 Thank you very much Bonnie. Great introduction. Most of the time the entertaining comes because I'm giving extemporaneous remarks. This is actually a cleared address this time. I can't even remember the last time I did that. When I needed that for this audience, this is the most impressive collection of Taiwan hands ever assembled in one place. I think it's very, congratulations to Brookings and CSIS for bringing together such a terrific group. Today, 35 years after the Taiwan Relations Act went into effect, it remains of course the guiding document for our important and valuable relationship with Taiwan. And I agree with President Mao when he says that U.S.-Taiwan relations today are stronger than ever. Some respects may be even stronger than before in 1979. In 1979 there were many in the White House, many in the State Department who did not expect that in 2014 we would still be talking about U.S.-Taiwan relations. Unfortunately that view is supported by the historical record that has been coming up. They certainly would never have imagined that it would be such a close and important relationship today. As we've heard earlier today, the tendency then the tendency for quite a few years afterward was to treat U.S.-Taiwan relations as an issue or treat Taiwan as an issue, a problem in U.S.-China relations rather than as a separate substantive meaningful relationship in and of itself. Today we do take our relationship with Taiwan seriously. We do treat it as a relationship on its own merits. The language of the TRA continues to be very relevant I think for policy concerns. And I think it's instructive as we did a little bit today but I want to continue that to look back at how some of that language evolved into its final form. Discussion of the TRA usually focuses on its language that commits to the United States to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social economic system of the people of Taiwan. And to a determination by the President and the Congress of Appropriate Action to take in response to any threat to Taiwan's security. This language is the core of our of America's unique defense commitment to Taiwan. A commitment made of course by no other nation. A review of the legislative history which we were treated to this morning shows that Congress added much of that language I wrote much after hearing this morning I would say most of that language to the original executive branch draft text of the TRA. The underlying policy for this commitment was spelled out in I think language is also very important in the TRA's preamble Quote to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. That policy of expectation that the future will be determined by peaceful means. And all the commitments that follow from that policy remain unchanged 35 years later. The TRA's defense commitments I think understandably get most of the attention. But the acts underlying the acts broader more fundamental goal was quote to preserve and promote extensive close and friendly commercial cultural and other and you can drive a truck through other of course relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan and quote that the entity that then was created to manage the continuing relationship is of course our dear American Institute in Taiwan. We all know the Institute functions in nearly all respects the same as an embassy with representation of all the US agencies that you would expect to find in an embassy and the capability to represent US interests on all issues. Moreover the AIT format became the model for many other countries that subsequently or in some cases even earlier had broken relations with Taiwan. So you could say that indirectly the creation of AIT the format that we came up with for it contributed to Taiwan's ability to maintain close ties with numerous other countries. Over the years we have in fact made a few adjustments to make the relationship to make the AIT structure work more smoothly. I can give many examples but one of the most obvious I think is that a few years ago about a decade ago we decided to send active duty military officers to serve at AIT instead of relying on retired officers which had been the practice since 1979. But the basic structure of how we deal with Taiwan, the basic structure of AIT is unchanged and it is now really largely mirrored by the structure of Dr. Shun's Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington. The TRA drafters were very careful to ensure that agreements between the United States and Taiwan prior to 1979 would remain in effect and also to spell out how future agreements made between the U.S. and Taiwan would come into effect. Today AIT manages and oversees the implementation of over 100 agreements and arrangements between U.S. government agencies and their Taiwan counterparts all handled through AIT and tech row channels. At the same time right now over a dozen additional, I think it's more like 15, 18 additional agreements are currently under discussion. And if you look at the breadth of pending agreements, of existing agreements between AIT and tech row I think it attests to the very wide ranging substance of our interaction with Taiwan. It ranges from defense and security issues, environmental cooperation energy