if and only if they have the same causes. So and this link between causality and identity of nature is precisely what is ensuring the necessity of the invariable concomitance between two causal properties. So the Buddhists will have to show that the mango inference is a correct one but is not dependent upon the category of coexistence and according to the Jainas they will do so by showing that everything in the mango inference is translatable in terms of causality. So we can reconstruct the following inference. This is sufficient to know that this has a taste of the mango in order to know that all the conditions of the presence of a mango are met. This is in terms is sufficient to know that this has visible properties of a mango. So one does not need the category of coexistence in order to explain why this inference is a correct one. No, by rephrasing it this way the Jainas are but preparing their next defense against the Buddhist attack. But in order to explain this I have to say two words about the conception of causality the two schools are holding. So the invariable concomitance between an effect and its cause is the canonical model for the presentation of an inference Shemata. The most famous cases of it being one's knowledge of the presence of a fire on a hill due to one's knowledge of the presence of smoke on the hill at stake. The popularity of this type of inference based on causality is due to the fact that it turns an inference into a scientific explanation. When presenting this type of inference Manikyanandi uses the following example Paul knowing that there is speech ability in this individual is sufficient to know that there is intelligence in this individual because speech ability is but an effect of the intelligence. So although Jainas and Buddhists agree on this example they would not agree on its converse because their marketing considers that only the effect and not the cause can serve as an evidence in a correct inference. So only the effect and not the cause is a correct evidence why is that so because the cause is not sufficient as an evidence because one can never be sure that the two following prerequisites are being fulfilled namely that no impediment is blocking the potential of the given cause to produce its effect and secondly that all the conditions required for the production of the effect are present. So you can maybe see now why the reformulation by Manikyanandi of the Manga inference is an attack against the Buddhists. Manikyanandi said that those who accept to infer the visible properties of a fruit by means of the inference of the totality of the condition of the presence of this fruit itself obtained from the taste of this very fruit those accept to that the cause of something is an evidence for the presence of this thing. Wherever now over conflicting cause is blocking off the efficiency of the cause at stake. So if we go back on the inference you can see that the totality of conditions of the presence are of a mango is a cause and is used as an evidence for the inference of the visible properties of a mango. So here the Buddhists say that cause is no good evidence but they are using a cause as an evidence. So this is the Jaina criticism against the Buddhists here. But if we are closer look on one Dharmakirti says it seems that he is not dying with a mango skin in his mouth due to this attack because he happens to consider it possible to draw an inference in which causes are used as somewhat a kind of evidence and these types of inference according to him fall into the general category of inference whose evidence is an identity of nature. So Dharmakirti is saying that the arising of an effect which is inferred through the complete cause is called an identity of nature because it has no dependence upon any further object. So this new statue to pursue the totality of causes as a kind of property of the effect so as the identity of nature is allowed because as we have seen there is a deep connection between identity of nature and causality in Dharmakirti's theory. So what these new statues bring is that the Buddhists accept identity of nature as a correct evidence. So they can say that the mango inference is a correct one without being a threat to accept cause as a correct evidence here. But there is another, this attack consists in several parts and one part of the criticism still remain. Again in his commentary to the parikshamukam Prabhupāda Chandra reminds us that according to the Buddhist knowledge can be of what is past and present not future. But here again a closer look on Dharmakirti's theory will reveal that this problem has been avoided when he said that this identity of nature is but a virtual identity of nature. And that what is inferred is not the actual arising of the effect but the potential of the effect to arise. So in Gillian and Hayes Road Dharmakirti has taken into account the fact that the beautifully colored apple that showed promise of tasting sweet may turn out to have a bitter taste. So more broadly speaking what Dharmakirti is trying to save here by the introduction of this rephrasing is nothing less that our ability to make prediction. So within this reformulation cause can be used as a correct evidence. So if we reconstruct the inference we have that knowing that this has the taste of a mango is sufficient to know that all the conditions of the presence of the mango are met and this is done used as a virtual identity of nature is sufficient to know that this has visible properties of a mango having in mind that this is a potential effect and not the actual one. So the next move from the giant side is to show that even with this rescue of cause as a somewhat evidence the Buddhist cannot give an account of all correct types of inference. One is legitimate to draw. Why is that so? It is because there is another type of invariable concomitance due to worldly regularities. Due to worldly regularities some phenomena are predictable. This is called the invariable concomitance between a predecessor and its successor. This invariable concomitance between a predecessor and its successor is a separate kind of invariable concomitance. It cannot be translated says Manikyanandhi in terms of identity of nature nor of causality because contrary to them this one is a relation between two phenomena separated by a time interval. Yes. So the inference presented here by Manikyanandhi is the following one. Knowing that the playa des arts are arising at a given moment is sufficient to know that Aldebaran will rise in the future. So the rising of one star can be known from the rising