 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. If you take your seats, we'll begin in just a moment. Thank you. Good morning. I'm Steve Morrison, Vice President here at CSIS and head of the Global Health Policy Center. And on behalf of Dr. Hamry and my colleagues here at CSIS, welcome to the second seminar on our US-Swiss dialogue series. I'd like to extend a warm welcome and a special thank you to Ambassador Urs Ziswiller, who will speak in a moment. And his colleagues at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, who's generously provided the support for this program here today. Also want to thank, particularly thank my colleagues, Heather Conley and Jennifer Cook and Richard Downey, for putting this all together. As we look back, I understand this program today is intended to really look back and look forward, with the pivot being the CPA, the Comprehensive Peace Accord. Just a few points of background that are relevant to today. We have brought together many of the key personalities who persevered throughout this period in putting the pieces together for that. And I think that's quite remarkable. Jennifer will introduce General Simbeiwo in a moment, who presided over this process of negotiations, which was an arduous extended period of negotiations. It actually succeeded in the intense period of was about 30 months, which, given the complexity, the length of the war and the complexity of the accord was actually quite a remarkable achievement. It probably didn't feel like it was quick to those who lived through it. We also have with us a number of the other personalities who were part of this. Susan Page is with us from the State Department. Today, Nick Hasem. They were together in Machakos and the other venues of these negotiations. Charlie Snyder, Tim Carney, many of the people who lived through this period and pushed it forward. And I think they deserve an enormous amount of credit and gratitude from us all for the work that they put into this. It's important to remember that this process sort of got kicked off just five days before 9-11 here in Washington when then-President Bush appointed on the White House lawn Senator Danforth as the envoy for the Sudan peace talks. It was a beautiful fall day, and many of the people in this room were present when that happened. And Senator Danforth and Charlie Snyder and Bob Oakley and others began a process, a quite intense process that stretched into April-May of the following year of trying to test the parties to come back to President Bush and Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice with an answer to the question of whether the parties themselves were really, truly prepared to engage in a process that had as its objective a negotiated settlement to the war. And one of the first tests, there were four tests that were pursued, but one of the first tests was the Nuba Mountain ceasefire agreement, which was concluded in January of 2002. And that's where the Swiss came in. It was a US Swiss team that mediated that agreement, that ceasefire agreement within the Nuba Mountains, which remains a flash point in a particularly sensitive area within Sudan in the transition area. To this day, that was concluded in Bergenstock. The parties signed it into force, and we were very proud, those of us observing this process, that the US was able to partner with the Swiss government in getting through that test. And that proved to be terribly important in building confidence looking forward. Because when the Bush administration then deliberated in the spring about whether to move forward, the answer was affirmative, that this was an effort that deserved a strong commitment. And I think if that decision had gone another way, we wouldn't be here today having this conversation. And so looking back, that Bergenstock agreement was very, very important. That period was one where we really moved to a focus on pragmatism and engagement. It was a turning point away from the focus in the late 90s on condemnation and isolation and resort to war or armed threats as a way of trying to resolve this. It was a period in which the Eritrea-Ethiopia War, which had huge consequences within the region, was still winding its way down. The DRC wars, multiple wars, were still very much with us. 9-11 became terribly important also in retrospect in boosting leverage and focus, particularly boosting the pressures upon cartoon coming from Washington and elsewhere. And I don't think we can underestimate the degree to which that bump up contributed to creating momentum leading up to the 05 Accord. We'll hear a lot today about the details of what was postponed in terms of decisions and preparations and the like, and what was not postponed in the strategy of engagement and the strategy of enticing these parties and testing them and putting back upon the parties the ultimate responsibility of making this a success. We've had a lot of experience the last five years, a lot of frustration among the parties. We've seen a remarkable durability and longevity of the government and cartoon, even under the stresses of the ICC and the condemnations that have come over Darfur. We've seen the rising strategic asset of oil, the rising alliance with China, the spread of new actors, the UN