 Thanks, Lee. I appreciate the opportunity, the SNA affords us, you know, people like, what are you doing doing two panels? Well, there's a really nice thing about a panel is the moderators only got to say a few words and those guys do all the work. So, it's not as much of a burden as you all might think. I always worry when we have a maintenance panel right after lunch and so if you see the person next to you nod and just give them a little bit of an elbow and I'll make sure these guys keep it nice and lively. The maintenance business is a lot different than building ships, you know, as a shipbuilding P.E.O. for a long time there and the nice thing about being a P.E.O. is you go work to get a contract, the contract's in place, you go start building some ships, it's kind of, I won't say it's in the done pile, but then you go watch the ships being built that goes for a long time. Tried to characterize the maintenance business a little differently, so in my first year I got their tremendous challenges across the shipyards, the RMCs, technical, etc., something like 50 ships in availability and we worked like hell and we delivered all 50 ships, none of them are still tied up, blessedly. And then the next year starts and there's 50 more. And we got that year done and then this year there's 50 more, right? So this is not something that it's ever done, it's not something that you ever get to put in the done pile, it's a going concern and it requires that constant work. The Surface Navy Association is a view beyond the horizon, this one is right here, right? So there's no horizon associated with maintenance although we are attempting to push our horizons out. I was talking to Admiral Davidson, I know he didn't talk much about maintenance this morning, I had spies in the room to find out how badly he lambasted us. He was very kind, although Rick I'm sure you won't be, but we got in a good conversation about this in the maintenance business and then the overall sustainment of the fleet and what first is it's about balance and Admiral Davidson would I think would agree with this, the balance of how many deployments are going to get out of the ship and how long they are and how often they are, how much training the crew needs to be ready for those deployments, how much training they need after the deployment to be ready should they be called on short notice, how much maintenance you got to do to get the full service life of the ship and in many cases 10 or 15 or in the Coast Guard's case 50 years longer than what the ship was designed for, how to keep it ready for surge and how does the maintenance community handle a surge, right? When you suddenly have a ship deploy that you thought was going to go into a shipyard, how do you sustain the shipbuilding capability and then in our unique case right now, how do you reset a force that got overused, right? We have a lot of surge built into our Navy and for a year or two we can surge like a champ. It really isn't built, our system's not built to surge for 10 or 12 or 14 years and that reset. So that's got to all be done in balance and every part of it's got to be strong or else it all gets very, very difficult and so what I'm hoping the panel is going to lay out for is how we're attempting to strike a balance with those parts of this equation that we control and then in the tactical fight of any individual availability, any ship that's entrusted to us for putting back into the force the balance of the performance of the individual maintenance activity and there's a lot of different ones and where they are in their cycle of learning. That's an observable thing. The capacity we have overall, how much capacity is there in the entire country, how much in that port, how much can be brought to bear, how much is taken for the things. This one I stomped my foot on all the time, the ship's knowledge of itself and what needs to get fixed on the ship. The number of times we get into a system and find a problem and the chief goes, oh yeah, we knew that was there but we knew you guys were being there to fix it. We'd have been a lot more successful if we'd known that going in up front. That reset and surge that I talked about in the first one is that's got to be all done in balance and then really probably should have put this one first. Support to the optimized fleet response plan. So those ships got to go into the maintenance phase when they're supposed to go in or into the training phase when they're supposed to go in because that battlegroup is going to come together and the unique set of challenges that come with making those ships appear in many cases, two or three of them out of availability simultaneously will always challenge us. And so all those things that got to be done in balance and as again I think the panel will be good at showing you how that plays out across all of the activities. The number one investment I think we've made on my watch has been in plant. And anybody that's ever executed anything really hard, if you plan it right it usually goes pretty well. If you don't plan well and you just take whatever comes, you get what you would expect out of that particular horizon. That investment and for the surface navies, particularly that includes a significant investment in surf map and surf map now fully functioning as an equal partner with carrier planning activity and submit in that planning process that is so essential. Planning of the individual maintenance, disclosure of when the maintenance is going to be, how big it's going to be, and then the planning associated with maintaining as level of load as possible. Whether that's the old war we do with the shipyards and the new six year, nine year, I don't know which we're hopefully 30 year, I think if Mr. Sackley gets it right, maintenance and modernization plan. And everything that goes into the private repair yards in the home ports. We had a couple of discoveries over the last year that we should have planned for and didn't because we didn't even really have a minor horizon. Things like topside work on aircraft carriers that's done by the repair yards in the home port to sometimes the tune of 100,000 mandates. And we were surprised. That's obviously on us. Our planning wasn't up to snuff and it is we're working to make that better every day. So the lineup I got for you, Admiral Rick Burkey is going to give us kind of fleet perspective on OFRP and how we're doing where we need to do better. I'm sure we'll hear about that. Moises Del Toro's in charge of the program side of the submarine maintenance pot. And like this morning, everything's connected to everything. You go in there, you find out that Southwest Region Maintenance Center is a principal contract for the SSNs being maintained over on Point Loma. You're like, I didn't know those were connected together. So Moises will give us that view. Mark Whitney will talk about the challenges of our naval shipyards for predominantly carrier and surface ship maintenance, but somebody may not know this or not know this is the planning yard for several of our classes of surface combatants are those public shipyards. And when their resource challenge, guess what? The big deck amphib planning is a little bit on. It's not as good as it could be right now. Of course, you've all heard Bill Galinas a lot. If you have anything to do with maintenance, Bill, give us his perspectives. And then a special treat, Bruce Baffers joining us from the Coast Guard. Bruce and I built ships together for a number of years, went to a series of shipbuilding forums around the world. He, like me, finds himself in the maintenance business. And he's going to try to pull some of that together with the idea of maintenance as a requirement, making sure you've got the requirement right. I would put that in the planning and hopefully tie a bow on it. So without any further ado, I'll turn it over to Rick and we'll move down the panel. Go ahead, Rick. Good afternoon. Good afternoon. Can you hear me? Can you hear me in the back? Oh, there we go. Sorry about that. It's a little bright up here. So I had to make sure I had the buttons right. But I want to say thanks for the opportunity to speak here today. It's a really appreciate the opportunity to kind of talk about where we're at in the maintenance side of the house. Those of you who have heard me speak before in the past, the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, which Admiral Hardis has talked about there, and the