 So as many of you may have already know, the International Energy Agency was founded more than 40 years ago. Currently we have 29 member countries with island as our founding members. During the past decades with the strong support of the IEA member countries and the hard work of our own staff. IEA has established itself as one of the most reputable international energy governance bodies. Meanwhile, China is the world's second largest economy, largest energy producer and carbon emitter. So it's natural for the IEA to work with China. Indeed, after Dr. Fatih Biorou, our current executive director took office in September last year. He immediately chose China instead of any IEA member countries as the destination of his first international missions as executive director of the agency. During his green speech in Beijing at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, he talked about the sleepiness of IEA's modernization. First, opening the door of the agency to emerging economies. Secondly, to broad IEA's mandate of energy security beyond oil. Third, to make the IEA the global hub of clean technologies and energy efficiency. And per Dr. Biorou's invitation, China's energy minister, Mr. Noah Bakry, led a delegation and attended IEA ministerial meeting in November last year. During which China became an association member of the IEA together with Indonesia and Thailand. In March 2016, IEA and the National Energy Administration joint organized the 20th anniversary ceremony of IEA-China engagement. During which both sides announced that we have started the process of establishing IEA-China Energy Cooperation Center in Beijing. If we look at the picture, it is very easy to understand why IEA and China should work together. When IEA was created in 1974, our members accounted for the majority of global energy consumption and oil imports. However, because of the ascendance of emerging economies, especially China in global energy arena, IEA member countries can only account for less than 40% of global energy consumption. If the composition of the agency remains intact, IEA's analysis indicates that our member countries will account for less than 30% of global energy consumption by 2014. In comparison, in several decades, China has surpassed the United States as the world's largest energy consumer. Its share of near one fourth of global energy consumption is expected to keep the same over the decades to come. Given the rapid ascendance of China in the global energy sector, the international community faced both opportunities and challenges in engaging China in global energy governance. The fact that China is not a member of IEA is such a good example. If we compare the energy mixture among China, the world average and the United States, it is easy to discover that the energy structure of the United States is very similar as the world average, which means that if energy consumption changes in the United States, the implication on world trade is not so significant. In comparison, China currently consumes too much coal, with coal representing nearly 70% of primary energy consumption in China, no matter what energy forecast we examine. The convergence of energy mixture between China and the world average is inevitable. In other words, the importance of coal in China will decline over time. China will need more and more oil gas hydro-nuclear and renewables in the years to come. Such convergence is expected to have profound implications on global energy and environmental agenda. After the successful concluding of COP21 in Paris in December last year, three countries stand out for their particular contribution. France, for its excellent presidency, China and the United States for their willingness to cooperate with each other. In particular, China's intended national-determined contribution on iron disease made very positive impacts on the negotiation process. China committed to pick its carbon emissions around 2030 to reduce emissions' intensity by 60 to 65% between 2005 and 2030. To achieve 20% of non-fossil fuel in primary energy mixture by 2030, country is only 12%, and finally agreed to the five-year review cycle. Nevertheless, if we compare the BAE scenario with the two-degree scenario, near 30% of global carbon reduction efforts are expected to be showed by China. Since China still considers itself as a developing country, how ambitious China's climate agenda could actually be has become an open-ended but also quite important question. It is not a secret that oil pollution has become a serious environmental problem in China in recent years. However, I'd like to remind everyone in this room that oil pollution is not a China-only environmental phenomenon. In the past, many IE countries had a similar policy challenge. Iron based in Paris, oil quantity could still be quite annoying, sometimes during the year. Of course, both the magnitude and scale of oil pollution in China is unprecedented. Unlike climate change for which the responsibilities of taking actions could be easily passed to future generations, oil pollution cannot be easily ignored by anyone. In other words, Chinese decision makers who live in Beijing are as eager to resolve this problem as LVG Chinese. To tackle the challenges of oil pollution, it is very important to fully understand sources of PM2.5 emissions. These two figures show that coal combustion so far is the most important source of PM2.5 emissions in China. At the national level, coal accounts for around half of PM2.5 emissions in China. As a result, control oil pollutions. We need to either replace coal with cleaner fuels such as natural gas or renewables, or install environmental treatment measurements such as the disaster relations denotes particularly control equipment. In the next slide, I will explain what should be the preferred strategy for China. China's energy governance mechanism imposed a particular challenge for enforcing post-combustion environmental measurement. Currently, energy governance in China is fragmented among many government departments. For instance, while the politically powerful national energy administration is the reignite of China's energy sector, can I change energy efficiency, energy pricing, and the sponsor of the politically more powerful NDRC? While the Ministry of Environment Protection in China is in charge of carbon monoxide emissions, it has nothing to do with carbon dioxide emissions. Not surprisingly, enforcement of energy and environmental regulation has not been the weakest link of China's energy governance. China recently issued an outline of the 13th five-year plan and proposed a first-ever smooth national energy consumption care at five billion tons of coal equivalent by 2020. It will be quite interesting to observe how such type of national target could be implemented at provincial level in