 Welcome back to Think Tech, and this is Transitional Justice. And we have the honor of talking again to Chirad Gahima, who is in Washington, but who is very familiar with the subject because he's from the Sahel. And the Sahel is an area south of the Sahara Desert and north of, I guess, equatorial Africa. And it's actually in the larger scheme, it's not that thick a belt. It is a belt all the way from the east to the west of Africa, and it seems to be in trouble all the way from the east to the west in Africa. And Transitional Justice is working there because it just so happens that there's a lot of failed states and violence, and of course what follows violence is war crimes. So Chirad, Chirad, tell me what is going on in the Sahel, but it should be this way. I mean, this is an area that maybe it used to be bigger, but then the Sahara dried up, and now it's a little smaller. And south of the Sahel, the Sahel is not great land. And south of the Sahel is a more lush tropical region. So it's kind of squeezed between the Sahara and this lush tropical region, right? And why is it that in this belt across Africa, across the widest part of Africa, we have so much trouble? Do you make a connection between, you know, the environment and the trouble? Many reasons. Climate change is one of them in some places. Like in Sudan, for example, some of the wars, some of the conflict is the result of struggles over resources, land and water, struggles fighting between people who want to farm the land and passers-by who want to graze their camels and cows over the land. So those resources are very conflict. But there are also external factors. Before September 11th, there's been a gradual increase of fundamentalist Islamic activity across the world, and some of those Islamic groups, Islamist groups have established a presence in the Sahel, and they are taking over, they are trying to take over government and establish Islamic states. And lastly, the issues of governance too, poverty, sometimes driven by corruption, that leaves many people feeling dispossessed. But then again, it's not a situation that is unique to the Sahel. Like even in this country, in the U.S., there are a lot of poor people who feel left out, feel marginalized, and there's also a similar problem in Europe, and that's why some authoritarian rulers are coming up across the world by exploiting this sentiment of unease, of dispossession among disadvantaged populations. So that is happening in Africa as well. So are there, well, I'm sure there are, but what is the relative contribution of immigrants from the Sahel to Europe? Are a lot of people trying to leave the Sahel and get to Europe? A lot of people are leaving Africa generally, especially in the countries that are poor and very poor and have suffered from conflict, and going to Europe. So yes, there are a lot of people who are not leaving the Sudan, but who are coming from south of the Sahel, going to Europe to seek greener pastures. And what about, you mentioned that there was a fundamentalist factor here, and we have a number, we spoke before the show, about a number of who events, particularly in the, what, the western part of the Sahel, Niger, Mali, Chad, and one other one. As well. And what? Bukhina Faso. Yes, right, right in that same neighborhood. So is that, is the common denominator, people who want to create fundamentalist governments, or is it just people who seek military power and do military coups? They're basically Al-Qaeda ISIS type of organizations. And it's not just Mali, Niger, or Bukhina Faso, it's happening right now as we speak in Sudan as well. These groups are active in Sudan, trying to establish a base, and to do what they have done in other countries in the Sahel. Are they being led by some external group who, who coordinates them, manages them, outfits them, and supports them with money? Or is it all independent country by country? I mean, I don't have any knowledge or an overall, couldn't, and financing organizations. I think the, some of these groups, they draw inspiration from ISIS and Al-Qaeda, but they're not necessarily financed from a common fund or by a common government, one government or organization, no. So what's the process and how they take over? I mean, take the case of Chad, Mali, or Niger. Those were military coups. How does the military coup enact up with the fundamentalists? Who is running the show, the fundamentalists or the military people? In some countries, like in Bukhina Faso and in Mali, these military, these extremist groups have taken over parts of the country and they're trying to govern the areas they control by Sharia rule. In other countries, they've not captured large territories as such. So the military, the coups, are really a response to the failures of that government to protect people from these Islamic groups. Of course, when the Islamic groups attack, they destroy schools, they destroy hospitals. So they destroy livelihoods and people feel angry and unhappy about the government's inability to protect them. And it's not just West Africa. We do have a similar problem in Somalia, for example. These groups have been active for a long time and we've had a similar problem in Mozambique as well on this coast of Africa. So I just wonder how it works. I remember reading that there are groups that oppose the fundamentalists and they're kind of guerrillas and they live in the mountains and they come and they attack the fundamentalists in order to protect the villages and all that. And I wonder if they're successful at all or that's a losing cause. It sounds to me like what happens is the fundamentalists come to town, they do brutality and they scare people, they put them in fear of their lives. They destroy the village, they maybe kill some people. They do war crime kinds of things on the people and then the people succumb. And now it belongs to the fundamentalists, whether it be Al Qaeda or ISIS or whoever. And now the fundamentalists own the town and people follow their instructions. So it sounds to me like that's a question of taking power through violence, through fear, through physical kinetic domination with guns and bullets. And to the extent there is a counter guerrilla offensive that tries to stop them, those guys are not all that successful. Am I right? You're right. They do all those things. The bulk work, the protection people have are the enemies of those countries and those armies have not been effective. Part of the problem is corruption. If you look at a country like Nigeria, which is one of the biggest countries, one of the biggest economies in Africa, but they've not