word balance I think is the important one there for us in the fleet. So what are we trying to balance? We're trying to balance maintenance with training with operational time. So when Admiral Gordney put this together a couple years ago, the idea was to get for the sunk cost of maintenance and training that we do for a strike group or for an ARG or for a submarine that's getting ready to get deployed, it's a maximum operational time that we can get out of that force for that sunk cost of maintenance and training because that's the bulk of the cost to us really in the Navy is the maintenance and the training piece. The deployment piece in the operational side is really the minimal cost. That's only about 10% of the cost, 10 to 15% of the cost of our total budget in the fleet is to do that. The bulk of that cost to 70% is just owning the platform and getting it ready to go. And that's the maintenance of it, that's the modernization in order to make it right. So that maintenance phase that's part of the operational fleet response plan is very important. The more we can get done successfully in that maintenance phase, then the less worry or the less time I have to worry about the sustainment phase as we go through training and we go through deployment. Ships that go through their maintenance phase successfully and we have had several that have gone through successfully have been easy to maintain in both the training phase when they go up for exercises or when they get ready to go deploy in their work up cycles and on deployment. The number of cash reps is less, the ships are doing much better, they do better on their exercises, they do better in their in-server cycles that they go through. So it's clear that we've got to get this maintenance phase right. For the most part we're getting the maintenance done. The question right now though is how to get it done in the time frame that we have in that maintenance cycle. And that's the challenge that we've had for many of the guys here up on the board is getting the maintenance done at the right time and getting it as the schedule goes. The OFRP does offer us flexibility from the old plan that we had before because we can, if we know ahead of time because we're looking so far ahead of the amount of maintenance that we need if it doesn't quite fit into the maintenance schedule that's currently planned. Like say it's a six month availability that is scheduled and we go and we look at the work and we see it's going to take eight months to do that work and we can go ahead and schedule that earlier and take a look and dig into, take some time into the sustainment phase in order to get that maintenance phase right to be able to deliver the ship the capability that we need and get the deep maintenance done to get that ship out to expected service life. So that's the whole idea the OFRP offers us flexibility and get that maintenance right and it's up to us in the maintenance community in order to be able to get that maintenance done correctly and to get it done on time so we can get it matched in to get the training done and to be able to get the ship deployed and work up. So successful OFRP depends on that maintenance phase and what we're looking at now, what we've been working with NAVSEA on is look, as Emeril Artis said, maintenance tends to be right in front of your face if you let it. We have to get better at looking out further ahead one in terms of the activities themselves, the LMAs whether it's the RMCs or whether it's the shipyards, are they positioned to be successful? Do they have the mil-cons right? Do they have the manning right? Do they have the training correct? Do they have the tooling, all those things? We're looking years out in advance now in order to get those right to be able to prepare the shipyards or the RMCs in order to be able to be successful in executing the work that is on the horizon. And then as many of you know for each of the C&O availabilities it's about a two-year window in front of that where we start that planning effort. We haven't done as well as we could in the planning side of the house in the recent past and so we're working with NAVSEA to try to take that focus shift back to the left and drive that planning focus further and further to the left in order to get it right. Because once we get the planning done then there's a lot of things that have to happen in order to get to, if it's in private sector it's getting the contract award, all the type of things that has to happen in the naval shipyard side, it's getting it balanced right into the capacity of the shipyard. So the further ahead that we know what the size of that availability is going to be, what the duration of it is going to be, where it fits into the OFRP and where it fits into the cycle, the better it is for the LMAs to be able to plan for when that work is going to be done and to be able to have the capacity to be able to support it, whatever that case may be. So that's the driver that we're working towards. Now how are we doing? Well, frankly, we're at about 30%. We're at about 30% right now. In baseball that'd probably be pretty good. That's not very good when we're trying to match maintenance phases to get ships out on time in order to get to the OFRP. So we're about 30% and that's about the same for both public and private sector. We're working a lot with NAVSE in a couple different areas that focus on planning, like I talked about before both for the activity itself and for the C&O availability. Naval work loading. We've been very good about trying to level load the workload in the naval shipyards as best we can. We have a team of folks, fleet availability, scheduling team that's a NAVSE fleet, OPNAV team that looks out ahead and does that and we're pretty good about level loading the naval shipyards. Mark might not agree with me, but we're better. We never had that focus in the private sector for a variety of reasons. I think in the past we just assumed that the private industry would just match up and whenever the work came they would hire the people they needed to do and go do the work. The problem is if you keep doing that and it's spiky or it goes up and down, now you have the problems that we're kind of facing right now in Hampton Rose with layoffs or hiring and layoffs and hiring. That cycle doesn't work. It doesn't work on the shipyards and it doesn't work in the public shipyards and it doesn't work in the private shipyards either. So we've got to do a better job of level loading that workload and the OFRP process, the generation model, allows us to look ahead. The horizon for OFRP is nine years. We look at three deployment cycles with three three year cycles, nine years ahead. So we can look out that far and see what ships are going to be tied with what ARG, what strike group, whatever and then we can mix and match and make sure that we have that laid into the schedule correctly and then to be able to level load. So we started what we call a surface fast fleet availability scheduling team last summer. Again made up of the folks, it's a NAVSEE fleet op-nav team that takes a look at that and we're meticulously going through and trying to level load the private sector ports that we have. Now some are a little harder to do than others. Hawaii, for instance, is a little hard to do. Pac-Nor-West because you don't have the volume of ships to do that. But San Diego, certainly in San Diego and certainly in Norfolk and in Mayport, we can do a much better job of level loading that work to make it so it's not spiky and it doesn't cause the private industry to have problems in it. Now when I say that, level loading, as you all know, we're moving from a Mismo to a fixed price construct. So that doesn't necessarily we don't level load it by contractor. We level load it by port. So there's still that competing process that has to go through for the work in that port. But there is somewhat of a capacity, I don't want to say a fixed capacity, but there's a capacity in each port in order to be able to go do work and you can kind of see how that works its way through. So I think that's an important thing that we've just started here about a year ago and we're already seeing some of the fruits of that here in the FY17 and then at 18. Timely funding is another one that we in the fleet really own along with the OPNAV. I think we've been doing a pretty good job of that the last two years of getting the funding to NAVSEE whether it's on the public or