 Can I ask all our panelists to just sit up here in front if you don't mind? Or would you rather just sit there? Okay, fine I'd like to get started ladies and gentlemen. So if you've grabbed your lunch, please grab your coffee or dessert Welcome to the Carnegie today. My name is Chung Min Lee. I'm a senior fellow at the Asia program And it's a real pleasure to welcome all of you It's a very special occasion because the conference we'll be having this afternoon is on a very important topic namely the aftermath of the second US North Korea summit. I Am delighted that we'll be part of partnering with the ASEAN Institute for Policy Studies Introducing our panelists quite shortly and from our perspective I believe that the conference cannot cover possibly all of the critical issues, but I think three major themes stand out the first is where do all of the stakeholders go from here from from Hanoi and We are hearing more of what happened in in Hanoi from various sources The other major issue that I think is quite germane is what will happen to the peace process that is happening on the Korean Peninsula today And I think the South Korean government is very focused on sustaining the peace momentum for what it's worth And I think they were a bit disappointed at the outcome in Hanoi But that is more the reason why I think the Moon Jae-in government is going to really focus on perpetuating and and and sustaining the the peace initiative Last but not least although it is not going to be covered directly I believe that all of this has a critical impact on how the two Koreas are unified as At some point down the road and so if you argue well What about the nuclear issue the peace process that at the end of the tunnel at the end of the highway? You will see what type of a unified Korea that we all of us envision As I said today, we're joined by very close personal friends as well as professional colleagues The ASEAN Institute is Korea's premier non-governmental think tank. It was founded 10 years ago Dr. Ham Jae-bong the president was going to be here, but a number of prior commitments prevented him from doing so But in his stead, but in fact, I would argue in more respects a very fitting person We have three outstanding colleagues from ASEAN Dr. Cheyong the vice president Dr. Shim Bum-chul the senior fellow and Dr. James Kim another research fellow at ASEAN and so they all flew in yesterday and a couple days ago for this conference We also have a number of outstanding panelists here from Washington He'll be joining us very shortly. He's on his way Scott Snyder from the Council of Foreign Relations Laura Rosenberger from the German Marshal Fund Yuki Tatsumi from the Stimson Center Ryan Haas from Brookings and last but not least my colleagues here at Carnegie I'd like to particularly recognize Dr. Michael Swain Dr. Toby Dalton Toby in particular. I'm very grateful because next week Carnegie holds and will convene a biennial nuclear conference Which sucks out all the oxygen in the building and I know that he doesn't have you know Even two minutes to spare, but he was gracious enough to give us his thoughts this afternoon Everybody wants to know what happened in the summit and We will give you a take on that as much as possible based on on on we know But my final comment is we've been with this issue for a long time as I was preparing the Remarks this morning. I asked myself how many leaders have there been Working on this particular issue since the first North Korean crisis occurred in 1993 In my account, there have been 15 Japanese Prime Ministers 15 six Korean presidents including the current one four US presidents three Russian presidents three Chinese presidents Two North Korean leaders So if you look at it from that perspective that the North Koreans have the luxury of having one person in power for quite a long time and so there is consistency in that sense of the word and I feel that on in the first session we'll be talking primarily about the US and South Korea And the impact that this has on the Alliance and where the South Koreans want to go down the road in session two That's when Dr. Chakon will be moderating the regional dynamics of this particular issue and So without further ado, let me introduce dr. Chakon vice president of us on to give his welcome and remarked and we'll begin with session one very shortly last But not least let me thank all of the participants who have come from Washington and including the greater Washington area We're joining us at Carnegie here today. Thank you very much Thank you. Dr. Chung Min Lee I'd like to thank you all for joining us this afternoon as Dr. Chung Min Lee mentioned that Dr. Jepong Ham president of awesome supposed to be here But actually because he's so many things to do in Seoul. He actually asked me to come instead So I will do my best to fail in his emptiness But anyhow, he liked to extend his sincere gratitude to every one of you today and also it is very Honor and pleasure for us on to co-host this event with chronic endowment for international peace I hope this is the beginning of a new partnership. We will continue to do so if there's something happened on the grand peninsula and mostly stasia There will be many way we can do together Actually, let me make some Remarks on this Hanoi summit and then I like to save the best for the panel one But it's my personal observation. Of course Everybody may say the Hanoi summit is a failure But I think we have learned some lessons in Hanoi. There are at least three lessons But first of all, I like to make it. No deal sometimes better than bad deal that actually proves the Actually what happened in Hanoi? It seems to me that we have learned the number one North Korea has not made it's a static decision to give up nuclear weapons So North Korean proposal for partial denuclearization confined only some facilities in Yongbyon Actually, that led me to conclude the North Korea has not made a strategic decision Unlike special envoy Chong Yong said on upon his return from Pyongyang Exactly a year ago of today. He went to Pyongyang He led South Korea special envoy to Pyongyang in preparation for summit upon his return. He mentioned Kim Jong-un has made a strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons on the two conditions First one military threat must be gone second regime security must be guaranteed So under those two conditions, he can give up nuclear weapons So I thought it's not actually a strategic decision. It's a continuation of the same policy for the past 25 years So I made a critical comment on that. It's nothing new. It's beginning of another show so I Hope I was wrong, but it turns out to be I'm right at this point of time So I hope we can continue to these kinds of diplomatic engagement to make North Korea's strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons Second point about economic sanctions. We used to talk about economic sanctions would not work But ironically it worked since Kim Jong-un desperately Needs to relieve of all sanctions actually my five major economic sanctions on North Korea That means North Korea economy is in very bad shape continue to be in that past If there's no relief of economic sanctions So that means we have to keep economic sanctions at work as far as we can get the denuclearization go fast and effective way Actually, sir, exactly. Actually, we know more more about North Korea nuclear program So it was told that the US actually gave the list of nuclear Facilities they have found over the years and then no square was alarmed very much. It seems to me We have very speculative in knowing North Korea's nuclear capability But it turns out us has more information more reliable information than we thought So we are in a better position to press North Korea toward That the declaration of nuclear facilities and the process of denuclearization So task is ahead of us how we can make North Korea to make a strategic decision so for that I think this I will save all those questions to the panel one and Among others on top of almost anything robust out. Okay, you as it turns posture is very necessary to keep The future of Korean Peninsula safe and nuclear free Otherwise, we will be in a very bad position or there will be so many crises and threats coming from North Korea So of course the second session will cover beyond the North Korean issues How this situation on the Korean Peninsula unfolds will affect the regional dynamics For example now actually against our expectation. North Korea actually began to improve its relation with China Chinese influence over Korean Peninsula has increased over past one and a half year very much North Korea is going to strengthen its relations with Russia as well to form Former alliance or the maybe kinds of network of cooperation to stand against the United States on the other end US has shown especially from Trump has shown some Intent to change out of KUS allies in different way So that raised a lot of concerns in South Korea very much He mentioned he's going to terminate out of KUS joint military exercise because it's expensive and provocative war game That actually alarmed a lot in South Korea very much But the US is going to maintain its allies commitment Or not that is going to be a question to be addressed in the following in the second section So without further ado, let me thank you all again So looking forward to having very interesting and productive discussions in panel one and panel two. Thank you well, thank you very much Kong for those remarks and on behalf of The ASEAN Institute and Carnegie. I'd like to also recognize two other people several more people, but Alex Taylor, who is probably in the back some place and Kate Okay, Alex there you are and then Katie Botto who were indispensable in setting this up for us and are really as to junior fellows including a an ASEAN fellow who is here for a year What I would like to do in the in the first session is go down and then just give us a quick take a Snapshot of you will if you will of what you think were the main takeaways from the summit So I'm gonna put you on the spot because you're a friend of mine And we work together. This is not how we treat friends. Right now about in the American press and the South Korean press Toby It was mentioned that you and others including our dear friend and in the Vite Was very instrumental in providing some type of a roadmap and so I wanted to ask you What is your take on the summit in so far as you see it from a non-proliferation point of view? Well That's a good question. I think the summit was Neither a success nor a failure In part because there wasn't a uniform set of expectations And as Laura and I were discussing in the hallway just prior The the main takeaway for me is less about whether there's a pathway or road map to denuclearization or not It's more about kind of the risks of this high stakes high risk Summetry to try to you address very complex detailed technical issues and to to use that to try to force momentum where Time is probably really more required so for me that was the main takeaway actually is that this this affirms what we all know which this is a really hard problem and it's going to take time and Sending the president off to Southeast Asia for a summit at this particular