 I'd like to, first of all, talk about the causes of the present crisis, and I'd like to speculate on where this is all headed. Now, with regard to the causes, it's very important to understand that who caused this situation is of tremendous importance because it involves assigning blame. You really have two choices here. You can argue that the West, and especially the United States caused the crisis, or you can argue that the Russians caused the crisis. But that means that whoever you argue caused the crisis is responsible for this disaster. And it is important to understand that this is a disaster. Ukraine has lost Crimea. It's, in my opinion, going to lose the Donbass. And the only interesting question to me at this point is whether it's also going to lose more territory in the eastern part of its country. Furthermore, Ukraine's economy is wrecked. Its cities are in the process of being wrecked. The international economy is going to be badly affected by these events as they go on. This is going to have terrible consequences, I think, for the Democrats in the fall. Furthermore, it makes it difficult for the United States to pivot out of Europe and pivot to China where there is a potential threat, which is China. Furthermore, we're driving the Russians into the arms of the Chinese, which makes no sense at all. And all at the same time, we're making Eastern Europe a very unstable region, and therefore forcing us to, if anything, up the ante there. So this is a disastrous situation. So the question of who caused it and who bears the blame really matters. Now the conventional wisdom in the United States and in the West more generally is that the Russians are responsible for this, and in particular Vladimir Putin is responsible. As I'm sure almost all of you know by this argument at all, and I haven't bought it for a long time. And the West bears primary primary responsibility for what is happening today. And it was largely a result of a decision in April 2006 to make Ukraine and to make Georgia a part of NATO. We were going to integrate Ukraine into NATO come hell or high water. And the Russians said at the time that this is categorically unacceptable. The Russians made it clear that they had swallowed the first two tranches of NATO expansion, the 99 expansion and the 2004 expansion, but Georgia and Ukraine were not going to become part of NATO. They were going to line in the sand they said this is an existential threat to us. And indeed in August of that year of course August 2008 you had a war involving the Russians and the Georgians over the whole issue of whether or not Georgia would become part of NATO. It's important to understand that when we talk about Western policy and we focus on NATO and expansion of NATO into Ukraine that actually Western policy had three prongs to it. The core prong was definitely integrating Ukraine into NATO, but the other two prongs were integrating Ukraine into the European Union and turning Ukraine into a pro Western liberal democracy. In fact, putting in place the Orange Revolution. And these three prongs of the strategy were all designed to make Ukraine a pro Western country, a country in the West orbit, sitting on Russia's border. And again the Russians made it unequivocally clear at the time that this was not going to happen. Now, the first crisis broke out in February 2014. The way I like to think about this is that you had a major crisis in February 2014 broke out that day. Then you had a major crisis breaking out in December of last year that's December 2021. And on February 24 of this year, the war started. What about this crisis in February of 2014, February 22 to be exact. It was precipitated in large part by a coup that was supported by the United States that took place in Ukraine and resulted in a pro Russian leader, President Yanukovych, being overthrown and being replaced by a pro American Prime Minister. The Russians found this intolerable. At the same time they were debating with the West and with the Ukrainians over EU expansion, and always in the background at that point in time was NATO expansion. This blew up and it had two consequences. One is that the Russians in effect took Crimea away from Ukraine for themselves. They had no intention of ever letting Sevastopol become a leader. And the second thing that happened is that the Russians helped foster a civil war in Eastern Ukraine. And of course that civil war festered well after 2014, but the crisis really blew up in 2014. And then starting about mid year, and really heating up at the end of last year, I would say in December 2021 was a second major crisis. And the question is what caused this crisis. In my opinion, it was caused largely by the fact that Ukraine was becoming a de facto member of NATO. It's commonplace in the West, especially in Washington these days to say that Russia had nothing to fear regarding Ukraine becoming part of NATO. And Russia had nothing to fear because NATO was doing nothing to move forward, Ukraine's incorporation into NATO. I think in a de jure sense, that's absolutely correct. But in a de facto way, that's wrong. What we were doing was we were arming the Ukrainians. And you want to remember it's President Trump in December of 2017, who was under great pressure who decided to arm the Ukrainians. So we were arming the Ukrainians. We were training the Ukrainians, and we were forming ever closer diplomatic ties with the Ukrainians. And this spooked the Russians. It especially spooked the Russians in the summer of last year, when Ukrainian military use drones against Russian forces in the Donbass region. It especially spooked the Russians last summer when the British drove a destroyer through territorial waters, Russian territorial waters in the Black Sea. It especially spooked the Russians in November, when we were flying bombers within 13 miles of the Russian coast. All of these events coupled with this de facto bringing of Ukraine into NATO pushed the Russians to what Sergei Lavrov said was the boiling point. You know Lavrov was asked in January why the Russians had reached this point. And why we were in the midst of a crisis. And he said, Lavrov said in January, we had reached our boiling point. First expansion of NATO, second expansion of NATO, and then all of these events associated with Ukraine. The Russians had had it. So you had a crisis of massive proportions, which of course resulted on February 24 in the Russians invading Ukraine. And we are now in the midst of a real war. This is not just a civil war in eastern Ukraine, which is what we had before February 24. We now have a real war. So this brings us to the question of what is the conventional wisdom on this subject. And how do I think about the opposing argument? The opposing argument is that this has nothing to do with NATO expansion. This is quite remarkable. When you listen to people in the administration speak, and when you read editorials in the Washington Post, words like this are spoken. This has absolutely nothing to do with NATO expansion. I don't know how anybody can say that. The Russians have been saying since April 2008 that this is all about NATO expansion, that NATO expansion into Ukraine is an existential threat to them. But Americans simply refuse to believe that. Not all Americans, but many Americans, and certainly the policy elite in this country. And instead what they have done is they've created a story that is not American policy. It's not NATO expansion that's driving this train. Instead, it's Vladimir Putin. And it's the fact that Vladimir Putin is either bent on recreating the Soviet Union, or he's interested in creating a greater Russia. But whichever one of those two outcomes you take, he is ultimately an expansionist. He's on the march. And thank God we expanded NATO, because if we hadn't expanded NATO, he'd probably be in Berlin by now, if not Paris. This is the basic argument. He is an aggressor. There are a number of problems with that argument. First of all, before February 22, 2014, nobody was arguing that he was aggressor. Nobody was arguing that NATO expansion was required for the purposes of containing Russia before February 22, 2014. We didn't think he was a problem. And in fact, when the crisis broke out on February 22, 2014, we were actually shocked. If you go back and look at the newspapers at the time, the Obama administration caught with its pants down. Why? Because they didn't think that the Russians were aggressive. But of course, we had to invent the story after the crisis broke out so that we weren't blamed for what happened. We had to blame the Russians. So we created the story. Second reason you want to doubt this is that Putin has never said that he is bent on recreating the Soviet Union, or he's bent on creating a greater Russia. He's never said he was bent on conquering Ukraine and integrating it into Russia. There's no question that in his heart, he thinks that it would be appropriate for Ukraine to be part of Russia. In his heart, he's made it clear he'd love back to bring back the Soviet Union. But he's also explicitly said that in his head, he fully understands that this is a bad idea. So if you look at what he said, there's no reason to think he's bent on recreating the Soviet Union or creating a greater Russia. Take this a step further. He doesn't have the capability. He doesn't have the capability for two reasons. First of all, he doesn't have a big enough military. This is a country whose gross national product is smaller than