efficiency, scientific and technical collaboration, law enforcement, training programs for people from other countries and so much more. Now on the occasion of the TRA's 35th anniversary Assistant Secretary, Danny Russell, testified in April before the Senate Foreign Relations Committees, East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee my friend Kien Moi, our Deputy Assistant Secretary testified in March before the House Foreign Affairs Committee so those testimonies outlined in considerable detail the current state of our economic, cultural and security ties with Taiwan as well as our support for Taiwan to have meaningful participation in international organizations. I will spare you from repeating all of the excellent information available in their testimonies but I'd just like to highlight what I think are a few important points. Let's return for a minute to the important subject of our support for Taiwan's defensive needs. We believe that support has given Taipei confidence in its engagement with Beijing. The result has been the impressive string of agreements on trade transportation, law enforcement, cooperation and other cross-strait ties that have been concluded in the past six years. President Ma has certainly made clear both privately many conversations that I and others have had with him and publicly as well. The connection that he sees between American support for Taiwan's defense capability and Taipei's ability to negotiate confidently with Beijing. The Obama Administration has notified our Congress of over $12 billion in sales of defense equipment and material and training to Taiwan. As China's military spending grows, as China continues to carry out military deployments and exercises that are aimed at Taiwan, it is more important than ever for Taiwan to invest sufficiently in a professional military force that uses asymmetry, innovation and other defensive advantages it can muster to deter potential attempts at coercion or aggression. Our security relations with Taiwan are about much more than arms sales. The U.S. engages in a wide range of consultations and exchanges with Taiwan in order to assist Taiwan's armed forces as they seek to maintain to train and to equip a capable effective self-defense capability. Our defense support for Taiwan is based only on our assessment in close consultation with Taipei on what Taiwan needs for its defense. As we have assured Taiwan many times before, we have not and we will not hold prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan. Our economic relationship with Taiwan is also something of great mutual benefit. Taiwan is, I was going to say 12th, I now know from Lushan it's 11th. It goes up, it's been 10th, it's 11th. Largest trading partner, it's a top 10 also destination for U.S. agricultural and food exports, big market for all those things. I used to like to say that Taiwan per capita is extremely high. It's like number two. I used to like to say Taiwanese people like to eat, drink, wear, and smoke U.S. agricultural products. I was criticized for the smoking part, but I said the numbers don't add up. It's no longer number two per capita if you take out the tobacco, so we have to leave it. Sorry, that is departure from the clear text. Yes, right, yes. Another thing, Taiwan investment in the U.S. for a long time was a pretty stable figure. It's growing. It's really picking up. I had the honor of accompanying former Vice President Vincent Xiao and his big delegation of top CEOs when they came here last November. Just during that trip, for most of plastics announced it was putting $2 billion into it's already large petrochemical facility in Texas. I've talked to a lot of other top CEOs who are seriously working on and moving toward other major investment projects in the United States. I think the price and supply of natural gas in the U.S. has become a major factor attracting these investments, added to all the other things we have going for us here that are attractive as a manufacturing hub or as an export platform perhaps better now than it's been in past years. Taiwan tourists to the U.S. also have increased significantly, started out a little slow after Visa Waiver, but it's picked up and that's another very positive factor. Now these are all tangible factors, whether it's tourist numbers, investment numbers, exports, things we can put a figure on, which immediately benefit the people and companies in the U.S. and in Taiwan. But I think we also know from our Taiwan friends that it is very important for Taiwan to maintain its economic autonomy based on a diverse spread of trade and investment ties, including the United States, Japan, Europe, and its Asian neighbors. Economic autonomy like self-defense capability and international dignity is an important factor in giving Taiwan the confidence to strengthen cross-trade ties. For both strategic and economic reasons, we attach great importance to the resumption of our Tifa Council talks, trade and investment framework agreement talks at the Deputy Ministerial level a couple years ago. Our economic dialogue and activity with Taiwan has increased in a number of ways and we're looking to increase investment, increase trade, and to help Taiwan maintain a balanced economic relations in the world. I'm going to just close by noting that I think, and I've said this in other gatherings, I think an excellent symbol of the importance we attach the commitment we've made not just to current U.S.