effort, the AU effort. We'll hear more about that. And of course, now we're facing the prospect of great uncertainty and anxiety around what the future will look like and what the end game, or if there will be an end game, what it might look like. And we'll hear about the good, the bad, and the ugly as one of my friends here this morning described the options that lie ahead as we move towards 2011. So those are just a couple of brief introductory framing remarks. I congratulate all of you for this. And again, thanks, very special thanks to the Swiss government. I'd like to introduce the ambassador to say a few opening remarks. And then Jennifer will introduce our keynote speaker, General Simbe. Thank you all. Thank you, Stephen, for your kind words towards my government. Let me start by welcoming all of you here. Thank you for coming. And special thanks go to CIS as our partner. It's always wonderful to cooperate with you. And I hope that we have many other such events ahead of us. A thank goes also to my own team, Guillaume and Simon, who are both in the room somewhere there to the right for having organized this day. In our view, the coming months will be critical in determining Sudan's future. So I'm more than happy to have a number of excellent experts here today to speak about Sudan. Some of the names are already mentioned. I will come back to it. Thank you, General, that you found time to join us today and all other experts. I would like not going into Sudan immediately, but say a few words about Switzerland and its mediation efforts around the world. It's probably one of the few countries who has in its constitution a sentence which says that the promotion of peace is the duty of the country. And therefore, it's one of our goals in foreign policy. And we believe that mediation is one of the most effective tools to achieve that goal. Therefore, my own ministry is directly or indirectly engaged in a quite impressive number of peace negotiation processes. Let me give you a few examples. We have mediated in a traditional classic form between Turkey and Armenia. Our state secretary traveled from capital to capital, brought people together, organizing meetings for both parties, making also proposals, presenting ideas how he could come closer. And finally, the two parties met in Zurich and signed an agreement. Unfortunately, it's still not implemented, but that's also one of the problems you have in mediation. You have to be patient, and you have to have sometimes long periods of time ahead of you. Another example is Nepal, but that was another kind of mediation. A Swiss mediator worked absolutely behind the scenes, assisting local mediators, acting as go between the Maoist movement and political parties, arranging their first meeting in India and providing advice for the formulation of the peace agreement. And so far so good, it still holds. It's certainly not what we, at the end of the day, expected. But again, we have to be patient. A third example is when Swiss experts on mediation supported the movements of Papua with capacity building workshops and on negotiations, mediation, designing of peace processes and the topics of power. And well-sharing. And last but certainly not least, we were, since many, many years, very active in the Middle East. We had one of our seminars here on that subject. And maybe the most evident or most known effort of ours was the Geneva Initiative. And I was happily, myself, quite a bit involved in that. We had two goals with the Geneva Initiatives. Very often, wrongly understood by politicians and by the medias. We had two goals. First, we wanted to prove that they are on both sides, still important people who really are ready to sit together and hammer out a peace agreement. And second, we wanted to create a document of reference which, in any future peace talks and negotiations, will serve as a reference document. And if you look now at the direct talks going on, almost every day the Geneva Initiative is quoted. And I am personally convinced, if there will be a two-state solution in the Middle East, it will be plus minus 5%, 10% Geneva. These are a few examples of our more bilateral peace efforts and mediation efforts. But of course, we are also supporting the United Nations, often the main mediator in situations of violent conflicts. We support the Department of Political Affairs and its mediation support unit with funds and personnel. Then we recognize the need to support the expertise of regional organizations. And this effort we are talking about today is a wonderful example for that. Intergovernmental authority on development is one of the organizations we are supporting, and we will certainly hear a lot of them later on. Finally, Switzerland is supporting and closely cooperating also with the NGO world specialized in the field of mediation. We are actively supporting the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, the mediation activities of Kofi Annan, but many, many other NGOs active in peace efforts and mediation are supported by us, be it by personnel or with financial support. Mediation is highly relevant for Sudan. Sudan, as we all know, has had a challenging history since its independence. And Stephen already mentioned the ceasefire agreement at