been able to defeat this Islamic movement that has been killing people and committing atrocities. And part of the problem is corruption. So generals are given money to fight wars and they sign up for the resources instead of using them for fighting those groups. So it's the armies that are supposed to protect people, but the people are not happy with the protection they've received. Oh, but nevertheless, at the end of the day, the military coup, the generals control the place. Do they also control the fundamentalists, or is there... No, they don't. They don't. The fundamentalists are in charge. In the areas they have captured years. Why do the fundamentalists do this? Do they do this for economic reasons, for money, for resources, for gold, diamonds? What have you? Or is it just for power? It's ideological. It's what they believe. They believe that their societies should be governed. The northern part of Nigeria has both Christians and Muslims, but the north of the country is Muslim. Niger, Bukhina Faso, Mali, Benin, those are Muslim countries. So they believe that their countries should be ruled according to the Quran and to a fundamentalist understanding of the Quran. So it's basically philosophical, it's theoretical, it's ideological. It's not just about power. But you know what? I keep hearing that the Quran really doesn't support violence, that the Quran doesn't support brutality, that these guys have perverted the Quran and created their own Quran, their own kind of Quran, and ordinary Muslim people don't necessarily agree with what they're doing. Am I right? Again, this is the question of Israel and Palestine. It's another main fruit. It's true Muslims will tell you that the Quran is a very tolerant religion. But ask yourself, you know, it's possible to come to the US tomorrow and build a mosque. How many majority Islamic countries would allow you to shop today and say, I want to build a church? Two, in most countries, it's possible for a Muslim to come to this country, open a newspaper, a radio station, a TV station, and that try to convert American citizens to become Muslims. And that will be fighting with people and our constitution. But in many Islamic countries, it's a crime that carries capital punishment to try to convert a Muslim to become a Christian. So I don't think Islam promotes violence like we are seeing now in necessarily promotes violence of the kind we are seeing in Israel or in Israel and Palestine. But no, I don't think most Muslims are as tolerant of other religions as they want us to believe. Okay. So let's look at these various coups, you know that there's been a fair amount of reporting that Pugosian, remember him? The fellow who came down in that very interesting accident near St. Petersburg. And Putin want to have influence, well, Pugosian doesn't have any urgent aspirations right now, but Putin wants to have a piece of Africa and Pugosian helped him get a piece of Africa in terms of gold, diamonds, other resources, and power. And they were busy, the two of them were busy for some years in this very area that we're talking about achieving influence for Russia. Is there truth to that? And is it continuing? Yes. Yes, the Vardina group is still active today, even after the leader's death, they are active in Sudan, they are active in the Central African Republic, and they are also present in the Sahel region. And the activist groups that oppose France in this region, they kind of see Russia as an alternative to French imperialism. So, yes, Putin is tapping into our pre-existing resentment against certain elements of the West. Well, Pugosian himself was sort of a master of war crimes. And then you get him, you get the fundamentalists, you get the military, the cool people, they had three factors working in these countries in the western Sahel, all of whom have a history of war crimes. What can we do about that? You know, one of the big questions I always ask, comes to transitional justices. So this is going on now. It hasn't stopped. It's not like we can say, oh, that's over now. So we could turn around, look back down the trail and investigate and find out who did what and try to bring closure to the victims, for the victims. But it's a different kettle of fish if the war crimes are still going on as we speak. And there's every possibility, every prospect they will continue on into the future. So how can an organization dedicated to investigate a war crimes operate and investigate in that environment? I'll give an example of Sudan, for example. There are many Sudanese who want democracy. Actually, the majority of Sudanese want democracy. They want peace. They want the rule of law. So there are many among them who are actively committed to documenting human rights, to continuing to advocate for a transition to democracy. So the best thing is to support people in those countries who are already committed to this cause. And there are such groups. And I think that's the best thing to do, support local forces that are working for democratic change. They can document their trustees that are happening, but it's really not possible to have justice and accountability at this time. In this day and age, when the fighting is going on, the important thing is to try to see how we can promote a return to peace. Justice and accountability will come much later. In Sudan, for example, as we speak, we don't even have an effective central government. The Amir has kind of lost to the rebel group. In fact, they are thinking of relocating to Port Sudan and setting up a ramp government in Port Sudan. So there is no effective government in Sudan. So the courts are not working, the police forces are not working. So it's not possible to have justice at all in this case, Chair Strachan. You know, you hear about all these places in the world, including some of those countries, the Baku countries in Western Sahel, some of them, the Russians give them flags. I've heard of this, the Russians give them flags, Russian flags, and everybody on the street is waving a Russian flag. It's cute, but it doesn't solve any problems and it doesn't create, there's no way it's going to create a rule of law, democratic institutions. It's merely cute. But you know what, what troubles me is the notion of failed state. And Sudan has every possibility of, you know, of hardening to a failed state. Think of Afghanistan. It's a failed state. It cannot govern itself. It cannot develop a bureaucracy. It cannot, you know, achieve representative government or the rule of law. It's all out of the mouth of a gun. And so some of these states in equatorial Africa, I guess French