the future. Listen to me. Picking of Chinese coal consumption has become international headlines, so I would like to provide my own observations about this very important topic. The Chinese economy was first opened to the outside world in 1978. In 1980 and 1981, Chinese coal consumption declined slightly two years in a row, since then China's economic boom was largely fueled by coal consumption. After China joined the WTO in 2001, Chinese coal consumption grew rapidly and entered the so-called golden age of coal development in China. However, after the recent Chinese economic slowdown, China's coal consumption peaked in 2013 and then declined two years in a row in 2014 and 2015. Then everyone in the energy and economic circle became very curious about where Chinese coal consumption peaked in 2013. To make my presentation a more neutral one, I didn't cite any IE permutations in this slide. Instead, according to China Energy Research Society's recent forecast, Chinese coal consumption might have already peaked in 2013. I'd like to bring two issues to everyone's attention. First, such a research finding is compatible with IE's own medium term coal market report and our flagship publication, World Energy Outlook. Secondly, even if Chinese coal consumption had already peaked, it won't decline drastically in the foreseeable future. Coal is still expected to be the backbone of China's energy sector for quite some years to come. After a discussion on coal, it is natural to spell some time to touch upon oil and gas development in China. The company is ongoing policy debate on oil and gas sector reform in China and I'd like to go through the news one by one. According to my understanding, the deregulation of crude oil license is happening in China now and the NDRC is continuously deregulate pricing of oil and natural gas but this is a very slow process with more additional reform to come. China had already established oil and gas trading platform in Shanghai. However, because of the slow progress on third-party accessible pipeline infrastructure and the difficulties in opening upstream oil and gas sector to private and international investors, whether trading platforms in Shanghai or other parts of the country could effectively reflect demand-supply balance in China is still a big question mark. Take shiogas development in China as an example. Though China has abandoned shiogas's gross endowment, national production only reached 4.37 BCN in 2015, which means that China's national energy company didn't meet China's shiogas development in the 12th five-year plan, which is 5 BCN in 2015. In April 2015, IEA and National Energy Administration jointly organized the third IEA unconventional Gas Forum in Chengdu. We identified many underground and above ground barriers for shiogas development in China. The take-home message is that a comprehensive oil and gas sector reform is a prerequisite to tap full potential of natural gas development in China. Another wild card in the Chinese energy sector is nuclear development before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear crisis in 2011. China's operational nuclear capacity was only 10.8 GW. Nevertheless, the nuclear target in 2020 was any number ranging from 70 GW to more than 100 GW before 2011. However, after Fukushima, the Chinese government became much more cautious regarding nuclear development. The most recent government plan for 2020 is only 58 GW. Looking beyond 2020, the Chinese nuclear industry is expected to face post-Fukushima political reality, higher safety standards, technological uncertainties in terms of competition among AP-1400 and Chinese indigenous Huanong. Less supportive attitude of the general public, rapid development of renewable and overcapacity of coal-filled power plants. From 2014 to 2020, what renewable cumulative capacity addition is expected to rise by 40%. That is more than 700 GW equivalent to more than twice Japan's current power-installed capacity. China alone is responsible for almost 40% of global renewable capacity addition. Fast growing power demand, diversification needs, and no pollution concern strongly boosts renewable development in China and to some extent in India and other emerging economies. Nevertheless, overcapacity of coal-filled power plants has become a particular policy concern in China. During China's ongoing anti-corruption campaign, the central government designated many responsibilities to the local government. However, to stimulate local economic growth, many provinces approved construction of too many coal-filled power plants in an unprecedented scale. As a result, coal-filled power plants only run slightly over 4,000 hours per year in China. If such a problem cannot be resolved as soon as possible, there will be no room to further develop either renewable or neocolium in China in the future. Given the magnitude of energy and environmental challenges in China, the Chinese government increasingly realized that China is not an energy island, and President Xi Jinping publicly called for international energy cooperation together with full energy revolution. This table details China's engagement in global energy governance Before 1978, China had basically no engagement with the international community on energy-related issues. China started the engagement process in 1983 by joining the World Energy Council. Over the years, China became more and more active and influential. The activation of association with the International Energy Agency in 2015 is such a good example. There are many reasons behind China's change of attitude. I would like to emphasize one particular issue. As the energy world becomes increasingly interconnected with each other, it is difficult for a few players to resolve their own energy challenges and all. Let me explain why multinational organizations such as the International Energy Agency have a very important role in global energy governance. To conclude my presentation, I will only talk about three take-home messages listed in this slide as it is relatively easy to read the rest on the screen. First, L-Penucing together with Climate Change has become the most important energy policy driver in China. Second, comprehensive energy sector reform in the prerequisites to realize the full potential of natural gas utilization and renewable development in China. And the Chinese government should unfold the reform in a timely fashion. Otherwise, the window of opportunity for reform may close quickly. Finally, recent progress between China and the IEA has made a solid foundation for China's engagement in global energy governance. But the future of bilateral relationship depends on efforts as both the IEA and the Chinese side. This concludes my presentation. Thank you very much for your attention. I look forward to our discussion. Thank you very much.