point of time Whether he wanted it or not that's kind of immaterial probably was it wasn't ripe enough yet to do that And so that that shows the risk of this in terms of the road map. I think the the problem as as it's structured is still there, right? To pick up on the point that the chae gong started with which is that you know Kim Jong-un hasn't made a strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons that that may or may not be right I think they're going to hedge for as long as they would need to this year next year five years from now 20 years from now And so we have to play along with that hedging right that's I think that's the reality And the nothing about what happened on the nuclear side, and I know I really changes that Laura you've spent A large chunk of your life working for senior U.S. officials in the NSE the State Department And now you need German martial fund as a former senior advisor to in the US government How do you think what was the inner thought if you can imagine it in the Trump administration as they went into the Hanoi summit? And what are you doing now in the aftermath of the summit? Well, I've made it a policy not to attempt to put my not to Speculate on the mindset of the Trump administration. I've learned that's a risky endeavor But what I would say is you know building off of what Toby said and having spent a lot of time, you know Advising senior officials including on negotiations, you know, that's right and the six-party talks and and after Is that process matters right? Process matters a lot if you want to get to good substance And in particular on a complicated issue as Toby was saying, you know with Korea with a lot of the technicalities here But also, you know when when we think about the the lists of the lists of presidents that you went through in the The number of changes that we've had and the fact that the consistency is actually really in the favor of the North Koreans You know many of us who spend a lot of time around around North Korea negotiating teams continue to see the same faces Over and over and over again and even while they've made some changes You know Chesonese appearance at the at the post-Hanoi late-night Press conference was kind of interesting for many of us who what sure kind of shrink away for a little bit there But the the same folks have been involved for a long time on their side And so when we have a constant rotation of folks on on the US side, which is part of our system It's particularly incumbent to ensure that our negotiators not only are very well-versed, which I believe Absolutely is but that they're fully empowered and and I think that is what has troubled me In the run-up to Singapore in the aftermath of Singapore in the run-up to Hanoi And now I think it's a question mark in the aftermath of Hanoi is that there really was no process I mean, you know, it's a Toby's point about time had we been using the time since Singapore for detailed In-depth negotiations on an ongoing basis through some dedicated process. We might have had a different Scenario going into Hanoi and a little bit of different set of Expectations or at least understanding about where some of the boundaries are the fact that our teams were clearly so far apart As far apart as they were going to Hanoi I think points to again the the consequences of a lack of a of a meaningful process with empowered negotiators One man showed diplomacy just simply isn't No pump chart you've been in Korea now for a while all your life, of course You're one of the very few analysts who have had real experience both in the Ministry of Defense and in the Foreign Ministry As an advisor and as a policymaker and from your perspective From Seoul's perspective if there is such a perspective, how do you see the summit? Was it was it is a failure for President Moon because it was to be a failure for President Trump or Does he believe that this still can be salvaged? I think there's a half of success and a half of failure Stop the toy mentioned that I think the loader is sometimes better than that deal. This time is exactly this case I think though we must think about the North Korea's strategy and the concept of denuclearization President Trump when he's press release press conferences mentioned that there is a some gap between the United States and North Korea About the concept of denuclearization No, North Korea Announced it's a concept of denuclearization of a Korean peninsula in North Korea tongue Joseon Bando. It's the same thing that Joseon Bando and Korean Peninsula and their government Spokesman announced it exactly 2016 and July 6th if my memory is correct under the tongue I think North Korea this time did not specify their strategy, but they're there based upon the Joseon Bando denuclearization concept They negotiate as a nuclear power and that their negotiation is actually the Nuclear disarmament negotiation and their condition to give a nuclear weapon is a retreat of a USFK That's the basis of North Korea's Negotiation strategy and this time many people surprised that North Korea just they give up the Young Ben nuclear facility and demand the lift of all Sanctions, which is actually hurt the North Korea's economy But we do not understand how North Korea can demand such kind of big things Instead of their small just denuclearization step on Young Ben, but under there the kind of a Korean Joseon Bando denuclearization concept That's a right thing because the Young Ben police Facilities equal to lift of sanction and next step probably the unreported running management of facility It is equal to rugged alliance then North Korea after the retreat of USFK They're going to decide that about whether they give up the nuclear weapon That's the concept. That's the gap between the United States and North Korea So I think this time we realized the fundamental gap between the US and North Korea Scott you've been watching this issue for the last 25 plus years And you're one of the most I guess well-known Observers of the Korean political scene. Can you give us a take from a South Korean domestic political perspective of how this summit went and what it means for the for the alliance from your perspective That sounds like a question. I should be asking you, but I'll take a shot at it I think that you know clearly there are still divisions in Korea over This entire process between concerns and progressives And so actually where I would go is to this Asan CFR joint poll that We just did that really focused in on perceptions of reliability of USFK In the context of an atmosphere of tension reduction, right that occurred following the Pyongyang summit And I think that what that shows, you know, we all know public opinion polls about where things stand in terms of support for parties support for the president I Think it's still pretty clear in the domestic context that There is a plurality of support for the ruling party But When you dig in to specific policies it gets interesting because Our poll showed very clearly that there is majority support across all sectors and quadrants of Korean society for liability of the USFK And interestingly enough when we asked whether the USFK is an impediment to an inter-Korean peace process three-fifths of Korean surveyed said no It's not an impediment. So is that cut across generations? I Need to go I I don't have that on the tip of my tongue. There's there's some varieties, but basically, you know overall There's a pretty strong level of support And actually the really interesting division is between men and women When you dig into perceptions of USFK in Korea And so if you're conservative in Korea, you're probably a little bit heartened by the results if you're progressive in Korea You're anxious because you want to see the inter-Korean process unfold you know in a way the biggest gap emerging that we have to deal with is a Growing sense that in Korea there's a focus on North Korea as an economic opportunity and challenge Whereas here in Washington, we're still very focused on it as a denuclearization challenge Although President Trump did say on numerous occasions that if North Korea the nuclear rises She's going to be the next Japan next South Korea. You'll have a wonderful future Whether he truly believes that or not is anybody's guess, but he did mention that I want to ask you just quickly in April 2020. We have very important national assembly elections in Seoul How is this going to how is this going to affect the the election you think? I never make predictions about the future of North Korea or about South Korean politics or what the Congress will do Yeah, so there's a long way to go before we get to South Korean National Assembly elections But what I expect is it by the time we get there We're gonna have a closely contested referendum on where things stand in Korea And of course the stakes are high because it's kind of a precursor to the next presidential election But the really significant question in my view would be even though it's fairly late in Moon's term Would the constraint offered by having to deal with a divided national assembly be removed For Moon to try to do as much as he can in the remaining months of his presidency No, Toby going you have studied obviously the JCPOA and When President Trump came into office. He was very negative about that He ultimately withdrew America from the Iranian nuclear agreement Which I would argue that means that he can do a better deal with the North Koreans That's the expectation, right? So you the US is no longer part of the Iranian agreement and you have this this hiatus in the US-North Korea relationship How does Iran if any? Impact going forward US relations in North Korea. I'd make two points here one the credibility of the US as a Negotiator as a partner that can fulfill the commitments that it signs up to I think has to be in question And we've seen that not just in the case of the Iran nuclear deal But in prior deals to Paris climate agreement with this administration, but even going back I think as some people have observed of the current national security adviser There's probably not an arms control agreement that John Bolton wouldn't like to kill if he hasn't done so already So I think you know the the problem of sustainability of US commitment to these agreements is certainly There at this point become in part of the because of the JCPOA, but more broadly than that the second point I would make That's that's kind of related to this is statements that have also been made by Trump administration officials about the reason That we're negotiating with North Korea, but not with Iran Right and the reason is that North Korea has nuclear weapons and Iran doesn't right that is really problematic now The political science literature about why states decide to get nuclear weapons and what motivates them right isn't quite as clear on this question But if you say to a negotiating partner We're negotiating with you because you have nuclear weapons the application for everybody else is gee if we want a better deal But maybe we need nuclear weapons too. So right we pull out of the JCPOA Now we're kind of in this limbo with Iran and yet we're negotiating with North Korea So I think the signal is there can't be any clear if I can just take you on that, you know