 Okay, I think I'd like to get some questions from the hall here. We've got a number of spectators who would probably be curious to ask a few questions. Anybody have a question out there? It's dead silence. I guess we've answered all the questions on Okay, right here, yeah Right here My micropos, Monsieur Quentin Nugy. Hey, no, it's not a question. It's just a comment because I wouldn't want Foreign I mean non-French friends to think that Renault Girard's Position represent the position of France of the position of other or let alone of Europe. I think it's a his position And I certainly do not share it and I just wouldn't want people to think that this is a position of France And I think it is You have to take the facts as they are. The vassalization that I'm talking about is a voluntary vassalization and assumed, completely assumed. It's not that America will not use the coercion like against England in 1956 on Sweden, America will not Use the insult or the threat as she did against France on Iraq by saying we are going to Punish France Forget Russia and forgive Germany. No It's a fact, this vassalization is a fact, it is assumed, it is voluntary Is that it will be bad for France? I think that Macron will get, I think that there will be no American attack against the big French companies, whether it's Airbus as it was in the past attacks or Orano or Total etc. I don't think so. I think that the extraterritoriality of the American right will remain, it's just like an extremely strong instrument But I think that on lira, for example, because you asked the question of Macron's visit to the United States I think that Macron has asked for waivers, it's a derogation that the US President can give a law and I think that on I think there will be an American benevolence and I think that Biden was sincere when he said that he would agree with the waivers and I think that if France or other European countries ask for waivers on the IRA, I think that they will get them but my point is very simple, is that the American situation in Europe is today 100 times more favorable to the Americans. The influence is 100 times more important today than it was in October last year, during the last World Policy Conference If there's no question from the audience, I would like to ask my French colleague What is, what are you trying to tell us? Who first of all, who's the enemy? Is the enemy Russia or is the enemy the United States? Is the America's influence going down or is it going up? It seems like if somebody like as we've heard from Stu Eisenstein somebody is re-engaging in Europe in a systematic way and shelling out what will be close to a hundred billion dollars to, to, to, to, to Ukraine Is that a slight, hmm? 100 billion dollars. Well, they've been 54 so far plus another 40. Yeah, whatever. Let's, let's not quibble. 90, 100. Okay What is it? What is your complaint about the United States exactly? Do you want to go back to 1958 and Monsieur de Gaulle? Do you see any chance that another de Gaulle will unify Europe on the French or German or Franco-German? Susirenti, what are we supposed to, concretely, what are we supposed to do in Ukraine at this point? Okay, so I'm going to answer you very clearly. First of all, I gave tribute to the American clairvoyance very clearly in my conference by saying that they even underestimated their success in terms of information, intelligence, which they did not have on the direct war, and in terms of the formation of the Ukrainian forces. That's the first thing. Secondly, I talked about a strategic error, the most serious strategic error in the history of Russia. So I think that, here I said it clearly, but my conference is not on Russia. So is it an attack that violates all international laws, the answer is yes. Are the Europeans of the East right to be afraid of success again? The answer is yes when we have a third. Thirdly, have Americans provoked this war? The answer is no. Since I talked about the maintenance of Geneva in June 2021, where Biden gave an important gift to Putin from Nord Stream 2. So I didn't think about it. The Americans sent William Burns, who went to the Patrushev office in Moscow, they talked on the screen with Putin, William Burns spoke Russian, he openly warned the Russians not to do this nonsense. Here it's quite certain. And so I understand completely, do I criticize Sweden? Do I criticize Sweden and Finland to have joined the time? No, I would have been Swedish or Finnish, I would have done exactly the same. What I'm saying is that there have been many European strategic autonomy that has been expressed by President Macron. There have also been Franco-German velocities to resist the extraterritoriality of the American right. That is to say, when BNP finances exports of underground oil, it is condemned to 9 billion dollars, while Goldman Sachs is not condemned when Goldman Sachs helps the Greek government to make its public accounts to enter the Eurozone. So this is obviously the state of the vassalization. Do I think that President Macron was right to go to Kiev and deliver weapons to Ukraine? The answer is yes, because we cannot accept it on the European soil, but certainly not on the European soil, an aggression like this. The administration asked the capability and the authority to grant waivers on the inflation reduction act. I was in New York discussing with the French ambassador to the US who was part of the delegation of the Macron visit, and he told me that they had a session with Congress where this point was discussed, and he felt, and I'm just quoting the French ambassador, he felt that there was little interest in granting specific waivers to countries that wouldn't be part of a more broader type of agreement. So I'm a little bit suspicious on this one, which Renaud is right, but I'm not quite sure whether this is something that's legally possible, could the administration do it with us, Congress, that's one. Particularly, and I don't think it's going to happen doing what we call the lambda session between now and beginning of January, and I think the House of Representatives with a majority of Republicans is probably less inclined to grant this type of waivers. That's the point I wanted. Jean-Claude, I just want to get over to a colleague over here who's had his hand up for a long time. Yes, sir, what's your question? Well, my name is Im Sung-Joon, former Korean ambassador. Well, we have to remember that there is a very dangerous geostrategic flashpoint that is the Korean Peninsula. North Korean, somebody talked about Kim Jong-un, and this year he fired, he launched, I mean, the biggest number of missiles, including ICBMs. Recently, he sent out a picture with his daughter, you know, besides the Hwaseong-17 ICBM. They think that is the, you know, most advanced weapon in the world. And well, since Biden, you know, became the president, we expected, I mean, you know, some positive policy to reduce the tension on the Korean Peninsula. But many people, you know, in South Korea think that he doesn't pay the, you know, attention as much as he should pay. So what do you think, I mean, Biden should do, I mean, to reduce the tension and, you know, prevent, I mean, the, you know, recurrence of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. Let's turn to our Washington insider here, Stu. Stu, what do you think? Is there going to be any change of U.S. policy on North Korea? I don't think so. I mean, obviously the policy that Trump proposed of meeting with Mr. Kim with no preconditions and no preparation was not successful, number one. Number two, our leverage with China, which is the main lever we have against North Korea, has evaporated because of the poor relationship with China. And it's one of the reasons I think we need to have a modicum of better relations. And so there really is very little that the administration sees that it can do with Mr. Kim. I think that it is important that President Biden in the second half of his first term go to South Korea, go to the DMZ, make it clear that he's willing to reengage with Mr. Kim to reduce tensions, do the same with Japan as well, and try to reengage with China on this issue. But Mr. Kim sees launching missiles as the only way to gain attention. He's got a collapsing economy, and this is his only way. So I think there's very little room for leverage by the United States, but we should certainly try again and I think and hope that the President will do so by a major visit to South Korea. Thank you very much, Stu. And thank you, Paddle. I think we've got to now end it right here because we have the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia who has arrived. And if you're confused about American foreign policy, I just remind you about a foreign policy concept that's as old as Richelieu, and that is constructive ambiguity. So maybe it's just a little ambiguity on the Americans part. Thank you very much all.