the private sector side in order to get that planning done in order to get the things that need to be done in order to set the table successfully for the activities to do that work. Hiring capacity, I know Mark will talk about this in the public shipyards, but it's also in the RMCs as well. We have a hiring we have an issue in the RMCs that we need to get the hiring done in order to get the organic capacity correct to where it needs to be to handle the contract workload to be able to administer the contracts, those types of things. So we've been working very hard in the last year for the most part on the public sector side. I think we've got that right now in the four shipyards. Still some opportunities I think we're going to need a little more capacity both in Pearl and Portsmouth to support the workload out in FY18, but we think we're about there. There's some tweaking still needs to be done. In the RMC world I think we still have some areas that we've got to improve on. I think Bill will talk about that. We have some targets of where we need to hire but with a roll out of firm fixed price that might get adjusted as we go through as it rolls out into the other ports. But hiring is an important piece. The capacity and the productivity of those people is important in order to get that right to set that table correctly that we talked about. The last one is improving communications. We've kind of slacked off a little bit I think in our communications specifically about availabilities. We've ramped that up in the last year or two years between NAVSE and the fleet and the type commanders. We meet on a monthly basis at the flag SES level to walk through availabilities both in planning and in execution. And we've seen some significant successes I think at least on the land side of where we've gone in the private sector with completing avails on time. With those remarks I'll hold for there but this is the last thing I believe you with. This is a marathon not a sprint. It's not something that's going to happen in one year. You don't just hire a workforce and then it becomes productive the day it steps into the shipyard. Both public and private it happens that way. So there's a lag time with where we have to go in order to be able to get this done correctly. I think most folks recognize that and it's up to most of us on the panel here to be able to present that and support that through NAV to get the funding that we need in order to go do that. So that's all I have. Thanks, Rick. Turn it over to Moises. Say again. Mike's working but the green light's not working. Sorry. Alright. I have the one slide up here. So thanks for the opportunity to come talk to you here. So again, Moises Del Toro, NAV CO7 so one of my portfolios of course is the submarine in-service side of the house. So I'm here to talk to you about submarine force sustainment to a bunch of swows but I think a lot of what I have to say probably applies equally as well to the surface force as it does the submarine force. So let's talk to the left-hand part of this slide first. So this slide shows the correlation of lost ASABO and operating costs versus the age of the submarine force. So on the very left hand side of the chart we have our Virginia class submarine. So again, new class of submarine, a number of blocks. We're in a block three contract for block four. So some of the challenges that we're seeing here from a sustainment and an in-service standpoint is taking that new design. So as the blocks, as we go from block one to block two to block three, it's backfitting the new design changes to the older block classes of submarine and how you sustain that for the life of the ship as we continue to build newer block of Virginia class submarines. Another challenge that we're seeing is the transitioning of the in-service support of those Virginia class submarines into my program office. So PMS-415 builds the submarines, they care and feed until after the PSA and then there's a handshake between 450 and PMS-392. And so that transition and when you transition has been complicated, it's getting better as we move and mature the transition of Virginia class submarines over to 392. And then it's a lot about the logistics, right? So there are, again it goes back to the first point, there are design changes between various blocks that of course leads to logistics challenges between the various blocks and how do you manage correctly the logistics trail to sustain a number of blocks of new classes of submarines. And then obsolescence issues, right? So yes, I mean it's a brand, Virginia is a relatively new submarine, but again we're using COTS equipment, you're going to face obsolescence probably a little more quickly than we did in the past when we weren't using COTS type equipment. If you go to the far right, let's show the aging SSBN, SSGN and really the first flight class submarines, right? And the challenges that we see there. So again it's a balance, it's all about risk taking and so it's how you get the most operating availability out of those submarines on the far right hand side. So looking at the class maintenance plan strategies to balance the maintenance and the operations of those ships. One of the things that we do in the submarine force is we have a material condition assessment. So as you look at some of the older first class SSNs, so how do you extend the operation interval and the operation cycle and the operation interval of those submarines as they get older? So there's a process in place between the fleet and the program office to go off and look at what the risk is of all what maintenance can we defer or what maintenance must happen in order to extend those operating cycles. An interesting thing, and I know Rick talked about the optimized fleet response plan. So a good case study would be SSGN, right? So SSGN when it was designed was designed for a operating to maintenance turnaround ratio of something like 2.2 to 1. We've exceeded that. We're up to 3, 4 to 1 based on the desire to use from combatant commanders to use those assets out in the fleet. So after 10 years of continuous use of these dual crewed submarines, so this could apply to LCS LCS is relatively new, but it's food for thought, right? So as I want to use these more and more, I just continuously defer maintenance to the right. So the optimized fleet response plan, we've taken the lessons learned from the last 10 years and we're going to reset that maintenance. So we know the major maintenance periods may have to be initially larger and the extended refit period for the SSGNs will have to be larger so that we can do all the maintenance that's required and then reset that cycle so that you can balance the operations and the maintenance for those high demand assets. And last, so the middle is relatively easy, right? So again, we're looking at class maintenance strategies. So we're always looking at it. There's always a desire by the fleet to increase ASABO, so we're always looking at the request of the fleet to balance and relook at the class maintenance plan for a specific class of submarine and where can you take the risks so that you can lessen the operating interval or lessen the maintenance period so you can get more operating interval for each of those submarines. Also, reliability centered maintenance is big so that we can improve the maintenance processes and then process improvements to reduce the depot durations and cost and then also private shipyard. So we're looking at how to balance based on future depot availabilities, how we can get the private shipyards involved in balancing the mandates for some of these larger workloads. So again, that's about all I really wanted to share. So hopefully there's a correlation between some of the issues and challenges that the submarine force or me, CO7, faces in sustaining in-class submarines and what you're seeing there is a surface ship. Thanks. Good afternoon. Okay, there we go. So good afternoon. Mark Whitney, I've got the honor of representing the four naval shipyards and now over 34,000 civilians in military that are geographically dispersed around the world fixing predominantly the aircraft carriers and the submarines. For perspective, last year we executed about 5 million mandates of workload and this year we're projected to execute about 5.4. And over the course of the next three years we're fairly pressurized to continue and that will grow slightly as we move through the fit up here. Last year I believe