-Taiwan relations but to the future is the splendid new office complex at the IIT that we are constructing in the Nahua District. I picked the site out myself, it was quite a long time ago, but it's getting, it does have great feng shui, by the way, also, but has the mountains behind and the river in front and so forth. Seriously, the main building is large, modern, attractive. Those of us who've seen some of our other new embassies in the world may find the word attractive and surprising. This one really is, not like the embassy in Bangkok, where it was, for example, sorry if anybody person about that, but it kind of looks like a federal prison. We expect to move in, we expect to move in to the building in Nahua at the end of next year. Okay, and a very important point, seriously, this will be the first dedicated office building any country has built in at least 30 years to have as its representative office in Taiwan. I think that's a great symbol of our longstanding and important future relationship. The core of that relationship has always been our shared belief, I shouldn't say always been, I say it's been since the late 80s, our shared belief in democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Americans have a deep respect for the extraordinary economic and political progress that the people of Taiwan have made, I would say made against all odds, frankly, in the 35 years since 1979. And for our part, we will continue to stand by the commitments that we made to Taiwan 35 years ago. Thank you. Well, you did not disappoint Ray, it was both entertaining and informative. Ambassador Burkhard has agreed to take a few questions, we have about 10 minutes, so please keep your questions short so we can try to work in more than just a couple. I see all the journalists have their hands up. Okay, journalist number one, John Zang over there. John Zang with CTI TV of Taiwan. Mr. Ambassador, you talked about Taiwan's economic autonomy. How do you see the recent student demonstrations in Taiwan against the service trade agreement across the street? Thank you. Are you concerned in any ways that the kind of demonstrations is not just against any agreement with the mainland, but also having an impact on other free trade agreements that Taiwan may be interested in signing? Thank you. Thanks. I mean, all my friends are mouthing things to me and sort of trying to give me signals here. Look, I know over analysis is the greatest, you know, the most popular pastime in Taiwan of anything, you know, so and we try to avoid falling into that trap as much as possible. I've seen some interesting comments by Taiwanese I respect, including people, you know, who are close to the president about these two, and I've seen comments, you know, I see look, I'm going to speak as an analyst here, you know, of Taiwan. I mean, the student demonstrations seem to reflect wariness about the pace of integration with the mainland. I don't see them as a, I didn't see them personally as a comment on a sort of protectionist sentiment, you know. I mean, I think anyone can see that there were no demonstrations against the free trade agreement with Singapore or the free trade agreement with New Zealand. So the conclusion I guess most of us would draw is that this seemed to be all about relations with the mainland, and how they felt that those were being handled or, you know, fears about where it was going. And so I'll just leave it at that. Sorry. Taking a job away here. This is the journalist. Chris Nelson, also important. Following up on John's economic question. Ambassador this morning very clearly says, you know, Taiwan is super interested in getting a TPP. We've said we're certainly, we would welcome that. Our friend, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan says, yeah, but if you really want to get into TPP you need to do the economic reforms that we've been talking about for years. Do them, and then USTR can go to the White House and say they're ready. Let's see what we can do here. This is a classic chicken and egg problem. How do you see it? What advice do you give, and if there's a prediction you could give, that would be great. First of all, I mentioned that we've really revitalized our economic dialogue with Taiwan. Not only at the deputy ministerial level in the annual Tifa Council talks, but in lots of lower level talks, and in some of the policy meetings we have with Taiwan, economic issues are things we're deeply engaged in talking with them about. And obviously TPP and what that involves is one of the topics. So there's no shortage of interaction between us about that subject as well as many other subjects that are important for economic and trade relations of Taiwan, the United States and Taiwan with the world. There are just a few facts. TPP is now a dialogue, is now 12 countries are now involved in the first stage of TPP negotiations. We need to finish that round. Taiwan understands that. Everybody understands that. When that round is finished, then the talks will be open to other negotiating