Texas's, right? This is not the former Soviet Union in its heyday. Furthermore, the Russians understand that occupying countries or occupying territory in Eastern Europe is a prescription for big trouble. Most of us on this call are old enough to remember the Cold War and all the trouble that the Soviets had. Think East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, constant trouble with the Poles. And one could argue that the Romanians and the Albanians were the biggest pain in the next day ever faced. The Russians are surely sophisticated enough to know that not only do they not have the capability, but that occupying Ukraine, occupying the Baltic states would be like swallowing a porcupine. This would be crazy. So I think there's hardly any evidence to support that. And the final point I'd make is if you look at what the Russians are doing militarily in Ukraine at the moment, it does not look like they're bent on conquering the country and occupying it and integrating it into a greater Russia. But anyway, here we are. And I think everybody is very interested in the question of where we go from here. So let me say a few words about that. First of all, let me start with US policy. US policy is to double down. That's what we're going to do. This is what we did after 2014. Instead of reevaluating and saying maybe NATO expansion is not such a good idea, we went in the opposite direction. This is why I'm telling you that by 2021, the Russians understood that we were turning Ukraine into a de facto member of NATO. They understood that. So what we did after 2014 is double down and what we're going to do now and what we're doing now is doubling down. And what does that mean? We're encouraging the Ukrainians to resist. We're not going to fight for them, you understand? And we're going to fight to the last Ukrainian, but we're not going to do any of the fighting. They're on their own in that regard. But we're going to arm them and do what we can to train them at this late date and hope that they can hang in there and duke it out with the Russians. And nobody believes they're going to defeat the Russians, but maybe you'll get a stalemate. And you have to ask yourself, this is really the key question. Is what are the Russians going to do? Right? It seems to me that a lot of people in the West think that if the Ukrainians provide enough resistance, the Russians will roll over and play dead. Or maybe Vladimir Putin will throw his hands up. He'll surrender. He'll say, this was all a bad idea. I regret doing it. He'll be a coup in Moscow. He'll be overthrown. And they'll bring in leaders who will work out a deal with us. And Ukraine will live happily ever after. We will live happily ever after. And the Russians will be chastened. I've spent my entire adult life studying great power politics. A lot about great power politics. This is not the way the world works. And it is certainly not the way the Russians work. You want to understand, going back to what I said about the April 2008 decision, the Russians said at the time, this is an existential threat. This is an existential threat. Right. So even before the current war, Ukraine and Ukraine becoming part of NATO was viewed as an existential threat. When you're talking about a situation where you defeat the Russians in Ukraine, this is a much worse outcome for the Russians than what happened in April 2008 and a much worse outcome than what happened in February 2014. And the Russians are not going to roll over and play dead. In fact, what the Russians are going to do is they're going to crush the Ukrainians. They're going to bring out the big guns. They're going to turn places like Kiev and other cities in Ukraine into rubble. They're going to do fluges. They're going to do Mosul's. They're going to do Grozny's. You know what happened in World War Two when the United States was faced with the possibility of having to invade the Japanese home islands in early 1945. The idea of invading the Japanese home islands after what happened in Iwo Jima and then later what happened in Okinawa really spooked us. So you know what we did? We decided to burn Japanese cities to the ground starting on March 10th, 1945. We killed more people the first night. We fire bombed Tokyo. Then we killed either Hiroshima or Nagasaki and we were systematically burning Japanese cities to the ground. Why? Because we did not want to invade the Japanese main islands. When a great power feels threatened, the Russians are going to pull out oil stops in Ukraine to make sure that they win. And then there's the nuclear dimension to this. The Russians have already put their nuclear weapons on high alert. This is a really significant development because what they were doing was sending us a very powerful signal as to how seriously they take this crisis and what's going on. So again, if we start winning and the Russians start losing, you want to understand that what we're talking about doing here is backing a nuclear armed great power that sees what's happening as an existential threat into a corner. This is really dangerous. Go back to the Cuban Missile Crisis. I don't think that what happened in the Cuban Missile Crisis was as threatening to us as this situation is to the Russians. But if you go back and look at how American decision makers thought at the time, they were scared stiff. They thought that Soviet missiles in Cuba was an existential threat and they were willing many of Kennedy's advisors to use our nuclear arsenal against the Soviet Union. That's how serious great powers get when they think they face existential threats. So in my opinion, we are in a very dangerous situation. I think the likelihood of nuclear war is very small, but the likelihood doesn't have to be high for me to be really scared because of the consequences associated with nuclear use. So we better be extremely careful here regarding what we do in terms of pushing the Russians into the corner. But again, I'm not sure that's going to happen because I think what's going to happen here is that in a competition between us and the Russians, the Russians will win. Now you're saying to yourself, why is he saying that? I think that if you think about this, you want to think about who has the greater resolve, right? Who really cares more about this situation, the Russians or the Americans? The Americans do not care that much about Ukraine. The Americans have made it clear they are not even willing to fight and die for Ukraine. So it's not that important to us. For the Russians, they have made it clear it's an existential threat. So the balance of resolve, I believe, favors them. So as we walk up the escalation ladder moving forward, my guess, and it's just my guess, is that the Russians will prevail, not the Americans, and the Russians will prevail because the balance of resolve favors them. Now the question is, who loses this war? I think it doesn't matter much to the United States if we lose in the sense that the Russians prevail in Ukraine. I think the real losers in this war are the Ukrainians. And I think what's happened here is we have led the Ukrainians down the primrose path. We have pushed very hard to encourage the Ukrainians to want to become part of NATO. We have pushed very hard to make them part of NATO. We have pushed very hard to make them a Western bulwark on Russia's borders, despite the fact the Russians made it clear that this was unacceptable to them. We, in effect, and here I'm talking about the West, we took a stick and we poked the bear in the eye. And as you all know, if you take a stick and you poke a bear in the eye, that bear is probably not going to smile and laugh at what you're doing. That bear is probably going to fight back. And that's exactly what's happening here. And that bear is going to tear apart Ukraine. That bear is in the process of tearing apart Ukraine. And again, we go back to where we started. Who bears responsibility for this? Do the Russians bear responsibility for this? I don't think so. There's no question the Russians are doing the dirty work. I don't want to make light of that fact. But the question is, what caused the Russians to do this? And in my opinion, the answer is very simple. The United States of America. Thank you. John, I thank you for setting the stage so well and giving us the context. I particularly like the label that has been given to you as an offensive realist. Well, that sure comes through clear tonight, doesn't it? The US is to blame. How offensive is that? I'm going to give a thumbnail description of how I come at this. John and I both grew up in the streets of New York. John and Brooklyn and I in the Bronx. Actually, my wife from Brooklyn, she married up, as we used to say in those days. In any case, I remember being at the hands of bigger gangs and bigger guys. I used to shake my fist when I got home and say, when I get big, I'm never going to let anybody do that to me. Well, here's the analogy. Putin just got big. He got big last year. He got big when the Chinese threw their lot in with him and said, yeah, we're in the same fix you are. Let's join hands. Let's join forces and do the kind of alliance that exceeds the traditional alliance. That's kind of my bottom line here. But let me get a little bit involved in Ukraine first. How many, if I can see a show of hands, how many have seen the video of Victoria Newland and our ambassador in Kiev, Jeffrey Payet, talking about how they were going to arrange this coup in Kiev? Well, okay, not too