 Hello, very good to see you all. As you know, this is a very busy session of the Board of Governors with many important issues. So with that, let's go straight to your questions. Hi, Raqi Dabahna from Al Arabiya. I have the first question regarding what you just told the Board about receiving plausible answer from Iran regarding one of the three secret locations. We heard the response from Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, has said that you have bowed to political pressure from Iran. He's also said that the IEA might lose credibility over this. How do you respond to that? Maybe I'll wait for your answer and ask the second question. It's also regarding the 60% enriching of uranium by Iran. Is this now a de facto thing that the IEA has accepted? Because we don't hear alarm bells on this. You said that there's 100 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. Why is this not raising more concern? Well, thank you very much. Two very important questions regarding the issue of marijuana. Let me say that what we have informed is that we have received a reply, a response from Iran which is plausible. And this is why we have said that we have no further questions on this particular segment of an issue which is much wider. As you know, we continue to maintain an assessment regarding this site where some very specific type of testing was conducted and we have not changed that assessment. What we have is received a reply that is plausible. So we cannot exclude that what they are telling us may have happened. We do not have any means to actually prove or disprove that that was the case. We cannot exclude it. So then on the qualifications that may be there or opinions and comments on what we do, we are used to this. One day is one side that says one thing and the other day is another side. We accept this as part of our work. Our work is neutral, is impartial, is technical and we will always say things as they are. The considerations of what this implies is not up to us and I will never comment on government's opinions on what we do. What I can tell you is that this is technical work and what we are saying is technically correct. Then on the 60 percent, well, on the reactions and why there are not more reactions about this or then again, perhaps it's a question that you should put to others, not to me. What we are doing is telling the international community the exact amount of enriched uranium at that level of enrichment that exists. There is, as you may have noted, above 100 kilograms, maybe 116 for 15, something like that, at that level. And the general inventory of enriched uranium has been growing. It's around 4,500 and different amounts for the different degrees of enrichment is growing as we are seeing. And on the 60 percent, you say, have you accepted? Well, enriched uranium is not forbidden, as you know. What we do is verify what is happening and we inform. So this is what we do. Hi, Eugene. Just to get back to the core, we're used to hearing unhappiness from Israel about various aspects of this file. But there's a new accusation here, which is that you've essentially watched it down, say, for our standards in response to or because of some political considerations, right? So can you say the category that's not true? And then secondly, on your statements at the board where you said that, essentially, Iran should allow the installation of further monitoring equipment without further delay suggesting there's been delay. What was that due to? What's happened? Why is this taking longer than we expected? And how much longer should we expect this to go? Yeah. Thank you. On the standards, of course, we never, ever, never, ever water down our standards. We stand by our standards. We apply our standards. And if anything, in this process, which is a complex process which you have been following, we have been strict, technically impartial, as I like to say, very firm, fair, but firm. So we are not in the business of watering down or politically adapting anything. These are opinions. We do not take issue with them. We understand that there may be opinions. And without further delay, well, you know, this is, of course, something on which there can be opinions. We had a joint statement agreed, as you remember, in March presupposing that we would be implementing a number of voluntary additional monitoring and verification measures. And this is going very slow. This is the reality. We have been doing things. This is why, and I think this is also part of my obligation. I have to report fully what is going on. It wouldn't be fair to say that nothing is happening. No, that would not be true. The reality is that we have installed some cameras. We have installed some electronic monitoring devices at some places, but there is a lot more that needs to be done. And this is why, since, obviously, I want to have as much capabilities, monitoring capabilities in place as soon as possible, maybe in due regard to what your colleague was asking is an inventory that is growing. So I think we need to be present. I think we need to be monitoring as much as we can. This is why I'm saying we need to go faster. We need to go faster. Albert Otti, DPA, Chairman Press Agency. Yes. I have a question about Ukraine. On the sidelines of the Security Council meeting last week, I think you indicated that you wanted more IA monitors or experts in Saporizhia. And