 Mae'r eich cymdeithasen i'r ffordd, a'r tyfnwys a'r cymdeithasen i'r treid. Ac o'r ddweud y prifysgol sy'n poros ymlaen i ysgawr hefyd, ac mae'r ffordd yn fawr i'r cymdeithas yma, am ydym yn gwneud o bobl yw'r ffordd y byddwn gwleidio'r cyfnodau mewn pethau mewn pethau. A'n mynd i ymweld, a'r ddweud ei wneud yn ddwy'r cyfrannu. Mae'r ddweud yn gwneud yn gwneud yn gwneud o'r gweithwyr, Tim wedi'u gair gan y dyfodol, ac yn ymwneud, ydy'r oeddiad yn Cymru. Ond mae'n bwysig yw'r lleidion yng nghymru, ac yn ymwneud yn Eurcei. Yn ymgyrch i Eurcei yn ymwneud yn 1 ym 1945, mae'r adegadau yn ymgyrch ar hyn. Mae'n gweithio'n ei chynllun ar hyn oeddiad. Mae'n gweithio'n hwnnw'n gweithlo. Mae'n grannu'n gweithio, Tim, oherwydd mae'n credu hynny. Oherwydd gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithlo'n bwysig? Mae'r Ysgol yn y cynllun yn i'w ddweud yma, yn siŵr, a'r ddim yn dechrau i'r Ysgol. Mae'r ddechrau i'r ddechrau i'r grannu cymryd yn cael y dyfodol. Yn ymgyrch, mae'r Ysgol yn ymgyrch sy'n tuwer o'r gwahogu'r ddweud. Mae'n ddwy'n ddweud rhywun o'r ddweud, ond y ffordd yn ymgyrch ond mae'n ddweud yn ymgyrch. If it didn't, we wouldn't have St Paul's Cathedral, where there was a plan to safeguard it and it worked. The Hungarian Parisian Panzer Division moved the movable cultural property for the Naples collections out of Montecasino before the building itself was bombed, so that plan worked. The German state moved to protect the statue of Frederick the Great by putting a bunker around it, and yes, that worked. So, planning to safeguard is a viable thing to do, and that lesson from the Second World War has carried forward straight into the heart of the convention. And yet, cultural property protection as an implied military task has really been dormant since the 50s, and Peter spoke about that briefly this morning as well. So, for example, exercise triangle juncture 2018 in Norway, some 50,000 European troops, many of them with boots on the ground. Despite all of that, the exercise setting does not include the Ministry of Culture as an entity to be played in the exercise, so there's nothing to engage with in exercise terms. I think that more surprisingly, perhaps, despite all the fact that all those people are maneuvering through Norwegian territory, there was no real world plan to safeguard cultural property. Nor was there an exercise scenario which to exercise it as well, despite the fact that Norway is one of the countries that has the most comprehensively sophisticated wartime planning regime you can imagine, despite all that, the Ministry of Culture isn't there. So, why is there a problem? Well, this is my view. Without the pressure of on conflict in North West Europe in particular, we have these competing value systems I'm going to talk about that remain in unresolved tension. So, there's a lot of talk about CPP, yet it doesn't really sort of coalesce. The vested interests in professional regimes triumphs over the wider good, and here are the sort of reasons why I think that happens. Though one of these value systems is legal centric, though you will protect cultural property because the law says you have to, and if you don't, you're prosecuting. Of course it's particularly valid, and Tim gave us examples of prosecutions. That's UNESCO's dominant narrative, celebration of enacting international law, if it's when the UK ratified people said to me, that's great, now our cultural property is protected, to which I say no, it's not. It's protected anymore, but that's a different thing altogether from what happens on the ground. And so, what about the heritage centric view? In my view, the guardians of heritage, police, the dominant narrative, reserving the right to judge, people who don't necessarily exceed to their view of what it's all about and how to safeguard it, that's fine on its own terms, but the world is bigger than that. So, where does that leave the armed forces? Well, very recently really, and partly through our work at Lucille, we start to frame it like this. From a military point of view, CPP, framed in the ways I've just described, is not actually very useful when you're trying to plan and conduct military operations, whether you're thinking tactically, operationally or strategically. What's at stake for a commander whose task is to conduct operations anywhere across the spectrum of conflict, whether it's peacekeeping at one end or high intensity warfighting at the other? What's at stake for that person? You're trying to do that within the laws of armed conflict, because the 54 convention lies, is nested within the wider imperative, which is the law of armed conflict. So, lifting a quote from the protection of cultural property, military manual or TIN, references more. Whether a status comply during armed conflict, there's obligations, is about the standards provided by the relevant rules of the law of armed conflict, not the 54 convention as such. The 54 convention is nested within it, and what's interesting about the laws of armed conflict is that that regime is permissive within widely accepted boundaries about what's accepted only on the end of outer space. You can do whatever you think you need to do, if you can justify it as being necessary, and if you do it in a proportionate way, if you distinguish between civil and military objects, between military and civilians, etc. The LAWAC privileges the mission, it's not prescriptive, and I think that's a very important point. And you see how this percolates throughout the guidance that TIN's officers will refer to a lot in their careers, that we find this phrase repeated constantly, to the extent that the military situation and other relevant factors admit, that we have to take into account the military context in which we're trying to execute cultural property protection, namely a threat-based intelligence-led