 Welcome to this session about the global impact of a tech cold war. My name is Karsten Knob. I'm the editor-in-chief of digital products of Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, which is quite a tongue-breaker for non-German native speakers, but it's one of the leading German nationwide dailies and, of course, with a huge digital presence on the Internet and to more than a few extents, I'm really passionate about this topic since I'm using almost only American technology in our newsroom and FatsNet, our website is hosted on the Microsoft Azure cloud and basically everything's from the US. So it's possible that you don't feel comfortable with that and so I really have some good understanding for European politicians who would like to change it and who think about doing something about the dominance of US and maybe now even Chinese IT companies. Well, I'm happy to be able to present this esteemed panel here and let me just briefly introduce the panelists and this session is a little bit special since it's not just only a discussion between the four of us. There will be a short presentation to give you some facts and figures and theses that lead into the topic and then we'll discuss here just a little bit and then even more with you guys in the audience. Thanks for joining us and thanks for being here. Michelle Zetlin, co-founder and chief operating officer of CloudFair, a company from the United States, from San Francisco actually, but you're a Canadian born US UB. Entrepreneur. And CloudFair is a company that helps its clients to enhance the performance of a website and the security of a website, if you will, presence in Europe and other places of the world and a listed company for two years now or a year. Actually, so we're about 10 years old and we just went public in September. Right, so last year. So it was a very starting company to go in public is kind of what every country wants to see for their local tech entrepreneurs. Thanks for being here, Michelle. Sameer Saran, president, observer research foundation. That's an independent think tank from India. Hi, Sameer and thanks for stepping in on a really short notice since until yesterday evening, late in the evening, we expected a minister from Rwanda being here. Indian engineers generally step in at short notice. Thanks for that. And last but not least, John Shipman, director general and chief executive of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He's from the UK, but you're still welcome here. So, sorry. So, you're basically an expert on this topic and it's a good choice that you will give a short presentation into it. So, John, please go ahead. Thank you very much. Well, the double I double S is international, so everybody is welcome at the double I double S. Technology is largely multinational. It creates strengths and it generates vulnerabilities. It is an area of competition and it requires cooperation. Isolation is rarely feasible and integration will often carry risks. So, managing the bonds that technology and the attendant supply chains create is an obvious necessity and this maximum carries particularly relevance to the development of the internet and the competitive environment of the cyber domain, which is what I was originally asked to speak about. The internet has been built and governed uniquely with a fine balance being struck between the interests of the sort of innovative tech coders, companies and governments. Cyberspace became an important domain for the conduct of espionage and also for organized crime and the threat theft of intellectual property. An important origin of the present US-China trade and political tension is the increased and proven efforts of China to turbocharge its own industrial and economic development through commercial espionage. Though in 2015 a US-China agreement was arrived at on this issue it really hasn't been very effective. Since at least 1999 the US and other states also realized they could use their new cyber capabilities to do more than spy. They could interfere with the code and data of others rather than just grab it and could covertly insert their own. And we saw the birth of cyber operations including not just the insertion of malicious code or hacking. These operations were designed to achieve effect, to influence, disrupt, destroy and states like Iran and North Korea also realized that these capacities give them reach and effect far beyond their borders including to strike at the heart of the digitally dependent United States. And the list of state-on-state operations is very large. They include operations by the US and Iran against each other, Israel and Iran against each other, the Russians against, Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, Russia against at least the US democratic process and the subsequent US retaliation against the St. Petersburg group that had been deemed partly responsible. Iran has done cyber operations against Saudi Arabia and North Korea against Sony Pictures, global banking system, etc. Problem is that the states who operate these cyber offensive operations can lose control of those operations to the detriment of third parties as was the case with the mass shipping line and in the UK with our national health service. Cyber operations have also been increasingly aimed now at critical national infrastructures, financial institutions, oil and gas companies, power grids, plants, transport sectors, core communication infrastructures. But the media reports only tell some of the story because now the operations to reconnoitre and gain a presence on relevant networks are occurring every second and are now a permanent feature of cyberspace. So the risk of miscalculation is high. Critical national infrastructure networks are complicated. An opponent needs first to insert their code, later to activate it, remaining in contact with the code to ensure that it can still function. But that kind of pre-positioning of a cyber munition could be misinterpreted as an attack by the defender, cause the retaliation, or the code could malfunction, create an