I came and talked about two specific things. One was that we had gone through in the maintenance and modernization executive board of directors, the M2E BOD, discussion as we went through the readiness kill chain analysis, that there were really 11 total external and internal success factors on what it takes for a naval shipyard to be successful. And at the same time we were about halfway through the ramp up of hiring to about 33,500 people in the shipyard and so obviously the focus inside the shipyard was predominantly on that hiring but then also what are we going to do with them when they show up inside the gate. So this year I want to talk specifically about two elements of those success factors and both Rick and Moises have touched on it already. The key success factor that allows the environment inside the shipyard to be stable for the people to be successful is that balance between workload and capacity. And so we've been working on that very diligently and I would agree with Rick that it has gotten much, much better. You looked at the workload forecasting curves for the naval shipyards albeit slightly growing, the stability behind that is actually pretty decent and so what we're managing is the changes. So when the workload changes either just prior to the year of execution or in the year of execution that becomes the leadership challenge both at headquarters but then predominantly by the shipyard commanders and leadership teams in the shipyard. And so one of the things that that also leads to is as we've hired and quite frankly we're at that hiring point where we're done and now it's a matter of transitioning to training and developing people. The other recognition is that in order for us to get all the workload done we cannot do it alone. We are going to absolutely need our partners in private industry to help us figure out how to get all that work done partnering here with NAVCO 7 and with the fleet and the type commanders to figure out the best mix, the best opportunity to do that. That's availability, that's touch labor and that's discrete work. That's across the board. But all of that creates the stability, the environment inside the shipyard for quite frankly the most important success factor and it's the people. The people in the shipyard deserve that stability and so now that we've gotten a huge grunge of folks inside the shipyard about 5,200 people just last year alone, now it's a matter of taking them and creating a couple of things that make them successful. One of them is in their day job what creates work to stop. So that nonstop execution, that nonstop flow of work and working on the deviations from the plan swarming to those places where we're deviating from the plan understand it and then get work back started again. The other one is that elusive stability of a work crew that we've been going after for years and years and years. I'll tell you right now the best example of that is up at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Between their workload stability, their alignment of their leadership team their ability to see when they're deviating from the plan swarm to the problem and create the environment where people are very successful their stability at the work crew level is absolutely phenomenal and they're seeing it and we are seeing it in the results of that shipyard. The other place is now that we've got the new folks and quite frankly this isn't just for the new folks this is also for the folks that have been in the shipyard for a while. We can't train the way we've always trained. The way we would sit in a room and look at PowerPoint slides, that is not the way the folks that come in the gates nowadays learn. They learn very tactfully tact-fingers you gotta touch it. You gotta touch it. What we've done is we've created these things called learning centers and it's really an escalation of what we've been learning and been doing in the nuclear repair world for years which is mock-ups. But it's really taking the mock-up to a completely different level for the majority of the shipyard which is bringing QA, bringing engineering, bringing all of the trades that are going to be associated with the job, creating an environment where it's safe to fail instead of what we had historically done which is kind of learning over the shoulder but down on the boat, down on the deck plates and that's not a place that we can afford to fail. So creating the environment where it's safe to fail ahead of time to go down and rapidly insert people, crews quite frankly, into a learning environment and again the best example is up at Portsmouth. So we recently just last week brought Dr. Stephen Spear who's the author of High Velocity Edge for him to come up and see how uniquely complex enabled shipyard is but then to kind of validate for us that these learning centers are indeed an effective way of accelerating learning and quite frankly he was wild by what we were doing up there in the learning centers and we are doing that corporately across the board. So stability creating the environment in the shipyard where people can be successful and then focusing on developing people and getting them as productive as quickly as we can that's going to set the stage for us to meet the demands of the fleet and so I will turn it over to Bill Galanis. Thanks Mark. Good afternoon. Again I really do appreciate the opportunity to be here and I represent the C21 organization as well as the Regional Maintenance Center so that's our maintenance and modernization program offices, the team that sustains the fleet inactive ships, the training systems as well as a lot of our overseas foreign military sales cases and then certainly on the water front the men and women of the Navy Regional Maintenance Centers that actually execute the maintenance and the modernization work with our private industry partners. So I want to start off just a little bit and I'll talk about the organization in a second but I want to start off a little bit from last year and I'll combine a little bit of the C21 and the RMC priorities that we set for ourselves last year. You know first off was Admiral Burke you talked about the resourcing of the RMCs and again with the fleet and the support of the two type commanders we were able to you know authorize an increase in our end strength of almost 10% across the Regional Maintenance Centers and so a lot of those billboards are going into some of the key positions that we have so these are our project managers, these are our contract specialists, ship building specialists on the water front some areas that we really had you know some real shortfalls. We've also reestablished the planning cells. Admiral Hallard has talked about planning being a core function you know that is certainly one of our focus areas as well and so as part of that we have reestablished planning divisions within the RMCs and we're already starting to see you know some benefits from that. The second area was the implementation of the new contracting strategy and again I'll talk more about that but essentially in 2015 we have shifted the rudder in terms of migrating from the cost contracting approach to the MISMO contracts that I think most in the room are probably familiar with to fix price contracting for surface maintenance which frankly is a game changer on the waterfront for us and then you know really the big area that we were focusing on was the execution of availabilities and you know I gotta tell you it's a little bit of a mixed bag in terms of the performance improvements that we're seeing and you know Admiral Burkey talked about the 30% you know on time completion and you know there's a lot of work to do in that area still obviously the good news is the one of the things that we did to that end was the fast process that Admiral Burkey also spoke about you know and this really kind of goes back. I would offer there's a couple of different elements to this and part of it is starts out two years before the availability with the avail duration effort that we do really looking at that class maintenance plan work that's coming into an availability as well as the modernization work and from that perspective you know you probably really have your critical path and what the driver is for the duration of the availability and so in the C21, it's led by C21 and the 407 organization a lot of good work there to get the avail duration analysis right and we really just kind of finished our second year