Bürgenstock, Switzerland, where I had the pleasure to be present with my minister at the time to sign that agreement. And it was mentioned as probably the beginning of many other efforts and signing ceremonies. And we will hear today that we are still not yet at the end of our efforts, pains, or whatever you name them. I'm sure there will be several words used for that. Sudan is, therefore, a very good example of my country's engagement in the field of mediation, especially in supporting the expertise of regional organizations. We have substantial commitments to Sudan. It is one of our focus country for our peacebuilding operations. At present, we are involved in various projects, including peacebuilding, promotion of human rights, humanitarian relief, security sector reform, and demining. And we are supportive of the UN agencies on site. But it's not up to me. We have excellent experts here, not only on the panels, which we'll follow, but also in the hall. And, therefore, I would like to stop here and hand over to the keynote speakers. And I'm very happy to have General Subaibo here, who will be introduced by somebody from the CSIS, from Jeffrey. Please. Thank you very much, again, for being here, and have a great morning. Good morning, everyone, and welcome. George Bernard Shaw wrote that peace is not only better than war, it's infinitely more arduous. And it's a pleasure, therefore, and an honor today to introduce General Lazarus Subaibo, who, as I expect all of you know, played such a critical role in shepherding the parties to the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the SPLA, and the government in Khartoum, really to the first critical step in that arduous process. And I think we'll hear, perhaps in the second panel, how that process goes on and will continue to go on, I think, over several years, in fact, ahead of us. General Subaibo served as the chief mediator of the Sudanese peace process under the auspices of EGAD, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. At the request of President Daniel Eropmoy, he left his post as Army Commander in Kenya in 2000 to take up this position of mediator in a conflict, really, that had racked Sudan, essentially, since independence, and that many, I think, in the broader international community in 2000, at least, thought of as hopelessly intractable. So I'm not sure, and perhaps General Subaibo can comment whether he considered this a promotion, but he certainly rose to the challenge, and as we all know today. General Subaibo came to the process at a moment in which both North and South, I think, were exhausted from war. Neither side really had any realistic prospect of an eventual outright victory, and I think there was increasing recognition of that. The international community, particularly the United States, as Steve mentioned, was cautiously considering a different tack on Sudan, moving towards more robust engagement with both sides in partnership with Atroika of Partners, the UK, Norway, really in support of an EGAD process. Although the EGAD process really had been somewhat more abundant throughout the 1990s, so there was a lot of skepticism around that. So in some ways, it was a moment of opportunity, but I think a very fragile one given the level of mistrust between the two parties and a history of failed agreements. So into that atmosphere, General Subaibo, really with remarkable patience and a very principled approach, was able to cajole, encourage, and inspire the two parties to move from the declaration of principles that had lain on paper for a decade or six years or so to the Machakos protocol, to the memorandum of understanding and ultimately to the signing of the CPA in January 9, 2005. I think from the very get-go, he made very clear to the parties that he was not a proxy for external interests. He was incredibly patient in listening to the concerns and aspirations of both sides. As a military man, I think he won the respect of the parties in the conflict, but also the observers and I think in a number of instances put them in their place as well. He was insistent to the Troika and the broader community that this was going to be a Sudanese process and ultimately that the Sudanese held the reins, were responsible for the outcomes, and that the timetable would be theirs. So he very, I think, pushed back really on the tendency for external mediators to rush the process to a final signature and just get the thing done with. So I won't keep this long. This is a person of remarkable patience with a very strong sense of ethical purpose and mission and energy. Just on a personal note, during that period, General Sunbewo came to Washington for a couple of weeks and I heard he did these early morning walks and I thought how nice it would be to join this elder statesman for a nice stroll around the Washington Monuments. Well, two hours and 10 miles later in 15 degree weather, I was completely exhausted and ready for a nap. The general went on to a full day of talks and affairs. So I got some sense of the energy that he brings to all his endeavors. He is officially now retired, but as he said last night, he considers retired to mean that he has new tires and he's ready to go. Most recently, he's been engaged with President Obasanjo in the