president Trump basically said that all Of the other previous US presidents going back to I guess Bill Clinton Kick the can down the road and he was only he who decided you know what I'm gonna I'll take this I'll resolve it in my own way So whether you like his style or not, that's what he said, right? Looking back as a nuclear expert in this field going back to let's say to the Clinton years and then Bush and then Obama What is that true the previous US government's basically dropped the ball and we let North Korea have nuclear weapons and having nuclear weapons What are you gonna do about it? As with all of these issues there are complex histories and there are narratives the US narrative is that North Korea cheats on its commitments and therefore You know negotiations have failed largely because of North Korean actions I think the North Korean narrative and even the South Korean narrative on these questions is probably Substantially different about the ability of the US and the US Congress in particular to make good on commitments that administrations have made About the US shifting the goalpost on verification For instance, which was one of the issues that came about in 2008 when the six-party talks were falling apart So I think it's it's you know, there's no single narrative to these things But we're here at this moment talking about summits because of President Trump's Desirer to have this kind of high profile made for TV relationship Love letters and all with Kim Jong-un and so it's not that past efforts have Succeeded or failed because of particular administrations approach. I think his approach just clearly is different now. Is this better? Thus far Not willing to declare victory just yet Laura you you mentioned the importance of process And I think everybody in this room can agree with you that process is crucial But at some point in time you have to have the political leadership basically say, okay This is what I'm gonna do. I may take some political flag for this, but I'm gonna do this what I want to ask you was the political mood in Washington has changed because the US House of Representatives is now controlled by the Democrats and So with Nancy Pelosi in their second speakership They're in charge of all the committees intelligence, you know defense for an affairs subcommittees on Asia, etc Do you think my first question to you is do you think the US Congress in particular? The Democrats are going to use their newly found power to have an impact on the future of US North Korea relations and negotiations in particular I think it's an interesting question and let me Start with one of your points that that political leadership matters in addition to process And I would I would absolutely agree with that. It's a though There has to be a connection between the two right right And the political will and the process have to have some connectivity And I think one of the challenges is number one We've seen sort of a lack of process or lack of an empowered process number two We've seen a lack of connectivity between whatever process there has been in the apparent Headspace of President Trump at least as we can understand it So that's that's just one point on that on the question of Congress. I think it's an interesting question You know it's Toby mentioned of course Congress The US Congress has played quite a role on on North Korea in the past including on Potentially introducing what some might characterize as challenges in the implementation of previous agreements if you look at what the Democrats are Focused on right now and their their posture vis-a-vis North Korea I think you actually don't see a whole lot of consensus in the Democratic caucus that opposing Trump's approach to North Korea is a place they want to be Politically, I think it's actually a little challenging for them to be against a peace process right to the extent that that's you know I mean, I think one thing that I would just note I think is very different from the South Korean context from the US context is that North Korea is not a Politically resonant issue in the United States It's simply not most Americans really don't get it and don't care all that much except for they don't want to go To war period right that's kind of it But so I think you know you're not going to see a whole lot of animation by Democrats around this issue as a Means to kind of go after Trump as you may on other even foreign policy issues Where I do think you're going to see some pressure from the Democrats Is on a couple things one is human rights, and you've already seen a pretty strong reaction to the president's line on human rights, I mean globally but including in North Korea and and Specifically with his really deeply deeply troubling remarks about Otto Wombier and Kim Jong-un's Role or not or responsibility or not in that right so I think that you will certainly see Democrats continuing to push on that issue Which is a bit funny for me because I You know one of my earliest Assignments when I was on the Korea desk as a junior analyst, you know a junior officer over a decade ago was Was implementing the you know North Korea Human Rights Act, which was really a Republican led Human rights agenda on North Korea, and so we sort of flip the tables on on on that piece of the issue set Which is interesting to me the other place. I think you're going to see some real pushing from the from the Democrats is simply on transparency, right, I mean The Congress never got a briefing after the Singapore summit right in any depth, right? There's been no Hearing focused on North Korea in in any depth Where where Secretary Pompeo or or another State Department representative has had to testify and be clear about what the administration's policy is What's been happening? So I think now that you have you know, that was that was one thing when when you had both houses controlled by the Republicans Now that you have one house controlled by Democrats with subpoena power I think you will see an additional push for transparency and a better sense of just what is happening here from the perspective that you know Congress As you know in its oversight role has a right to know and to hold the administration accountable No, let me just focus your attention a little bit on on the GOP side in the Senate. That's controlled by the Republican Party What I see really lagging here in Washington is there's no real giant in the Senate Who has a commanding voice on foreign policy issues and I'm talking about the late John McCain among others But you had also like Ted Kennedy, you know the late senator the Kennedy and you know all people Biden John Kerry Biden, right? And so in the Senate whether it's the Democrats or the Republicans Do you see this as a long-term trend or is it just like a blip on the radar screen that the Senate will regain its voice and Not just counterbalance Trump, but you know have their own voice on where the US should be headed not only in North Korea, but overall in general Yeah, I'm taking a step back Foreign policy has always been sort of a funny issue in the in the sense of sort of the Balance of power between the different branches of government the executive branch really believes that Foreign policy is an article to function of the government It is to be carried out by the executive branch Congress traditionally has had more of a role certainly in the conflict of oversight, but also, you know I mean in a completely different kind. Well, I mean, I remember actually North Korea You know, we had You know the the chair and ranking of the House Foreign Affairs Committee You know a decade ago. We're very involved In in the North Korea issue actually led a codel to it's opinion at the time And so there was a time when you did have members of Congress being more involved I think it's important not just vis-a-vis Some of these thorny issues, but frankly when we talk about things like alliance Alliance relationships Relationships between Parliament and members of Congress, especially when there's sort of turbulent times or differences of views in different countries Where we have strong alliance really important to be able to have that connectivity And so while I come at this problem set as is somebody who has spent my career in the executive branch and believing that You know, really it is it is the executive that that should be the driver of foreign policy I think it is to our detriment as a country if we don't have leaders in Congress Who are able to be not only conversant on these issues? But show some leadership and in some instances either be that connective tissue or frankly be deployed as envoys You know In the Obama administration John Kerry camped out in Kabul for quite a while Helping to to forge an agreement for a new government in Afghanistan when there was a Challenging election there. So lots of reasons to have Congress be more involved. I'll tell you though that Not terribly optimistic on that front. The reality is that it is not politically rewarding for members of Congress to to take up Positions on on the foreign affairs for foreign relations committee They don't get a whole lot to show their districts at home on this issue. And so You know, we've been fortunate in the past when we've had some of these giants But and I certainly hope we will see that again, but not not hold my breath in the moment But yeah, I think there's one small bright spot And that is the Asia reassurance initiative act with Gardner and Markey taking the lead And so I think that it would be great if we saw Them build on that or other step up and own this issue a little bit more, but I just wanted to note that You know against that dumb backdrop. There's at least one bright light Although it's interesting that that issue kind of cuts both ways because part of that is also a signal domestically That there are limits to what Congress will permit the Trump administration right you on the realignment questions With the alliance so it's yeah negotiate on nuclear issues But if you're gonna do things related to the alliance usfk, etc. We need to be on board Yeah, so you have a two-figured Toby. No, that was that was that was it? Okay? So in that framework, I think Congress actually did sing send both signal of reassurance And then there's some other efforts to send signals of restraint in the run-up to henway and I would just note that Congress Anticipated and had some expectations and I think they began to make their voice known in terms of How they would respond to their expectations for the summit. No, Pumchol. I want you to imagine for a moment That you are Kim Jong-un So can you imagine that can be nice Just imagine that you're Kim Jong-un and you are meeting with the president of the united states for the second time in Hanoi Of course, you want a deal that will reduce sanctions normalize relations with the u.s And then get more respect in the world But you're sitting down in Pyongyang and you're asking yourself, okay Why do why do you think Kim Jong-un agreed to meet with donald trump for the second time in Hanoi? I think for Kim Jong-un Trump is a weaker point of a u.s. Policy trump is the weakest weakest point. Yes, okay Well, he would argue that he's a stronger. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, I know but from the kim jong-un's perspective Right president trump does not know details on the nuclear negotiation and he is unpredictable So he his approach is so called top-down approach North Korea emphasize this top-down approach is new Brand new approach to improve the relation between north korea and united states. So When he watched the back about the Negotiation among the working level North Korea to not focus on the working level negotiation Because they want to directly talk to president trump and if they Might be successful in persuading president trump. That's the end. That's the achieve of north korea school so the there is no such kind of Detailed discussion between the working level and then president there's the kim jong-un Meet again president trump and he probably Expected that another success of singapore Which he believed that he was successful at the time. He recognized as a world leader We have a summit with the president trump and he got us some kind of ambiguous Agreement with the united states the first line is improving bilateral relations with the united states Out of blessing for kim jong-un regime. So this time Kim jong-un tried to Try again to directly Perturbed the president of trump, but this time probably he got strike back. Okay. No What I want you to then imagine is if you're kim jong-un and you're back in pyongyang. Is the back in pyongyang now? Yeah, yeah, probably now right after a 36 on our 60 hour train ride and so you're back in pyongyang and I think he will probably get a message From the south koreans very soon that they want to start south north dialogue again Right if you were kim jong-un Would you come and visit president mun jie-in in south korea left maybe april or may Is there something to get in Seoul now after after the hanoi summit if I were kim jong-un? I don't think so because from kim jong-un's mindset if we visit the seoul He needed kind of a successful result of an economic package Right, but he knew that he knows that south korea government cannot provide him such kind of big economic Present because of the limitation of international sanction south korean government probably wanted to expand the economic cooperation with north korea However, it has its limitation because if we violate international sanction south korean corporation got the sanction It hurts our economy By the way, there's a super korean people as scum mentioned about the korean politics maybe next year No, north korea issue is not that important Economy is the main issue at the election So I think that with regard to that present moon has some kind of limitation We cannot provide the kim jong-un economic such kind of economic present kim jong-un know that so If I were kim jong-un, I will meet the present moon not the visit of the seoul maybe panmunjom just like the second summit last May 26 Last year and then portrayed the president moon Why don't you meet the president of the trump? And why don't we do some kind of small deal or middle deal not a big deal that's president President trump demand him Maybe that's the chairman kim's approach probably You know scott. You mentioned earlier that There are tensions or there could be tensions between washington and seoul over a host of issues And president trump has said recently that he's going to cancel the the major military exercises Although the number of u.s forces will remain. I would argue I would assume Relatively constant, right? He hasn't really said anything about trip reductions or withdrawals Now and then the president moon jane just yesterday had a national security council meeting Where the foreign minister wants to revive 1.5 track dialogue The defense minister said he wants to revisit the cbms to make sure that things are in place My first question to you is What role does us forces korea play in all of this? Is is deterrence in your view has it does it remain fairly robust throughout this peace process? Or will it be impacted by whatever happens, you know, either between the us and north korea or between the two koreas Yeah, that's an interesting question because obviously both militaries have been You know working on this plan for revised exercise schedule And everybody I think jumped to the conclusion that it was Connected to the hanoi summit, right? And it really Is connected to the inter korean pyongyang agreement the comprehensive military agreement Where essentially we see first steps in terms of confidence building measures and tension reduction And we see an effort by the united states working together with south korea to support a lessened environment An environment that reinforces tension reduction By making some adjustments in the schedule of exercises and I personally think that In principle that is a prudent thing to do but the critical issue is can we Do this in such a way that we maintain adequate readiness That's really a military specialist judgment, right? And so, you know having listened to general abrams and his testimony And having watched this process unfold since the scm and mcm Meetings last october It appears to me that at the institutional bureaucratic level That there is a willingness by both sides to craft this alternative plan And so we're adjusting the scope size volume and timing of exercises In cooperation with south korea And that's also the test and so one of the critical points that general abrams made Is that in the north korean winter training exercises We actually didn't see the north koreans reciprocating. That's right. So that is you know a point to note And then the question becomes If we have confidence our readiness Then it's possible to as general brook said, you know take some risks in order to be able to support A diplomatic pathway. I think that in principle that is a reasonable approach Um, but we obviously want to keep in close coordination with south korea and And also, you know, the real challenge comes in the next phase right because The comprehensive military agreement is just about some initial signaling around confidence building And arms control But if you start to talk about structural adjustments Between the two sides and that really has bigger implications And it's actually I think a much more challenging set of issues for the us in south korea If I could just pick your brain a moment on the sma on the special measures agreement The us in south korea agreed on a one-year deal Right And then after that one-year deal is over presumably sometime this year They'll begin negotiations fairly soon on a new five-year Negotiation right on defense cost sharing If you have a us president who is so transactional and he says on record that these exercises are so costly They're costing me as if he's paying them hundreds of millions of dollars And so as a negotiator you've got to ask yourself, you know at some point if north korea doesn't Live up to its expectations. Then those exercises will be back on the table But as a president who says Basically over my dead body. Do you see any chance of these exercises coming back? Well Maybe not in this administration. I think that it remains to be seen If you're doing one-year agreements, I mean the the problems I think really lie and what is the motive? And so the critical issue from my perspective is that the us north korea initiative Really needs to kept very separate From this us south korea discussion on burden sharing because they are separate issues And as long as we can keep them separate and try to manage This set of issues. I think we start on the right track But it's also true that the president's own view Of the defense burden Is well, it's just not supported by anybody else That I can see in power in washington Including at high levels in his own administration Uh, and so you have to sort of step back and start to think okay. Well, this looks like the carter scenario all over again Right. We survived that and so the question I I would focus on the fact that so far In terms of our institutional coordination capabilities We're still so tightly tied together that my judgment is that The alliance will survive the leadership No, Toby we spent a lot of time here talking about nuclear issues And of course it is the most pressing issue between Uh, the two koreas in the us and north korea or even china for that matter Excuse me, but there are other outstanding threats The ballistic missiles you have chemical biological weapons increasingly cyber Capabilities, I think was a new york times. It just reported a couple days ago that When the us north korea summit was taking place in hanoi There was apparently a a a spike in north korean attacks cyber attacks On us and other companies So from your perspective Leaving aside the nuclear issue as important it is for the time being How do you how should we go down the path of talking about other wmd threats in north korea? It's it's a really good question And I think the the reductionist approach and only focusing on nuclear issues is really problematic from that regard and I think a lot of the Yeah Over focus on young young if you will is is really symptomatic of that that that actually that is As much as it might have been the heart of north korea But it's not a cure all you know not at all no and and uh, you know Now ballistic missile production is arguably more important than missile material production right in terms of the the size and Capability of the future arsenal or other qualitative steps that that north korea might take And so I think there's there's a risk in broadening too quickly too much And losing focus on areas where the threat could grow worse and if you're trying to retard and Making sure that you've accounted for the things that are our extent threats today For me, I think other wmd probably comes a little bit later later. Okay But there's a principle that should be Asserted up front, which is that these are important issues as well and have to go hand in hand with whatever You define as the final denuclearization that the other asymmetric capabilities go Hand in hand with that The flip side of that is that in this stage when you're when you're attempting some sort of interim steps You have to Account for the capabilities that could get worse right? This is the idea of a freeze or a cap That's right. You have to it's not just for some material production It's also ballistic missile production the transport vehicles for Any other kind of testing that would improve The missiles or the warheads That has to be the effort today such that when you get to that final stage You're you're dealing with an arsenal that is already kind of reduced in readiness reduced in scope Reduced in in terms of the the threat that it poses to the u.s. And allies I think at that point it all becomes more meaningful to deal with cam bio and other, you know, if I can just Ask you one mini question If you look at the so-called sad controversy in south korea That was deployed initially by by pakhanese government and then it was sustained under the monjean government And the chinese got really upset because they argued that that was deployed against chinese missiles And so it denigrates china's second strike capability. And so therefore the koreans did not do not need this And so number one what my question is how does that if any figure into all this or missile