 So, I'd like to introduce DDG Everard. She has led the International Atomic Energy Agency Department of Nuclear Safety and Security since April 2021. Prior to her current position, she served as a commissioner of the French Nuclear Safety Authority and also served in roles in France's Ministry of the Environment and Ministry of Economy and Finance. Her broad experience includes oversight of research and environmental issues, regulation of waste, decommissioning of fuel cycle facilities, management of radioactive materials, and responsibilities for radiation protection and nuclear safety. At the IAEA, she oversees more than 450 staff and coordination of all aspects of IAEA's safety and security mission. Chair, the floor is yours. Thanks, John. And thank you, Deputy Director General Everard Liddy for being here and joining us here at the RIC. It really has been an absolute pleasure for me personally to work with you for the past three years. Three years that have included a lot of challenges and some pretty big successes. You know, one success I think I just want to highlight up front and that I really wanted to thank you for was all the support on the part of the agency, along with my good friend, Christopher Vectorsen from the United Arab Emirates to host the regulatory effectiveness conference in the UAE last year. I think that was a great success and one of the things I appreciate, too, is the support of the agency in following up from that conference, not just having it be a collection of documents that sits on a shelf somewhere, but actually building momentum for the next conference in three years. We'll get to this in a minute, too, but also just recognizing and really appreciating all of the work that the agency has done, and particularly your group in supporting Ukraine, as well as initiatives to harmonize and synergize regulatory approaches for new reactors really across the globe. So before I really dive into the substance, I wanted to give you a couple minutes to make any remarks you'd like to make. Thank you. Thank you very much. Dear Roger Hansen, dear Chris, so it's my great pleasure to be here and thank you very much for this invitation. Before starting, I would like to say a few words about the U.S. NRC, and more specifically a big thank you to the U.S. NRC and to you, in particular, for the great support we receive continuously from the U.S. NRC directly through the participation of many NRC staff in our activities or indirectly through the support you provide to our activities in particular for capacity-building activities. Thank you very much for this. It's very much appreciated, and we have conducted many activities together. You just mentioned the regulatory conference in Abu Dhabi, but there are many others in a wide range of areas, so nuclear safety, of course, radiation safety, nuclear security. I think this is a huge topic for the agency, so I would like to highlight how much we appreciate your support. Thank you so much, and I would like to echo some of your comments this morning regarding this changing landscape. I think this is a big challenge for everyone, and the fact that we can work together. It's referring to what you mentioned regarding optimism. It's a forced multiplier. I think international cooperation is a forced multiplier in this regard as well, and I think the U.S. NRC plays a great role for us. Thank you so much. Thank you. Well, let's dive in, shall we? You've traveled to Ukraine quite a lot in the last two years with your most recent trip with Director General Grossi, I think, a little over a month ago. Could you just give us an update in your perspectives on the status of operational safety and security at Zaporizhia, maybe even including near-views about the impact of that? I think there was a recent announcement that none of the staff employed by Ukraine's national operator, Energoatom, would be allowed to remain working at the site, et cetera. Can we just hear from you a little bit about what you've learned and what you're seeing there? Zaporizhia. First of all, today, we completed the 17th rotation at Zaporizhia. So the 17th team arrived today at Zaporizhia safely. I think this is something I wanted to mention because we have built, in fact, our knowledge at Zaporizhia for the last 18 months, more than 18 months now. These rotations bring a lot of knowledge to the agency, and I would like to echo to what the Commissioner Caputo mentioned this kind of knowledge management. This is really key in this kind of situation because we started with almost no knowledge or very, let's say, general knowledge at Zaporizhia. We conducted some other missions at Zaporizhia before the war started. But of course, everything has changed since February and March, the 3rd of March, 2022. And we had to reconsider the framework of our assessment for safety and security. This is completely different from any situation we can experience in any other member states, whatever the nature of the facility or the situation in any other member states. So at Zaporizhia, we started from scratch. With these rotations, after 18 months, we have many teams with these rotations, many experts. Some of them participated in up to three missions at Zaporizhia. So each mission is one month, so that means they have now sometimes even more than one month. So we have gained good knowledge, but having said that, there is a big challenge is how to assess safety and security at a nuclear power plant in a war zone. So that means that we have to reconsider some basic principles. And that's where we came to these seven indispensable pillars, which are the most important topics, which derive from our international safety standards, but applied to a war