 Well, there's a few words here, first of all, tomorrow I'm going to go to New York to participate in the U.N. 40 anniversary celebration. We think it's a pretty good opportunity for getting our vision of world peace. The U.N. plus world leaders, the President of New York, scheduled includes the anniversary of a major speech on Thursday, and then I'm going to have a lot of bilateral meetings and a meeting with the summit leaders, the economic summit that we have every year where we're going to be there, one missing, to meet around it. And I'll also be meeting with Svia and Prime Minister Gandhi, and this will probably be the most significant meetings to try and reconcile those two and get them back on track of getting together in his evidence that that can be done. You heard me say on a number of occasions that the new Soviet leadership has demonstrated a more polished, public style, but we have yet to see a lot of fundamental positions, but I'm going to do my best to create a more constructive relationship and to reduce nuclear arsonists. And I'm not going to limit my discussions with Gorduchov to arms and foe. We'll address the fundamental differences between our two countries, which are the reason for the military expenditures. Human rights, bilateral contacts, and Soviet expansionism in the third world. But let me also say, I'm not going there with anything in mind of making any concessions just for the sake of getting an agreement. It isn't good for the United States. It ain't going to be made. I don't really have any expectations that he has any different philosophy than that that has characterized the Soviet policy for all these years, but we've tried to show them that it is worthwhile for them for their own interests and he is part way on that. In that address on Thursday with the UN, I'm going to highlight the Soviet role in reaching conflicts and what we might be able to do about those conflicts. They're all wars between the Marxist, Lenin regimes and their people. They all follow major outside roles in all of the threatened neighbors. And we'll call attention to that pattern and see if we can't break it. And I'll suggest specific ways of resolving these conflicts. Based on past experience, we have no reason to expect the Soviets to cooperate. Do you think it's worth it? And before calling on George, I'd like to point out that his resolve has sent an ease to action to extend and expand the state of emergency in Nicaragua. The few existing civil liberties in that country, you know, have been suspended now. Not only civil liberties have been crushed, but we're seeing increased Cuban military involvement in Nicaragua. To their credit, and to my surprise, both the New York Times and the Washington Post spoke our forcefully against these threats. I think I watch it, but it's when they begin to sound friendly. And because of these actions, I'm asking for this, I'm asking you to make every effort to adopt without change. The Senate version of the Fiscal Year 86 Intelligence Authorization Act and the Fiscal Year 86 Defense Appropriations Act. The CNA should be able to provide non-lethal support to include air transportation, communications, quartermaster supplies, and other equipment of a non-lethal nature. We should also be able to provide advice and share intelligence to coordinate third country assistance. We need your help and advice on this now. And now I'm going to ask George Shostakov in the events coming up in New York. I'm here for the equivalent of two days. I have seven bilaterals and four, what we call mini-bilaterals. Give a speech and appear on various occasions with some of the allies. It's going to be a busy time, but I think it'll set. Next to us. Next to us. It's just a present. I presented my vision and hope for a future in which nations could live and secure in the knowledge that their national security didn't rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation but rather on the ability to defend against potential attacks. And the fundamental purpose of the SDI is to determine whether and if and so how advanced defensive technologies could contribute to the realization of this vision that all started right around this table. It's when Chiefs of Staff and a number of others, I pointed out that there had never been a weapon in the history of man that hadn't led to a defensive weapon. Why had we started to do something about that? I think it's an objective that's worthy of our nation and a goal that I intend this nation to pursue with all deliverance fee. At the same time, to our credit, we're a nation which respects law and meets its commitments. When we embarked on our SDI research, I made the commitment that this research would be conducted in full compliance with all our legal treaty obligations. And I directed from its inception this program to find that commitment. Well, recently we re-examined the ABM Treaty of 72 with the Associated Negotiating Record in Great detail. And the process that gained new insights into how this treaty can objectively be interpreted. This, however, does not signal any lessening and resolve if this nation will remain in full conformity with its treaty obligations. Our recent legal analyses have led me to believe that the ambiguities that are involved could permit the technical legal debate to be taken. But initially, the initial assertions that remained 1972 and about what the ABM Treaty restricts concerning advanced defensive technologies were in fact unilateral and were resisted by the Soviet Union. They were not clearly demonstrated in the terms of the treaty as written on the Associated Negotiating Record. Such unilateral U.S. assertions reflected more the U.S. hopes of that time about what could result from the treaty, as made then in the context of our assumptions about the future. Then an objective assessment of what had actually been achieved and mutually agreed by the signed treaty document. Our technical community has fully met my guidance and designed the SDI research program to conform to a more restrictive view of the U.S. ABM Treaty obligations. But as long as the SDI program receives the support needed to implement its character-crafted plan, it's not necessary to authorize the restructuring of the SDI program toward the wider boundaries of treaty interpretation, which we could observe. This being the case, the issue of where exactly these boundaries should lie is moved even though in my judgment, a broader interpretation of our authority is fully justified. The U.S. SDI program will continue to pursue the course currently settled on my previous guidance. And under this course, there can be absolutely no doubt that the U.S. intention to meet fully its treaty commitments. As we do so, we'll continue to insist that the Soviet Union correct its behavior and come into full compliance with its obligations, especially in those cases like construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar and their telemetry encryption, among others in which there are no grounds for doubt in compliance. In sharp contrast to Soviet behavior, our clear and principled restraint of respect to our own SDI program demonstrates by our deeds our sincerity toward negotiated treaties. I can envision that in the future, the day will come when our research will have answered the questions that are necessary to permit us to consider going beyond the restrictions that we have and will continue to observe under the current research program. At that time, based upon the conditions that we and our allies face and the behavior of the Soviet Union in the interim, the United States will have the opportunity to reassess the guidance that I have issued based on this decision. And in order to carry out this policy, which reflects both our determination to achieve the goals we set for SDI, while demonstrating by our deeds our commitment to meet treaty obligations, I need your help in two ways. First, I need your support in fueling and funding the SDI program and fueling is not a bad word, as I had requested. I can't implement this policy of pursuing the current care-free craft program if you don't appropriate the funds for me to do so. Second, I ask you to resist additional legislative restraints on the conduct of the program. Such restraints establish a clear double standard under which the U.S. actions in this critical area would be legally constrained by our own legislative action, not by the ABM Treaty, while those of the Soviet are not. Such unilateral restraints would be extremely damaging to our national interests and I must encourage you in the strongest possible way not to tie our hands. Now, I may have a few questions or so, but I know that my time here is limited, so I'm going to speak to you about this subject, but anyone has a question? Yes, Mr. President. If you were to pose that presentation, which was simply identical to the one that you yourself have imposed in terms of the more restrictive interpretation. Well, I think so because, as I say, we believe very strongly that the wider interpretation is perfectly possible under the program and there will come a point if our research is successful as it gives every indication it's going to be within the number of breaks, but weirdly needed to show the world a defensive weapon that can come close to rendering non-Sovietive, not actually rendering non-Sovietive, nuclear offensive weapons, that this then we come to a point with regard to deployment and so forth. Now, we have some plans about that also. The day comes that we have such a weapon. I believe that is the day that we should seriously consider saying to the world, here it is. This is the thing we can all have now and make sure that no madman down the line in the future because, you know, we can't take up on minds the fact that we know how to make these things. Somebody, someplace in the world, would decide to do this. And it's a little bit like 1925 when we outlawed poison gas. Everybody kept their gaspists. This President appropriation limitation would just be for one year, so if an appropriation limitation would just be for one year, so we would conclude the decision that the program would move along.