defense? In downplaying north korea's threat. Is that a is that the right step to go? First of all Can you from your perspective? I think that probably is an issue that has to be included in the what is the future of the us force posture and alliance relationship with korea The the rationale built for that Was flexible enough to mean different things to different people And so the chinese were concerned that it was the radars in particular where we're aimed at china I don't think that was the south korean view and that wasn't something that the us said but perhaps there are people here who believe that In so far as you know, you mentioned that wmd is not just nuclear although nuclear is the most most pressing problem Does this is the trump administration paying attention to other north korean wmd threats? And is there someone whether it's vegan or others in charge of that portfolio? Well just to pick up on one last thing I think that the That the where the thad comes in is not so much in the north korea or even the china context But the regional context and the chinese concern was about building some sort of regional missile defense architecture Right, so all these things are linked together in terms of you know, how the us negotiation with north korea You know, how far you can go where you still have us south korea north korea And chinese interests aligned to carry that through versus where they start to Disaggregate and I think missile defense is one of those issues where they do disaggregate specifically on the theIndia issues I don't know how to interpret this and the information is still a little bit murky But the you know, the trump administration seemed to be confident that there was a nuclear deal on the table in hanoi But then the rumors were that something happened at the 11th hour that kemen bio were included in the freeze and that was sort of seen as a shifting of the goalposts and that blew it apart I don't know whether that's true I want to bring your attention a little bit out of the box a little bit If you're sitting in london or paris or tokyo Core allies of the u.s Are you worried about what trump did in hanoi or what he didn't do? Um, so I would probably be less worried about what he actually did in hanoi right and more worried about just the General package of things that we're seeing right so talking about things Allege like alleging that he's Ended the exercises because it's saving the u.s. You know millions hundreds and millions of dollars or whatever dollar figure he's put on it, right Hooking things like like joint military exercises on cost Um, for instance would be of concern to me Um as an ally a significant concern Um That those are the kinds of things I think and and I do actually spend a lot of time in european capitals these days And and that is the kind of thing that they are quite concerned about they've watched the sma negotiations the dialogue around burden sharing I mean, you know Trump's messaging around nato and burden sharing there is is certainly something we've we've seen a lot of here So I think the concern is is mostly in the alliance context In in particularly in the burden sharing space the focus of trump on cost Which by the way has been how he has thought about alliances for more than 30 years Right, so he's very consistent on that point And I think that is broadly speaking the the concern that we see there the other piece of frustration goes back to a Discussion you were having with toby earlier on is about the difference between the how they perceive the difference between How trump has handled north korea and how he's handled aram So we're having a lot the u.s. Is having a lot of discussion right now with the europeans about The iran deal there was this big Speech in war saw from the illustration really pushing them on on you know continuing to enforce the sanctions You know the south the europeans are talking about setting up this special purpose vehicle that would essentially allow for Essentially circumvention of the u.s. Dollar system in order to continue to trade with iran and not be sanctioned And and I think you know I the frustration there is around the differences in the handling of these two situations But I also have you know thinking about sanctions enforcement and how important You know working with for instance our european allies is there I have some broader questions about how doing something like the special purpose vehicle What the implications of that are for for broader sanctions regimes and for other countries potentially to follow suit on that front Can I also just know of course come back to one one point you were having with with tobi earlier too on the cyber front Which is that I think tobi's right that That you know piling too many things into the negotiating track at this point Is probably not the way to go although you can put those You don't want to overload it But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't be doing everything we can to defend against and deter those activities And particularly on the cyber front and some people may know I've been pretty obsessed with this So I'm sorry for telling me say it again, but I do not believe we are doing and this falls for me in the risk management front of like Okay, so even if negotiations are proceeding. What are we doing to manage the risks along the way? Either of other capabilities or if negotiations don't succeed And I am deeply worried that we are not doing enough to address north kris cyber capabilities from the alliance Defense and deterrence perspective in particular. I mean cyber deterrence is a whole much broader kettle fish in terms of the challenges there But I think we need a much more robust conversation within the alliance On north kris cyber capabilities what we need to be doing In light of that because I think the you know, whether it's The potential for damage to To actual hardware and systems whether it's The ability of north kria increasingly to circumvent Sanctions by just stealing money by hacking into the banks or breaking crypto Or or whether it's the ability to potentially, um, you know Just hack for espionage purposes. All these are are things that are have direct alliance implications And I would like to see us be doing much more on that front There is this question here And I think these are these are part of this kind of broader suite of issues of how do you do deterrence during Declarezation or whatever it is. And so I think there's a there's a balance between, you know pulling back in some areas to allow Pcbms, you know military related things to go forward and remaining vigilant and strengthening capabilities where we can in ways that don't necessarily jeopardize the ongoing Negotiate, you know told you on that point it just reminds me of what happened back in 1989 and 1990 in germany and so as germany was Moving really fast towards the unification that nobody expected The russians were on their knees And george hw bush with his masterly masterful diplomacy pushed the two plus four process onward, right? So even though you were really negotiating in this new germany and new europe within a space of, you know, one year You still maintain a robust defense posture, although the two circumstances are of course very very different And and there I think again it just reinforces how important leadership is So the u.s president can chew and walk, you know chew gum and walk at the same time But there has to be trust in his ability to do this And think that I think is crucial coming from the other side from the perspective of allies, right? So pom chul You know people here in washington and in sol where other capitals talk about so-called hard liners And soft liners in pyongyang I've always argued there there's only different shades of hard liners in north korea I simply cannot imagine that someone going to kim jung and saying Oh dear supreme leader, I think we've got to take this a little bit slowly today and You know, it's like don't demand too much on the americans and I don't think that's really going to happen But from your understanding of the korean people's army and the structure of the north korean state What are the different voices within the north korean political system? Whether it's the army the ministry of state security Are there different voices quote-unquote in north korea? That's my first question to you Maybe there will be a different voices, but it depends For me, so maybe i'm categorized as a hardliner in south korea, but i'm very soft guy Yeah, but anyway, we all know you're a very gentle hardliner But uh, maybe in north korea Maybe we assume that somebody because of his position he might be the hardliner But that's not sometimes true because when you watch the second third summit between So third inter korean summit at pyeongyang. Yes at the time president moon visited the geumgang mountain Baekdu mountain in the cheonji lake The kim yong chul so we believe he's the hardest liner in north korea He spoke to the president moon jay in at the time that Or whenever the our great leader kim jong-un visit this lake The sky is clean. That's not rarely happen And he explained that this is because the cheonji lake Recognize the owner of this mountain That's the voice of kim yong chul the hardest line Just when just he said kind of So maybe the the military raised their own voices probably but that That does not Cross over the intention of kim jong-un. So the top leader's decision is very important They probably have a decision maker decision making process and military usually raised the Hardline voices and those diplomats probably raised the soft line voices But there's a certain direction among those them Now so if you're north korea and of course kim jong-un is the most important decision maker in pyeongyang If you look at other important allies from north korea's perspective you have two which is basically China and to a lesser degree russia Do you believe that ties with china although we'll cover this in session two from a chinese perspective from a north korean perspective How important is china to kim jong-un's? bargaining chip with the americans Is he using china as a leverage against the americans? I don't think so Of course, I believe that for kim jong-un the president she is a kind of insurance when something Bad happen He demands the kind of insurance policy But from north korean perspective They believe that they should not depend upon china They're there they are when we look at their History of their diplomacy is the history of their sometimes friends relationship But they try to detach from china to Over outside from the chinese political influence So kim jong-un sometimes he has some necessity to maintain good relations with china because current situation is kind of difficulties because of a strong international sanctions so China might be The life supply for kim jong-un So he wanted to maintain good relations with china But he does not want to north korea might be dependent on china So when uh kim jong-un meet the president Trump like that Maybe he might say that we want to be more dependent from china Independent from china and we want to make a better relation with the united states, but he do not use the if you don't Be kind us i'm going to go to china That's i don't