context where people have to make very difficult, subjective judgments in near-impossible circumstances. And that's why training is so important. So what do we need to do? Well I think we need to develop a more inclusive discourse. We have to recognise that ministers of defence and their armed forces must be regarded as valid partners, not people to be told what to do and what will happen to them if they break the law, to be regarded as valid partners in the CPP discourse. And that this dialogue must embrace context that everybody understands, whether they're lawyers or heritage professionals, that part of this is about applying means and methods to achievement to objectives, the harsh reality of executing military operations. And so the military component of this discourse, I think, reads something like that, that in order to recognise the value and the utility of CPP for the armed forces, and the armed forces have to recognise that it's valuable and has utility. This is the way we have to do it. Actions indicating on cultural property have foreseeable, scalable, cause-effect relationships, whatever you do or don't do, what impact on your mission. And if you incorporate cultural property protection as a planning factor, then you might generate previously unrealised ways and means of understanding and operating, and that might be to your advantage. If you do those things, then you're almost automatically promoted here to the 1954 Convention on applications, because you're working with the laws of armed conflict, and the two are nested. So here's an example, if you like, and this is from the exercise that ran through the core of the team's course. So if you think about scalable cause-effect relationships, here's the scenario. Winchester is in any held territory. Very reliable sources report that the old vine hotel, and we've been in that great two-listed building, and it's so right. The old vine hotel in any occupied winchester is being used as accommodation for the senior headquarters, the enemy senior military civil headquarters. And their support staff, of course, are having to go live in the slugging lettuce, which is down the road. Which is also a great two-listed building, in the centre-containing monuments that is the middle of Winchester. With Winchester Cathedral so close by in the centre-containing monuments, we need to act in accordance with LOAC, having estimated the possible tactical, operational and strategic consequences of our chosen course of action. So evenly, it may be entirely appropriate and proportionate to drop a £1,000 bond right in the headquarters and kill the entire enemy commodity. But what are the consequences of doing that? Not only tactically, but operationally and strategically. What about within the peace after the conflict when you destroy a significant portion of the historic centre of Winchester? Where will that leave you in 10 years' time, 20 years' time, 90 years' time? So the task for the officers on Tim's course was to table any CPP factors that they assessed to be vital and bring them to the targeting range and to do it pretty quickly because we're in the middle of fighting the war. That's the sort of thing we're talking about. So what we're trying to do here is to train to develop a more inclusive discourse and to make it real on the ground as it works. And the thing that we've been driving at in Llucia in particular is this idea that we have to do it together. We cannot train models and say, well the armed forces must do this, heritage sector does that, states, parties do this. We have to do it together because it's only together that we obtain the kind of purchase that we need in order to safeguard. So the convention looks like this in terms of its obligations. State party in peace time develop inventories plans and very particularly in the convention ferry hot on this. What are the common control arrangements for delivering these plans? So that come the day that you have to transition into our conflict. You can take operation control, you can activate your measures, you can transport stuff and you can deploy the dispute to them. So that's what basically, that's what the convention is all about. So if we're not operating in your own territory with some of the others where there's a host nation, then if you're a deploying force, so Tim's officers, that's what they're looking for. Has this state party done these things? Because if they have, we can plug into it. If they haven't, we've got a problem. And by the way, most state parties in the world haven't done any of this. They've lit service to the convention and the UK has only done a little bit of this. So these are the obligations, this is what we have to do to activate these obligations. That the staff officers, Tim's staff officers, identify opportunities and risks associated with significant control property in the area in which they're operating. They must develop crisis-driven relationships with the host nation or other state parties as appropriate, as well as academia and so on. They must, in the end, support the host nation. It's always the only nation who's in charge. How do we support the only nation to protect their cultural property? And we have to factor all of that into a military planning process because if you can't do that, all of this falls apart. And so I just want to challenge Peter Stone, this morning, that it's mission first. It is mission first. CPP has got to be embedded in the mission. We have to get away from these kind of binaries or unitary ways of thinking about the subject. We have to think about it holistically as one thing, as a whole. That the challenge, and it's not just a military challenge, it's a heritage sector challenge, is to get your interest represented inside the military planning process. Because that's what saves stuff in the context of warfighting. But