situation. And as of today, I would say that the situation is very precarious. There is no nuclear power plant designed to operate or even to be in a war zone. So this is just starting with a very basic reminder that there is no nuclear power plant aimed at being located in a war zone. That means that we have to pay attention to all these potential hazards, so external hazards, shelling, loss of offsite power supply, loss of water supply, so with the destruction of the Kakovka dam. So you know, I would say we are monitoring the situation. It's really precarious with this recent development with the staff now that has been requested to sign contracts with all of them. So this is not completely new, but since the 1st of February 2024, now all staff at the Appreger needs to have their job contract with the company, the Russian company. So that, of course, implies a lot of new challenges for safety because safety relies on technical equipment, of course, but on people. And this is obvious that when you have staff with under pressure with these kind of, let's say, limitations and yes, pressure, I think this is very, very challenging for safety. It's an incredibly stressful environment and it is an ongoing tragedy. I think that's important to recognize that we are still in the midst of this and it's still a very precarious situation, this illegal seizure that Russia has done. But while we're in the midst of this, is it time yet to draw any conclusions or to step back and look at this and things that we can learn and put in place more broadly for ignoring the safe and secure operation of nuclear power plants and conflict zones? So it's very premature to be able to have conclusions, but you're right. I think we need to, let's say, not to forget what we have learned over the last two years. So this is a kind of very, very unique situation where the situation is not stabilized at all. This is the major difference between an emergency or an accident and what we are experiencing in Ukraine. In Ukraine, nothing is predictable. So that means that we, and we have experienced this with the destruction of the Kakufkada with so many events, completely unpredictable. That means that we need to weigh the pros and cons from having this kind of capturing what we have learned from the last two years. So we are preparing a technical document based on what we have learned as a project, but at the other nuclear power plants as well, because the other nuclear power plants may have some challenges as well, of course, because of the war. And this will be a kind of interim report for us to keep memory and track of what we have observed over the last two years. That will be an interim report because, of course, we will be able to elaborate more on this lesson learned once the war is over, not now. I think it's just an interim report. But however, I think that will be helpful for us to have this kind of first reflection of how we could strengthen nuclear safety and security in these kind of very unprecedented conditions. Good. Well, we look forward to seeing that. Thank you. I want to emphasize, we've talked about Ukraine and what's going on there is so important and to raise the awareness and to highlight the actions of the agency. But your obligations and your work in Ukraine are on top of the core mission, particularly of your organization of safeguards, organization, et cetera. And even outside of that Ukraine work, which is substantial, you've seen some challenges and some real successes. I just wanted to give you an opportunity to talk about all of the other things, the other work that's going on in your part of the agency. Thank you. I think that's very important to highlight that even if Ukraine has mobilized a lot of resources within the department and within the agency, we still continue to provide support to member states. In particular, we continue, of course, the development of safety standards or new class security guidance documents. This is one of our core activities and we should not stop this. It's kind of a long-term activity that will be very, very, let's say, difficult to stop and then to restart. So we, of course, continue, we are continuing this activity. We continue to provide support to member states for them to apply these standards because it's not enough to have some standards. We need to have them applied in the different member states. We continue, of course, our capacity building activities and this is something key because this is really a long-term activity. This is thanks to our activities today that we will make nuclear safety and security stronger in the future. So this is really a long-term activity. So these are our core activities. We had to reorganize some of them, sometimes to reprioritize some steps, but we have kept the same focus on this. In addition to that, we have some very specific initiatives such as the one on SMRs, so NECI initiative, so nuclear harmonization and standardization initiative aimed at providing support to member states and to facilitate the deployment of safe and secure SMRs. I would like to highlight a very important event on nuclear security with the inauguration of the new Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Center. So this new center is located in Cyberstuff, so it's one hour from Vienna, but this is a new training center designed to provide training courses to member states, but in a complementary manner, complementary to what member states can find as potential courses in the field of nuclear security. And this center is key to me because that will help member states to strengthen their national security framework, and that's very important. You touched on the nuclear harmonization and standardization