with that part of the effort. Then the follow on part of that is really the workload forecasting piece which then feeds into the fast process but you know this is kind of the workload charts the sand charts I think most of us are familiar with to talk about workload forecasting and as we came out of FY14 and we started looking at the workload you know we realized that hey we did a lot more work than we initially planned and as we really kind of started digging into this what we found hey we were not accounting for all of the work that was being done on the waterfront, we had some significant gaps in collecting all the modernization work, we were missing some of the carrier topside work that the RMCs do working with our McWhitney's team in the public shipyards. In some cases we had new construction work, PSAs and stuff like that that were done in fleet concentration areas by the repair yards that we weren't accounting for so you know rolling all this work in to the workload charts and then you know taking those workload charts and trying to smooth that and again a lot of progress I think probably more so on the east coast at this point you know we've got some work to do on the west coast and we're making progress there but the you know from a cost perspective for coming through from FY12 through the end of 15 you know we've driven the delta between what we estimate the cost of the availabilities to be in the workload agreements and these are signed generally about the beginning of the fiscal year to through execution from 148% of the plan versus actual down to just less than 20% so that piece is moving in the right direction. What's not moving in the right direction is the lost operational days so this is the start on time finish on time piece and frankly in 15 we actually saw that trend go up and part of that I really believe is we kind of went back and tried to assess ourselves was an overloaded condition principally in Norfolk and San Diego different parts of the year but we just dumped a ton of work into the private sector that was not well planned and that's I think what drove some of that you know even though we kind of had a counter for that in the workload agreement it wasn't well planned as we started the availabilities and then the last thing that we kind of look at is for the mandatory technical work that we have to do within each availability how are we doing there and you know we've driven that down now to less than 2% deferrals across the enterprise so I think we're moving the needle in the right direction there but it's at start on time finish on time piece that we really have got work to do. The other thing now kind of shifting into where we're going in FY16 here so coming out right at the end of last year we aligned C-21 and CNRMC and you know principally driven by a reduction in force and the number of flag billets but I will tell you and it's really principally due to a lot of heavy lifting on the part of the two executive directors that I have Ann Sandel and Tom Lavergette who really kind of have been driving this whole process and pulling the C-21 and CNRMC team together and again think about the end-to-end process that starts essentially two years before you start an availability and the work that needs to get done in the advanced planning phase and then at that one year point that A-360 point where that gets turned over to the RMC and private industry to start doing the detailed planning the production planning and the contracting and getting that work done. Bringing C-21 and CNRMC together I think really has been it's worked out very very well and I'll tell you I'm excited about where the organization is going I'm excited about the conversations that are taking place within the organization the program managers the CEOs at the regional maintenance centers there's a lot of good work there and I think we're going to see some improvement from that as we go forward. So again kind of looking forward into FY16 and so you know we've kind of set across the enterprise for ourselves five key tenets or focus areas really and the first is the execution of the end-to-end process and the modernization and maintenance availability and this includes not just the C&O veils but it's also the smaller veils the CMAVs the emergent veils and I will tell you we do a tremendous amount of work on surface ships and CMAVs and I think most people in the room here recognize that we you know and so this is I haven't mentioned the OFRP I would tell you I think the maintenance work that the teams do out there is really the foundation and we've got to finish these veils on time get the ships in a condition that they can get into their training phase you know unencumbered by ongoing maintenance issues and so that's kind of the focus there you know part of that is driving I'll say a culture of process compliance and more often than not we tend not to follow the ruleset that we set for ourselves we generally have good processes out there we don't follow them all the time and we just we need to continue to challenge ourselves to do that we've got Vice Admiral Rodin is hosting the second maintenance summit this 10 year here coming up the end of February and that's going to be a specific focus area for that and you know we're going to talk about how we get better collectively across the team and it's a you know it's an all hands sport really it's a type commander on how they prepare the CSMP it's the port engineers how they screen work into availabilities it's our project teams how that work gets brokered and planned as we start going forward and so we've got some work to do there the other key piece of this is really our industry partners and I'll talk a little bit more about this in the contracting strategy but we had yesterday I spent a good part of the day with the private shipyard leadership working with the Ship Builders Council of America the ship repair associations across all the ports and it was a very good session there was some I think some very frank very open discussion and I see that as an opportunity to kind of reset where we are as we move forward here but avail execution and performance will be our top area of focus the second area is the fleet sustainment piece and again bringing C21 and CNRMC together PMS 443 led by Captain Tim Crone that is the organization that I want when the type commanders or the fleet has an issue with surface ships I want them to have 443 on speed dial and we need to be the one stop shopping for all technical issues inside of NAFSE for the fleet and of course through the tech warrants at the RMCs and whatnot there's certainly other venues into NAFSE but really I want when an issue pops up I want the fleet to respond and 443 needs to be ready to take that call and you know there's a lot of work going on in that area the revitalization of the life cycle management group we've met a couple of times on that working with principally the folks up in Philadelphia and the health assessment the system health assessment work that they do which really started last year we're building on that and I think that's going to pay some dividends for the type commanders and for the fleet going forward and then the other thing is just managing the specifications the changes the SCD's you know that all falls within 443 and just kind of keeping that on track making sure that we're pushing those into our planning activities into surf map to make sure that those get included in the availabilities as we go forward and get those planned and executed. The third item is the implementation of the surface ship contracting strategy and as I mentioned in 2015 we started to make that shift principally in the Norfolk area we've got five availabilities that were contracted under fixed price that are in progress at different stages right now. They were who frankly never really walked away from a fixed price contracting in total they for a while there they had a mix of cost and fixed price so that's really kind of if I had a center of excellence if you will on the RMC side those are the ones that have the experience with the waterfront execution piece and so we've been able to kind of leverage them but they have shifted over fully now to fixed price contracting you know in particular as you know we shifted the Iwo Jima arc down to Mayport over the last 18 months or so the first two ships of that arc Iwo Jima and New York are going through their first CNOs under fixed price contracting