many. So let me see if we can bring that one up now. Is that the video queued up, the one with Newland talking to Payet? What do you think? I think we're in play. The Klitschko piece is obviously the complicated electron here, especially the announcement of him as deputy prime minister. And you've seen some of my notes on the troubles in the marriage right now. So we're trying to get a read really fast on where he is on this stuff. But I think your argument to him, which you'll need to make, I think that's the next phone call we want to set up, is exactly the one you made to Yats. And I'm glad you sort of put him on the spot on where he fits in this scenario. And I'm very glad he said what he said in response. Good. So I don't think Klitsch should go into the government. I don't think it's necessary. I don't think it's a good idea. Yeah, I mean, I guess you think in terms of him not going into the government, just let him sort of stay out and do his political homework and stuff. I'm just thinking in terms of sort of the process moving ahead, we want to keep the moderate Democrats together. The problem is going to be Tony Boak and his guys. And, you know, I'm sure that's part of what Yanukovych is calculating on all of this. Yeah, I think Yats is the guy who's got the economic experience, the governing experience. He's the guy, you know, what he needs is Klitsch and Tony Boak on the outside. He needs to be talking to them four times a week, you know. I just think Klitsch going in, he's going to be at that level working for Yats and Yuk. It's just not going to work. Yeah, no, I think that's right. Good. Would you want us to try to set up a call with him? Here's the next step. My understanding from that call, but you tell me, was that the big three were going into their own meeting, and that Yats was going to offer in that context a three-way, you know, three-plus-one conversation or three-plus-two with you. Is that not how you understood it? No, I think, I mean, that's what he proposed. But I think just knowing the dynamics that's been with them where Klitschko's been the top dog, he's going to take a while to show up for whatever meeting they've got, and he's probably talking to his guys at this point. So I think you reaching out directly to him helps with the personality management among the three, and it gives you also a chance to move fast on all this stuff and put us behind it before they all sit down, and he explains why he doesn't like it. Okay, good. I'm happy. Why don't you reach out to him and see if he wants to talk before or after? Okay, we'll do. Thanks. Okay, I've now written one more wrinkle for you, Jeff. Yeah. I can't remember if I told you this or if I only told Washington this, that when I talked to Jeff Feldman this morning, he had a new name for the UN guy, Robert Ceri. Did I write you that this morning? Yeah, I saw that. He's now gotten both Ceri and Ban Ki-moon to agree that Ceri could come in Monday or Tuesday. Okay. So that would be great, I think, to help glue this thing and have the UN help glue it and, you know, fuck the EU. No, exactly. And I think we've got to do something to make it stick together, because you can be pretty sure that if it does start to gain altitude, the Russians will be working behind the scenes to try to torpedo it. And again, the fact that this is out there right now, I'm still trying to figure out in my mind why Yanukovych did that. But in the meantime, there's a party of regions faction meeting going on right now, and I'm sure there's a lively argument going on in that group at this point. But anyway, we could land jelly set up on this one if we move fast. So let me work on Klitschko, and if you can just keep – I think we want to try to get somebody with an international personality to come out here and help to mid-wise this thing. And then the other issue is some kind of outreach to Yanukovych, but we probably regroup on that tomorrow as we see how things start to fall into place. So on that piece, Jeff, when I wrote the note, Sullivan's come back to me, VFR, saying you need Biden, and I said probably tomorrow for an atta boy and to get the deeds to stick. So, Biden's willing. Okay. This coup was the most blatant coup in history. It was advertised 18 days beforehand on YouTube. When a conversation, an intercepted conversation, between Assistant Secretary of State Nuland and Jeffrey Payett was put on YouTube on the 4th of February 2014. Now McGovern, being used to a little bit – a little bit used to coups and what happens if they're divulged ahead of time, breathe the sigh of relief and say, poor Yatsen, you're going to be prime minister now. The coup's blown. Well, apparently Vladimir Putin had the same reaction because he stayed in Sochi for the Winter Olympics, never decided to come home, and lo and behold, on the 22nd of February, there's the coup. Now, we know enough about the coup now to know that it was arranged by – with thanks to the Western Intelligence Services, if you could put it that way. And we know the result. Now, for just a little bit of background, why did Victoria Nuland, whose claim to fame is working for Dick Cheney and who was an arch-nail-con person, why did she decide it was so important to get the Russians to get them over the barrel in Ukraine? Well, it goes back to the year before. The year before when – if we could have the second slide when I say slide, the year before when President Obama, to his credit, was reluctant to start another war in the Middle East, they wanted him to bomb Syria. He didn't want to bomb Syria. He even said, you know, I'll go to Congress. Oh, that's a big deal, okay? Now, here was a New York Times op-ed after Putin pulled Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. I hope that you can see it. It appeared on September 11th, 2014. In the midst of all this, this appeared in the New York Times, and it said that my working and personal relationship with Obama is marked by growing trust, trust, the coin of the realm. And he objected to something. Then he said, you know, his speech, that Obama's speech last week really bothered me. I don't agree with it at all. This business is about the exceptional country, being able to do exceptional things. No, no. The way I look at it, there are big countries and small countries, rich and poor. One with long traditions of democracy, others different. Their policies different. But we're all different. But when the Lord's blessings look on us, we must not forget that God created us all equal. Now, I was told at the time by a pretty good source that Putin penned that last paragraph of that op-ed himself. And confirmation of a kind came about two years ago when he gave an interview and sort of off the top of his head, he said precisely the same thing in almost exactly the same words. So what does that mean? Growing trust. What does that do to the Mickey mat? What does that do to the military, industrial, congressional intelligence, media, academia, think tank complex, which grew like a topsy after Eisenhower's warning that unbridled influence of these, of this make, the military industrial complex, would be a danger to our democracy. A little footnote there. Eisenhower said the only antidote to that is a fully informed American citizenry. And we have that far from that now. What's my point here? This was the high water of our relationship, in November, 2013. It took the neocons, not even a year, about a half a year to stage the coup on the Maidan in Kiev. The causal relationship was not something that McGovern dreamed up. Bob Perry and I went through this in detail, and it seemed, and actually I had a catburg seat at the top of the CNN building when Joe Lieberman and Paul Wolfowitz were talking about this as though, well, it looked like a funeral there. They had missed their chance. They didn't get their war against Syria. And so a lot of this was reaction to that. Yeah, a lot of time for prepare, and they invested $5 billion, billion with a B dollars into Ukraine's aspirations to join the West. Okay, so here we had a decent chance for growing trust, okay? Doverai no proverai. Trust, but verify. This was all shunted aside by the coup arranged primarily by Newland and the other people who were doing the dirty work. And acquiesced in by our French and our German allies. They were there. They saw what happened. Steinmeier, the German foreign minister. I met with his principal deputy, and I started to talk about the coup in Kiev. And he said, get this. He said, what coup? He was there. Steinmeier and the French took it upon themselves to guarantee the Minsk process, and they didn't have the chance. They didn't have the guts to follow through because the US didn't want it. So maybe I'm an offensive realist, but that's how I look at it. Could we have the next slide please? Okay, now just at about this time, you will be surprised perhaps. No, no, it's the one before that. Yeah. Now the Defense Intelligence Agency is obliged by active Congress. To make sure they do an annual strategy report. And this is what they came up with at the end of 2015. So they had a year, a year plus since the coup. Now that's what they said. That's what the Kremlin is convinced the US is trying to do. John Meersheimer is very nice and calling that democracy promotion. But, but he explains that in the next phrase by saying, it's, you know, it's, it's a, it's a coup. So this is what the Defense Intelligence Agency said. Who knows that they issued this. Did McGovern get this from