 Hello, initially I would like to thank the organizers for the opportunity to participate in this conference. I'm Ana Paula Alves and I will talk about the risks of the 50th generation telecommunications networks, known as 5G. First, I will talk about the technical characteristics and the benefits of 5G. Then, based on the report named European Union Coordinated Risk Assessment of the Site Security of 5G Networks Report, published in October last year, I will indicate which are the main risks that have been identified and the measures to mitigate it. From a technological perspective, 5G will make use of several new technical features compared to the current situation in existing networks. First, there will be a major shift from traditional network as functions will no longer be built on specialized hardware and software, but instead will take place only on software. Second, there will be a network slicing that will make it possible to support a high degree of separation between different services on the same physical network. Third, there will be an enhanced functionality at the edge of the network and it will be less centralized than previous generations. Thanks to these technical characteristics, 5G is said to be a hundred times faster than existing 4G networks. With speeds as fast as 10 gigabytes per second, it is expected to provide ultra-high bandwidth and low latency connectivity, not only to individual users but also to connected objects. Additionally, 5G will serve a wide range of applications and sectors, including the maintenance and operation of vital societal and economic functions, such as energy, transport, banking, health and industrial control systems. However, the sociologists that study risk societies like Erich Beck talk about the ignorance of the unknown and that we are experiencing the irony of having an advanced technical scientific society that many times it has to deal with the incalculable and the unpredictable. We will talk about the main 5G known risks, separated according to the type of threats, authorship and vulnerability. First, the threats. Like any digital network, 5G can be associated with several generic technical threats. Although many of these threats are not specific to 5G, their number and significance are likely to increase within 5G, due to the increased level of technical complexity and the future greater dependency of economies and societies on this network. For example, in the area of health, currently surgical robots are not used for high-risk surgeries because the 4G network does not have the technical capacity. The 5G will be able to do so. Nonetheless, if during the surgery any of the threats mentioned has happened, the surgery will be stopped abruptly, which can lead to the death of a patient. Another example are autonomous vehicles. Driverless trucks in Sweden already operate on predefined roads between warehouses. They currently use the 4G and occasionally experience problems with the speed and latency of this current network. When this happens, a human from a remote operation center takes over and stops the trucks, avoiding collision. With 5G network, the auto industry intends to generalize the use of autonomous vehicles in all directions. If damage is caused to the network, there will certainly be a major accident between vehicles. Second, threat actors. The relevance of threat actors in the 5G context is considered by combining two parameters. First, the estimation of their capabilities that is their resources, and their intention to perform or attempt attacks against 5G networks that is their motivation. The various actors identified are accidental actors due to human error, natural phenomena, or system failures, hacker or activist groups, organized crime groups, and state actors or state-backed actors, which the motivations are primarily political. Third, vulnerability. Since 5G networks will be largely software-based, major security flaws can facilitate the insertion of intentional backdoors into products, facilitating malicious actions such as espionage. It's important to remember that the telecom equipment and software market is characterized by a reduced number of global suppliers, capable of providing the necessary technology to large telecom operators. The main suppliers are Huawei, Ericsson and Nokia. Other vendors include ZTE, Samsung and Cisco. But only two of these suppliers are based in the European Union. That's Ericsson and Nokia. Therefore, the European Union has long been concerned about the increase in 30-part technology suppliers. In several opinions and reports issued approximately 10 years ago, when the novelty was still cloud computing, there was a red concern about the fact that Europe's information and communication technology industry is dominated by American and Asian companies. Meredith in mind, the Commission is developing a strategy to reduce Europe's dependency on foreign technologies. This strategy reiterated that all entities providing equipment or services in the European Union, regardless of their country of origin, must comply with your fundamental rights, including the legal framework on privacy, data protection and cybersecurity. To do so, member states agreed to, first, reinforce security requirements. Second, assess supplier risk profiles. Third, apply relevant restrictions to suppliers considered to be of high risk and have strategies to guarantee the diversification of suppliers. Specifically in the UK, the Chinese company Huawei will be able to participate in the installation of 5G network, but with restrictions from a high-risk supplier. So, they will not supply safety parts that equip the central core of the new network and it will only be able to sell up to 35% of the material that constitutes the periphery of the network. Also, it will be excluded from areas close to military bases or nuclear installations. To finish, I would like to talk about global risks mitigation. Following Yurich Beck's classification, the risks on 5G are not traditional risks nor risks of human development, but they are new risks. The new risks are also based on human decisions or conducts. But if fair from them, because they are not individually bearable, they are socialized and have potential to cause catastrophes or major accidents. Besides that, 5G risks have a global dimension not limited to one geographical location or space and because of that, they have incalculable and no compensable consequences. Therefore, the mitigation of the 5G global risks depends on a performance that follows the precautionary approach and looks for an approximation with the current notion of good governance, namely transparency, openness, participation, effectiveness, coherence and their responsibility logic. This mitigation also needs a collective multilevel and coordinated action between various international actors, which goes to encounter of the Lisbon Treat. Since its signature in 2007, civil protection is increasingly moving out of a national orbit to take on supranational controls. Also, it is stressing the importance of cooperation between the member states in order to enhance the effectiveness of disaster prevention systems. Specifically, in the case of 5G, lots of institutions of European Union are involved, like the Commission, the Parliament, the Council, the Agency for Cybersecurity and the body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications. Also, are involved in the member states and their institutions related to telecom and cybersecurity and global institutions like the International Telecommunication Union of the United Nations. So, to finish, I would like to reinforce that today there is no longer any possibility for action at the international level from state to state. The classic concept of nation-state governance is being surpassed by a new concept of global governance. Thank you for your attention.