 As always, let me begin by paying acknowledging and celebrating the first Australians on whose traditional lands we all respectively are present and acknowledging and celebrating and respecting leaders past and present and emerging. It's my very great pleasure to welcome to this session Bob Einhorn, senior fellow Brookings now but a hugely distinguished diplomatic career behind him as you've seen from the CV papers as a senior State Department or very senior State Department official in the non-preferration arms control area during both in particular the Clinton and Obama administrations. As you might have noticed, we were going to be joined in this session by Amanda Gawley, who is the Australian Ambassador for Arms Control and Counterproliferation. But Amanda was given a special assignment in circumstances we can probably imagine, which made it impossible for her to join us. But I think we have so many other distinguished piloted members of the DFAT and defence establishments, both present and former, but even though I can't be relied upon, I can't be trusted to give any kind of empathetic view to the present government's position, no doubt someone will fill the gap if I misspeak. Let me begin in terms of the conduct of this session. There's a lot of ground we want to cover. So Bob and I will have a conversation covering eight or nine different topics over the next half hour or so, hopefully not much longer before we go to general discussion and Q&A. In which context, I think if we could work on the basis of just raising your hand physically or pressing the raise hand button to get into the discussion, that would work better than relying on me to follow a chat box. So I don't have a 10-year-old, so let's just do it physically as we can. So look, in our opening panel conversation, Bob and I will assume, no doubt heroically, that you've at least had a glance at the framing paper that was circulated a few days ago. And in our conversation, we'll take as given that low participants should of course feel able to challenge any of these assumptions. We'll take as a given, we'll take as given the high likelihood is unintended if not deliberate in the foreseeable future. We'll take as given the enormous existential risk associated with any significant nuclear exchange. And I think we'll take as given also the self-evident sense of the Reagan-Gorbachev statement, now actually recently embraced by all of Biden, Putin and Xi, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. So taking all that as more or less given, our focus here will be on what if anything can be actually done to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used. We'll be looking at the state of play, the prospects for nuclear stockpile reduction will be an elimination. We'll be looking at holding the line on non-proliferation and we'll be looking at more general risk reduction issues. I want to start with the existing nine nuclear arms states and then moving from there later in the discussion to potential newcomers. So my first question, Bob, to get things started is basically is the framing paper too pessimistic. The framing paper describes the prospects for significant movement towards disarmament as desolate. Increasing modernizing stockpiles. With missile systems developed with no sign anywhere. Nights and nuclear weapons and national postures. Longstress Russia. Ending and with no buy-in at all from anyone who matters to the nuclear ban treaty. That's the picture that's painted in the framing paper. Is it too pessimistic beginning in particular the US Russia relationship given the possible ground for optimism. I guess and I'd like you to talk about this the Biden-Putin summit agreement to reestablish and strategic security dialogue to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction as they say. Is there any hope at all for further bilateral stockpile reductions of the kind that we saw after the end of the Cold War Bob. Thank you very much for that introduction and I think the organizers of the Crawford leadership forum for inviting me. Gareth for reasons that you just mentioned and also for additional reasons that you put in your framing paper. There are plenty of grounds for pessimism in the current environment. But that doesn't mean that arms control is dead. It means that the focus of arms control needs to shift, at least in the near term formal agreements to further reduce weapons are very unlikely in my view. It's a good thing that the new star treaty was extended for five years and a good thing that the United States and Russia have agreed to resume strategic stability talks on a bilateral basis. But the main purpose of those bilateral talks will be largely conceptual to reconceptualize strategic stability and arms control to consider how stability and future arms control will be affected by great power competition by disruptive technologies such as cyber and hypersonics by novel nuclear weapons systems like undersea drones and also by additional nuclear competitors, primarily China and North Korea. So we can't really expect any near term disarmament agreements emerging from these new and resumed bilateral US Russian stability talks. The priority now when the prospect of nuclear conflict is greater now than it's been for decades really should not be on further nuclear reductions. It should be reducing likelihood that nuclear weapons will ever be used again. And that means pursuing confidence building transparency communications measures that are designed to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict resulting from accident or miscalculation. It means developing informal rules rules of the road to create norms of responsible behavior in such areas as space and and and cyber and because in my view, any use of nuclear weapons today will almost surely be the result of escalation of regional conventional military conflict. It means focusing heavily on preventing regional armed conflicts from erupting in the first place, whether along the NATO Russian border, the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, the Korean