of course this is a significant challenge because we all speak different languages and we have these battle systems existing in tension. So heritage specialists will have their own way of thinking about how we can serve cultural property in peacetime going forward. But the notion of threat, of course, is an entirely different thing for people in the armed forces, Tim's staff officers. And I used to start to see why it was at Tim's recruiting heritage professionals turning them into army officers. Because suddenly we can start to close the gap between these two different ways of viewing the world and how cultural property and its protection fits into all of that. So we start to achieve convergence with threats and vulnerabilities to a recent mitigation environment where everybody is working together. But that of course requires training and it's not just military training. Everybody implicated in that diagram needs training because everybody needs to understand everybody else and where they're coming from. So when we come to training in collective training, which is training headquarters as teams, how do we start to imagine what this looks like? What does the convention say? How do you turn that into activity during an exercise, a command post exercise where commanders and their staff officers are being exercised? What does command and control look like? How do you achieve command and control in conjunction with the host nation, with the heritage sector, its ministry of culture, as well as your allies? How do you actually do that? How do you take control? Well, on an exercise I can simulate that. I can role play the state party special representative for cultural property protection, an appointment which is established in the 1954 convention, which has a whole raft of causes about command and control in the regulations for executing the convention that nobody ever reads. There's a whole raft of good stuff there. So when I go on a NATO exercise like this, I've got to try it. It's going to put these guys in a situation where they're going to have to recognise the need to work with the host nation's ministry of culture. And it works. I write a letter as the ministry of culture to a free star general, CEO general, asking for a one to one, and I get a one to one. We role play what it means to represent culture at the highest level during the planning of military operations, something that's never been worked before in Europe since the second world war. Yet we have the magic about the imperative to get Italian heritage professionals back to work about the critical issue of getting the host nation alongside you on the same page, protecting cultural property during and immediately after conflict. That's exactly what we're trying to do here. So I'm getting him to think like me about cultural property. So this is training. I'm mentoring a senior general in NATO, exposing it to something he hasn't really had to think about before, and pitching it at that level, I'm educating him. Same with planning. So she had plans in peace time, and the plans to be activated. What happens if there aren't any plans? What happens if you have to do some initial planning during the early stages of an operation? Well, we can easily replicate that. So on the same exercise, I create a situation where those nations are asking for emergency assistance to evacuate a museum that finds itself unexpectedly in the end of this line of fire. And it's a museum where the collections excite a certain amount of sectarian attention. The part of the population loves this museum, and the other half of the population of different grouping act to dislike the content of the museum. So here's the challenge. The host nation wants NATO to help to evacuate a museum within range of the enemy's weapons in a town where half the people hate that museum, and the other half love it, and where everybody's terrified and hasn't eaten for four days because there's a long conflict going on. That's the situation which we're trying to enact cultural property protection. So what does it look like to do that? Now, I want to respond to the question over here from all their force about the need to trade people across the board. This is a massive trade line entity. If you look at the table on the left there, that's a Greek headquarters, a Greek sponsored headquarters doing this exercise. That is their planning meeting, and there's something there from personnel. There's something there from intelligence because cultural property is an intelligence issue. There's something there from counter-intelligence because it's a security issue. There's something there from operations because it's an operational issue. There's someone there from logistics because it can require logistics support in the back of the museum. There's somebody there from plans because they've got a right to plan. There's a member of the ordinary police there. There's a legal adviser there. There's a liaison officer from the Ground Holding Infantry Brigade in these Territories in the Museums States, et cetera. That's a planning meeting that went on for about three hours. And all, if you like, all that is about is helping the host nation with mechanical handling, site security, and convoy escort to evacuate part of their collection. And the thing that that meeting isn't about is about wrapping and packing. It's not about the heritage bit. This is a security problem set within which the heritage bit is nested. So it makes it very important questions about how long do you need to wrap and pack? Have you wrapped and packed? Or are you going to move everything? All the critical stuff. And what do you mean by significant in this case? You mean politically significant? The stuff that one side don't like and the other side love? What do you mean significant in some heritage-related context of the