accident, escalation could follow. So in these circumstances, China has learned the advantages that it thinks it could gain with greater influence over the physical development of cyberspace beyond just the advantage to its own internal security. The combination of its made in China 2025 strategy with a digital component of the Belt and Road Initiative could see much of the developing world turning to China for help in building fiber optic cables, mobile networks, satellite relay stations, data centers, servers, e-government platforms and smart cities. And President Xi has prioritized China's indigenous microchip and quantum computing and AI capabilities as central to this effort. And at the front line of this is Huawei. The US position on Huawei is clear in May 2019. The Department of Commerce added Huawei to its entities list. And the US position is that the presence of Chinese equipment in a country's 5G network, given the technical differences between 5G and previous generations, greatly increases the risk of espionage and sabotage. And this is all the more the case because of a Chinese law that would require any company to provide intelligence to the state if asked. And the US clearly sees that protecting the US ICT advantage is a core goal of its international tech diplomacy. A few countries agree with the US, many do not, and some remain undecided. In the UK, the view of the technical experts is that the 5G risk can be managed much as the 4G risk has been. Additionally, were Huawei to be allowed into the system, they would be excluded from the so-called core. It's estimated, for example, that Vodafone has three main data centers for 4G in the UK. It would only have three more with 5G, suggesting that at least this core capability could be managed. As for the delicate intelligence links that the UK enjoys the member of the Five Eyes, some people think that these might be politically put at risk, but the fact remains that intelligence sharing does not happen over public networks. It's heavily encrypted, and it doesn't exactly happen over WhatsApp or over Signal. So the idea that the UK having other suppliers into its 5G network would remotely touch the technical manner with which the US and the UK exchange intelligence is just not correct. But the wider point is that the US and China are grappling for who will dominate the future of cyberspace. An ICT development covers microchips, computer assembly, internet essential services. US and European and other states have 42 of the top 50 companies, with China having eight of the top 50 companies. But Chinese companies are now rapidly expanding. They're a market share in East and Southeast Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa as part of the Digital Silk Road Program. And the data that China will gain from those investments and cooperation will help to fuel China's digital ambitions. Remember one basic fact. At present, the enormous amount of data that China gets from its own 1.4 billion population is actually fairly homogeneous. The more diverse data it collects from other geographies is what will empower it as a data superpower. Now, for its part, China has contested the way the internet has governed. It wants to push for greater state control. It seeks support from parts of the developing world to establish norms and protocols in that spirit. The US is interested in protecting its global ICT advantage. Russia appears to be trying to develop some form of national internet. And so with these three powers having different visions, the fear has grown that a global internet will break down into three or more separate ecosystems. The ecosystem issue is important. What do we want the future to be? The choice may be between the continuation of this multi-stakeholder free model that we have today, or one with greater state control or some compromise position. The continuation of a single internet would see all countries, including China, having a vested interest in the global economy that it supports. A bifurcation of the internet, sometimes called the splinter net, could see two competing models. We would have separate supply chains and ICT built different standards, each looking to win business from each other, but with the Chinese model potentially being much more attractive to the developing world that prioritizes internal security. Clearly the banning of Chinese tech in the U.S. and allied networks heightens the risk of a splinter net. It's already happening in the military domain where you saw last week the U.S. ask the Taiwanese company TSMC that also supplies Huawei to produce its military chips in the U.S. because those are the military chips that go into the F-35 fighter jet. By the way, the F-35 fighter jet is basically also the J-20 in China because China was able to steal from Lockheed Martin in a cyber operation, all the designs of the F-35, so there's also an F-35 produced in China, but it is called the J-20. A balkanized network, though, would be problematic for consumers and maybe even more dangerous. It could mean that more state-on-state cyber operations are conducted. There are lots of national security risks that could also arise from a lack of diversity in the high-tech marketplace. And a number of countries are trying to adapt. We think of Japan that has introduced tax breaks to national firms investing in 5G as an example in an effort to create a form of national champion. And finally, the need to develop international norms for cyberspace will, I think, only intensify. So that means we need to look to standards a little bit more. Countries and companies will need universal standards for ICT products to ensure the reliability of the tech they employ and the welfare of their citizens using it, as well as to ensure the ability to sell into foreign markets. That is why Huawei, Qualcomm and others have put such efforts into filing 5G patents. But there are few patents from anyone relating to security. Had the international community spent much more time designing international standards to control the cybersecurity risk from espionage or sabotage, I