Iwo Jima started actually last July is doing very well right now and New York it just started in December is really just getting started but so Norfolk and Mayport they have made that shift will transition fixed price contracting into the San Diego area and the San Diego waterfront in 2016 and then the Northwest and Pearl Harbor will follow it at some point in the future actually I'm sorry Northwest also will contract for gravely as a fixed price contract in 2016 so that effort is you know the execution contracts are all coming in now at fixed price the other thing that we finished up in 15 moving into 16 is the planning activity so really two parts of fixed price contracting one is the planning efforts we have two of the three planning contracts in place the expect a third contract for the LHA and the LHD class to be awarded here in 2016 so that work is also moving on but you know one of the things that as we talked with industry yesterday and you know it's caused me to kind of again you know rethink our approach here and make sure that we've got this and how we communicate with industry and you know Admiral Burkey talked about communication I think you know certainly within the Navy lifelines and the periodic you know discussions that we have on planning and execution but I'll tell you one thing that's in my mind is you know not to lose sight of that communication with industry and I will tell you over the last year as we kind of came through this release of some of these competitively sourced contracts you know we got away from some of the more traditional interaction opportunities that we had with industry going more to targeted industry days that were fairly well structured and so we're gonna kind of I'm gonna take that on and we're gonna go work that 2016. The fourth item is the cruiser LSD modernization program and this is I will tell you I see this as an extremely important program and really the way that we're gonna maintain a cruiser based air defense capability well into the late 20s early 30 time frame and you heard this morning the discussion on the Ohio replacement program and the pressure that that's gonna apply on the on the surface ship building budgets you know one of the ways we mitigate some of that risk is by maintaining the fleet that we had today and you heard you know Admiral Davidson talk about that you know a third to three quarters depending or half to three quarters depending on how you measure that fleet's gonna be around for another 10 years or so and so you know the way we maintain and modernize those ships is gonna be key so you know as we shift into 2016 we're often executing the 246 plant so that's two ships a year out for no more than four years no more than six ships at a time essentially the first three ships for that program Gettysburg and Cowpens the two cruisers east west coast and then Tortuga have all been inducted into the program we're starting the what we refer to as the SSRA's I think are special selected restricted availabilities but it could be could have a little bit off but we start those this year Gettysburg and Cowpens are getting ready to start here in the next month or so and then Tortuga will follow in the late spring time frame and then we're also getting ready to induct the next two cruisers chosen in Vicksburg and that will also happen in this year and so we're the team is often and executing that program and then the last item the last focus area that we're gonna focus kind of work this year is continuing to mature the the sustainment efforts for the littoral combat ship and you know that's a program and you heard Admiral Antonio this morning talk about it that's really kind of taking that operator maintainer concept that we're all very familiar with on the surface fleet and shifting it more to the operator side of the ledger with a lot of the maintenance going to shore and that's a game changer for the RMCs with the preventive maintenance availabilities that we do we're actually a combination up to this point in some cases between the RMC and private industry going down and actually doing PMS on board the ship on board the LCS and so we're wrapping that into the portfolio there's a lot of effort that's going on right now with our fleet tech assist folks in the code 200s at the RMCs to bring them up to speed with some of the new systems that are on board the LCS's we've had really now going back almost 18 months essentially quarterly meetings with the type commanders the LCS Ron and the program office to kind of talk about maintenance bring in some of the lessons learned we're getting a lot of good feedback from the first two ships that have been deployed over to the 7th fleet and so as we start thinking about ships that may eventually get home ported over and by rain a lot of those lessons learned are kind of being rolled in so a lot of good work there but the RMCs are ready to take on the LCS and we want to make sure that we're ready to go so that's just kind of a quick snapshot of what we got going on in the surface maintenance world and with that I'll turn it over to my colleague Bruce. Thanks Bill. I'm Bruce Baff from the Coast Guard Chief Engineer and I just want to start off by thanking Admiral Hillard for letting us participate in this panel. As a smaller sea service we spent a lot of time fighting for a seat at the table and I think I almost got one today. Alright. What I want to do is just give you a quick summary of our surface recap program and take you on a tenured journey of our maturing maintenance requirements and if there's a punchline in here anywhere it's as sustainment has to start with the acquisition. It can't be an afterthought. It can't be built in later. You've got to start right at the requirements level and I'm going to show you why. I don't know why I put this picture in there other than I'm a ship driver and I think it's pretty cool. And I figured by the time we get to the end of the panel you guys would be ready for a little gratuitous violence so I throw that in there. But actually it does have pertinence to what I want to talk about because just like the Navy Coast Guard sustainers they provide continuous mission readiness. We've got 242 ships, 1,800 boats were spread throughout the country in the U.S. territory so it's really trying to corral all the cats and dogs out there. There's always a difficult problem for us but to be able to operate in these kind of conditions you need the maintenance and the dependability because they're essential readiness attributes and readiness in the worst conditions in these kind of conditions that's where we earn our pay. That's where we get paid for. When you call the Coast Guard, C-TOE has already said forget it. You're out of options. This is NSC-1, this is Berthoff in the Bering Sea going on a SAR case and I want to search and rescue here to go get somebody who obviously made some bad decisions or didn't read his weather facts or something but it can't be an afterthought because we need the durability and you can't get the durability and reliability if you don't build the maintainability into the ship. I'm going to run through a quick survey of our surface recap why it can't be an afterthought and why it's got to be in the requirements because at the end of every project when money gets tight everything's been spent except for the logistics and money. That's the only money that's still out there so that always gets dropped. That's always what gets sacrificed at the end of the project to get it done and the problem is that logistics money that's what turns a big piece of steel into a usable, sustainable, dependable asset that you can go do things like this with so let me just walk through this. Next slide please. This is our national security cutter. 