Jonathan Pollard or one of his old succession? No, no, you have to read, you have to read everything that comes out in the media. This slipped out. Let's go to the next slide, please. Okay, what I'd like to do is get a little granular here. And talk about how we proceeded. Once, once Biden got his feet, so to speak, feet on the ground. I call this US diplomacy. You can think of what you will. March 17. Putin's a killer. March 18th, 19th, Lincoln and Sullivan insult the Chinese talking down to them and making very much like the old imperialists that the Chinese are so, so used to. Now, interestingly, on March 24th, this is all last year. The Ukrainian president Zelensky out of the blue announced, we're taking back Crimea. We're taking back Crimea and we have to use military means will so be it. That's what we'll do. And, you know, I don't think there's anybody, not even on CNN, who would say that Zelensky thought of this idea all by himself and didn't check with the United States course he got permission. So put yourself in Putin's place. It's a declaration of war and was described as such by Western media as well. What's Putin going to do now it's Ukrainian official policy. It's a, it's an order that we're going to take back Crimea. This is important. Okay, because it's always this calculation that that Putin is looking at these new leaders, leaders, if you will, and seeing what they're doing, how they're acting killer talking to the Chinese. Now we're going to take back Crimea. Now, on March 25. No coincidence, 24th, 25 Russian troops are going around the area of Ukraine. Well, they built up a lot of troops and of course we reported that in the New York Times, Washington Post reported that ad nauseam. But finally, Biden got wind of it, or at least started to appreciate the significance of it. And he calls, he calls poutine on April 13. What else happened on April 13. Well, everybody was saying, Oh, there are tons of tons of troops there. There are a lot of troops and should I go to the Defense Minister gets up and say, Yeah, you got that right. Would you believe two armies and three airborne airborne units. Would you believe that. That's what we mean by this will be him. This is what we mean by asymmetrical power. You got it. Biden, on that same day, reverses the Navy's orders, sending two heavily armed and very sophisticated ships into the Black Sea, if you're about to enter the Dardanelles and they turn them around as I go visit Greece. And then finally, on that same day, Biden suggests, Hey, Vladimir, let's have a summit late to get together and talk this stuff through because we don't like this. Okay, next slide please. So the summit takes place on the 16th of June. Okay. And Biden says to poutine. And we know this from Biden's own voice. Okay, what Biden is saying on this. They couldn't get him onto the plane long enough to have him say these strange things. Okay. Biden to poutine. We know you got a rough road to hoe here. We know you're being squeezed by the Chinese. We know the multi thousand mile border Chinese is not only going to be a major economic power going to be a major military. We know about that. I would love to have been a fly on the wall when poutine connected with his advisers that who's advising this president. Who's telling him that the situation is the same between China and Russia as it was four decades ago. I mean, hello. And so they decided poutine and Z finally, we got to educate this guy, we got to tell him that nobody's squeezing anyone else except in the fraternal embrace. And that's what they set out to do for the next several months. And on November 15, 2021. There was a summit a virtual summit between poutine and Z. Presidency, President Xi Jinping of China. It was heavily choreographed. And they, they gave the first minute to the New York Times and other media, because it was, it was so clearly designed to show, look, we are very close allies. And as a matter of fact, they made the claim that our relationship or strategic relationship exceeds an alliance in its closeness and in its effectiveness. Now, most people though us really, really neat rhetoric. trainees don't usually do that rhetoric but it's it you know, it helps helps poutine. Well, that's what it was designed to do. Okay. Now, on December 15. When when they said this on that very same day. The Russians gave those draft treaties, those very far reaching proposals they still call them on the security situation in Europe and how it has to change. Now, I suppose it could be a coincidence that the Russia picked that same day, showing the closeness of their relationship with China, and giving this ultimatum and some sense to to the west and to the US. I don't think it was a coincidence. Maybe we have the next site please. Okay, now we fast forward to this year, February 4 poutine is in Beijing to launch the Olympics with Z. And he says that, you know, our friendship. Actually, they both say in a very, very important joint declaration, not just rhetoric guys. This is the real thing. Friendship between the two states has no limits. There are no quote, forbidden areas of cooperation. Well, well, are we to take them at their word. Well, when do the winter Olympics end when are they over people are saying that the Russians might might strike out against Ukraine, but would pause until the Olympics for over. When did the Russians invade Ukraine, or you know, a couple days after the end of the Olympics may we have the next slide please. Okay, now the big deal here is what a surprise this was to to all of us right. I mean, wasn't all of us. It was me and lots of others and I, and I next Saturday I thought I would go to confession of being so wrong. I was so long with my colleagues that I thought it put it off till the next Saturday. Yeah, dead wrong on whether the Russians would invade Ukraine. I didn't think they needed to. I thought they could get what they wanted, simply by acquiescing and the notion that they couldn't get NATO to say no more people in NATO. And anyway, and then going for the what they call the secondary issues, like the employment of cruise missiles and worse, right at the eastern at the western edge of Russia, but no, it ends up here. China has supported Putin. I think, you know, not only a lot of Russian experts, but a lot of Chinese experts were surprised at that. I mean, rhetoric is one thing, violating your cardinal foreign policy principle of non intervention and the fears of other people as as was China's is another thing. Right now, we don't know, maybe the Chinese will change your mind but so far, and not only China, India. Now you know I asked myself the question well what's different between the West and the US and India and China. Well, I mean one obvious difference that they were all white, and they're not white. And that can be very mischievous, because James Baldwin, way back when suggested that it's much easier for imperialist whites to get out after blacks or browns or yellows. So does exceeds an alliance mean mutual defense pact. Well, probably not. I don't think the Chinese want to be bound by what happens in Europe. And I don't think the Russians want to be bound by what some crazy China man might do be sub the Taiwan, but it's a virtual alliance. And it's no small thing that China is supporting supporting Putin on the ground at the UN elsewhere. And it's more than rhetoric. Now, when we talk about Putin's new, I called it assertiveness, I've been saying for weeks now that China is the much neglected factor behind this. China has made Putin a big guy, like on the streets of New York. Nobody's going to push me around anymore, because I got the leader of this other gang. It's really, really powerful. So you're going to push me around anymore. I think that's part big part of why Putin has proven not only assertive, but aggressive. And I wonder where he'll stop. I just don't know. The real question here is how we can work to make sure that negotiations succeed once Putin has finished what he intends to do in Ukraine. And that's a biggie. That's really big because right now we're looking pretty silly by imploring the Chinese to do something about this fella. Do something that can't you intercede. And we're looking a little bit strange because as I say, not only China, but other countries including India have voted against us. Now, do we have a let's see how much time we have. Yeah, for one more minute. I want to show another another video. And I think it's important to know this because it's way back a while ago, I think 15, and it shows Putin talking about what really, really troubles him. And it was the notion that Tomahawk, Tomahawk, as Putin says, missiles can be in place in these so-called ABM sites in Poland, Romania, maybe even Ukraine. Would it be possible to show the minute and the two and a half minutes of that right now. This is from an old recording. Very good attention to this next clip, which just is about a minute long. And it shows Putin very uncharacteristically losing his cool. He's talking to Western journalists. They don't get it. Okay, they have no idea how the Russians look at this as a threat to their national security as a threat to the retaliatory capability. I don't know if these missile defense systems are able to squelch their offensive capability with their ICBM. So watch this next thing. And you'll see from this segment, which I hope will go on just a few seconds now, how Putin really is kind of beside himself because as you can see some