think the current debate around 5G would now be very different and Huawei's tender price would have been much higher leveling the playing field with Nokia and Ericsson. U.S. companies in the 1990s were actually quite effective in opening an office in Beijing to lobby on standards in China to make representations to Beijing this day. Microsoft and Cisco were invited three years ago into China's new cybersecurity council so U.S. companies have been able to try to insert some of their own standards into the Chinese marketplace. IBM and the Bank of China as recently as September 2019 agreed to expand their existing relationship to create a new innovation model for the financial industry. And that's an example of how entangled U.S. and Chinese entities actually are in cyberspace together of course supporting tens of trillions of dollars of exchanges per year. So in my judgment now is the time to begin working together having failed to do so for 5G using well-practiced standard setting arrangements to design the universal standards for the generations of mobile technology that will follow 5G and to design those also for AI. And the broader goal would be to establish the ICT standards that would ensure the single interoperable internet on which the global economy depends. There will still be security challenges, covert interference. National origins of technology don't necessarily affect this. The U.S. and Israel interfered with Siemens equipment when it covertly launched cyberattacks on Iranian centrifuges. Stakeholders, it doubles. So I'll conclude with stakeholders 90 seconds more. The future of the internet isn't just a techie subject to be left to the techie experts. It is germane to future global power and no nation company, international institution or other stakeholder can leave it to others. And it certainly shouldn't be left to the U.S. and China alone. The development of norms and the development of standards should be reinforcing and that's something which will require international and national interventions on ICT from companies and governments. And there'll be a need to engage with international standards bodies like the UN group of government experts and the ITU, the International Telecommunications Union. Conversation between governments and companies need to be based on rigorous research rather than being narrowly shaped. The national investment model for ICT needs more robustly to be considered. It's, for example, the Japan model to build a national capability one that others might wish to develop. So in conclusion, if anything, we're a typical Davos multi-stakeholder subject containing competition in a technological cold war especially in cyberspace qualifies. Thank you very much. John, thank you. And just a question for the audience and it's for all of you and you can raise your hand. Who heard the term SplinterNet before? Maybe half, but not even half, I guess. So this is a fairly new development and the sad thing is it's actually happening. Michel, you run a company that relies on clients from all over the world. Do you feel this separation of the network already while talking to your clients? I thought your remarks were really helpful to help set the context and I would just add one nuance sort of thing to help answer this question. So 10 years ago there were eight technology companies that had market caps that were over $100 billion. Only eight, 10 years ago. And so because there was only eight, I think a lot of people thought, oh, those technology companies, they're the geeks in the corner, counterculture, they're not that interesting, not that important. Today there are 25 technology companies who have market caps over $100 billion. I'm from Europe. Yet. Hopefully there's an entrepreneur here who helps change that. There are four of those 25 companies, there are four companies in the world that have market caps over a trillion dollars. All four are technology companies. And there's a whole host that are behind and so this is why this is such a forefront where before it kind of went from this technology, went from this thing in the corner to something that's really shaping industries and economies both at the domestic level and national. And it's not going away. It's only going to accelerate because of all the things we outlined. And so it's not a surprise that it's at a forefront because all of a sudden it's like, wait, these are big economic upswings. Who's going to capture that value? As an entrepreneur who's built a large global company that happened to start in the United States, I absolutely believe in a free and open internet. We want interoperability between countries and the internet. We want the internet to transcend country borders. We think that's very important. We think that helps drive innovation, which helps make it better for citizens and the businesses in those countries. And while there are absolutely challenges that come with all of the upside, no doubt the internet has made our lives better, not worse. Whether it's business productivity, the way we communicate, how you order food or a phone. I mean there's so many examples where it's been a force for good, but with the good there have been challenges. In terms of the splinter net idea, I think the one narrative that sometimes gets lost or people say but it gets forgotten and I cannot, it's kind of counterintuitive, but I'm going to say it here because it's so important. If countries go to more of the splinter net where you have the Chinese with their internet model, the US and then India potentially with their model and potentially a fourth, the companies that are best served by that are actually the biggest companies because they have the resources to be able to figure out how to solve that from a technical perspective or how to work with the policy makers to figure that out. And the people that it harms are actually the entrepreneurs and the new entrants trying to create something in that market. And so I absolutely believe in interoperability of free and open internet, so I look for policies that do that. While understanding