418 feet long it's a program record of eight. We've got five delivered, last three under construction and we just got funded in 16 for a ninth. We're pretty happy about that. These things have been doing great. They've been bringing back over 50,000 pounds per patrol of pure uncut cocaine that's a picture in the upper corner there. That's a whole tractor trailer load full of cocaine on every patrol that they've been bringing back. That's enough to pay for a ship each time they get underway. That is just huge. This business is good. The bad news is as a father of teenagers business is good. Unfortunately that's the world we live in and these ships are actually getting at it and doing the job. So we got the operation requirements right on this. It's been doing great. When we designed this ship it was going to be 100% contractor maintenance. Coast Guard wasn't going to maintain this we were going to contract it all out so we didn't pay really as much attention to things like maintenance envelopes as we really should have and some of those maintenance envelopes that were a little tighter now was turned out we're doing the maintenance. We do contract out a lot of our maintenance but we're doing it ourselves and we're realizing boy it sure would have been better if I put that pipe over here or this over there and we'd be able to do it and even if you're contracting out it's short-sighted to say we're going to contract that because you're still going to pay for it. If maintenance is hard you're going to pay for it. If you want to maintain it's going to cost you. There's no free lunch. We should have paid better attention to that when we were putting them together. The ships are doing great. They're getting the job done but on a life cycle basis and we've all seen those curves that say the real money in the program is in the life cycle. Not in the acquisition. We should have paid a little more attention to that. Okay next slide. So that takes us to our next project our fast response cutter. It's 154 patrol boats a program record of 58. We've delivered the first 16. We've got 32 on contract and the second phase contract for the remaining 26 will be awarded later this year. These also have been operationally extremely effective. They've been working in the Caribbean. They've been very busy dealing with undocumented migrants coming up the Straits of Florida right now. We've got good maintainability on these. The injured rooms have soft patches we got the maintainability we need but we got that because we used a parent craft. We didn't really think as well as we should have about this but we got the maintenance and the maintainability because the parent craft came with it. It was already designed. It was well designed. We've got a very experienced shipbuilder that's building them. Those things are cranked into it. So we got what we needed but we kind of got there through luck. You know we didn't plan this out and think it through and guarantee it. So with a different acquisition strategy we may not have had the success that we had with this in terms of maintainability. So we said okay we got lucky but lucky is not a good long term plan. Let's improve our process. Alright so next slide. Okay so here's our offshore patrol cutter. This is 25 ships. It's our next major project. We just finished up a design competition with contract level designs. We're going to be down selecting the summer to a final builder and final design and final builder. This has gone very well. We couldn't be happier with the quality of the contract level designs. There's not a bad solution for the Coast Guard here. We just got to pick the best solution at this point and we had a good position for us to be in. When we did this one we knew what we wanted. We've been operating medium endurance cutters for a long time. We've been maintaining them. We knew we were going to maintain them ourselves. We're a learning organization. We looked at the past and said what do we do wrong. We got some things in the requirements. We were very involved in writing the RFP and the ship spec. And we put the things that we need for life cycle costs and maintainability into that spec. Based on the model that we got from NAFSE and put that together. They were very involved with the contractors and we got the maintenance envelopes into the designs and we're going to be okay here. But again this one was driven because of affordability being a focus on this acquisition and making sure that that life cycle affordability is going to be something that we can afford to sustain throughout the whole life cycle of program. But we did it in the contract. We really have it into the requirements. So again we're going to get to where we need to be but we need to take one step to the left to really make sure we're getting our requirements right in terms of sustainability and maintainability. Alright next slide please. Alright so this is our next big program. Obviously it's gotten a lot of pressure recently. The president announced in August and the last year we're going to be building some new polar class ice breakers. These are heavy ice breakers. And this one we said okay we're going to get this one right. We're doing the requirements right now. It was a big program to do the requirements. We looked at it and we said what does this ship have that's unique in terms of sustainability and maintainability requirements and it really has very unique requirements. It literally has to go through the hottest, saltiest, most open parts of the earth to get to the coldest, most inhospitable, less supported parts of the earth. It has to transit from Seattle or wherever it's at down to Antarctica. In fact the polar star right now is in doing deep freeze right now breaking out the myrtle sound. There's no contractor support down there. There's no parts down there. It's got to be self supported. You've got to have the people on board. You have the parts on board. You need the redundancy, the reliability, the dependability that this thing requires. And this is really, I mean it has to break 21 feet of ice by backing or ramming. And when you think about it you go up, you hit it, you stop. The way you fix that you back up farther is harder. 21 feet, that's a two story building that you're running into as hard as it takes to get through. That's an ex game sport for a naval architect. Those things, I mean this really is this is big steel. This has got to be able to do it down in Antarctica without throwing a blade, without having a propulsion casualty because you need all 70,000 horsepower to break that ice and then get home. Without help, without tech support, without any kind of in fact even the internet is not very good down there. It's hard to even get emails down there right now. So we just finished the requirements and we put those things right up in the requirements. Be self supporting, to have the environmental considerations. This thing is going to be working in pristine environments. It's got to winter over if necessary. You've got to have all that stuff on board. You've got to plan it out ahead of time. You can't wait until after because especially with this asset the operational performance requires those illities that come with logistics and we've got to make sure that those things compete on even footing with things like ice breaking capacity because if you can't get there and can't get back home, you've wasted all that horsepower you put into the ice breaking. So this one we got that right. The award has done the operational requirements documents done. It's moving forward and we're looking forward to a real good program with this. So that's just kind of our 10-year profile where we started from, what we learned and how we ended up. Now our logistics and our sustainment and all those illities show up in the requirements in the award so they can compete with everything else when money gets tight at the end of the project because just like everything, it'll get tight at the end. We know it, but we'll be ready for it. Thank you. Alright, give the panel members a round of applause. So that's a repentant PEO, right? Somebody who milked all that sustain money out when he was building the ships and now he's living with it. So that's good Bruce. I feel that every day. I'll just say that. So we have time for maybe 10 minutes or so of questions this morning. It took a little while to get rolling, but eventually we got at it. Anybody got some hard balls for the team here? Good. Very good. Go ahead. Hi, Chris Barrett with Delta Resources. Good afternoon. I don't know if this constitutes a hard ball, but over the course of the last three days we've heard a lot of great news about shipbuilding programs and delivery representing a wide variety of platforms and systems. So as the maintenance community continues to absorb or prepares to absorb these ships, how critical is the need for standardized configuration data and maintenance management transfer files for your planning and is there room for improvement along configuration data file standardization? That's a great question and I would say it varies fairly widely and I'll start and let other folks pile in on that. We went through