equatorial Africa, are, you know, either on the brink of being a failed state, because a coup is closer to a failed state than a democratic government is. So my question to you is, at the end of the line, Gerard, when the state is failed, what is life like in a state that has failed, that is run by people with guns? What is life like for the individual citizen? But before we come to what is life like, let's look at the causes. So for example, we talked about people waving Russian flags, how the Russians give people flags to wave. Let's not say Russia is a problem, because Russia has not been in charge. The people have been charged at the French exploiting these countries for decades. So the blame lies elsewhere, not with the Russians, the current situation. Because the French have rules, have controlled those former colonies with a tight fist even after independence. You know, one country, Guinea, which chose not to be controlled by France at independence. When the French were living, they have put in everything, even electrical ports, or you know, the rails of the rails, they put up everything before they left. So the French have been very, very exploitative in running these colonies. Another comment I would say about failed states, you know, there are places that are failed states and we see examples like Somalia or like Sudan now. Life is very bad because there is lawlessness, people are not protected, government cannot provide services. But I would say state to call Afghanistan a failed state. Because for all the human rights violations, they are more effective than the government, the American supported government that they replaced. When I spent a year in Afghanistan in 2015 and 2016, we were literally prisoners in our homes and offices. We could not travel to the provinces. So I think the Taliban have more effective control of the country than they are not Democrats. They are not Democrats. They abuse human rights violations. They are particularly abuse the rights of women and minorities. But I would rather have an effective fundamentalist, Islamic fundamentalist government than a failed state. I think we need to distinguish the two. My question to you, Gerard, is that going to work? Is there a model there that can be helpful for failed states elsewhere? The years has been to hate before and they were not successful and I don't know. The UN has been in Congo for almost 20 years and they have failed to restore peace to the Democratic Republic of Congo. So I'm not holding my breath that they will be more effective in restoring order in hate. But there are a few successful examples, like for example, in Mozambique, in East Africa. The French had a 20 billion gas project in the country and Islamic groups took over the area where that project was based. So the French and Mozambique and the government of Rwanda to give them their own military to go and restore order and they have actually done a good job of that. They have driven away the rebels and restored the government over part of the country. So I hope that the Kenyans can do the same, can do for Haiti what Rwanda has done for Mozambique. Yeah, it seems to me there's a solution out there somewhere where you have a country of force that can control things and ultimately restore rule of law to a place that it's failed. And I think we have to focus on that. I know that you're more interested in investigation of war crime church respectively and all that. But I think the U.N. and the U.S. for that matter should be focusing on systems and models that have been successful or that have the prospect of being successful because I think would you agree with this that once you reach a certain point, it's very, very hard to recapture. Am I right? You are very right and there should be a more approach. Combine intervention like we are seeing in Haiti or in Mozambique with preventive measures. For example, you know, you see all these people are crossing the border coming from Latin America to the U.S. That is unsustainable. So what the U.S. government ought to do in concert with the countries of, you know, of the southern hemisphere should be to find ways of addressing the root causes that drive people to come. And sometimes the causes are over all making, for example, seven million people have left Venezuela. And many of them are ending up in the U.S. Part of the problem in Venezuela is that we have imposed sanctions on them and made life unbearable for them. So when you impose sanctions on drive people to object poverty, they have to leave the country. At the same time, we complain that they're ending up on our borders. So we need to think twice about the things that our government does. Absolutely. I couldn't agree with you more. I agree with you 10,000 percent that the first order of business is try to help those countries restore the rule of law, help them become more validable for the individual citizen, so everybody doesn't have to run away. And that is not limited to Latin America. It's also, you know, a process that should be examined in Africa and in the global south. You were saying, no, what? But our governments, you know, some of the things they do don't make sense. Like, I've agreed, granted, my duty is a dictator. If I was president of the U.S., I would help you to make Venezuela better so that Venezuelans can stay in their own country. So I don't have to deal with them at my border. But we still keep sanctions against Venezuela, can't allow them to sell their oil, you know? And we complain that Venezuelans are leaving to come to our country. And we're making it harder by imposing and continuing to impose sanctions. That's like, I don't know if you remember, but that's like in Hong Kong, where Donald Trump imposed sanctions on Hong Kong when he was trying to help Hong Kong, but instead he imposed sanctions on him. What good does that do? Anyway, we're not even half finished without our discussion, Gerard. I really appreciate you're, you know, taking the ride with me on all these questions. And I hope we can get back together again and look more at this, Sahel, look more at these possibilities, because we live in, may I say, a degenerating world in many ways, and we have got to figure out solutions, not only solutions to prevent war crimes, but solutions to retain some reasonable civilized society, civil society, if you will. And I'd like to compare notes with you on that going forward. I look forward to and our thoughts out with the people in Israel. Yes, indeed. And Gerard Gajima, Project Expedited Justice, thank you so much, Gerard. Israel and Palestine. Yes, absolutely. Thank you.