how can each country domestically have strong, robust domestic tech industries as well. And if we go to more of a splinter net, then I actually think it favors the internet giants, the exact thing that countries are trying to get away from. Right. So, but of course, I guess there are a lot of advocates of free trade here in Davos always have been, but to be realistic, free trade is not a really popular topic and listening to the president from the United States, you get an even deeper impression on that one. So why should we be optimistic about the free flow of data in the future? Well, I mean, there are, there have been some bad behaviors that have gone on and from both the technology companies and the governments, and we should have conversations about saying, what do we want this to look like in the future? And I think that the companies that will win in the future are ones that built great technology that solve, that deliver real value to their customers and show, demonstrate responsible leadership about these tricky situations because as technology becomes more and more important, what happens is it comes closer and closer to policy and the next 10 years is all about policy in technology. And so if you are a policymaker, you need to learn a lot about the technology and if you're a technologist, you need to learn a lot about the policy side of beginners and amateurs in both fields. And so it's the companies and the policy makers who lean in and say, okay, explain to me how the technology works and then the technologists say to the policy makers, what are you trying to protect against and trying to have that conversation? If we can do that, we'll have much better outcomes over the next 10 years. And again, and I think there are lots of places where that's happening and it needs to happen more. And I think that's what a conference like Davos can help convene those conversations between the policy makers, the governments and the technologists to say, hey, how are we going to solve some of the challenges that come up? Because while there have been some bad behaviors in the past, it doesn't mean that it has to continue in the future. And I think the leaders who say, hey, we're going to do something about it are the ones that will create the most positive change. Sami, one question for you before we open it to the audience also. There was one thesis, if you will, in John's opening remarks that the Chinese form of the Internet, a controlled one, may be the most attractive one for developing countries. Do you think that's right? I mean, the answer is yes, that may be right. But I genuinely believe that it is also the price points, which is beyond just the control. It's also the affordability and the accessibility that strengthens the Chinese proposition. Let me give you a very decent example. We had, as a country a few years ago, I think this was during the time when many of us still used the Blackberry. You know, there used to be... The Canadian company. Some guys will remember. And at that particular point of time, there was this big hula-baloo in India about Indian data being stored in Canadian servers because of the messenger service that the Blackberry used to offer. And a Chinese company at that point of time had just begun starting introducing phones, which were offering similar services. Now, the rule that came out at that point of time from India was that anyone who wants to offer this service should keep their servers in India. Blackberry refused. The Chinese agreed. More recently, we have asked in terms of our 5G trials and transparency mechanisms that need to be adhered to if you want to operate a network in India. Western companies say no. The Chinese say, please, use our... We will open everything up for you. We will dismantle it all. We will give you everything you want. Use the Chinese equipment. So I think it's more than just the control element. I think, yes, many parts of the emerging world and in fact, forget about the emerging world. I think many parts of Europe and perhaps even the US today would like the state to be more in charge. And the idea that a strong state is important is not an emerging world phenomenon. It is not a developing country reality. It is a secular phenomenon happening around the world. The populist and strongman leaders were born out of the Western hemisphere and we are only catching up. But I think so it is not a developing country. I think many political regimes around the world will like the Chinese offer for multiple reasons. But let me just say one thing that John and John, it was a fantastic presentation. I think you kind of captured a very long story in a very suscent manner. But let me just put two, let me problematize it. I don't think we are looking at the balkanization. I think the internet was always balkanized. There were three reasons why the internet was always divided. For someone living in India I could never access much of the content because A, I could not afford it. I could not afford it. I think it was as chilling as freedom of expression, counter freedom of expression laws in other countries. When you have strong IPR laws and there are people who have committed suicide, you are denied access to information for which the internet was created. There was one reason why they were the differential internet. Those who had money accessed a certain form of internet. Those who did not did not access certain parts of it. There were the dark white web to be divided. They opened the doors and windows on their terms. The internet was balkanized and it was sometimes connected when the Chinese decided that the terms of engagement were all right for them. I think what is happening now is a pushback and I think amongst many problems that many people may have with Donald Trump, I think one thing he has got right is his approach to the Chinese. I think one of the few things he is doing right is resetting the trade and tech terms with the technology. I think in the first time telling them that you are not getting a free pass, you can't dip into our internet and engage