initiative, but you kind of, I love this initiative at Cyberstuff around nuclear security, so I kind of want to jump in if I can a little bit into capacity building, because of course what the agency does, and particularly the capabilities, the laboratory capabilities, and the research and development capabilities at Cyberstuff outside of Vienna are so important, the education and training, the human resource development, etc., can you speak a little bit more about those efforts and share your perspectives about what are the gaps that you see that your organization is filling, how can member states contribute to help fill those gaps either directly or through the agency itself, etc. Gaps, I don't know, but for sure I think we need to have a very, very comprehensive set of activities to be as efficient as possible in capacity building activities. That means that we need to work on different formats of events, so could be training courses, e-learning events, meetings, workshops, so we have a lot of many different formats. We need to cover different areas, so from radioactive sources, safety for radioactive sources, waste management, I am selecting this kind of topics because these are some very, very challenging topics for member states, in particular for those who do not have a nuclear program, where radioactive sources, waste management, I think, of course, or radiation protection in the medical field, just selecting these kind of areas which are not as big as nuclear safety, but however that may imply potential implications on safety in the public domain, in addition, so different formats, different wide range of activities, and then I think we need to use different levels, so the international level, of course, this is where the agency can provide a very strong support, but regional levels are very, very important because this is something in addition to what we can do at the international level, and that usually is very efficient to have these two different levels so that member states can have the global picture and at the same time to have some specificities linked to their geographical region and then to implement what is, let's say, the best suitable to their needs, and I think the most efficient, of course. This is how we can build this and that's where the US is so key for us because you provide support at the global level, you participate in many activities, conveying very strong messages at the same time you support some regional initiatives, and with the two types of activities, I think that's very, very efficient at the end of the day. Thank you. I am really interested in the radioactive waste disposal and handling of that. Right if, as the DG, and I know your organization has supported, if we want to expand the peaceful uses of radioactive materials around the world for human health and development, for industry, for economic development, and other kinds of things, there is this kind of back end of collecting those sources afterwards, and I know as we've both traveled around the world that the issue of disused sources has become an issue even as we've seen some countries also start to collect those, store them safely and securely, et cetera, which I think is a nice segue into rays of hope, and it is a major initiative for those of you who don't know on the part of the IAEA to increase access to radiotherapy and nuclear medicine around the world for cancer care for underserved populations. It's been a remarkable and worthwhile program. It's had a lot of impact since its inception in 2010, too, with the first wave countries. Could you talk a little bit about it? I think one of the things I'm really interested in, with rays of hope, and the United States is a big supporter for those of you who don't know. We've, through the State Department and the USAID and others contributed substantially to this, but from the regulatory perspective, my interest a little bit, and I suspect yours might be, too, is making sure that there's some regulatory framework, that there's an opportunity for inspection. I think Commissioner Wright saw this a little bit when he was in Ghana there with the inspectors at the hospital. He had those great pictures. Making sure that there's some regulatory, even just kind of the basics in place for licensing and inspection and so forth. Talk to me about what the, say, technical cooperation group or the nuclear applications group in the IAEA are intersecting with what you're doing, and how this is kind of coming together. Rays of Hope is a very interesting initiative because it brings together different departments and in a very integrated manner. It's led, of course, by the Department of Technical Cooperation together with the Department of Nuclear Science and Applications. Because of this focus on medical needs. But safety and security experts are involved at the very beginning. So what we have changed with this initiative is now we assess safety and security frameworks at the very, very beginning of the process, and not at the end or too late or later in the process. Because we can identify with this very, very early involvement where member states may need some support for them to fill the gap. Because it's, nobody wants to deliver medical equipment without the proper safety framework. But we can provide support. And this is where the agency can help. Once we have a good understanding of what is missing, then we can provide support and assistance so that the member states can reach the right level for them to receive the medical equipment. So this is something, yes, rather new or at least a bit different from what we did before. That means that we have this kind of project management approach with all the departments