of another one even though there is no relation of causality nor of identity between these two risings. By the way the Arabic name Aldebaran is another recognition for the non-succession between these two stars since it means the follower. So the claim of the giant side here is to say that hipdermocurity tries to trace back cases of succession and cases of succession to identity of nature and causality. For example by like in the case of the Manga inference by saying that knowing that the playa des arts are arising is sufficient to know that for example the world is in the state A and this cognition enables me to infer that Aldebaran will rise. This will not save their arguments because sorry Prabhupachandra reminds us that according to the Buddhist the relation of identity holds only between two synchronous phenomena and the relation of causality holds between two phenomena that take place in continuity. That is to say in succession but without any time interval between them. So there will be no possibility to to go from TN up to TN plus one here. So in relation to conceptions of time Peter made it clear that in his lecture that there are more than enough materials for another independent lecture but I will not concentrate on this argument here. Instead I kindly invite those who wants more on this to look at Anne Klavel's work on the playa des Aldebaran inference in Akalanka. And as far as today's talk is concerned I am interested in showing that another part of the Buddhists and the Jain theories, namely their respective theories of non-apprehension is such that the Buddhists do not need a distinction between causal relation and relation of succession here but the Jainas do. So the theory of non-apprehension. In the first section we have been studying not all types of correct inferences but only correct inferences related to apprehension. No one can acquire new knowledge through non-apprehension and uparabdhi too. First of all according to Manikyanandhi one is justified to infer the absence of a given establishable property in case one has apprehended an incompatible evidence to it. Twenty minutes gone, twenty minutes gone. So this concerns correct inferences only in case the evidence at stake is a perverted property, an effect, a cause, a predecessor, a successor or a existence. So I will pass very quickly on this because the only disagreements between the Buddhists and the Jainas here are but the same that the disagreements they had in the case of apprehension. Namely the fact that no cause can serve as a good evidence nor successive relations or coexistence relations. So skip this and in the second case of non-apprehension there is no way of knowing how much difference either the first case of non-apprehension will interest us. So in this second case one is justified to infer the absence of an establishable property in case one has not apprehended its evidence. So this concerns correct inference only in cases the evidence is either a pervasive property an effect, a cause, a predecessor, a successor or a coexistence. So if one asks about the difference between apprehension of an incompatible and non-apprehension of a compatible let me take as an example the difference between saying he isn't happy and he is unhappy. More precisely in he is unhappy the negation concerns a determined domain. More precisely one is speaking about an individual who has feeling and who has a precise feeling of unhappiness whereas in he is not happy the negation concerns a broader range of meanings. He might have another feeling that happiness or he might have no feelings at all. In this the correctness of the inference involving each type of negation that is to say apprehension of an incompatible evidence or non-apprehension of a compatible evidence. The correctness of the inference involving those won't be the same. So there are not redundant categories. So a consequence of this fact is that one can combine these two types of non-apprehension so as to derive the third and last category. Okay, and this is the giant torch in the sense that it is not discussed in Darmakirthi, Pramanavartika. So more precisely according to Manikyanandhi one is justified to infer the presence of an establishable property from the absence of an incompatible evidence in case later is either an effect, a cause or an essence. So I haven't been speaking about the relation of essence up to now which is called Svabhava but very quickly it is the relation that holds between a thing and its direct essence like for example the pot and the potness. So it should not be mistaken with the Buddhist relation of identity of natures, Svabhava too. I haven't been speaking about it because the Jainas do not present it when they do present the different types of invariable commitments but are introducing it only here at this place. So for the time being we left as an open question the question whether to know why they are introducing this fifth type of invariable commitments that late. But it is mainly to prove their theories of Anikanta Veda. So here we aim at showing that this last disagreement between the Jainas and the Buddhists is connected to their disagreement on the admitted types of invariable commitments. Why is that so? Because in the first case of non-apprehension there is a difference between the cases of application of the invariable commitments related to succession and the cases of application of the invariable commitments related to causality. More precisely from the non-apprehension of an effect one can infer the presence of its cause. I think there is an example here, yes, from the non-apprehension of connection with their ones which is an incompatible one can infer that this creature has grief. But from the non-apprehension of a successor one cannot infer the presence of its predecessor. So this difference is crucial, why? Because it is the only difference that one can find between the cases of application of the invariable commitments related to succession and the one related to causality. So this is made evident in the following table in which you see that the only difference relies in the final column. So in other words the way one knows things by means of an inference differs if the inference is based on causality or on succession. Therefore reducing Manikyanand's classification of types of invariable commitments would produce the collapsing of these different ways to gain knowledge from inference. And this is one reason why succession should be recognized as a separate category, separated from causality and from identity of nature. Thank you for your attention.