with us on your terms. We need to have a reciprocity on technology terms and I think he may not stay the course because like everything else that he does, I think a little bit of stamina and focus is important to make this happen but he has probably got the discourse right. I don't know whether he has got his intent right. I think that is the second thing he mentioned. Tech and technology flows represent actually trade flows and financial flows. If you look at the World Economic Forum chart from a few years ago and I can't remember exactly the year of production but you would find the stagnation in the flow of new finance and in the flow of new goods but you would see exponential rise in the flow of data which really means that the global value flows are now moving through data. We are talking about the transition to the transition 4.0, the sharing of value etc. And if you look at that, I think you have to understand that what we are really talking about is a whole new architecture. So this Cold War is not about tech Cold War. The Cold War is about two differential trading systems. We are actually hitting at the global trading arrangement when we are discussing technology today. We are talking about global political change. We are talking about three different spheres of influence. We will have similarly three differential political regimes that will be operating at the same point of time. We will have three security arrangements which are different and the number three is arbitrary. You can multiply it. Correct. So what I am really trying to say is don't limit it to a tech Cold War. This is a full blown Cold War. Tech represents everything. Your political organizations, your autonomous vehicles, your right sharing, how you love, how you romance, how you date, everything is tech. So when you are really talking about the cold edge where countries are now finding disagreement, you are really talking about a full blown Cold War. It is beyond tech. Okay. So I would be really surprised if there weren't any questions from the audience on those topics. So we would love to have the first shot. So what is the question that you are going to win this war? What is the question? Well, I have a point of view. It is not about winning the war, but I actually think it is an opportunity for India and if India doesn't step up, potentially another large country to step up. So I don't, there is the China model of which way the internet works. And then there is the US model where China has this state-owned data layer where the US has this very unregulated data layer that they say opens up to private industry to compete on. And I don't think the world, I think there are a lot of people in the world that don't want to adopt either the China model nor the US model. And so the question is whose model do they adopt? And so one of the things I said to Smear before is I actually think India has the opportunity to step up and play that role. And then he said, well, I hope that doesn't happen because there may be a third model and there's an appetite from a lot of countries around the world to say, hey we don't like the US model, we don't like the China model, we want a third model and there's an opportunity for someone to present that and then for actually a much of the world to migrate to that. So actually there's an opportunity for someone to step up. Maybe Europe? Maybe Europe. Europe could be, Europe is another another region of the world that is really taking a stance here. So it could be, I heard someone from Europe, so Europe or India, I think of those are two potential opportunities where people, where other countries in the world can say, huh, let's do it this way. Okay. You know, my response to that particular question would be that I don't know who wins or who should be winning, but if we can let me put a phrase out of the Russian dictionary and suggest that if we can convert the Cold War into hot peace, we might be better served. And I think that's something that John mentioned in his initial presentation, that if we can agree to a framework of standards something we did with the telecommunication networks around the world that you sanctioned each other, you fought wars with each other, but you could still connect to each other online. You could still dial the number and get through. So I think if we can come to a robust standards framework that keeps the interoperability and let's define it in two levels. One is the bare minimum required to keep it healthy and other is the lifestyle where we can do plenty more. If we can do the bare minimum to keep the net alive and maintain that hot peace that even as we differ on technologies and who are ways and your way and my way we can still continue to transact engage, communicate and collaborate. Now that's one part of it. The second is that it is there were two theories thrown at us at the turn of the century. One of course was by very prominent thinkers like Joseph Nye and others who argued for the longest while or who suggested for some time in their works that the Chinese would never be able to compete with western technology simply because they don't have democracy and freedom of expression and innovation. Not creative enough. Now I think the Chinese have clearly disproved that theory. See that particular school of thought will have to now come up with a new idea to respond to what the Chinese have really been able to do. Now, whether it is theft, but guess what? Let's start talking about who stole textile technologies a few hundred years ago and who stole some other. And you'll certainly realize that we are very close to home right now of the Den of Thieves who created the second and third industrial revolution. So I don't think IPR theft is anything unique to the Chinese. What they have really stunned the world with is that and by the way I'm not lauding them or applauding them. I'm just a neighbor who shares a 4,000 kilometer border which they don't agree to. So but let me just tell you that they have been able to create a potent Chinese alternative and I'm not saying not so sure that