of these Western journalists say, oh, that's interesting. So let's have that second clip, please. There are no pros, but the pro system continues to be built. So we were right when they said that they're lying to us. They're not sincere with us, sending us to a supposedly having an Iranian nuclear plant to build the pro system. Well, that's how it is actually. They tried to nudge us again. Now they've built this system, now they're putting rockets in it. Well, you should know that these rockets are put into a capsule that is used to launch the Tomahawk medium-range missile, the sea base. They're putting anti-rockets in it, which are capable of hitting targets at a distance of 500 km. But we know that the technologies are developing. We know in what year the Americans will get a new missile, which will be 500 km away, and then more. And from that moment on they'll start threatening our nuclear potential. We know what's going to happen in years. And they know what we know. This is what you're only supposed to be saying. And you, in turn, are hanging on to your population. And people don't feel the danger. Well, how can we not understand it? We're dragging the world into a completely new dimension. That's the problem. They're doing it as if nothing's happening. But I don't even know how they're going to do it. Why can't you understand this? And he's talking to the journalists, of course, and you can't see any rational discussion of this in Western media. So just to finish up here, here's Putin, way back then, saying, how am I going to get through to you? And it was the same in his official conversations with US statesmen. And that's when he and the military in Russia built up these hypersonic missiles. And he said, look, now you have to listen to me. And if that's when he went after China to become a virtual ally. Now, I thought, as I wrote, that Putin making these far reaching proposals would be satisfied with half a loaf. This loaf seemed really important to him. The notion that Tomahawks, and worse, could be stationed right across the border. But no, he wasn't satisfied, obviously. What he wanted to do, and this I underestimated, was to make sure that he protected Russian speaking and Russian citizens in Ukraine. And he's done that and still more. So where will he stop? I think he stops when he's satisfied that there are no more Nazis or proto-Nazis or neo-Nazis in power there. That's going to take some cleansing, but he's going to do it. And then I hope, and I expect that the Chinese and the Russians get together. Okay, that's enough of that stuff. Now let's get together and make sure nothing untoward happens in the future. I'll yield the floor then. Thanks for listening. And I really look forward to your questions and conversation. Hi, it's Ron Maxwell here. I followed your whole argument. The one thing you left out is the agency of the Ukrainian people. I want to talk about this as if it's only the United States and Russia that has any stakes here. It seems to me the highest stakes are with the Ukrainian people. And what we've watched in the last week is that they have something to say about this, which has nothing to do with what we want or what the Russians want. It's what they want. And it seems to me, based on what we're seeing 24-7, they will never surrender. And the Russians will be faced with a situation much worse than they faced in Afghanistan. Well, we'll see whether that happens or not. There's no question that the Ukrainians have agency. I don't dispute that. And my view all along is that if the Ukrainians were smart, what they would do is divorce themselves from the United States, right? They've hitched their wagon to the United States. And your description of how the Ukrainians are behaving today is absolutely correct. And we're encouraging that, right? And as I said in my presentation, the question is what are the consequences of that? You're quite confident that the Russians will lose in Ukraine the way they lost in Afghanistan. I would not bet a lot of money on that, but I would note that even if the Russians lose in the process, they will destroy Ukraine. And from Ukraine's point of view, that's not a good thing. This is why my view is that Ukraine should have long ago divorced itself from the United States and worked out a modus vivendi with Russia. My view is, if you're a reasonably small power in the international system and you live next door to a gorilla, you have to go to great lengths to accommodate that gorilla. And the last thing you want to do is poke that gorilla in the eye because the gorilla will do great damage to you and it probably will never forget. I don't know if you're old enough to remember when Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, but shortly thereafter we put sanctions on Fidel Castro and on Cuba. Those sanctions are basically still on Cuba. We've never gotten over the fact that Cuba behaved in ways that we considered to be unacceptable. And I think you have a similar situation here. And my view is, yes, the Ukrainians have agency, but if they were smart, they'd divorce themselves from the United States and try to work out a modus vivendi with Russia. Thank you very much, Ray and John. I'm the vice chairman of the committee hosting the question and answer session. And I have a roster of people I'd like to call on who have been participants. I'd like to make three just opening observations that can be deliberated on by the participants and John and Ray. One, it's not clear to me that the choice is either one or the other with regard to responsibility. In the law there's something known as comparative negligence. You can have both parties partially responsible. That's not just one or the other. It may be the case here. The second is with regard to these existential threats. I don't know whether or not there's a moral or legal right for a nation to ensure it to have a right to a buffer zone. Most of the nations of the world don't have a buffer zone and they have existential threats and they don't attack neighbors. The third observation is, yes, Mr. Putin speaks regularly, but it's not altogether clear that he's honest. He denies trying to poison his dissidents in London or elsewhere shooting down aircraft over Ukraine or otherwise. It doesn't mean he lies all the time, but surely we can't just take at face value what he says. But those are just open observations to throw into the mix here. And I'd like to call on Jack Matlock. If you could contribute your views, Jack, given your experience in the background, which is very, very profound and thorough. So what's your observations on the both very, very masterful representations by John and Ray? I guess what worries me now is the, you might say the state of President Putin's own mentality. I was one of those who was quite certain he would not invade Ukraine. I was also one of the people who around 2003 said if we were in a war with Iraq in 2004, President Bush would not be re-elected. So I'm not a good, I'm not a good prognosticator. I do think that politically a strong reaction was inevitable in the United States when you got the direct invasion. But I worry that it has gone so far that it is becoming increasingly an attack on the Russian people themselves, denigrating them. And I would say, in addition to all the things that the others have talked about, I think one of the most unfortunate things that has happened has been the personal demonization of Vladimir Putin. And in that regard, our president from the time when he was the senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and voted for NATO expansion, later continued to keep Jackson Vannick in force long after Russia was no longer subject to it. And in 2008 when he started running for president, he said he would stand up to Vladimir Putin. I really don't know what Vladimir Putin had done to him or to the United States at that point. So, you know, and then of course, particularly in the second half of the Obama administration where everything is being explained as a reaction to Vladimir Putin, we're going to cost him for what he's doing, et cetera. I think this is very dangerous. And going back to my experience and in the Reagan and the first Bush administrations. One of the, I would say one of the basic points in our strategy in the Cold War was to start dealing with the Russian leaders as individuals pay attention to where they're coming from. Ronald Reagan spent more, much more time trying to understand Gorbachev where he was coming from. Then he did studying, you know, throw weights and more heads and the technical aspects of arms control. We have talked a lot about NATO expansion, but it's not just that. Although, of course, assigning American forces to Ukraine as we've been doing, certainly across a red line that anybody would understand. But it was much more than that. Remember that beginning with George W. Bush, we began to pull out of almost every arms control agreement we had. We pulled out of the ABM treaty, which had been the basis of it. We pulled out later of this INF treaty. We pulled out of open science, which had been an American proposal ever since the Eisenhower administration. And at the same time, we were injecting ourselves directly into Russian politics and as far as Russia was concerned, even worse in the politics, the domestic politics of the other ex-Soviet republics. So it seems to me that there was an absolute almost effort to denigrate and to insult. First Putin and then, in many cases, Russian