a period where we were going to let contractor do all the maintenance. We gave them high level design criteria to make a whole set of decisions associated with what went on those ships. And of course I think just like the Coast Guard has experienced, when we start maintaining this, we'll struggle with that and wish we'd bought more of it. I would say the ships that we're most familiar with, the Virginia class, the DDG51 class, I would say we're continuing to progress the shipbuilders most of them have moved to new product data models. Our goal is to go have us be able to take the data models and bring them over to the maintenance side and a lot of work going on in that. That's really tough sledding but it is on our radar screen. I don't know anybody else want to take a stab at that? Billy, maybe you have a thought on that? The thing that I would add is the drawings are important. I think we generally can get those either from the building or the planning yard. What I tend to think is even more important is having the right technical documentation in terms of tech manuals and then really it's parts and I'll tell you what I see anyway is the availability of parts. We don't keep as many parts certainly on board the ships that we used to. We don't keep as many parts in the supply system whether that's the fleet logistic centers or DLA so often we're going back out to the OEM and they don't sometimes keep all the parts on the shelf either. From a logistic standpoint drawings, I don't know that we're having too many problems with the drawings. It's more kind of the technical documentation in the parts issue. Chris, I think that's huge and that's been a big problem for us because we used to not specify the formats that we wanted that in and so we ended up with all kinds of different things. What we've done is we have standardized it and we're putting it in the RFP. We're putting in any requirements not every ship that are like that because then they have to maybe change their file to meet our needs but then what that gives us is the ships in the fleet have the same standards, have the same standard maintenance procedure cards, the same technical data at least has the same look and feel so when we send a crew member from one ship to another it's not the engine just maybe bigger or smaller but as far as the manuals and the technical data and what they need to sustain that ship is the same so it helps us on the training side quite a bit. Great question, that's a pretty tough one. Mark Vanderof, is that Mark Vanderof? It is, it is. Admiral Galenis, so you mentioned 443. And so I think it was this year, it might have been just last year, that saw the reorganization within C21 where we created 407 and 443. So I've got a question for you that I struggle with that I'd like you to publicly opine on and that is who is in charge of a class of ship anymore? We now have modernization across all the surface fleet grouped in 407. Do we not care that there's issues handled class by class and we would rather handle it by functional activity or is there someone in charge of the Navy's cruisers or LSD's or do we not care about that? Because we used to care and now it seems like in the current organization we don't anymore. We build them by class but we don't take care of them by class anymore. So why? That's my question for you sir. That's a good question. So the short answer to your question Mark is yes. Yes we do care about the class and yes we do have organizations within 443 that manage class so we have class maintenance teams within 443. What I would tell you is really and we're looking at this now and we had this discussion last week actually about how robust and how well staffed are the class maintenance teams and do we have the right people on each one. So you should be for the DDG 51 class you could go to the DDG 51 class maintenance team within 443 and they ought to be able to answer your question. Now I'm not sure that frankly we're there yet. I think the reorganization that was done in C21 a year or so ago I think it was done for the right reasons and I think it is the right organization. We've kind of taken on the maintenance and modernization piece kind of the best of breed if you will between the old 400F and the 470 organization and kind of pulled those together and you know Captain Zobel, Ted Zobel is doing a lot to kind of standardize that process across the enterprise. Tim Crone is kind of doing the same thing within the sustainment and the readiness piece in 443 and so those teams do exist and then frankly even on the modernization piece there's a parallel organization a class organization within 407 okay so we've almost got like two parallel organizations there's a sustainment piece and then a modernization piece but those organizations do exist and again I would just offer we need to do a better job of advertising that and what services we can provide and being I'll say on our side maybe a little bit more proactive in going after issues to go solve them. I'll say that there was a lot of skepticism about my plan to combine CNRMC and C21. The first storming meeting I'll never forget stand in front of the 4RMC commanders and the program managers in C21 there were some slings and arrows in the arrows I recall what we did is we locked them in a room we burned the bridge behind them tossed pizzas under the door until they came up with the structure that we thought would work it is a work in progress it's the kind of thing that's got to adjust to the differences in the classes again the DDG 51 class fairly well supported by planning our services and things from the bill yards as Bill begins to bring the LCS and 505 to that you're going to have a completely different set of structures there. It is also a NAVC wide team sport the CO5 ship design managers the warfare center and service agents it's not as clean as there was a type desk with 100 people who knew everything about the class it will never be that clean but I think the organizational place is about right and I think I know who's going to do the next review that to help us come up with a better structure start Monday that's great I think I got time for one more question thank you so much for offering enough. Yes sir. Commander Stephen Melvin long time listener first time caller. It's been about 10 years since we stood up the Surge main program to kind of take some of the spikiness out of those graphs y'all were talking about but based on your discussion today it sounds like we're still having some spiky graph issues do y'all have any plans to expand or enhance that program at all to help maybe take some of the load off of industry move it over to your reserve component or can you just speak to that please. Surge main from my view and I didn't know a lot about it till I became the commander is one of those wild successes that I probably am guilty of not talking about enough across the public shipyards and regional maintenance centers last year 15 almost 1600 man days I think that was the that was man days of work that was timely work parachuted into the middle of a big predominantly done out of the reserve component the only problem with Surge main really is the amount that we're ever going to get out of it when you compare that against the number of man days and the totality of both the public shipyards and the RMCs it doesn't get very big but what's best about it is that you can put it in at just the right time and I give Surge main leadership a lot of credit for having aligned those reservists such that when we snap our fingers and say okay we need a team of 40 guys on the bush, on the midger, on whatever ship we need generally they can produce the right set of skills at the right time to go really help us out. Probably the perfect use of reserve sailors and has created in the reserve component an entire cadre of ship engineers you know the mechanics and electricians and stuff who are available for that very bad day when we have to activate them all and bring them into the active force so a tremendous success and my hats off to all the Surge main leadership for having made that possible. Everybody else got a Surge main story that's worth great thanks for asking that question and I know Admiral Braun talks about Surge main all the time as they reserve just celebrated their 100th anniversary. She sees that as one of the big successes of this year. Well thank you all very much for your attention and we'll see you around SNA. Thanks.