working together for a better identification of the needs and then earlier involvement of the agency so that safety and security are not the true stopper at some points. But at the same time, of course, we need to ensure the right level of safety for the benefits of workers, of course, and patients. We cannot deliver this kind of medical equipment without the appropriate framework for safety. But we work earlier in the process so that we can provide support as needed. So this is still in progress. But this is really the philosophy of this initiative together with, while including safety and security, very early in the process. No, I love that. In a way, the regulatory and the institutional capability really almost has to be ahead of the curve in terms of the income and lay that groundwork before a device actually lands or is installed in a country. I know that's been very helpful. For me as I think about future travel, communicating with your staff, communicating with other parts of the agency about, okay, well, where are the, you know, they're the first wave countries and what is helpful in terms of the engagement of the United States? Where is the agency looking at laying groundwork so that we can build on those efforts, hopefully augment those efforts to have a greater impact, to facilitate those deployments? I think for this kind of initiative, graded approach is very important. We do not have the same requirements for mammography units, for instance, and radiotherapy equipment, of course. So that means that we need to assess, you know, the situation in each member state from this priority list to just mention and then to provide the support as needed for them to reach the right level before receiving this equipment. Very good. Thank you. I want to talk about your career journey and your experiences in science, technology, and engineering and math. Your career has spanned multiple fields, both technical and administrative, with protecting really people in the environment as the key theme. You've said that you believe that developing a holistic approach that combines technical matters and public affairs is crucial for finding solutions to complex issues. I think you and I have spoken personally about this, too, on the sidelines of a few receptions here and there, and I've been so fascinated by it. But I wanted to see if you could just share a little bit more about that perspective and particularly, you know, how your career has progressed from early stages and what you were focused on into your time at ASN and now at the agency, and how the combination of those perspectives has evolved. That's a very interesting point because you can build different professional pathways, let's say. From my side, even at ASN, I had three different positions. The first one was in the reduction protection field, and on medical facilities, more specifically. The second one was with waste management, safety, decommissioning, research director, safety, fuel cycle facilities, you know, safety. And the last one, when I was a commissioner, of course, the scope was much broader, but different with another level of involvement, but of course, covering very, very wide range of topics, all ASN activities. So what I have learned from this is that you have always benefit from listening to other views. In particular, you know, the medical field, regulating the medical field is completely different from regulating nuclear power plants. But if you want to make the most robust decisions, you need to listen to others use it, in particular when they are different from yours. So this is to me a key point that if you can listen to and include in your decision making process different views, I'm sure that the decision is more robust. And this is from the technical perspective, together with this kind of political dimension, political in the very wide sense, and so policy makers, I would say, that nothing is only on technical matters. So in particular, in the nuclear field, we know that stakeholders involvement is a key factor, transparency, communication is something very, very important. So having these kind of different dimensions to me, that makes a lot of sense for us to be able to make the most robust decision. And in fact, this is the only ultimate objective. Now, working at the agency, I would say that there is another dimension, which is geopolitical, you know, and this is another step, you know, in the how many dimensions you need to include when you make a decision or when you work on a daily basis. So technical, this kind of policy making, you know, approach together with geopolitical, I think this is a third dimension. I'm learning, you know, in Vienna. No small thing, this geopolitics and decisions. Well, since that's such an easy topic, why don't we see what we've got here on the iPad. And I am going to try and update this. And unfortunately, I have to use my glasses. So excuse me, just a second. So while, here's the first question, I think this is a good one. Well, the IAEA issues recommendations and the NRC enforces rules and requirements. How can the global nuclear market flourish without robust global standards? And what role do you think the IAEA should establish in, or play, excuse me, in establishing these standards? I think this is a link to this core activity I mentioned, how to develop safety standards. This has been another case for decades now, because this is part of our, the mandate of the agency. The challenge now is how we can, you know, develop safety standards. Do we need more standards or do we need to revise some standards? I think this is first of all one of, we need to decide whether we need more standards in a more detailed, you know, more detailed