partners. The nature of TPP is that there has to be consensus, there has to be agreement, I think it's not just agreement among the existing partners on admitting new partners. The way the process works is negotiating partners are not actually invited to join. That's not the way the process works. When Japan came in or Mexico and the same process would apply to Taiwan or anyone else a new negotiating partner expresses interest and applies to join. That's in fact the way the process works. Taiwan wants to join the TPP negotiations second round, it would apply to to join. Obviously you do that after a lot of ground work. I see Taiwan is doing that ground work, that's all public. All the work that President Ma has gotten his administration to do, all the work that Taiwan's representatives around the world have been doing meeting with not just the United States but with all of the 12 Lucian's colleagues in 11 other places, 11 other countries also have engaged with those countries about TPP. So Taiwan's doing the right things in this process. I'll just leave it at that. Let's take one last question. Maybe somebody who hasn't asked a question yet, Norman. Excuse me Ambassador Burkhardt. My name is Norman Fu. I'm a columnist of the China Times. You gave a very upbeat account of US-Taiwan relations however in the meantime there have been some disturbing developments. I refer particularly an article by University of Chicago professor entitled Say Goodbye to Taiwan published in the National Interest Magazine. His argument is that when China rises the US ability to defend Taiwan will diminish incrementally. So much so to the point one day the United States will be unable to defend Taiwan. That will be the time when the US will have to say goodbye to Taiwan. You buy that argument of this professor? Yeah. I was recently at a very interesting discussion of US officials and former officials with Taiwan officials and former officials. I made sure that Mirsheimer's article was on the agenda and it was a great discussion. I can't quote any of the people involved that was part of the terms of the conversation but we were treated to a really great analysis of the so-called realist foreign policy analysis and some of the alternatives and where Mirsheimer fit into all that. One of the fascinating factoids that came out of the conversation is that one of the people there was actually involved in teaching a lot on the mainland Beijing University and so forth and he said the Chinese students of international relations love Mirsheimer. Is that true? Look, I think this kind of analysis, it's good, it gets you thinking. It gets you looking at what the situation is but I think there are a few obvious comments that would make about it. One is islands have certain defensive advantages whether it's Japan or Britain or Taiwan. I'm not sure Mirsheimer completely or I'm not sure we as a government are sure that Mirsheimer completely took that into consideration as analysis. The other thing I would say is that just going back to some of the comments that Randy Schreiber made earlier and so forth, we in fact do have a very in depth discussion with Taiwan at all levels about arranging from policy makers to sergeants about what Taiwan's defensive needs should be. And I'd say we've made a lot of, we've made real progress both sides in working and I mean this business about asymmetrical weapons and so forth. I mean it's not just a mantra. We've looked at what Taiwan needs and if you look at what Taiwan has done in its own indigenous defense development work as well as in what it's bought from other people, you see just exactly the kind of items that make sense in terms of dealing with the kind of threats that Mirsheimer was talking about and that includes like I'm not a military man but I'll tell you the kind of things that military people look at and like, you know, mobile anti-ship missiles, fast patrol boats, greater capability to handle naval mines both removal and putting them in. And the list goes on you know and Taiwan's getting good at this stuff and this represents exactly the right kind of attitude. You know, Mirsheimer looks a lot at the balance of forces on the other side of the strait. There are only two things that matter in terms of what Taiwan has to do in terms of defense. Deterrence and survivability has to be enough deterrence to, I liked Andrew's phrase, enough deterrence for the Beijing to know what would get a bloody nose. Great way to put it and make them really have to think twice. Survivability it means surviving long enough until let's just say external factors can be brought to bear to resolve the conflict. Terms of you know, the other half of his argument what does it mean in terms of US commitment and US capability. Commitment is something and it's something we have to we say it and as Randy Schreiber put it, we have to walk the walk too. We have to do things which show it's still there. That's important. Terms of capability I spent a lot of time at the Pacific Command being able to deal with area denial and access these are exactly what all the plans are about. Exactly what these are exactly the important issues. I'm for one fully confident that our military will be able to do that. So thank you very much.