they're going to win in this longer race, but certainly they are a compelling actor you cannot ignore and if you think you can normalize Chinese businesses into say a UK industry model or a European, I think you are being a little naive. It's time for everyone who engages with China to be far more strategic. They are not innocent businessmen anymore. They have proven to the world that they are compelling strategic actor and technology is the most powerful weapon they have today. So I think we need to draw the naivety and the romance around the rise of China or the rise of any other actor with that kind of capability. That's the point. And as the technology company, if you're trying to build a global company you have to abide by the laws of the rules and what you operate in and that is really important and so there have been several US tech companies who tried to say, oh, we're not going to do it the China way or we're not going to do it this way we're going to do it our way and that doesn't work and so I think that also it works the other way to what you're saying to smear is if you are a business owner it is on you to make sure you're following the rule of the law in the countries and what you operate and that is a nuance point that's very important. Could I just ask you why wasn't your go-to place Europe and you thought of India first? Yoga? Yeah. Be honest. Well, no, no, no, right. There's a large population in India which is very interesting so the size of the region plays an important role because that creates a large economy that you can buy from internally but then also the global nature so I think it really comes back to the size and then having said that I would say that you joked when you read out some of your stats about 50 large companies 42 of which are US based which are China based and Karsten made a comment on none are European based and you kind of ask why haven't there been very many recent internet giants coming out of Europe. There should have been the last one I can think of is Skype and Spotify would be the last two that I can think of and there should be more and right, from my vantage to right, well what should happen in Europe to help enable more? Well, okay, so this is different than what is going on but as a if you look at all of the large unicorns, unicorns is defined by technology company that's raised venture capital that's worth more than a billion dollars. A lot of them are based in the United States some are private, some are still public some are still private, some are still public, some are still private but if you look at the ones who are the founders over half of those are actually founded by a foreigner so it's not the Americans who are actually coming up with innovative companies it's the greatest German founders are actually moving to the US to start the company or like me I'm a Canadian who moved to the US to start a very successful company and so it's actually not the Americans who are innovating what they are they are attracting the innovators who are the most ambitious companies and so then the question is why do they go there and stay at home and I will say that building a company is very hard the odds are 100% stacked against you it's a one in a thousand chance you'll make it you read every single stat you think why does anyone start a company it's all about failure, failure, failure because the ones that succeed you end up the stories of Steve Jobs or Jeff Bezos or Mark Zuckerberg and people say I want that I want to build a company like that and the best place is in the United States and many reasons why is access to capital access to the people who can you attract to come work to build these companies it's not one person you need a team to build to make it happen and it's been working on it for over 50 years it's an ecosystem that helps enable all of that now what you've seen is I actually think the answer today is very different than 10 years ago I'm not so sure the Silicon Valley is still the best place to start a company there's nothing about tech there's a lot of backlash against that it's not as not as clear cut there's a lot more capital around the world it's there are a lot of people who have left that part of the world and who are now starting companies in other places and there are a lot of companies who say hey I want what the Silicon Valley has created and the governments are doing really smart things to attract people to stay in their home countries to do it so we'll see whether it's still the right place but historically where if you are an entrepreneur trying to build a very global large company very ambitious company your best chance of success in the past was to move to the valley I don't know if that's the case anymore and it may be changing but that's historically why again it's not the Americans innovating it's America is the place that all the innovators went to realize their dreams before I will be taking two more questions one for John since you are the other European on this panel what is the European perspective on that one well all I would say is that a bit of it is about competition policy and so the difficulty is when you have just Nokia and Ericsson and if you're trying to create a European champion can that be done within the competition regulations that the EU likes you'll have one commissioner that is in charge of digital issues that will say great let's have a single European champion then you'll have a competition commissioner so there will need to be some sort of intermediation between those two the EU has a great administrative brain so it should have the capacity to set standards in the digital domain it would open up some wounds within Europe because there's 16 European countries that like to dip their toe into the Chinese pot quite a bit and there's a lot of diversity of view in the European Union about just a basic Huawei issue but it should be something on which the new president of the commission Arsala Vondelaian who did have a background in defence and understands these issues might want to lead a more strategic debate on standards