peninsula or cashmere. Eventually, further nuclear reductions may be possible, but for now the international arms control agenda will consist of these more modest risk reduction measures. I want to come back to risk reduction measures and perhaps some slightly less modest options in that area as well in a few moments. But let's first of all explore some of the other key players and in particular China, because even more eyes are on China these days than the than the big two, I guess. Although it's arsenal is only presently about one 15th on most estimates, the US size, and even though China has traditionally adopted a both a no first use and a minimal deterrence posture. What is your take on the risks associated with the current Chinese enterprise of modernization expansion diversification not least the recent information that's emerged about these missile silo sites. And in Western China, maybe up to 300, even though that doesn't necessarily mean 300 weapons, it could be a could be a show game what you take on the, the current risks associated with China's posture and whether it will ever be possible to get China directly engaged in control arms limitation arrangements. Thank you, Gareth and not just in my view it's almost consensus view now, China's current nuclear modernization efforts are disturbing, including what you just mentioned this evidence that they are constructing two or three new fields of ICBM silos that could house hundreds of multiple warhead missiles. And, you know, for decades, as you mentioned, China has pursued a minimum deterrence capability, but now that appears to be changing the goals of its modernization program remain unclear at a minimum in my view it wants to ensure a secure reliable nuclear retaliatory capability to deter the United States from conducting a disarming nuclear first strike by itself, that's understandable and relatively benign. But it takes place at a time when China is acting more assertively towards its neighbors and working hard to replace the United States as the dominant conventional military power in the western Pacific by achieving a mutual nuclear deterrence relationship with the United States, China may hope to gain a freer hand to pursue its regional objectives without fear of US nuclear coercion. China is therefore very unlikely to agree to anything that could impede its ability to achieve a mutual deterrent relationship with the United States, but at the same time China wishes to avoid armed conflict resulting from accidents, misperceptions or miscalculations. And so hopefully it will agree before too long to engage in a strategic stability dialogue with the United States. It's so far resisted holding such a dialogue at such a dialogue would allow each side to gain a better understanding of the other side strategic objectives and perhaps avoid, perhaps avoid worst case planning and even an arms race. It could also allow them to develop confidence building and other measures to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent armed conflict and conceivably, they could also agree on mutual limitations for rules of the road in areas with the United States and China have comparable probabilities, such as cyber space or hypersonics, but formal quantitative nuclear arms limitations agreements are very unlikely for quite some time. How much serious commitment is there within the present Biden administration given domestic political imperatives and the, and the extent of the emotion that now seems to be invested in the anti China position how much serious commitment is there to such a strategic dialogue as you describe it even a, even a feeling modest aspirations. I think there's a real commitment to do that. The Biden administration has emphasized that it while key aspects of the relationship will be competitive. It looks to cooperate in areas where interest can converge whether it's climate change or dealing with North Korea, but certainly avoiding inadvertent armed conflict is one of those converging interests. Moving across this rather broad landscape. Next, North Korea and which you've been very closely involved for a very long time with almost every dimension of US nuclear policy are prospects for a negotiated settlement with Pyeongyang now completely dead in the water. Do you see any hope at all for achieving denuclearization or even just a permanent freeze on North Korea's nuclear capability. Has the US really gone as far as it could and arguably should go and putting incentives on the table for North Korea to move. Gareth at their summit in Singapore Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump agreed to work toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but nothing Kim Jong-un has said or done since then suggests that he has any intention whatsoever of abandoning his nuclear deterrent deterrent, which I believe he sees as essential to the survival of his regime. The North has continued a de facto moratorium on ICBM range missile tests and nuclear weapons tests, but it's continued to increase its strategic capabilities, including by developing and testing short and medium range missiles and also by producing fissile materials to expand its arsenal of nuclear weapons actually in the current report by the IAEA. The IAEA states that after a lengthy hiatus, North Korea has resumed the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. The Biden administration has repeatedly reached out to North Korea and called for negotiations anywhere anytime, but the North has repeatedly refused to engage. I believe the Biden administration is realistic about what can be achieved with North Korea. It's reaffirmed the ultimate goal of complete denuclearization, but it recognizes that at least for the foreseeable future, that goal is not in the cards. And so it's prepared to pursue denuclearization, but as a long-term step-by-step process that would begin with near-term limits on North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities. Further steps toward denuclearization would be deferred for until a future time, but Pyongyang hasn't budged. Perhaps it's