Congo, and I'm sure we haven't heard the last of you on the international scene, General Sunbewo. Welcome to CSIS. We're delighted to have you here. The general will speak and we'll open up for questions and then turn to a panel. Thanks. Why are you talking about me? CSIS directors and the staff, Swiss representatives, United States of America representatives, participants, members of the media, my colleagues who suffered with me for 30 months, ladies and gentlemen. I thank God for enabling me to be here today. And so I'm pleased to be among us here to discuss this very important topic on the prospects for referendum in Sudan. It is indeed something that requires the attention of stakeholders involved in the peace process and the implementation of the CPA. Today is exactly 92 days to go before the people of southern Sudan exercise the right of self-determination in a referendum that forms part of the CPA. The road to the achievement of the CPA was bumpy, and the road to the referendum, or rather a referendum, as there is a bare referendum, is more challenging, has been more challenging. The implementation of the CPA itself, we may be aware that the CPA was not a perfect document, but it was the best under the circumstances that we operated in, taking into account that Sudan civil war had been running for several years, and the issues under dispute were of complex nature. I know many people have criticized the CPA. It is not comprehensive enough. It is not inclusive. It is not, we did not take into consideration many aspects that needed to have been taken into consideration. We agree. It's not perfect, but it managed to stop the war. And so at least we should get that credit that the war stopped, and it is still, the war hasn't erupted yet. The accord signed by both the North and the Southern Sudan, that is the then government of Sudan, which basically was represented by the National Congress Party and the SPLM representing the Southerners, therefore provided the best way out of the 21-year war, although others hoped that it will also translate into democratization of the Sudan. This, however, many would argue that it has not been achieved. I believe if I read it right, the international community at the time wanted to get in to the agreement, phrases, clauses, sections that would eventually help the Sudan to democratize. Unfortunately, they have fallen by the wayside. They have not been impressed. They have not been adopted. And so I believe this has to be, I'm not asking that we go to the table to redraw things, but I think it needs to be re-looked at. The regional, particularly EGAT subcommittee on Sudan, who facilitated the achievement of the CBA with the support of the international community for the first three years of the signing of the agreement abandoned the process completely and abandoned the parties. What happened is that after signing the agreement, everybody said, hallelujah, hello Akbar, let's go. And everybody went to Darfur, forgetting that the parties had been fighting for over 21 years and they needed to be shepherded. It was with the assistance of the American government coming in at the right time when the then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had to come to Addis Ababa to implore the SBLM to resume their engagement with the National Congress Party in the government of national unity. There are a number of things that stand out as the main challenges in the implementation of the CBA. One, the border demarcation. And I want to explain a little bit about this border demarcation. In 1998, on the 7th of August, we made an agreement in Addis Ababa that this border was going to be the 1956 boundary at independence. I know this very well because it was the first, it was the day that the American Embassy in Nairobi was bombed. And I was in Addis Ababa, I was signing this agreement saying we have agreed that the border was going to be. But you must understand that from the National Congress Party, from the Northern Party, that it is not easy to demarcate a border, to go and say we are demarcating a border. One message are you sending out to the rest of the world and to the rest of the South and to the rest of your constituency. You are saying this is the border, you can go. And that's not what it was meant. That was not what the CBA meant. The CBA encouraged unity. It says it will give a chance to unity, although nobody gives a chance to unity. So that's one of the challenges that has remained and continually to remain. And it's not going to be easy because as soon as you start demarcating the border, you are sending a message to both sides, a different message. Second challenge is the preparation for the referendum. Again, it's been slow. One message would you be sending. As soon as you start putting in place that the referendum is going to take place. Referendum in Sudan doesn't mean the consultation of the people. It means something different. This is what I learned. And my colleagues will bear me out. In Ivashia, when you talk about referendum, you are talking about something else. Lack of political will. There's been a lack of political will. And especially from the National Congress Party. And you can understand why. The conflict areas of southern Kodafan, that's