documents, or if we need to update to new standards. And for this, this is not only with the Secretariat, so the services of the agency. This is something that needs to be decided together with member states. Because these standards, they are, you know, developed for member states, only for member states. This is not for our own use. And that means that we need to find some ways to interact with member states so that we can collect your expectations, how we can, you know, develop additional standards or not. And what is very important is that we need to have, to succeed in reaching a consensus. Because safety standards are developed based on a consensus approach. That means that if member states do not agree on the same, you know, priorities, that's of course something we need to manage and we need to handle so that we can, you know, proceed with a common, you know, understanding of our priorities. And that's what gives, you know, this robustness to safety standards, because they are recognized by all member states. But this is a positive aspect. But on the other side, of course, we need to build this consensus with so many member states. Sometimes, of course, it's a challenge. But to me, having this same process, which has proved to be, you know, efficient, including from, you know, other partners, this is something we need to continue now, how to adapt our ways of working and how to revise or develop new standards, for instance, for SMRs. But for the time being, we have, you know, work on this and after a review of applications, of applicability of safety standards, the conclusions were that we could manage with the existing, you know, set of safety standards while developing a few additional guidance documents. So this is something ongoing and I think that will be in addition to the safety standards. Of course, the Committee on Safety Standards has been really critical, I think, in developing some of these things. And yet we also recognize the unique twists or approaches that each country has to regulating, to evaluating licenses, et cetera, that while there are these high level standards, there are also going to be some regional and country specific differences. The, you know, what we're seeing, I think, in our collaboration with Canada and now with the UK has been, you know, the real desire to have that kind of standardized design and for other countries to, you know, get in and look at the specific reviews and how they might be able to take credit. Of course, I'm previewing our technical session on Thursday morning yet again on this topic about not to minimize the amount of kind of reinventing the wheel. But in a way, that standardized design is on the part of vendors is the other part of that equation. That's why, you know, this initiative has two tracks. So this new initiative launched by the DG in 2022 has two tracks. One on industrial matters and so with this standardization objective and then one of the regulatory matters. And this is on this one that, of course, the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security is involved with this, what you mentioned, avoiding, you know, duplication and then maybe in addition learning from others, you know, and leveraging lessons learned from other regulators so that we can improve or strengthen the work that can be done together with different, you know, regulators so that we can, you know, move forward in the most more efficient manner. So that's avoiding duplication while being more efficient. And of course, maintaining the sovereignty of each mobile states with regard to safety. Yeah, if I think about that, the most tangible result of the NESI as it's called, the Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative, I think it's that avoiding that duplication and that redundancy I think could be one of the most impactful things. But is there anything you wanted to, I don't want to say that that's the most impactful. I wanted to... I think it has been a bit challenging, you know, to put together all regulators with different views and different needs. Or a wily bunch. Because in fact, there are, you know, very wide range of expectations. So from member states who would like to use SMRs for their domestic needs but without any existing, you know, regulatory framework. While on the other side, there are of course member states with an extensive experience on the nuclear regulatory matters. So having all these regulators and then finding a way to develop this cooperation has been a bit challenging at the very beginning. And I think this is still something we need to continue to work on. Regarding the two tracks, I would like to mention that there are of course coordination mechanisms. So that's, you know, what is being done by this industrial track is not completely, you know, disconnected from what we are doing on the regulatory tracks. Because at some point, and not too late in the process, we should have some well coordinated mechanisms. There will be a preliminary meeting on AC in October this year. And that will be a good opportunity to present you know, the progress made over the last two years and then to prepare for the next steps. Because that will be the very first step after two years. But we are preparing the next steps so that we can of course continue developing this cooperation on SMRs. Thank you. I've got another question here. I think it's, I think this is a good one. The U.S. or the U.S. NRC places a priority on resident inspectors. Not just the NRC by the way, but other countries do too. I was in Spain a couple of weeks ago and got to meet their resident inspectors. However, many other nuclear regulators implement their mission without regular onsite safety inspections. So