ruled out engagement as long as it remains sealed off from the world due to the COVID pandemic. Perhaps it's waiting for unilateral concessions by the Biden administration, or perhaps after the failed Hanoi summit with Trump. It sees a little prospect of an agreement that would serve North Korea's interests. I'll let you finish, but what is the downside risk in the U.S. coming forward with something that is a credible unilateral concession, even if only something to do with the status of the war issue, the guarantee of diplomatic relationship, or something of that kind, which career is obviously wanting. The U.S. position has not been to put anything on the table before sitting down, but maybe we need a circuit breaker. Well, you know, the U.S. Ambassador and Envoy Sung Kim was in Seoul recently, and apparently the two allies talked about humanitarian assistance to the North, especially during the COVID crisis that could help jumpstart engagement between the U.S. and North Korea. But I think we'll have to wait and see whether the North has an appetite for beginning discussions. I think eventually it will. It's an economic crisis. I think the Biden administration is dead set against making major unilateral concessions other than humanitarian assistance to get talks started. I think it's the Biden administration is already pursuing a domestically risky engagement with Iran. It knows that the prospects for productive engagement with North Korea are even lower. And so I think it's reluctant to undertake more unilateral steps to get talks started. Well, we have to wait and see. There's no doubt a number of our participants will want to come back to North Korea and in fact all these issues so far, but just one more quickly on North Korea. How seriously do you place the risk of aggressive first use by North Korea of such weapons as it has. Do you count that as a risk factor at all? Well, you know, Kim Jong-un has has talked about initiating the use of nuclear weapons. I, you know, I don't think he's serious about it. I know he must know that that would mean the annihilation of his regime, which is something which is a thing he doesn't want. So, I doubt these threats are serious. Okay, let's pick up the pieces briefly with the other nuclear arms states, India, Pakistan, Israel, including the NPT non-members. What's the prospects at any of bringing them into serious nuclear arms control negotiations, whether bilateral or multilateral. And even if the prospect of stockpile reduction in those cases is zero in the present environment, what about the possibility for some serious, not just confidence building, but some more serious risk reduction measures like, you know, reduced deployments, de-alerting, and no first years, which we'll no doubt come back to. Any of that stuff? Well, you know, I think there may be some value in trying to bring NPT nuclear weapons states and, you know, non-NPT nuclear arms states together for consultations. I'm only talking, by the way, about seven nuclear powers. I'm not talking about Israel, which is not going to play it doesn't acknowledge having nuclear weapons. I'm not talking about North Korea. We don't want to invite North Korea to a table with nuclear arms states. So the seven nuclear powers, if you could get them together, might discuss some common challenges, like the challenges, the challenge of securing its nuclear weapons, installations, materials against theft or seizure. They might also share experiences, their own experiences with previous confidence building measures and compare notes on what has worked. But developing new risk reduction measures is more likely to be feasible, I think, in a bilateral or regional context, such as along the NATO-Russia border or the South China Sea. I've read about your 4Ds, Gareth, and I'm not terribly optimistic about anyone, any of them, whether it's decreasing the number of nuclear weapons and total inventories, decreasing the number of deployed nuclear weapons. What you have now is US and Russia, I don't believe are going to reduce their deployments. The UK, as you pointed out in your framing paper, has even increased the ceiling on its deployed weapons. China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan are increasing their deployments. De-alerting is your third D. I don't see it. I see United States and Russia retaining their highly alert prompt lunch, force pastures. And China, Pakistan and India once kept their nuclear warheads unmated from delivery systems, but now it looks like they're moving in the other direction. So the third D, not very optimistic. You're fourth on doctrine and prospects for universal buy-in to no first use. I'm dubious on that as well. Even for China and India, which have had no first use pastures, but may be moving away from them. But you probably want to talk more about the US approach on no first use. We'll come back to that in just one second. But if the weapon states are going to dig their heels in on any significant movement on any of these really major risk reduction issues, what on earth can they bring to the table in an NPT conference context that will begin to satisfy the production of the non-nuclear weapon states that the weapon states are simply not serious about disarmament. They can talk their heads off about transparency and Australia can talk its head off about, you know, all the wonderful things we're doing to contribute to energizing the nuclear weapon states to bring something to the table. But in the absence of any of that biggest stuff, I mean, is any of this remotely credible? Well, look, what can the nuclear weapon states bring to the table? I think many of the NPT non-nuclear weapon states understand that the current strategic environment is not very auspicious for arms control, especially for nuclear further nuclear reductions. And I think they recognize the need to pursue risk reduction measures that can reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. Will they ever be satisfied? No, they will never be satisfied, nor should they. The record of nuclear weapon states in implementing