the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and Abye. These areas have a problem. It's they are at Kite 22. There are countries that are in there. There are areas that are in the north. They were fighting with the SPLM or SPLA. And so they are in a position where the challenge is, if the South succeeds and goes, what happens to us who are in those areas? That's the questions they are asking themselves. And so it's a challenge. There's been a problem with well-sharing. To this day, it's only from outside us. It's not from the Sudanese themselves who are saying, this is the amount of oil we are getting from this well. And this is the amount of oil that we are selling. And this is the oil that we are processing. There hasn't been an open explanation as to what's happening with the oil revenue. And the Southerners have not been able to account for the money that they have received. They have received the money, whether they go into the people's pockets, whether this goes into what. I think the only thing that I have really seen come out very well in the south is tamaking of roads or some roads in Nuba. Lack of institutional capacity. If you tell SPLM you have no institutional capacity, they will not agree with you. But they have a problem. They have a problem they do not. They have never run a system before. They have never run systems before. They ran war. They continued running war within. And so they are lacking institutions. And they are talking about having a government of southern Sudan. They are having state governments. They are having provinces. I think they are in wars. But they are not there on the ground. And the people from the NGO world will bear me out on this. I think the biggest challenge has been there are full conflict and the handling of it by the government of Sudan and the international community. You should share the international community. You should share the responsibility for really creating this challenge. Ladies and gentlemen, the prospects of the referendum. In discussing the prospects of referendum, it is vital that we look at the moments leading up to it, especially in the last one year. The parties themselves have been pulling and pushing. One party accusing the other of sabotaging, while the other accuses one of rushing through without due care of the provisions within the CBA. The arrest warrant issued by the ICC against President al-Bashir, which still stands, even after being reelected, has created tension in the country. The tension has translated in developing defensive mechanisms by the North and the National Congress Party especially. Some African Union countries have also taken different positions regarding the ICC issue and even the referendum. The region on the other hand has had different perspectives of the final product of the referendum. They have therefore been sending conflicting signals to the parties. The witnesses to the CBA and there are very many have also not been pressurizing enough the parties to move forward in a direction that will produce positive and sustainable results. In the last one year and more recently in various fora, the realization has come to all that the interim period is soon to come to an end. The EGAD, the Africa Union, the Arab League, the European Union, the Troika, and the United Nations seem to now pay more attention than in the previous years following the signing of the CBA. EGAD called the summit early this year to look at the implementation of the CBA and to evaluate its progress. And they assure the parties that they will support them as they overcome their outstanding issues. I doubt. Recently, on 24th of last month, September 2010, at the margins of the General Assembly of the United Nations, a Sudan High-Level Forum was held. And a strong communique was issued jointly by the parties under Security Council, affirming that the referendum will take place on 9th January 2011, without fail, and committed themselves to organize and support it. The initial challenges of setting up both South Sudan referendum commission and ABA referendum commission seem to have been overcome at that meeting. However, I think today the ABA referendum commission has not been established. A UN Security Council in Sudan this week will confirm that the Sudanese are either ready or not ready to cross this milestone. Ladies and gentlemen, preparations for the referendum. With only three months left before the referendum, the preparations needed to have been at an advanced stage. The people of the Sudan need to be sensitized on the importance of the referendum, as well as the consequences of the outcome. It is important that the exercise is conducted peacefully and that the people are able to accept either of the outcomes. The referendum law is clear in accordance with the CBA, but the National Congress Party has been unwilling to put in place the mechanism to provide for a free and fair referendum. The registration of voters have not started. The commissions to oversee the referendum have yet to be established. Marges needed to be done in order to achieve acceptable results of a free and fair referendum. There is also need to commence the training of the officials who will oversee the process. To this end, financial and technical support from the