attribution of that? What is stake here operationally? Let me think about doing that. Incidentally, the meeting on the right here in this German headquarters is the first time anything like this was ever tried, I think, since 1954. And of course I'm training people who are untrained to come back to this question about who needs training. All those people need training to understand what CPP is and how you activate it. They need to understand that before they come to this meeting, otherwise you end up in a situation where I find myself and I go on these exercises where I'm mentoring people who know nothing. So I'm training and mentoring at the same time when we do this, while NATO feels its way forward towards a capability. And then you start to see how Tim's unit fits in because what Tim is trying to do is to replace me by his guys who can go into a panel meeting like that where people know relatively little about CPP and they will have a subject matter expert who can guide them. That's what's going on. Within all of this, the centre of gravity of the whole thing is the host nation's ministry of culture. The deployed force has no authority to do anything to culture property in accordance with the Convention's owner's responsibility. So the key enabler in all of this is the training staff, Tim's people. What they're going to do is this, to assess the mission critical CPP factors and very importantly deliver it to the wider planning process. How do you get this into the plan? Well, conduct an assessment of the CPP factors, which is pretty much all we did on Tim's course for 10 days. Learn how to conduct an assessment of CPP factors in a given scenario and to understand how the activity that you're shaping carries with it the scalable cause effects relationships. The only 10 consequences. Again, it might come back to Peter's example. He says, you know, the Brits in 1917, they put Muslim troops around a Muslim, around Mosque. Well, was it Sunni or Shia? And so, as soon as you do that, you search yourself into Ottoman religious politics straight away, whether you know it or not. Unless you've done the staff work and you recognise that by protecting the Sunni Mosque, you're potentially causing strategic operational level problems. You've solved the tactical problem that you've created a strategic problem. Other people will see you do that and think that you've taken sides in a historical, long-standing dispute. And you will be indicating the people who've just, the Ottoman Empire has just been ousted from hope. It will be like that. So, scalable cause effect relationships in the complexity of culture. It's political nuance. It's critical to all effects. In what way does CPP can it have operational value? How do you tell it to account for you? Because armed forces people are not interested in about whether it has heritage value and such. So really not, and not really need to be. They want to know what's in it for them. The value and importance connoted by the heritage sector is an underlying factor that informs this. But what is the operational value? So, the challenge is to create new ways and means of understanding and shaping and exploiting the operating environment. Is that weaponising cultural protection? Well, potentially it is, I think. The challenge is to do it in a denying way. If that's not an impossible thing to say, maybe talk about that. But you are making people more efficient warfighters. But the efficiency stems from the fact that they apply their role of conflict better. So you're making them more moral perhaps, right? So what Tim's guys will be doing is to validate cultural property protection as a necessary task on operations. Not something you have to do because the convention says. Not something you have to do because the heritage community will touch if you land a helicopter on whatever. You'll do it because it will help you get to where you need to go to. It's a necessary military task. And in the process of doing that, you will conform to the convention and do less damage or destruction. So, if we take that forward into the training environment. One of the first times we had a go bring everybody together was last year. Coaching with culture, which is a German Austrian exercise run last year in Vienna. Is that we ran for the first ever pilot attempt to assess cultural property factors, protection factors. In a non-conflict scenario of my writing. Using the military history using Vienna, Europe's oldest military history, using it as a vehicle. And what you see here in civilian clothes, nevertheless, is an explanation to heritage professionals, arms service people. All of them are ranking professionals in their own right. There's a filmmaker there. There are people from across NATO and more widely in Europe as well. And they all listen to a curator whose role play. He's talking about his museum in the context of the crisis. And they're asking questions about their mission. What does he think is critical for him, post-nation? And they're thinking about, well, yeah, what's critical means for me? Because we need to blend those things. We've got to pull this together. Conducting a threat analysis. What are the threats to this collection? In what ways is this collection vulnerable? And how can we mitigate the risk? So that's what's going on there. And I love that footage, because for me this sums up entirely what we should be doing. This is blended, collected, everybody's role playing being a military star officer. Most people, they will never be a military star officer. They all know what it means to be a military star officer and to plan operations. The other half of them is what it means to be a heritage professional. And these are the kind of questions that come out of that process. And this is the model that we have taken forward into training. And I think it was Clyde