people as a whole. I mean, I was astounded when President Obama was saying something. Russia makes nothing that anybody wants. At that time, the only way we could get to the International Space Station was with Russian rockets. And we were trying our best to keep Iran and Turkey from buying Russian aircraft things. I mean, how can an educated, decent person as I'm sure a father is make statements like that. Well, anyway, I think we have reached a situation which is extraordinary dangerous. And I'm not sure we are handling it as responsibly as Kennedy and Khrushchev handled it back when I was a junior officer and the American Embassy in Moscow and translated some of Khrushchev's messages to Kennedy. Thank you, Jack. We just need to have the time space here, Jack. I'm going to move on to Ted Postal. If that's all right, we'll come back if we have further time. But those are very, very trenchant remarks. Ted, your observations. This is a highly political talk for obvious reasons. And my only small addendum, I won't take too much time on this, is something that's a very big minor technical problem, which is of major importance, which is that the Russian early warning system is nothing like the American early warning system. In the United States, we know when a ballistic missile has been launched from any point in the world at any given time. The Russians cannot do this. And because of that, more than 20 years ago now, there was a false alert that occurred at a time of extreme peacefulness between both countries. And we know that the Russian military officers involved made decisions also based on their judgment that there was nothing going on between our countries. If that same accident had occurred in the last few days, a different outcome might have occurred. I think the Russians are very careful about nuclear weapons. In fact, in my judgment, they are much more so than we are, we Americans. Nevertheless, the fact that the Russian early warning system does not give them comprehensive understanding of what is going on throughout the world when missiles are launched is extremely dangerous when you have a period like this. Now, to the benefit, one of the few things I just want to make one more comment on is that just a few hours ago, there was a little news item saying that the United States has decided not to have a ballistic missile test that was scheduled sometime in the next few days or hours. I think that is an extremely good decision because the Russians only have a very piecemeal idea of what is happening with nuclear forces around the world and anything that happens in one place cannot be confirmed by observations of other places. And because they don't have what I would call global situational awareness that could put their forces onto a higher level of alert and possibly even lead to actions associated with predeligated authority, which we know for sure the Russians have to be doing because the warning system does not give them adequate time for the kinds of consultations that we are are planned to have if we ever need to make a decision about our nuclear forces. So this is kind of a technical observation. It's peripheral to the main political issues that which I basically agree with here, but I think it's a real problem. I have been talking about it for well over 20 years. I get laughed at when I've talked to people from the Pentagon about trying to do something constructive that would be between both countries. I point out to them that if the Russians attack us because they think they're under attack, when they are not, it's not in the interest of the United States to let that remain as a condition. But you just have there's no interest at all in cooperation on this matter. And in some ways, although it's politically extremely different from what we're now talking about, it is another example of how there is a kind of underlying unacceptance of Russians having a legitimate set of concerns for their own security and in that it on that matter I strongly agree with Ray and and of course I strongly agree with the John Miersch armor as well. I'll stop here. Thank you, Ted. And it underscores I think what John said about the reason why he's in a state of alarm, even though the likelihood of a nuclear exchange. He should be very long. Nuclear of all of us. Yes. Now I'd like to go to Susan Eisenhower. You know, your father's warning about the military industrial complex has been mentioned here. But do you have any observations to add to the group? First of all, it's magic say that it's a real delight to see Jack Matlock and also know that there are other friends and colleagues on this call I'm here really mostly in listening mode. Because I sort of stepped away from being deeply involved in this field about 10 or 12 years ago I've been working in the energy space but this crisis I think is deeply unsettling. If anyone is interested in my views, I post regularly at www.SusanEisenhower.com, and I do have a piece on the nuclear threat this week because I mean we're all losing sleep over it and Ted postal. Thank you for reminding me this I'm taking notes here but I had forgotten about this situational awareness problem, which is really deeply disturbing so I do I have any comments on the military industrial complex well, not exactly in this but while I'm promoting myself here, I wrote a book called how I clad the principles behind Eisenhower's biggest decisions and I think there's a lot in that book about about why he wrote that section in this farewell address and the problems he was having with his own, you know, his own military people who were his comrades during World War two over things like the missile gap and the bomber, I should say the bomber gap and the missile gap. And then of course, you know, how that played out as we went into the presidential lecture 1960. Anyway, I think this is a persistent problem that and I know many military people who recognize that it's a problem. What role they play in this particular crisis, I don't know, but I will say that I'm alarmed that we're not hearing a variety of voices and you know in our news media. Because this is a really complex issue. And I've had people ask me to be on the television programs and I'm simply not going to do something like this in two minutes, or three minutes I mean I spent 27 years of my career. You know, following all of these events, and it's just too complex to sum it up in two words except that we've got to be extremely careful, especially around this nuclear issue if we can get through that, we can get through a lot. So thank you for the opportunity to be here. Yeah, well thank those observations Susan I think your father deserves great applause I think he's the last president who stood up. Erin was able to call a bluff. Everyone else seems to capitulate very quickly. The next time I could just add one thing and this is where it all gets tricky is that he really was not a politician and that's the point I'm making my book he was a military man who spent eight years in the White House and after he retired, he President Kennedy says there's anything I can do for you and he says yes I'd like to be called General Eisenhower from now on. And, you know, we haven't had a bipartisan president quite like that since then so what we've got to do is on this issue is be very careful that it doesn't get politicized going into two very big electoral moments at the end of this year and of course, two years after that. Yes, well my remembrance as Susan is that at one time, your father was courted by both Democrats and Republicans who wanted them to be their presidential nominee. That's quite a phenomenon that we haven't got close to that in a long time. Well if I can just add to that, he writes in his diary after he's had visits from both Democrats and Republicans and he said after what he heard them say all it makes him want to do is dive under his desk. Anyway, thank you for this opportunity. Okay, everybody. Wonderful. Thank you Susan for those remarks to Adam. Do you want to contribute now. Yes, thank you very much. I suppose that my view would, I'm a little bit surprised that nobody seems to bring up Poland under Yaroszelski and roughly 40 years ago almost exactly 40 years ago in fact that and the Czech Republic because Well, I entirely agree with Russian grievances, etc. I also feel that the right to a buffer zone is doesn't belong to a country that that is not making itself attractive politically to the outside world. And this is where the Ukraine is much closer to the Czech Republic and Poland in its current identity. I mean obviously the Ukraine is made up of lots of sub components that are oddly shaped and antagonistic and have their own peculiarities. But collectively, they do have the same set of aspirations as Poland and the Czech Republic have had over a protracted period of time. And I don't feel that it is right to expect them to make themselves subservient to an operating system such as Putin runs in Russia. If they don't want to and clearly they don't want to be a part of that and there's very just very probably an irrelevant and slightly too peculiar a point to make but I remember vividly talking to somebody who is an American lawyer working for Daripaska. And we're saying well, it's interesting is Russia evolving is Putin trying to do anything to have the system evolve the legal system evolved from being presidential to presidential. And the answer was no. That was the disappointing thing obviously how