how are they different and successful in implementing their mission? Does the agency have a view on this? Is there, you know, talking about kind of standardization and guidance and capacity building and so forth? I'd love to get your thoughts. Yes. So I remember this topic when I was, you know, in France. And the discussions with the U.S. in addition. In France, you know, we do not have any resident inspectors. But now, having a, taking a step back, I think, I think we need to think a bit, you know, in a more holistic manner. What I mean is, so it's not only resident inspectors or not. It's how this is, you know, implemented together with the other, you know, provisions for inspection. So I would say that as long as it makes sense, you know, and because of the specific need of member states. So first of all, there is, of course, no objections at the level of the agency safety standards. There's more about how each member state implements what it considers as the most appropriate ways for inspection. Could be not only resident inspectors, but how often you rotate, you know, your inspectors. Responsible for a given site. Even if there are not resident inspectors, if you have for 10 years the same, you know, team of inspectors inspecting the same facility, you can have something, you know, not as a resident inspector, but you may have some practices, you know, that this kind of new or fresh eyes, you know, approach that works for a while but not for 10 years. So I think it's more how each regulator, you know, does manage its capacity to conduct inspections to keep this objectivity and this fresh eyes. So again, that applies to resident inspectors and to inspectors in general. And considering the national scheme for inspections, I think, to me, that's very important. And you cannot apply the same, you know, organization to the U.S. and to another, you know, member states with, let's say, one nuclear plant, of course. So that's a completely different. Thank you. That's fascinating. I love it. I'm going to finish up, I think, with a, I think, an interesting but slightly provocative question for maybe for both of us. And it's with respect to the war in Ukraine, would a new multinational treaty similar to, say, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that prohibits military attacks on or in or from nuclear power plants by signatories help prevent or limit the types of issues we're seeing now in Ukraine. We've seen the Director General. He has the seven principles and the five pillars in a way that kind of set those ethical and policy norms for the safe operation of a nuclear power plant in a conflict zone. But would a more formal mechanism like a standalone treaty contribute to that overall norm setting, do you think? So this is a question we have been receiving now for, you know, since the very beginning of the war. So the question is whether with a legally binding instrument, I would say, what we are experiencing at the project would have been avoided or not? We've seen a lot of other norms and international treaties violated in Ukraine as well. In addition, there is already a resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the Agency that states that any military activities should, be avoided or prevented at a nuclear power plant. So there is already some, there are already some provisions on this. Of course, transcending the international framework, considering these kind of very unprecedented situations could bring some value, added value, would it be enough to avoid this kind of situation? That it's another story, I think, you know, because in Ukraine there are other treaties, international law, international legal provisions that have been breached for sure. So it's how we can manage. From this side, I would say that at the agency, our top priority is to prevent an accident, a nuclear accident. So I know this is very, let's say, restrictive, but this is really our top priority. That's why we are, you know, deploying so many, you know, rotations in Ukraine. We are delivering equipment for nuclear safety and security. This legal aspect, I think at some point, will have to be, you know, is it today the right moment that I don't know, but I know that there are, you know, some legal officers working on it, at least, you know, reflecting on what could have been done for this. Yeah. Thank you for that perspective. It is a little bit of a conundrum and there are multiple sides of this. And sometimes it can be useful to have the international legal norms or the ethical norms in place, even if they're not fully effective in preventing a tragedy like this. And I know that's part of the discussion as well. Some people, you know, consider that that could be, you know, discussed further once the war is over. And that's probably very difficult to address this topic now, as it is. Thank you. We've reached the end of our time. I want to thank you very, very much. It's a great pleasure to have you here at the RIC. You said this is your first RIC. So I think a welcome. And I'm so pleased you're here. And I appreciate the very much the conversation. And it's a great privilege and honor for me and the rest of the NRC to participate and support and occasionally cajole. The agency and all of you do. I just wanted to ask you if you've got any final thoughts you'd like to share? Any final words of wisdom for us at your first RIC? Thank you for this conversation. I think it has covered a wide range of topics from my personal experience. So it's always, you know, a pleasure to have this kind of opportunity to interact with such a wide audience and very interesting questions. So thank you so much to all of you. Thank you to you, of course. So, Chris, for this.