the NPT nuclear weapon states in implementing the Article 6 commitments is not very good. And this is going to lead, I think, to more contention at the upcoming review conference. But, you know, my own view is, and you've raised questions about this separately, my own view is it's not going to lead to additional countries deciding to have nuclear weapons. You know, countries don't decide to have nuclear weapons because of the slow pace of disarmament they decide for their own particular reasons, because their security is jeopardized because they want more status and influence and prestige, because their domestic pressures to get nuclear or the rest. It's not because of the slow pace of nuclear disarmament. Well, we'll come back to one of the key proliferation potential states Iran in just a moment, but let's let's go back to the no first use issue, which is the subject of a major international campaign at the moment and is probably the risk reduction measure with one of the four days with the most apparent like the root of some buy in around the place the nuclear umbrella states Australia included, played a really fairly crucial role in the past and inhibiting any move by the US down this particular to Obama as we know wanted to go the no, at least the sole purpose route, which is a functional equivalent of no first use, but was dissuaded eventually by the, by the Northeast Asian allies by the Central East European allies and with a bit of help from Australia as well, and not to do that. What, what are the prospects, and what's the desire ability of a no first use or at least a sole purpose commitment and what are the prospects of the moving in that direction what will it take to get it there. Well, I'm not going to make you happy with this answer. And in January 2017 in his last month as vice president, Biden expressed his personal view that the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons should be deter and if necessary, respond to nuclear attack against the US or its allies, Biden repeated that position as a candidate for the presidency. But now his administration is conducting its nuclear posture review, and I doubt that it will adopt a sole purpose sole purpose as an official US policy. Now, a key argument for sole purpose, or NF you as you point out is this equivalent is that US adversaries no longer believing the US will use nuclear weapons first in a crisis will have less incentive to use nuclear weapons first themselves. And as the United States maintains a prompt launch force posture US adversaries will place will place very little faith in the US NFU pledge and their incentives to preempt with nuclear weapons won't be reduced. So I think a critical argument for no first use, I think is seriously question. The detail of no first use and you've alluded to, to this is that it could undermine the confidence of US allies in the US ability to deter major non nuclear threats, NATO allies in Eastern Europe, and in particular Japan among US Asian allies remain opposed to no first use, especially as threats from Russia, China and North Korea have increased, and given the Biden administration's strong commitment to reinforcing the credibility of US security assurances to allies, I think a sole purpose declaration is very unlikely, despite what might be the president's personal preference. Now this is especially the case in light of the strategic and political full out from the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, but I think there's much that the Biden administration can do short of declaring no first use to indicate that the use of nuclear weapons should only be considered in the most extreme of circumstances in particular, it can reverse the Trump administration's apparent expansion of those circumstances. The Trump nuclear posture review explicitly reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to conventional military attack against civilian populations or infrastructure, or in response to a cyber attack against critical infrastructure, early warning systems or nuclear command and control systems, but the United States has effective and more proportionate and credible non nuclear means for deterring and responding to such attacks and nuclear response is simply not necessary. The Biden administration, like the Obama administration, but unlike the Trump administration should explicitly adopt sole purpose as a goal, and should commit to putting in place conditions that would allow that goal to be realized. It should give substance to that commitment by establishing dedicated consultative mechanisms with allies with the express purpose of identifying and promoting those conditions and evaluating periodically progress toward putting them in place to be sure. It's not a step that would disappoint advocates of no first use, but it's a step, at least in the right direction, unlike the direction in which we've been headed in recent years. We've directly acknowledged that it is what we call an Australian bullshit to suggest that the United States would ever use first nuclear weapons in response to a sub nuclear attack, whether it's cyber or hypersonic or anything else, it just won't. That has got you sufficient conventional capability for the foreseeable future to retaliate in any conceivable way to such an attack it's not going to do it so why the hell not have people like you because look frankly becomes a self fulfilling prophecy if people like you with your experience and your credibility and not prepared to go and say this is something we should do it's not going to happen. Look, you're absolutely right in saying that without being backed by reduced numbers reduced deployment the alerting and so on. This does remain a statement rather than something that has a huge amount of credibility in extremis but but is this something we should give up on this so little on the table at the moment that this at least looks like something that would take us a credible step forward. So, once I was at a senior meeting was in the situation room and we're talking about these issues, it was the context of the 2010 