law is practiced in the United States is very uneven too. The Southern District of New York is has a good reputation, there are plenty other parts of the country which have much less reputation and these things can be politically charged but how well and even handedly law is practiced is very different even within our own country. But could one say of Russia that the system was evolving in a way that was going to protect provide a rule of law. And the answer was no. This really is not happening. And I bring this up peculiar though the point might seem because as an example of how Russian political culture has not been evolving in a way that countries that aspire to to something different could could want to accept. And, and that's why I feel that the evolution in the Czech Republic and in Poland, regardless of the fact that both certainly Poland is much more going through its own difficulties. Nonetheless, they want to be a part of Europe. And whatever that means to them and they do not really want to be a part of Russia and at that point as a country of 44 million. Own aspirations for self definition need to be recognized and taken into account, regardless of how legitimate Russia's complaints about being ignored and having their wishes and their security concerns run be run rough shot over. Sorry, that wasn't a very good sentence but if you want to see what I'm saying. Thank you. Yes, before I go on to Ron Maxwell me. Can you compare that attitude that you've described in Poland or Czech Republic or Ukraine not wanting to be absorbed by a country that is completely lawless. It's just whatever Putin wishes to the attitude of Taiwan towards being absorbed into mainland China, which also has lawlessness and everything is dictated by President Z. Are your positions comparable or not you think I'm not in a position to judge. I know so little about Taiwan. You know, aside from reading the economist type thing. So, I'm really not in a position to judge but I would have guessed from what little I do know that. President Hong Kong is deeply deeply worrying to Taiwan and not the least bit surprising to them. So, yes, they're in a similar situation of this larger entity has a political and legal culture that we do not want for ourselves. I'll take the liberty now since I'm in this the chair as a ersatz for john Henry. I wanted to raise with with john Mirshimer, you made some comparisons to Russia's reaction Ukraine and the US and Cuba Fidel Castro. And how we viewed Cuba and Castro as a threat to our, our security interest and existential threat and response, you know, we had the Bay of Pigs that attempted assassinations of Castro without operation mongoose. We even had plans after the failed Bay of Pigs to invade. Do you think those responses of the United States were morally or legally legitimate responses that that we made, you know that were an example that other countries should and can follow, or they something that ought not to be followed. This is a great question and of course it follows on one of your three initial points, as well as Adam Dixon's comments, which have to do with the subject of rights, and what's morally or legally permissible in the international system. I think that in international politics, states usually pay attention to international law, and they pay attention to moral precepts, as long as they're in their strategic interests. But if there's a conflict between international law and a country's strategic interests, the country will always privileges strategic interests and international law and human rights will be pushed off the table. This is why I think it's not very helpful to talk about rights. When you talk about whether Russia has the right to have a buffer state, or Ukraine has the right to have its own foreign policy, these are concepts that, in my opinion, get you into all sorts of trouble. In the international system, might makes right, and the United States would never tolerate a situation where Canada or Mexico invited, in a legal way, China to bring military forces into Toronto or Mexico City. We have a Monroe Doctrine, which is in our strategic interest, and our Monroe Doctrine says, no distant great power is allowed to put military forces in the Western Hemisphere. Period. End of story. What the Russians are doing here is they're basically articulating their own version of the Monroe Doctrine. They're saying you cannot turn Ukraine into a Western bastion on our border. Has nothing to do with rights, right? It doesn't matter whether Ukraine has the right to do this or that. We're saying they can't do it. Just like we're saying Cuba can invite the Soviets to bring military forces into the Western Hemisphere. So for me, when you talk about great power politics, rights in the final analysis just don't matter. Might makes right, and the United States is a mighty powerful country. It's a mighty powerful country on purpose, and it does whatever it thinks is in its strategic interest. And if the rights say that's okay to do, good. But if the rights are at odds with what's in our strategic interest, we do what's in our strategic interest. But let me offer this, John. The Declaration of Independence. Now, it may be departed from it, but it certainly spoke in terms of rights. Men and women, they're born with unalienable rights, and they also articulate a right and a duty to rise up and throw off a tyrannical government. Now, maybe the Declaration of Independence is quaint, but actually it's what gave birth to this nation that we're residing in right now. It may well be that as a descriptive matter, we're still living with Thucydides, the strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must. And it may well be that as a practical matter, maybe things don't change, but I don't think we should necessarily view as irrelevant, as you're saying, assigning responsibility. Maybe there's in peridolicto and responsibility, meaning making a moral judgment, even if the moral judgment has no immediate practical significance. Don't you think the Declaration of Independence is worth admiring and aspiring towards? I think the Declaration of Independence is of enormous importance. I thank my lucky stars. I was born in a liberal democracy, right? And I think like you regret the fact that liberal democracy is under threat at home. But my view, and I'm probably different than you, Bruce, in this regard, is that international politics is a different domain than domestic politics. And in international politics, the Thucydides way of thinking about the world where might makes right is what applies. I'm not in favor of going around and beating up on other states, and I'm not in favor of wanton violence and so forth and so on. And I do think that what is happening in Ukraine is absolutely horrible. It makes me sick to my stomach. But on the other hand, I think it's very important to understand basic realist logic. And the reason it's important to understand realist logic is because at least in this case, that's what informs Putin. I think that Putin is thinking like a community and Americans have a terribly difficult time putting themselves in Putin's shoes. And this is because Americans tend to think in terms of rights and in terms of American exceptionalism and all these other ideas that I think get us into trouble. I think, you know, going back to the film clip that Ray put up there where Putin talked about in that New York Times op-ed, the trouble America causes by thinking of itself as an exceptional nation is correct. I just don't want to think that way in IR, and I don't want to think about rights when it comes to international relations. Ray, did you want to add your thoughts? I just wanted to add, Bruce, that John Meersheimer needs no endorsement from me. But I would simply add that this is, I think, we talk about offensive realism or offensive. It's offensive to think that one should have to deal not so much with rights, but with mice when one is judging international relations problems. But realism really needs to be the primary factor here, particularly when, as John pointed out at the beginning of his remarks, it matters greatly as to how we got here and who bears the primary responsibility. I agree, and sometimes we're saying my view is that you can have more than one act to be responsible. They say in the law it's called comparative negligence, the same idea here. And my view is that there isn't any right buffer state. Why do just big powers get to say, you know, we get to declare we have an existential threat and attack you. Most of the countries in the world have existential threats. We could blow up all of them tomorrow, you know, with the snap of a finger. Yeah, we don't say, OK, well, then they could attack the United States. Anyway, that's for another session here. Does anybody else want to offer? I don't want to cut anybody off. Any additional questions before we close the session? The speakers have been marvelous every participant. I think it's been wonderful here. I want to congratulate everybody. But is there any last questions that would like to be asked? I would like to ask a question. And basically, there are two variables that I'd like to. First of all, I thought that the talk was was fantastic. But there are two things that I wanted to ask about. One was the economic aspects of this. And the other is the political will of the people in Ukraine. So when we talk about might is right. The question I have is Russia is Russia's might is being undermined