think that they kind of lever in china to not exercise Scott many years ago you wrote a very good book on negotiated with north korea Would you still basically agree that the conclusions you drew from that book remains today? Well, I think we're looking for changes I think the book stood up for a very long time and the question is basically whether or not kim jong-un is using the same playbook or a different playbook and What I would say at this point Is that there's not really a change in underlying strategic objectives in north korea that we can identify And there are a number of measures that I would use in order to Make draw that conclusion such as well such as The north koreans have historically I think because they've always viewed this themselves as outsiders in the international system They've never believed in reciprocity They basically always Pocket the quid and don't give you the quo And so you know one thing that we should be looking for right now as we test whether kim jong-un might move in a different direction Is you know can the north koreans accept and embrace reciprocity as part of their interactions With the outside world that would be significant another one would be Do we see evidence that? Kim jong-un and his strategic objectives has Kind of given up on the north korean-led unification dream Another way of putting it is that you know, I would like to see evidence That the concept of uri minjokiri our nation together is still not driving North korea's policy you think it's not I think that it still is still is yes that it's still Basically about the competition Between north and south korea and that you know the north koreans are playing padu and they're trying to flip the board in some way by You know making just the right strategic move that would have all these fascinating consequences now the progressives in south korea argue That the more you engage with kim jong-un the more you give him in terms of economic incentives if you reopen kumgang or you know The case on industrial complex that are closed now Then he is going to change that he is on the cusp of reforms If you look at the chang madang The other reforms that he has instituted The argument from the progressive side of the argument is that north korea is going to change on the kim jong-un He just needs a little push He just needs a little bit from the west and the rest you buy that argument Well, my view is actually A little bit different I think that we always focus on the external measures that we can use to induce a change in north korea Including sanctions including engagement But the real critical question is has kim jong-un's own internal constituency changed And so there I think that marketization Has been proceeding and is a potentially powerful force internally within north korea That could lead to a change if kim jong-un finds that there is a set of domestic constituencies among elites That actually comes to the conclusion based on their love for the benefits of marketization That well, maybe this is not such a bad trade-off that we actually You know want to get rich and are willing to give up the nuclear weapons in order to be able to get rich so in that respect I think that actually You know trump is kind of on to you know something in a way, but the critical factor that is going to determine The outcome is completely internal And so actually I would say that we need evidence That the internal changes are occurring and driving Kim in the right direction Rather than trying to induce it from the outside But do you think those internal indicators are there and they're real? I think that they're well, that's what we're testing. I think that in my view I think that so if we go back to the year 2000s, right kim jong-il basically Arranged his debut on the international stage on a template that kim jong-un also used In 2018 But there's an 18 year difference in terms of the changes. We've always been looking for the Internal economic modernizers that are going to drive this process in north korea And we've Thought we found them some people have thought they found them on occasion, but they got executed. So they weren't the ones, right? And so, you know the question is well, is there something different going on, right? because also and and so this is where it gets really complex because You know for north korea really to transform It's going to require two things one. They're going to have to give up their nuclear weapons, but they also Have to embrace a different standard of economic governance, right? Because right now this is a parasitic economy Where, you know, the leader can extort political loyalty and goods for his own support And so the big question I think really along with the question of can Economic marketization induce denuclearization is how do we project economic governance into north korea in ways that can kind of Cut off the flow of goods to the top and generate social mobility internally What I would like to do is open up questions to the audience and then we'll come back to To the panel so please identify yourself and make sure that you have a Question a short question and then we'll ask the panelists. Yes, please ma'am in the front. Yeah Thank you in jung chul with the voice of america I'd like to follow up on what tobi and laura said during the discussion You said that we shouldn't pile on too much at this point that biochem should come on later in the discussions But if we focused solely on denuclearization, what are the benefits of going big asking for more than yangbyon? You know asking for a secret facilities. Is that a good idea of going big on only on denuclearization? And I'd like to ask scott. Um, it seems um The moon administration didn't really know about the u.s. Strategy going into hanoi secretary pompeo said one Walking out of the meeting was one of the options Before going into hanoi. So do you think the latest breakdown in hanoi showed the disconnect between Seoul and washington of a strategy sharing. Thank you Let me collect just a few questions. Uh, yeah. Yes, sir. Yeah Oh, thank you. Uh, my name is mitsuo nakai. Uh, reagan foundation um This morning I saw the articles uh saying uh, president moon is willing to have a try letter or summit Uh letting uh, a south korean government involved and end the talk And I ran into a choice on this morning and we talked about that, but I just want to Get your Take on that Number one. Yeah, number one Uh, who knows not understand north korea better better than anybody south korea Uh, number two Is there any risk in it if we go it take that round? But I don't know if u.s. Is willing to do that Yes, uh, uh here in front peter huffey an intel analyst and a former diplomat Um, I don't like magical thinking and I see 200 people in this town With a lot of magical thinking i'm thinking some part of our effort should be defining plan b Maybe 25 of our effort and yet I see zero percent of our effort um What's that all about to none of you believe in black swans or or uh, you know big big bad surprises um How do how do I get people to sort of realize that no factory is going to open up in north korea When there's horror stories coming out of those prison camps every single day. Can you imagine samson? Hoping a factory and then the some horror shows up in northeast china with unbelievable stories No one's going to invest in that environment Let me take one more plan b. Let me take one more question and then and then we'll uh, yes Yes, uh, Dave, uh, if it's your retired foreign service a question about the process and the top down mood that seems to have been engendered from the singapore and hanoi Is there going to be a third summit is is there a way that the u.s. Can somehow Push it down from the white house to the secretary of state or the Special representative beggin who I don't think was in the even in the hanoi summit at least the photo op I saw Have we really seen any progress in that in terms of developing a real alternative to the top down or whether Trump just stays in this until He leaves and then the next president has to keep on doing this God want to start Yeah, with regard to coordination between the united states and south korea frankly the way it played out I'm not sure there was coordination between the president and the press office because uh, you know literally Midnight eastern time We were expecting there to be a signing ceremony and then a press conference And by 2am, you know that was all gone And so no, I think it was clear that this was a a surprise. It's actually the second surprise from the second summit for south korea But We'll have to kind of so so the really good thing I think about in a way this outcome Is that it forces to go through the working level just to address the other question There's not a prospect of an end around anymore leader to leader That is not supported by a pretty comprehensive working level process Yeah, maybe first question trial like summit. I think Maybe the president won't believe himself as a mediator Mediation between north korea and the united states which I Frankly oppose because we are party of the nuclear situation Not the third party to mediate to something but anyway president moon tried to mediate to something But the the problem at this moment is friend moon to not Speak frankly on north korea about its nuclear issue He must demand the north korea give a nuclear weapon Then he can play as a mediator as a good office So I think at this moment north korea United state would not accept a trial letter summit because the situation just one week ago Just four days ago at the time president trump realized at this moment north korea does not have an intention to Deny cry. That's the reason why president trump and demand north korea big deal that small deal or middle deal Black swan and maybe Possible but I believe that it's going to take a long time One single order means the administration cannot solve north korea nuclear issue if they try to do that's mistake I believe so it's going to take a long time. So I think the black swan must live long third summit, I think that's Possible but I think the president trump reset The situation just before the Singapore because Starting from the Singapore that was the north korea's term step-by-step approach But what a president demanded this time is that at least north korea must provide nuclear list or the the roadmap to denuclearization. So I think Maybe kim jong-un to not Accept that and then he believed that those kind of a top-down approach He might be scared at this time because this is something look at look back the second sermon kim jong-un was nervous He believed that trump is weak point. But actually kim jong-un is weak point as he turned down So maybe he wants more kind of a working level discussion next time. So I think the top down is over or Yeah, let me start with the plan b question. It's actually I was recalling the last time to be nighted in the event together here We talked a lot about plan b. That was either right before right after singing before I can't actually It was like two days afterwards. Yeah, it's all blurry to me Um, I think we absolutely need to be planning for plan b and c frankly. Um, I think there's a couple different permutations here I personally would put myself in the camp