nuclear posture review, and kind of before the meeting began I went to a very senior US military officer, and I said sir with the US president ever used nuclear weapons against a non nuclear attack would he actually do that. At the time I said he or she we were already thinking of a possible she, but in any way so I asked him he said, no. The president would not use nuclear weapons against a non nuclear attack, but he added, but our adversaries don't know that. And that's the critical thing from from the, the perspective of the US nuclear establishment. This is not an issue we'll pick up in discussion which I want to get to very shortly but just two other issues first of all. One is you've touched upon it but it is pretty critical a new technological development space cyberspace hypersonic drones. To what extent has that seriously complicated the prospect for any kind of arms control negotiation of the kind that we've been canvassing. The experiments, as you pointed out have only recently begun to conceptualize how to cope with potentially disruptive technologies like cyber counter space hypersonics and so forth. These technologies post serious potential threats to early warning and commanding control systems, and they could reduce decision time in a crisis. Now these challenges need to be addressed somehow in future arms control discussions it's no longer enough to deal with the threats to strategic stability posed by nuclear weapons themselves, but adding new technologies to the mix will clearly complicate arms control negotiations, because these difficulties are evolving so rapidly, and because of the difficulties of definition verification and attribution especially for cyber, it will be hard to deal with them using traditional arms control methods. Some, especially cyber will need to be addressed in separate informal arrangements like normative rules of the road, rather than formal legally binding agreements, and it's a, and here's an important point I want to make it. One needs to recognize, one needs to recognize that arms control by itself can't eliminate the threats posed by these new technologies. In fact, the most effective means of protecting against these threats will be unilateral, for example, taking unilateral steps to make early warning and command and control systems more resilient and more redundant. There's something you've been directly personally engaged with that issue right really from the outset what are the prospects now getting the JCPOA back on any kind of track will Iran's advances in physical material production given the Trump horror story mean that the restoration of the agreement is not going to make much practical difference is an agreement that doesn't address missile delivery systems and Iran's actions in the region still in agreement with having what should quick take on that we'll have to we'll have to leave some time for discussion so I just want you to open up the issue. Yeah, you know I look. Restorate, you know, the Biden administration to set plant restore JCPOA and use it as starting point for following negotiations on a broader deal that was strengthened the JCPOA deal with the regional and missile threats. The restoration was supposed to be the easy part. Well they began these indirect contacts and Vienna, but they bog down. I think the Iranians have overreached. We can go into some examples of that but I think they've, they've overreached in their negotiating positions. You now have a new hardline government to Tehran, President Ibrahim Raisi. He wants to resume negotiations he recognizes Iran is in dire economic straits, and it needs the removal of the sanctions through restoration the JCPOA to get the economy back on track, but I don't think he's going to soften their negotiating position. The Biden administration believes it's it's done more to reach to meet Iran halfway and doesn't want to make any unilateral more additional unilateral concessions. It says that negotiations can't go on indefinitely with the continued improvement of Iran's nuclear capabilities the experience knowledge the gaining from advanced centrifuge operation. It's going to be hard to put Humpty Dumpty back together again it's going to be hard to to restore the JCPOA and reestablish to long breakout time than the JCPOA guaranteed. So I don't know it's hard to tell now whether agreement can be reached sometime this fall if it's not reached. What the Biden administration may do is to try to skip the restoration of the JCPOA and go directly to these follow on negotiations these expanded negotiations that would also deal with the regional missile threats as well. But if they've had so much difficulty restoring the JCPOA, I wouldn't put, you know, a big bet on being able to succeed in the more complicated negotiation. There look just one last question which I would have been putting to Amanda golly had you been with us but I really like your take on it. What role of any can middle powers like Australia play in this whole nuclear arms control enterprise we have played some kind of a role in the past in developing normative positions with the Canberra Commission and so on the spilled out in the framing paper is there any prospect of us playing a useful role in the future and moving this agenda forward should we be minded to take over the years and you point this out in your framing paper Garth, or Australia has indeed punched way above its weight in these arms in these international arms control discussions, and you've played personally, a major role in that arena. You also point out that Australia has been a key participant in organizations like the NPDI, and they have helped pursue a constructive middle ground between the NPT nuclear weapons states, and some of the more strident, not aligned states, and this is sometimes a facilitated consensus at NPT review conferences, and maybe minimize some of the polarization that has played a non proliferation regime, but in terms of impact. Australia's most impactful role can be as a trusted ally of the United States, its views are taken seriously in Washington, both in