international community will be of significant assistance, sending impartial missions of servers during the process will also be vital because they will reduce the chances of an unfair process for all the parties involved. Post-referenda period. The outcome of the referendum will greatly change the future of Sudan and also have an impact on the region. The expectations from the Sudan, however, will be to maintain peace before and after the referendum. The outcome of the referendum, unity or cessation, need to be discussed by the parties before the outcome is known so that the parties can separately negotiate options of their relationships in critical areas of civilized integration which is unity or separation in the event of the outcome of cessation. Citizenship after the referendum in case of cessation, economic cooperation both rely heavily and especially the Sudanese rely heavily on the oil revenues in order for them to run institutions. Border issues including transit communities for pastures and water. These were discussed very, very at length and it took us quite a number of sessions to discuss the traversing of the nomadic tribes which have been doing it for over 400 years or so, criss-crossing in summer and winter, the borders for water and pasture. And this needs to be put in place. There are people, civil servants, who are serving in the Sudan. What happens? Where are they going? What is going to happen to them? There are politicians both in the north and in the south of different colors and shades. They need to discuss about that. The paramount reason as to why there needs to be discussions on these items is because there is a risk that there could be the same factors that could be the cause of conflict should the outcome not favor one of the parties. The region has a stake in the outcome of the referendum, especially the north-south referendum. EGAR subcommittee chairman has promised to call for a meeting in November 2011 to harmonize the regional position during and after the referendum. Needless to say that the hope for the region members is peace and prosperity for the Sudan and the region as large. Ladies and gentlemen, in conclusion, you will agree with me that the achievement of the CPA was monumental task, and its implementation was even more complex and difficult, having several challenges, some of which have not completely been overcome. The excitement of the Southerners is a desire's point to achieve what they have not achieved in over 60 years. CARE must be taken in the preparation and the actual referendum in order to avoid return to conflict. The conflict areas remain equally a source of concern for both the north and south Sudan, especially if the Southerners vote for cessation. Serious preparations for post-referendum period should be undertaken now by the parties with the assistance of all the witnesses and the people of goodwill to avoid protracted negotiations that will lead to further tension. Territorics coming out of both Khartoum and Juba should be avoided for the sake of peace in Sudan and the region. Ladies and gentlemen, many of us here were involved in the process towards the CPA, and we must therefore, where possible, see to it that its implementation to the letter because in actual fact, we are carpenters of the agreement and know the insights that lead to it, led to its signing. We therefore owe it to the people of Sudan. Thank you. General Subewo, thanks so much for really laying out the past but also laying out very clearly the challenges of the future. And I think we get a sense from you, from your talk, really, of what made you such an excellent mediator in this, in terms of challenging both parties and the international community and calling things as you see them, which are very valuable. Let's open up for, we'll take a few questions at a time for the general. We'll do about seven minutes, I think, to get on with the next panel. But we'll start, then, with Ni Aqwete. Ni, the microphone's coming. Please identify yourself. Yes, thank you very much. My name is Ni Aqwete. I work with a group here called ADNA, and we focus on African issues. General, you mentioned the question of some of the, what EGOT states, how they look at the Sudanese situation, as well as some of the other countries outside of EGOT. So my question is given that the African countries have different views of what should happen. I have heard from other places that some say, look, we don't support this because we all have our southern Sudanese. And if this happens, what's going to happen with parts of our countries want to secede? Given your very special work and role, looking at both sides, what advice do you have for the continent in general? Do we support what is, in effect, a peaceful divorce from a bad marriage? Or do we say that this will set a very bad precedent of secession in other countries? So where should African countries, what kind of position should they take? What is your advice? Thank you. Ski with our humanity and the balance. Oh, sorry. Sorry about that. I'm curious if you could speak to Meryl Zendarski. Yes, with our humanity and the balance. I'm wondering if you could speak to, in your opinion, if the referendum has a destabilizing effect in Sudan, how you think that might affect