of folks who are skeptical that north korea is ever going to denuclearize Now to me that doesn't mean that we stop trying to pursue that as a negotiating process But I think we can't be held hostage to that Now I would you know remind you when we talk about the sort of the big beautiful economy that the trump is offering him I mean, this is not particularly new original. I mean in the you know, bush administration This was also the kind of stuff that was on the table Future place for north korea in the region was also on the table This is where scott's really important point comes in about are the internal drivers shifting enough At some point to make those kind of inducements You know more attractive or the calculus different That's I think the key question the package that's being offered broadly is really not all that different Um, so I do think um, you know that we do absolutely need to be while while trying to continue to work for plan a of denuclearization There's a whole lot of reasons including you know, broader non proliferation regime that we shouldn't give up on that But we absolutely need to be doing those kinds of things That's why I talked about things like risk management in the context of of cyber attacks and other capabilities I think are incredibly important It relates also to the question of where do we go from here? Which is how I'm going to rephrase the third summit question Um, which is that you know, I think I see three scenarios of where we go from here One is the process continues at a working level Largely continued to negotiate around the contours of the package that was on the table That may happen and science coming out of piangyang or vaguely that that's maybe where they want to go I think science coming out of washington might be a little bit more pessimistic on that although a little hard to read Um, but what's worrying to me is if that's going to have a future I don't actually see anything that's been you know from the leader level actually saying Okay, this is the channel we're using. This is the process. I'm empowering my folks to do x y and z Right, and that's what what would need to happen for that to be successful The second is a return to you know provocation cycle fire and fury rhetoric All that kind of sort of falling off the the cliff stuff I see very little sign that that's where we're headed at least imminently It's always a risk at some point. Um, but I don't see that imminently I think the more likely scenario Is of all these is essentially that the freeze for freeze the de facto freeze for freeze Become sort of status quo permanent permanent status quo At least in the in the foreseeable future And if that's the case then you have a whole lot of other challenges on the deterrent side obviously particularly depending on where things go in the inter korean process As well as uh, frankly on on sanctions enforcement, which i'm quite worried about I keep hearing so much conversation about sanctions in just in economic terms in terms of pressure on north korea In terms of leverage to bring them to the negotiating table It's really important to keep in mind that the core of the sanctions regime even the resolutions that were passed post 2016 Include a whole lot of measures that are designed to prevent proliferation into and out of north korea Um, and I think that it's incredibly important for us not to lose sight of that Um, again, I put this in kind of the the plan b or risk management category of of even if we're in a sort of permanent freeze for Freeze step, you know de facto status quo or if we are in some kind of ongoing negotiating process Continuing the enforcement of those sanctions is going to be really really important not just to maintain that leverage But for us and alliance security Assurance as well Let me pick up on a couple of those points. Um, it was notable that I think it was in the Final us background briefing after the summit whoever was doing the talking Said that the president had made an offer to go all in or something like that I think that was the terminology and that's for anybody who plays or watches poker That's a really interesting analogy because usually you go all in under two circumstances one When you're trying to put the other guy out of business and you have enough chips that you think you can do that And are willing to take the risk that you lose or two when you don't have enough chips And that's the only way you stay in the game, right? I don't know which of those describes trump better. It probably depends on how much you think he was up watching the Cohen hearing during the summit, but um A lot because he said that Cohen was one of the reasons why There was failure in the summit. So I think that you know to go to the going big Question, you know, if you if you believe that if you believe that trump really did You know proposed to go all in then clearly kim jong-un balked at that like he's he's not there yet And so I think that reinforces this idea That probably there are smaller steps, even if it's status quo plus that that could be negotiated And which would sustain the diplomacy and probably are good for for both sides Uh, and I could see those kind of coming back together in a Coalest a working level process that would allow for some additional small gains I wanted to come back to the the plan b Question as well if you follow nuclear issues at all last week You are sort of having whiplash between north korea on the one hand and south asia on the other And like these were the two dominant nuclear stories and and I spent you know kind of You know one hand on each phone Dealing with with both of those last week And I think it if you're at all worried about plan b or plan c A future in in north korea could look a lot like in south asia where every single provocation Sort of seems like a knife edge about the potential for nuclear use, right? We want to avoid that circumstance that is that is a situation where The calculations about what actions might restore deterrence versus what actions might Result in inviting further retaliation the competition for escalation dominance That is not a game we want to get into in north korea And I would have think that the south koreans don't want to be in that game either And so that even if you're planning for bcd, whatever alternative outcomes Plan a is still the best one at this point to stabilize the situation and avoid that kind of Constant crisis that that could escalate into something really catastrophic. So even if we plan for those things I really hope that people are also investing a lot and making sure that plan a works May I ask a cluster of our younger audience And why it's because if we don't resolve this in our generation It's it's yours Either you guys should really Right, you guys should really understand or what the stakes are. Yes. Yes, right there. Yes Good afternoon. My name is jr. Lee a phd candidate at american university. My question is After the result happened at hanoi, there were several news outlets for the more conservative outlets in the united states They tried to compare this event to 1986 second grovechoff reagan summit to show that the second summit according to this Narrative reagan walked out the summit was actually a good thing because an year afterwards He got a better deal for us with the i&f treaty with One of the reagan grovechoff. So my question is is this the right comparative analogy of what happened in hanoi with 1986 and iceland second reagan grovechoff summit. Okay Yeah, yes right Please go ahead Steve winter's independent consultant. I think I'd direct this to professor shin if you would I want to think of some remarks that mr. Moon the advisor to president moon on inter korean relations made here in dc A few days ago But he mentioned that when he traveled to the north with the president moon And they brought along so many of the leaders of the south korean south korean conglomerates of the chaebol That the north koreans You basically were ignoring the diplomats and ran over and all surrounding the the executives from the chaebol They're discussing the economic future of north korea. So the question and and he also expressed Very strong frustration that because of the sanctions they can't go the south koreans and and the conglomerates can't go ahead with their plans for economic If you want to use Working together with the north. So the question is how much is this frustration building up in the south particularly given The china issue Which is that china is basically going to overcome all the advantages of the south korean industries within three or four years But if they manage to pull in north korea, you're going to get a dynamism dynamism economic dynamism Like you saw with the reunification of germany. So what i'm saying that the part i found missing here was You know already talking about the benefits to the north. There's a tremendous benefit to the south here in fact an existential necessary benefit Can we go back to the to the younger the general over here? Yes out in front and i'll take one more Good morning. My name is benjamin weill up until recently the international advisor to the israeli minister of energy My question is as follows is um If i were a dictator of a country I probably wouldn't want to open up my market or any ties to any other country let alone The united states a very liberal market very liberal country How effective is that that president trump bush or whichever other president Came offered north korea's access to the american market. It might seem nice to us but how Intensive is that to north korean is maybe there should be some other carrot? That's not the right one that we should be offering Okay, I think we have two asan fellows who are here. Are they still here in the room? Anyone yes Are they all gone? There's one more question. I saw in the back. Okay. There's one more person in the back with the with the question Yes, marina, please I'm marina robertson snowden. I'm a stand to nuclear security fellow here at the carney endowment My question is for you laura. You talked about the importance not only a process But of connectivity between the process and the political leadership And I was interested in your thoughts on how you see the domestic pressures on trump now with the impending Muller investigation results and the associated Investigations with that kind of influencing that connectivity of an empowered process with his political thinking Okay, so why don't we go down toby? Go ahead. Sure. I'll I'll punt on that one since that was directed at laura. Thank you Real free to yeah, no, let me pick up the gorbachev one. I think it's You know, maybe kim jong-un would be flattered to think that he was the gorbachev, of course In in that kind of reciprocal, but Yes, there was in f and and ultimately the start treaty later But also gorbachev was no longer heading the the soviet union a few years after that So it's a very fraught a fraught analogy all around But I think it's actually the the wrong It's wrong in many ways And a historic and so I think it's it's not a good analogy I think the better question is what is a good analogy here and frankly I can't come up with one. Um, basically this is it's a it's sort of sui generous and so Um, if you write your phd