who pointed out that, as it happens, one of my, because she's the former student of mine at UCL actually, she's holding the brochure in their hands that says, strong it together. That seems exactly what we're doing there, strong it together. So just to finish off, I thought I'd just show you a few snapshots from the exercise that ran through Tim's course. So some sort of visual essay into what this is all about. Military star officers and host nation stakeholders working together to plan. And they're always working of course in the context of the mission, of the operation, the military dynamic. Starting with this identification with mission critical cultural property. So not all the cultural property by all means. We were working here in West Hampshire. Alex, we were using the historic England database, the real English database. And we just passed out part of the West Hampshire. 300 pages of A4XL spreadsheet is what it took just for Hampshire. So out of that, these guys are trying to pass down what's important to the mission. Giving it our lay down and what we're hoping to do. Where's the key staff as far as we assess it to be? That's not going on there. And using the database, those people who were equipped with the skills were able to lay down precisely where all the cultural property was and you see the hotspots there around Winchester and Southampton. And the people who produced these guys are actually sitting in the wardens as students on course. And they can comment on that later on if they wish to. But for me, this is what good practice really looks like. Conducting a threat analysis, no matter what the threat is. I talked a bit about the heritage century understanding of what risk or threat might be and then these military understanding of what threat might comprise. And here we have the enemy's weapons. But we have crime, organised crime, disorganised crime, chaos in the battle space. And in the background all the environmental threats to cultural property that go on as they do in peacetime, all of that's in the mix. And again, I think this is produced by people who are sitting in the audience today. But what that allows you to bring to the military decision process is something like this, Winchester Cathedral, phase by phase. So phase one of the operation is where you are when you're planning. And phase two of this operation is when they go into the attack. So when we attack and we maneuver south of Winchester, what do we assess the threat to Winchester Cathedral to be from a variety of threats having assessed its vulnerability and how we might mitigate the risk? So this is the sort of thing you can bring to a planning table and say, look, this is what we need to focus on if we're going to mitigate the risk to cultural property. And there they are doing just that. There they are talking about risk mitigation on the course. That's the course in action. The other things we spent some time doing is working as a nation expert. Lisa Moll is at the University of the West of England. She's a ballistic damage to stone expert. She's talking about the Garrison Church, she calls it, but it really was planned in the 1940s. And she's talking about what it is that she can do as a piece of cultural property first aid, pretending that this has just happened. And she was able to say, well, look, this thing is red, it's being burnt. And because it's being burnt, it's flyable, it's liable to whatever. And that's what's going on there. And then forging very strongly between the operational staff work which is really what is the most important thing here, I think, but also how that translates into tactical action on the ground. So assessing the host nation's request for evacuation systems again, at this time within range of enemy artillery and enemy weapons. And again, I've got an entirely different interview that we're never asking anybody to put themselves at risk. I think the opposite is true. Any member of the armed forces within range of the enemy's weapons is always at risk. If we ask someone to drive down the road to go and look at the church, we're asking them to put their life at risk. If we ask them to do any of these CPP-related tasks, we have to be honest to ourselves about that. Everybody has to be honest about that. We are asking commanders just to assume and manage the risks alive in order to deliver CPP. Because we all of us have the responsibility to respect and protect members of armed services too. It's not just about people. Everybody's at risk. And we are asking people to do something dangerous in all they have. It's having human improvised refuge. In this case, working with English Heritage at Fort Rockhurst. So we've been to the place where we want to evacuate the staff, and now we're here to get to the place where the host nation wants to store the stuff. And we're talking there with the English Heritage professionals. Everybody's in role. We all understand this scenario. We're talking about risks to the mission, as well as to the CPP. And again, in the context of movement and trafficking, and the first aid, the Royal Cancer Church, again the English Heritage. So in the course of Tim's course, I think we did everything that I was about to do. We worked with the historic England database. We worked with the English Heritage. We worked with the National Trust. We have people from around the world, including in Australia and in America, we have people from around the world come working collectively, understanding what it means to try and protect our property from a military perspective, a heritage perspective, a reading perspective, with the focus on the mission because the people are trained here in military staff offices. And if we can't persuade senior officers that this isn't their interest, then it will come to you all. That's the challenge. Okay, thank you very much.