are really important because they also make competition a more level playing field and when people talk about economic warfare they think about sanctions you just impose sanctions but actually a more neutral thing is you impose standards that then some of your competitors you might have unhealthy motivations have difficulty meeting and I think Western Europeans and North Americans have missed out a bit in thinking about how they can influence standard setting in a way that makes the competition a little bit more honest and fair so actually we didn't even manage to build a true digital single market so far so and it comes to standards right so we have time for I guess two more quick questions and short answers so please Huawei showed up in the screen but was not mentioned the question is to whoever wants to pick it up but probably to Miss Zetlin especially the fact that the Chinese are willing to use their tech companies as geopolitical tools to lead the U.S. to view their companies also as geopolitical tools because of the rivalry can I just jump in there first please, please, you jump in maybe first and last if it's geopolitics I can't restrain myself I think a couple of points here the People's Liberation Army only uses Microsoft operating systems so I will just leave that point there on Huawei is specific because there is no question that the Chinese state has an ability to compel its own companies to provide intelligence to it in a way that the United States has signally failed to do the ability of the FBI to be able to access an Apple phone in order to figure out the communications of someone who blew up a base is limited there's a month worth of litigation you end up having to sort of pay a clever techie from a country outside the United States to be able to figure out how to do it so the United States is not positioned to use its ICT companies for geopolitical purposes in the same way the Chinese are they can't even compel as often as they would like the ICT companies to give it information to counter terrorist threats or the problems of child pornography or so many other ills that unfortunately pollute the internet but on the specific issue of Huawei the big concern is if the Chinese were through Huawei to build 5G networks well then they could easily do denial of service attacks from their own kit they do denial of service attacks every second of every day you don't need your own kit to do it and if you were to use your own kit and that would be identified that would be the end of the story that would kill Huawei globally forever and so I think that in the UK and in European countries there's a very sophisticated understanding in cyberspace and certainly in the UK GCHQ has a comparative advantage because we've compelled Huawei to show us their source code they actually pay for a place in Banbury and Oxfordshire that has 500 techies in it that looks at Huawei code it's quite efficient but it's very buggy and then they charge Huawei to fix those bugs so we gather a fair amount of intelligence on Huawei and that is the condition of their market entry and it will still be the condition of their market entry so I think sometimes in the United States people don't understand some of the advantages of engaging with the Chinese if you have the skill set to do it and what the UK does maybe is not scalable to Romania because GCHQ is in the top tier of signals intelligence agencies but if you have that capacity then it's useful to use it so I know that there are other questions quite a few actually in the audience but please accept my apologies, time is running out it's only two more minutes and it's all not too good if you aren't able to close the panel but I guess there will be a chance to ask our panelists afterwards those particular questions and I do know that you wanted to add something very briefly before we conclude everything here when you were living in India in the 1980s during the Cold War there was a common refrain that America has its most powerful generals called General Motors, General Dynamics General Atomics and General Electric so when were big companies transnational companies not geopolitical I think they always were and asked me because East India Company colonized us so companies were always geopolitical instruments and governments have used them and continue to use them that's the first point second I think your point is very important unless EU reconciles its battle with data EU is not going to produce innovation at scale I think it doesn't know how to handle its people's data in America the private companies own it in China the state owns it in India both of them own it so unless you reconcile your battle with data you will not produce the next miracle okay and I will just add just I know and I'm gonna be really brief you know I want I just I agree with everything that said but back to your question the one thing that I wish we would tell more stories of of examples of where US and China have actually there have been some bright spots and there have been bright spots you mentioned Microsoft Microsoft actually runs a very large business in China profitably and it's actually and I think the Chinese is happy about it they're happy about it actually think it's worked very well I'm an entrepreneur cloudflare we've actually been operating in China for the last five years which is pretty amazing and so there are actually a lot of bright spots between the US and China and what I would like is in between some of the places where it's not so bright that the bright spots don't get forgotten and so I think that's very important it's an and so thank you all actually I guess Europe will need to get its act together and I do hope that Thierry Breton the new commissioner who is in charge of all this is right when he says that the cards in this tech will always be mixed in you and there will be a new game we're desperately in need for that if you are right that there is still a war already going on so thanks for listening thanks to our readers on Fatsnet and you in the audience and thanks for joining us here