in the meantime, Moscow has also signaled that they're willing to have more people there. So exactly how many are there at any time now? How many more do you want? And additional question on that is, as part of your five points, you said that one of the five points is that there should be no military personnel that can carry out attacks in the plant. So how are IA experts equipped to monitor that? Thank you very much for the question, Albert. On the issue of the number of experts, this may vary. Typically, we have four people. We might have a little bit more. It will depend on the type of work that we need to carry out. We welcome the comments that the management or Russia, which is in effective control of the station, would be accommodating a bigger presence. So we will decide, depending on the activities that they need to carry out. Quite clearly, with the five basic principles being established last week, we will also be assessing that against the background of the real situation. The whole point of doing this is because we consider that military activity, and in fact, there's already a report about that even today. The military activity in the area is going to be increasing, so there might be need for more. It will depend. There has been commentary about the ability of our inspectors to monitor this. I stand by what I said in New York. You may have heard our experts are perfectly capable of observing and reporting on the issues described in these basic principles. With regards to the military presence, of course we were careful in drafting this and in consulting because these points have been consulted with the two sides in characterizing them as forces that could be used to project force, as opposed to security presence on the site. So that can give you an idea of what we have in mind. Thank you very much. Johannes Bleschberger for CJTN. I'm regarding Japan's plans to release wastewater at Fukushima into the ocean. Are there any new concerns and how is the IEA ensuring safety in the Pacific? Well, the concerns that exist, you know, there are countries in the region that have expressed concerns about this plan, and we have been carrying out a very detailed and meticulous process of preparing a number of reports. My final comprehensive report is going to be, I hope, completed in a few weeks. We just issued another one, so each one of our reports is public, so you may have an idea of what we have been doing. Of course, as the date of the final decision and perhaps start of a possible campaign of control discharge of these water approaches, the level of interest concern and perhaps even political discussion as we are seeing at the water governor's increases. There is nothing new specifically on the technical level. We are carrying out our activities as planned. Thank you. Hello, my name is Stephanie Liechtenstein. I'm a freelancer today reporting for the Associated Press. Sorry to be asking two different questions, one on Ukraine. In case I misunderstood you, you do not have a clear idea yet at what point the number of monitors at ZNPP will be increased. Is that correct, my understanding? And my second question is about the reinstalled monitoring equipment, the ones that you have actually managed to reinstall. Do you have access as of now to that data or an agreement at what point you will have access to that data? Thank you. Thank you very much, Stephanie. For the two questions, at what point in general, my idea is to reinforce ISMS, because ISMS will have now a wider mission if you want. So there may be a need to reinforce the teams. The moment is not so relevant. It may be with the next rotation or with the following one. I don't consider this as a point of substantive relevance. The second, on the reinstallment of equipment and the access to the information, it's a very good point. And this is something I have raised with my Iranian counterparts. Of course, the reinstallment of the equipment is very important, having the cameras that were removed or disconnected or the electronic monitoring devices that we may have to control and to check the enrichment levels and activity is very, very important. But it is obvious that there has been an important gap in the information. And I would characterize this as two types of gaps. In the first place, you may remember the issue is a bit complex and intricate, but it's like that. We had an arrangement as a result of one of my trips to Tehran in February 2021 when we decided that we would have all these systems, but the information itself would be kept in a very complex, convoluted way under our seals, but without us having access to that information. That is one thing because we never had access to that information. That information, when Iran decided last summer to disconnect the systems, etc., well, it remained there. There is the gap-gap, I would say. There's a gap from that point to now where we don't have cameras, we haven't had anything, so no information, no cameras, nothing. So all we are saying, and I think this is common sense basically, we reconnect the cameras and we have the systems again, but in order for us to be able to reconstruct the whole picture, we need to sit down with Iran and have some way to reconstruct the jigsaw puzzle. And there may be parts that are going to be a bit more difficult because for this first gap, as I described it, we have the footage, so it's