bilateral contacts and there are many of those, as well as meetings of like minded countries like, like the quads. Richard. Yeah, thanks, Garth and thanks. Thanks, Rob. You know, I can't speak for the government anymore as you know. But I do wonder about your question about middle power contribution. Because I think that's waning a bit from an Australian perspective and I think, I think there are probably three reasons for that one is the exceptionally good environment that you both have been talking about and the sense of real progress on the system's reduction. It's just not possible at the moment because of the very tense competitive environment between a number of the nuclear weapons states, uncertain regional situations and so on. The second is China, which of course hangs heavy over all of the Australian foreign policy debate at the moment, and a feeling in the system that the alliance and the nuclear umbrella that comes with it is more than ever. Third reason is, I don't think we've had a minister in recent times with the same personal passion that you brought to the issue, Garth, and I think that shows, but I would say that I do think that still embedded in the international security division in the department and across other parts of the Australian system like ASNO, there still is quite a deep repository of expertise in this idea that Australia can play an important role to push things along. We've seen that most recently. I think with Rob Floyd being elected as the head of the CTPO, and that continues a long tradition of Australian official serving in senior positions in international organisations dedicated to arms control and disarmament. And Australian diplomats still plugging away at things like technical questions on verification of nuclear disarmament and on the NPDI initiative to support the NPT, which has been hit a bit by COVID, hasn't been able to meet in person. So I do still think there is a role personally for Australia on middle powers, including encouraging the US system on in the negotiations in Iran. There was a bit of a wobble over the Iran deal a few years ago under the Trump administration, but ultimately the Australian government came down and said the deal was worth staying in, even though the Trump administration didn't listen to us. I think that's a valuable role we can keep playing. And certainly on North Korea, where we have a prominent role in sanctions enforcement. And also I think in talking to the American system about options there, including, I think, for stalling preemptive military action, which in most circumstances is the Australian system continues to believe would be highly risky and counterproductive. So I suppose there are a few thoughts about where Australia is. Richard thanks very much for that more specifically on just on the no first use sole purpose issue that is something presumably the Biden administration is going to seek allied input on what should our advice specifically be to Washington, if and when asked on that or frankly even if not asked. Should we be as cautious as Bob is suggesting we should be on this or is it something on which a little bit of heroism might be overdue. I will again I can't speak for the government here I, I think we will be reading the tea leaves pretty closely in Washington. And I think there'll be low appetite for suggesting a course of action to the Biden administration that we know that they're not going to take that's my, that's my guess. That's self fulfilling prophecy stuff I mean Biden's not going to take it if he doesn't get any signals from allies like us that this is legitimate cause. We all hide under the table I mean obviously lowest common denominator risk avoidance political risk avoidance is going to prevail. I weep a little Bob do you have any comment on any of that. Just one last question from me because the Crawford forum does engage not only business and public sector people but the civil society, non government organizations as well and Australian non government organizations are really been pretty prominent in the whole nuclear debate for a very long time but is anyone listening anymore to anything that comes from below is this. Not necessarily this whole nuclear arms control businesses necessarily a top down business, or is there potential for important bottom up contributions. Just one more dimension I'd like to get on the table before we break. Yeah, you know, when, when I was a government official, and I was a government official for many years. You know, I listened politely to NGOs. But, you know, frankly, I was a bit too dismissive, in part because I didn't feel they had access to the sensitive information I had access to. Some things have really changed with, you know, open source information so prevalent that so many issues with commercial photography a very high resolution, you have these non governmental organizations in a position to play important roles, and you have these think tanks and organizations like like you participate in Gareth with very deep expertise, including former government officials who know who remember how the sausage was made, and to have a real sense of decision making and policy making. And I think increasingly, they're going to play a big role, especially at a time when people don't have the answers, when, you know, a reconceptual conceptualization of deterrence and stability and arms control would be necessary. I don't think governments have a comparative advantage in in that. And that's a much more optimistic note on which to conclude after this sea of pessimistic desolation which we've been experiencing over the last hour. But we've been experiencing it with the help of some hugely interesting input from you Bob and hugely expert and experienced input, and we really really appreciate your participation. I would like to express my appreciation to all the other participants in this enterprise and bid the conference organizers Richard Pam or the rest of you. A very productive conference for the rest of the two days so thanks Bob thanks everyone and we'll now leave you to move on. Great.