by the sanctions. And so Putin is now potentially facing a decrease in his war fighting capabilities because of the economic situation. He's also going to lose the support of he may lose the support of the oligarchs and the population at large. And then on the Ukrainian side, you have this will to fight and you've got the potential for the war. It seems to me over long term, if not success in a conventional fashion. So I just was curious to get your thoughts about the economic aspects of the situation. Plus, you know, the issue of the political will on the part of the Ukrainians to determine their own destiny, which may include a guerrilla war. Okay. I could get in another Dr. Mr. Sharper. If I could just get another question to piggyback on that. I really been waiting to get this in as well. I think it matches very well with the economic aspects. First of all, thank you for doing this. Unfortunately, in the policy community, as you know today, there really are no voices at all for your point of view. Everything that we're seeing is more sanctions, more punishment. And the question is, if Putin runs into the problems that he may run into in case this insurgency doesn't go his way, his regime will be undermined. If the sanctions are biting enough to have an effect, they're going to collapse and implode Russia's economy, which would undermine his regime. If he goes back with nothing to show for his misadventure, that will undermine his regime. And my question is, what will his reaction be then? I'm not asking you to prognosticate, but from the standpoint of what you've seen over the last 20 years, is he someone to back down? Or are we going to see a ratcheting up from his point of view? Thank you so much. Thank you for the question. Why don't we just to organize it, John, why don't you respond first and then Ray, you chip in, and then we're going to call it to a close. Yeah, those are two great questions. And I think that the question is really on the table here is whether or not with sanctions and the costs of war, just the cost of losing people and fighting in Ukraine, that coupled with economic sanctions can inflict enough punishment on the Russian people and the oligarchs that they rise up against Putin. This is the question. And I think there are two reasons that's not going to happen. I'm not saying I'm right, you're wrong. But I think that what the scenario that you two described will not prove to be correct. And let me tell you why. The first is nationalism. States are able to sustain huge amounts of punishment. And the population does not rise up against the ruler. You want to think about what we did to Japan in World War II. You want to think about what we did to Germany. You want to think about the literature on sanctions, economic sanctions. Look at Iran. It's amazing what we've done to Iran. Look at Cuba. There have been sanctions on Cuba forever, right? And these countries don't throw up their hands. So the first point I would make to you is nationalism is a very powerful force. And I think that the Russian people will rally around Putin. Second point I would make to you is a result of this talk that I gave that's ricocheting all over the internet, plus the New Yorker piece, I get like 1,000 emails every day. I can't even open up all the emails I get. But I've gotten a number of emails from Russians. These are educated people who are not hostile to me in any way. And I read those emails to say that you want to understand that you Americans are threatening Mother Russia. And what's going on here is not simply a case of Putin misbehaving and us liking the Americans. And what's going to happen here is we're going to overthrow Putin. The emails I'm getting, and this is not a scientific sample, but it is consistent with my general point about nationalism, is that the more we push against the Russians in Ukraine and the more we threaten the regime, the more that people will rally around Putin. Now, again, I could be proved wrong on that, but my bet is that he'll be able to withstand the sanctions. And by the way, this gets to Ray's point. Ray's point is the Chinese are going to help him. We know the Indians are going to help him. We've heard that the Mexicans are going to help him. So it's not clear that we'll be able to punish him that much over the long term. But then again, even if we do punish him, do you think that's going to bring the Russian people to their knees or Putin to his knees? I wouldn't bet a lot of money on that. Ray, you've got closing argument. Well, I would like to identify myself with what John just said. But let's pause it. In other words, I think the Russians will get through this. I think there are a lot of reasons that they will. Let's pause it that Putin does have his backup against the wall. I think it was Jack Matlock, my friend, Jack, who's suggested, he's not quite sure of Putin's relative stability now. That's a legitimate question. I was surprised as hell that he invaded Ukraine, even with Chinese support, even under threat of all kinds of other things, sanctions, but he did. And so, and he sounds a little bit more emotional than I've ever heard him sound before. So would it be a good thing if Putin's back is up against the wall? I don't think so. And this is why. He gratuitously, for the first time in my experience, that was back about 60 years, raised the nuclear possibility. That is big. Okay. That means that he would consider employing that. So he's really had his back against the wall. Now, what does he look at? What does he see when he looks at the United States? He sees what Ted Postal has just explained to us. He sees that he doesn't have global dominance. So the global awareness to find out what's being shot at him and when he also sees people like Admiral Thomas Richards, he sees people like, what's his name? That little guy, Savridas. Yeah, he says Savridas, another Admiral. Yeah, I'm going to be a nuclear war with China in 10 years. That's what Putin sees. And so the reason this thing is so labile as the Germans would put it, so tentative and so dangerous is because these people need to keep their mouths shut. And what Putin would like is to bite and shut these guys up and say, look, no one wins in a nuclear war. I signed that thing with Putin. He agrees. So we're not even going to talk about that. And yet here we have Putin. Talking about it. So it's a matter of Putin stability and what having his backup against the wall. I don't think it's going to happen because of the sanctions. What that would mean. That would not be good news in my view. Yeah. Well, thank you so much, John Ray. Audience. You all been wonderful. Sorry. I have to close, but we'll see you on the next. Zoom meeting. But you both have set a standard to which the wise and honest may repair. And we thank you for that. All right. Okay. Bye. Bravo. Hi, it's Ron Maxwell here. Can you hear me? I can hear you, but I thought we're going to go to Ray next to talk and then go to questions. Well, somebody I have to leave in about 30 minutes. But if that could be one question. I followed your whole argument. The one thing you left out is the agency of the Ukrainian people. You talk about this as if it's only the United States and Russia that has any stakes here. It seems to me the highest stakes are with the Ukrainian people. And what we've watched in the last week is that they have something to say about this. Which has nothing to do with what we want or what the Russians want. It's what they want. And it seems to me, based on what we're seeing 24 seven, they will never surrender. And the Russians will be faced with a situation much worse than they faced in Afghanistan. Well, we'll see whether that happens or not. There's no question that the Ukrainians have issues with that. There's no question that the Ukrainians have agency. I don't dispute that. And my view all along is that if the Ukrainians were smart, what they would do is divorce themselves from the United States. They've hitched their wagon to the United States. And your description of how the Ukrainians are behaving today is absolutely correct. And we're encouraging that. And as I said in my presentation, the question is what are the consequences of that? You're quite confident that the Russians will lose in Ukraine the way they lost in Afghanistan. I would not bet a lot of money on that. But I would note that even if the Russians lose in the process, they will destroy Ukraine. And from Ukraine's point of view, that's not a good thing. This is why my view is that Ukraine should have long ago divorced itself from the United States and worked out a modus vivendi with Russia. My view is if you're a reasonably small power in the international system and you live next door to a gorilla, you have to go to great lengths to accommodate that gorilla. And the last thing you want to do is poke that gorilla in the eye because the gorilla will do great damage to you and it probably will never forget. I don't know if you're old enough to remember when Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, but shortly thereafter we put sanctions on Fidel Castro and on Cuba. And those sanctions are basically still on Cuba. We've never gotten over the fact that Cuba behaved in ways that we considered to be unacceptable. And I think you have a similar situation here. And my view is, yes, the Ukrainians have agency, but if they were smart, they'd divorce themselves from the United States and try to work out a modus vivendi with Russia.