regional issues, specifically with the LRA and with the ongoing conflict in the Congo? My name is Erwa. I'm a journalist and a political minister in Sudan. Taking into consideration that we cannot or should not dishonor the CPA, which has topped the war. But I read yesterday a pessimistic article, Mr. Nicholas. You remember him? Nicholas Christopher, very pessimistic article. Taking into consideration this, don't you think that we're making the same mistake as during the Meryl regime at this above accord, 1972, 1982? They're the one-man show, Mr. Mery. And then now is the one-party show, this NCPA. Could we make a compressive peace solution for the whole Sudan? Because if it's not accommodated, then, therefore, accommodated other parties in this CPA, maybe we can make the same mistake as 1982, the collapse of this above accord. How do you think? Thank you. From the Royal Military College of Canada. Sir, I would like to ask you, what do the North and the South agree on if, in fact, the mandate to separate happened? Thank you. Thank you very much. There isn't a major deviation between the countries of EGAT and the countries, the other countries of Africa. I think they are about 50-50 each. They have views of difference of what would the referendum, if in the event that the Southern had secede, what would it cause in the region and beyond? I think if the two parties agreed, the way the Ethiopians and Eritreans agreed to divorce and yet they went back to war, it is not, you cannot give up a marriage. If the marriage is not performing, you cannot give it by force. You cannot continually, if the parties decide that this marriage, we have to go to court or we have to call the elders to dissolve it, then dissolve it. You can continually make people stick together even when they don't want to stick together, just because you want to maintain boundaries that were drawn in Berlin in 1895. It's going to affect very many countries in Africa. It's not only Sudan. Congo is in the line. Possibly Kenya and Tanzania are also on the line. Other countries are in the line. But it is because you have to recognize that you cannot mix water and oil and call it just liquid because they are different. Each one has different properties. So let's do it harmoniously. And it is better if the parties are involved themselves rather than trying to impose from externally saying, no, we have to do this because if we do it, others will be affected. And so why didn't we ask questions when Yugoslavia broke down into various countries? They were accepted. Some of them are already in the European Union. I think we, and this was this, if people, in fact, the African ones did not come by agreement. They were imposed upon. Communities were cut into various groups. So I think that's my take. Merrill speak to, in opinion, the referendum is an destabilizing effect. I don't think so. If it was properly organized, properly, because it is something that was accepted, that the southern Sudanese will exercise their right of self-determination through a referendum, why should it be a destabilizing fact? It shouldn't be. It should, if it is properly organized, if it is disorganized, then it becomes a problem. So the parties must understand that it is good to organize. To give you an example, we had very shambolic elections in 2007 in Kenya, and it costed the lives of over 1,000 people. We had a referendum recently, well organized. Not a single life was lost. And it was more contentious than the elections. How do we go so that this is a rua? How can we go so that the seabed cannot be dishonored? This thing has been lingering in my mind all along, after Numeri, through the Adisababa agreement, through the window, into the Nile, and said it is not either. It is neither the Koran nor the Bible. There is a big difference this time, a big difference. Let me, I think this agreement was well thought of. There were implementation modalities in it. There is an army, there are two armies in the country today, in Sudan, and they are not very, it's not going to be a very easy throw away. You cannot just throw it away without having to pay a price. People are going to pay a price. And the people who are going to pay a price are Sudanese. And so they better not throw it away. Whether it is in the south or in the north, blood is going to be shed if this thing is thrown away. And I think they better not do it. Lastly, what do the parties agree on? On everything except implementation. When it comes to implementation, it gets difficult. But they agree nearly on everything, how things should be done. They agree to live peacefully. They agree to share resources. They agree that two militaries exist. They agree on a number of principles that they have. But when it comes to moving one leg forward, it becomes very difficult for either party. It asks them to move towards unity, each one moves away. It asks them to move towards cessation, each one moves away. Thank you. We're going to take a seat in the front row. And I think during the course of the discussion, if something is directed at you from the panelist or you want to pipe up, we can still call on you. We're going to wrap this session up and move to the next panel now. Thank you so much. I'm available. OK, wonderful. Thank you.