dissertation on what the right analogy is I'd be happy to consume it Bora Um, let me start a little bit with this question of is access to the us market the right inducement Which I think scott probably has much better thoughts than me on but just to briefly touch on it The one thing I would say is I think um, it's not just about the question of sort of market access for trade purposes It's uh, you know trade with the us and sort of a traditional western way of thinking about it, right? But north korea has been I mean back to kim il-sung kim jong-il now kim jong-un The obsession with recognition from the north or from the us right of being sort of put onto the the same level has been Um, a sort of driver of of north korean sort of outward facing policy, um for decades And so I think that there's a broader dynamic there now some might argue That by giving uh kim jong-un now two summits, um, we essentially given him what he wanted already on that I mean, you know, I Forget my exact count off top my head of how many summits he's had total, right? Is it Nine now between four with she three with moon and two with trump, right? So kim jong-un world leader has arrived Right. Um including vis-a-vis, uh, the us um, and so he's kind of gotten that the other thing though is I mean North korea is essentially cut off from the Global economy because of the lack of access to the us dollar system and broader sanctions equations there So I think there's a lot of space to go between, you know Go big in terms of forced opening up with the kind of trade that we envision versus where they are right now That I would just note But again, I'm sure scott has much better thoughts on that on the question of connectivity political leadership domestic pressures again, I have tried to avoid the business of putting myself in President trump's head because that's It's not a place. I want to be um, but But what I would say is that you know, I mean, I will you know just share personally that I had I I was concerned going to hanoi last week that he might go big in a way that I would have concerns about for US security interests and the security interests of our allies Because he was so desperately wanted to win in the face of domestic pressures And so I think there were a lot of people who were who had that kind of concern So it's interesting that's not what we saw happen now. I don't want to Over extrapolate from one particular case there But I do think that the As pressures grow here at home from investigations by congress investigations from moeller Having a democratic house in general that could constrain President trump's domestic activity Or policy room You know going back to the earlier conversation, you know article two You know executive branch has a lot of power on foreign policy fronts And I do think that we will see the president be looking increasingly to his ability to to wear the commander in chief hat And to to use his relatively unrestrained ability to exercise, you know foreign policy As as a means of of keeping the you know of keeping attention What that translates into I think remains to be seen. I certainly am concerned about the potential for the president to To become potentially more erratic as As the squeeze gets tighter But you know that gets a bit speculative territory But again, I do think that this is increasingly an area where where he has and will continue to feel Less constrained than in other parts of his policy agenda Okay, the economic opportunity of north korea. Yes, there is a high expectation in south korea Maybe north korea is our economic blue ocean But my understanding is I think that we'd need to think about the benefit cost Because north korea has only 23 billion people living there And their gdp total gdp is just less than 500 billion dollars Very small market On the other hand, we believe that only the competitiveness of north korea has in its economy is that their low labor charge labor salary But what north korea want is the high tech But high tech needs a lot of investment, but north korea's political system is not stable to Make such kind of big investment inside north korea. So there's a much gap in reality and expectation So I think we must calculate the things and on the other hand those kind of promise Reminds that the north korea's is might be the blue ocean our economic blue ocean But from the kim jong-un perspective He want to let other country Come to north korea and becoming the blue ocean of their own economy He want to make their economy red ocean make more competition and bring money From that kind of competition. That's probably kim jong-un's strategy. And so it's gonna take a long time. It's not that Blue ocean, I believe but I would actually put the lure of economic Opening into my category of measures that we're testing To see whether there's a change Inside north korea because we know that under kim jong-il, you know, ultimately there really was no prioritization of the economy And yet under kim jong-un, it's clear that there's a recognition that you can't fight marketization In fact, it's better to embrace it But you know, ultimately what that Generates is a dilemma about The need for isolation to maintain this peculiar system Versus the chance to take advantage of the opportunities associated with engaging in their national economy because It's very clear that enough resources are seeping over that people in north korea want to get rich Right and so kim jong-un has proceeded with I think reform without opening Maybe about as far as he can if my understanding of what has been happening in north korea is correct And what that does among elites In my view is that it creates voyeurs on the world People who are in the world. They're looking out, but they really can't participate. They're like the people in the bubble And you know that generates Rising expectations and desires to engage Uh, and so if indeed that is a pressure The promise of economic benefits is Uh, a potentially viable Way to test that proposition As we wind up, uh Let me just answer what the jump one quick question from the lady in the back. Yes, right there Yes, please Thank you. I am a fan young fellow working in absentee council now Like after hanoi summit, um, the south korea you told us like the south korea have to cannot Live the economic sanction due to like international contract. So my question is like before the like upcoming summit, um Between north korean and us the what can the president moon can take what is the like maximum action? to Improve the relationship between like three countries Um, not breaking the international contract. Thank you. I'll let scott answer that Yeah, so very interestingly I think that uh the immediate aftermath of the summit generated a kind of choice for president moon There was a choice between do we uh think about breaking out and just going on our own Or do we think about doubling down on trying to play a coordinating role? And I think that from this uh mornings national security advisors meetings, it looks like uh president moon wisely chose the second of those paths You know on the question of whether north korea can be An economic I guess boomtown for the south koreans. There is that view that is quite prevalent in south korea But if you are hyun de if you are samsung if you're sk if you're posco if you're you know, uh even neighbor for example You're in the business of making money And unless it makes sense to you from a profit maximizing perspective I think korea and j-balls are going to be very risk-averse They're going to look at the infrastructure. They'll look at the manpower. They'll look at training opportunities Now the chinese on the other hand have gone in as you know Because north korea is very rich in minerals and so the chinese are using their Proximity and their political leverage to get as much economic concessions from the dpr k But I think my south korean perspective the business community still doesn't feel all that comfortable Investing in droves for example to the extent of for example, what the south samsung is on in vietnam If samsung is able to invest at that magnitude in north korea I would agree with you sir that north korea could be the next big frontier for the korean economy As we wind up in session one I want you to conclude Whether you're an agnostic or pessimistic or optimistic. I really don't care Give me your one second prognosis for the future Over what time frame? Let's say the next 12 months third summit There will be a summit declaration and There will be some small further steps on the new civilization. Okay, that's we'll hold you to a dr. Dolp Optimist, I see. Okay, laura. I think largely status quo. I think it will be You know, maybe continuation of freeze for freeze Maybe a little freeze for free plus is toby was speculating as possibility, but I I don't see some profound profound change Okay, let me say the different angle that north korea provably exercises to leverage This is producing nuclear fissile material and there may be possibility of proliferation Which is a target of the united states public opinion What president trump do? Why don't you stop this thing? That's the one north korea going to do in near future and the issue here is that we should let north korea choose the nuclear weapon or economy Maybe I watched the interview of National security advisor bolton yesterday. There's another question of a regime change I think that's the wrong direction because it brings some risk and the political and military instability in korean peninsular So south korean people don't like it. So I think the the best way at this moment is land north korea choose nuclear weapon or economy Scott the additional fissile material production Also provides us data about the fundamental choice That kim jong-un faces domestically Because if he chooses to invest more in fissile materials production In order to generate leverage to deal with the united states it was it will tell us that he is Less interested in economic development and raising living standards for his own people. Yeah, my final is yes or no Will kim jong-un come to washington dc by the end of this year? No. No no I have to go with the panel on this one. No, no I'm going to stick my neck out. I think there is a better than even chance That kim jong-un is going to come to washington by the end of this year Wow, that's brave. Wow. That is a bold prediction. Now However, I am no longer chairing the session So let me thank uh, look really toby. I know how busy you are and I caught you at the last minute You're not only a dear friend, but a wonderful colleague and a Really great analyst. So thank you so much. Laura. I think this is the first time that we've really been in the panel in a long time And this will not be the last one. I assure you. Thank you. Thank you so much for your great insights Uh, and you were politically very very very balanced Right by my best, right pump child. I think you are a nice hardliner Ha ha ha ha ha ha Whatever happens back in korea. I think we'll always welcome you at carnegie and scott As the doyen of the korean studies field here in washington It is always a pleasure to hear your views. It is never never old. Thank you so very much. Let's give them a big applause We'll take a uh 14 minute coffee break and