easier for our people to do that. But for the second part, from June 2022 to June 2023, then it's a matter that will require some other type of consultation, access to records, talking to people, making some projections, etc., etc. So in the end, we can reconstruct the picture and say, well, in this period, our gross estimate is that such and such amount of rotors and bellows, etc., have been manufactured. I hope it's understandable. If it's not, I'm sorry. I can try again. Thank you. First on Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Iran is continuing to lie to the IAEA. The IAEA has capitulated to Iran's pressure, and this capitulation is a black strain of Spain on the records of the IAEA. I just wondered whether you can specifically address these allegations. One, secondly, the issue of Mary One over there, you say there is some explanation on some aspects of what happened. Correct. There is a new state standing by what you said, and your assessment stands on other issues vis-à-vis this particular side. I just wondered whether you can actually tell us exactly what, according to you, happened in our way. That is problematic. And thirdly, the issue of the 83% enrichment that was done last time, a few months back, are you satisfied that this was an accidental thing or a normal sort of thing in the process, or was it more than that? Can you specify that? Yes, thank you very much. All right, as I said, I would never enter into a polemic or an argument with the head of government of any member of the IAEA. They have their opinions, and what I said in my answer to Francois stands. I mean, we never politicize exercises, we have our standards, we apply them always. In any event, I would say the politicization is on the eye of the beholder. They may be seeing things in one way or the other, and I won't criticize that. We simply do our job in the same way, and we'll continue doing our job in the same way. And we respect comments from everyone. On Marivan Abadé, it's a long story, as you know, and what I was trying to explain is that we have a previous assessment, which is well-known that in Marivan Abadé there have been a number of explosive experiments in the past for which there hasn't been any preparation for neutron detectors to be used with nuclear material at an ulterior stage, which are part of the assessment, the historic assessment that the IEA has been having on this site. Then, as you may remember, the IEA conducted some complementary access in 2020 or 2021, and then new traces of anthropogenic uranium were discovered, and on this particular aspect, Iran has provided us with an explanation which we characterize as possible, not impossible. So in good faith, we cannot say that it is impossible that this happened. We don't have any additional proof. We have approached other member states which were possibly involved in the explanation that was given by Iran that this was part of mining activities conducting at the time of the Soviet Union and that perhaps as part of some of these traces could have been originated because of a lab that was located there. That is not impossible. We don't have a way to prove this, but we cannot disprove it either. So as we conduct our work in good faith, we cannot simply, for the sake of keeping something open, continue to seek what is impossible to pursue. But as I said, this is a part, a segment of a very wide issue. So these ideas that we are closing, cancelling things is not accurate. It's incorrect. So I hope this is clear. And on the enrichment, yes, I think the explanation was technically correct. What we, of course, and I think is very credit to our excellent inspectors and experts that were on the spot immediately able to identify this very high degree of enrichment. We had an analysis with the technical operators of this facility. And again, this oscillation, there's an oscillation that could be at the source of this very high level. What we have said is that there hasn't been any accumulation, no storage, no production at that particular level. Incidentally, these electronic devices that we are trying to set up are very important in giving us an immediate impression of what happens in case there is another oscillation or otherwise. This is, we are something that we are monitoring permanently. We have to move on to the question back. Yes. Hello, Digit. Hello. My question goes to your last response to my colleague. Yeah. Also, in your statement to the Board of Governors, you informed about the installation of the new devices in Natanz and Fordo facilities. My question is, could you tell us more about the function of the devices and will the agency, will the IAEA have access to the data of the devices? Yeah, yes. This, yes, because these are online, like an online system that allows you to read automatically or in real time the activity in a cascade or the enrichment activity. So you have direct access to it. And I think it is something that works well because it's also in the interest of Iran that we have a clear view so there is no doubt of what is happening. In any case, we would be able, even in the absence of this, I want to say, in the absence of these systems, devices, we would be able, as we did when we found this 83.4, we would be able to do it. But this provides us with a more reliable immediate source of information. Thank you. Thank you so much for coming. Thank you very much.