 owiąa ж chunky kese ka gauza sklepe and wi dha kwan a j agent about the concept of realization, particularly the concept of multiple realization theses advocated by Keem, the multiple realization theses was introduced by Hilary Putnam in 1967 where Putnam writes that for each psychological kind of aim there is a unique physical presumably the neurobiological kind P that is numeralogical equistensive with it. That is as a matter of law any stream of instantiates aim at T if and only if that system instantiates P at T. Now Putnam tries to show that the realization theses talks about a kind of a numeralogical co extension that is mental properties or mental predicates are numeralogically co extensive with the physical predicates. Now this kind of numeralogical co extension in fact talks about some kind of a correlation theses. When we talk about correlation that mental is correlated with the physical they assume that the emergence of the mind or the mental at T shows that the P is simultaneously has emerged. In fact it is the emergence of P talks about the emergence of aim because as we have discussed that there are molecular structures and the structures have certain properties and following theses of the micro level and the micro level properties we can very well suggest physical properties or neurobiological properties that are that a system is having or the structure of the system is having. What is more important in Putnam's analysis of realization is that Putnam emphasizes that there is a structure and this structure causes certain or produces certain physical properties. So, when the physical properties are produced simultaneously the mental properties are also produced. So, the events if there are mental events and if there are say physical or neurobiological events that are produced then this events are numeralogically co extensive. So, events of psychological kind the mental kind are co extensive with the events of physical kind. So, that was a kind of a theses which Keem is referring to in his paper called the Metaphysics of Reductionism. Now, we would like to see that this kind of a correlation theses is talking about reductive theory. In fact, it presupposes classic reductive theory which as I said surely shocked that certain properties like in this particular case the mental events or say for example, color or say for example, sound all these kinds of properties are reducible to certain physical properties. This is what Sal is saying it is a very kind of a shocking evidence that so much of scientific investigation has taken place and on the contrary it entails reductionism. So, that is what is shocking for Sal as I discussed in the last class. Now, the correlation theses as I mentioned to you that if there are say neural substrates. Now, these neural substrates would talk about physical events the occurrence of physical events and you have another kind of feeling or sensation say the pain sensation. Now, the very fact that the sensations are nothing but mental events the co extensive in the neurological co extensive theory such as that these two events are co occurring they are occurring at a particular time sati they are not occurring one after the another. In fact, they co occur and when we talk about this co occurrence then what happens? Now, Kim here proposing that in fact Kim here modifying this theses and talks about the status of correlation. Kim critiques Putnam's notion of correlation and tries to show that the correlation theses according to Putnam is empirically false. If it is empirically false then the question is how is it the case that it is empirically false? It is empirically false because we do not have as Sal says we are yet to find out what exactly the process that causes consciousness what exactly that neuro biological or neuro physiological processes in the brain that are causing consciousness. Now, once we find out that then probably such a correlation is possible in fact a causal correlation is possible. Since we do not have an exact information we do not have an evidence of that kind hence it is empirically false. So, Putnam is suggesting that the correlation theses is empirically false. Then referring to block Kim says that there is a conceptual point that the correlation theses entails that is the psychological properties that they are second order physical properties and their specification does not include constant on the manner of their physical implementations. So, when we talk about let us say that there are physical properties say x, y, z etcetera physical properties say x, y, z etcetera are physical properties and when we talk about this physical properties at a time t then the same time as I said you have all mental properties. Now, this mental properties are co-occurring along with the physical properties. So, he says these mental properties could be considered as second order physical properties they are second order physical properties. So, there are first order physical properties and there are second order physical properties. So, if we define in this way like there are primary qualities and there are secondary qualities if you remember Berkeley suggesting in fact critiquing this distinction of primary qualities and secondary qualities. Primary qualities like extension which is an essential property of matter is not directly perceivable is not given to my perception what is given to my perception or an observer is that secondary qualities like color, order, shape etcetera. These properties are dependent on the first order physical properties. Now, this dependence in fact prepares a ground of realization or implementation that since m is co-occurring as a kind of a secondary second order properties m can be realized on this first order say first order physical properties. So, the first order physical properties are the ground on which the second order physical properties are based in fact or dependent or they can be implemented when we talk about their realizations. So, hence there is a thesis which scheme is referring to a thesis which talks about the structure restricted correlation thesis. You have to talk about a structure and what is given to us is that physical properties the first order physical properties having a kind of a structures or say for example the brain having a kind of a structure there is a neural structure available to us. Now, what does it say? It says I quote if anything has mental property m at time t there is some physical structure type t. The very fact that t is a kind of a presupposed theoretical term here and the physical property p such that it is a system of type t at t has p at t and it holds as a matter of law that all systems of type t have m at a time just in case they have p at that time in court. Now, such a thesis would talk about a kind of a structural correlation correlation happening within a particular structure. It is not that mental properties a soul believes that they constitute a kind of a typical structure they constitute a mental life having a dozen of properties mental features constitute independent structure that is not the case here. The case is that they a same structure having two different kind of properties or holding two different kind of properties the first order properties and the second order properties. The first order properties are in fact the based properties on which the second order properties are dependent and this dependence helps in analyzing the concept of realizations that the mental properties are realized in physical or physiological properties. In what sense what kind of metaphysical baggies this carries this thesis carries since mental properties are realized or implemented by physical properties. Then mental properties is derivative one it is dependent would call it causally dependent. Let us call it this is a kind of a causal dependence your we can talk about some kind of a causal derivation that these properties which are emerging in the same time t are causally derived because they are not only correlated they are co occurring in the same time. So, then the third point which I would like to mention here is that mental properties is extrinsically characterized in terms of its causal role. So, there is nothing intrinsic about mental properties to say that intentionality is something intrinsic to mental life is nullified here if we say that this mental properties are second order properties and they are dependent on physical properties. So, there they will be causally inefficacies mental properties can produce certain you know action. So, for example, as I said there is a fact that I intend to face the glass of water. Now, this my intention is causing a kind of a movement a voluntary movement. But then in this case the intention is being caused by certain neuro physiological or neuro chemical processes that is happening in the neural structure of the brain and that is the source of my physical movement my voluntary movement and that is the ultimate source. Hence, the feeling of this intention or the experience of this mental state is dependent on the physical state. So, mental properties. So, what follows from this is that mental properties are not the first order properties in the physical right. Second mental properties do not have nominally coextensive physical property. Third, so no hope for reduction. If you say that this causal relationship is not defined relationship. We have not defined what kind of link it has, what kind of exact link is there. If that is not defined, then we have no hope for reduction as well. So, we are only talking about the relationship. So, we are only talking about the relationship and then we have no hope for reduction as well. So, we are only talking about if we limit this, then we are only talking about co-relationship or a kind of an emergence theory, etcetera as Sal talks about, but if we assert then possibly there is reductionism. So, that is what I would conclude, but then Kim also further goes to talk about what is there, what happens to this mental properties. Kim says now mental properties are explained by this first order physical properties. So, therefore this kind of correlation could be defined as explanatory connection. Kim tries to show that when you talk about physical first order properties, now this first order properties can explain about the mental properties say for example, desire, intention, etcetera. Those mental states can be explained. So, there is a kind of an explanatory connection. What happens when we talk about explanatory connection? Not every physically necessary connection is explanatory. P to explanatory implies that P is necessary and sufficient condition for M. If P is a kind of a property, which can explain M, then P must be causally not only causally sufficient, but also have some kind of a necessary condition, must be fulfilling a necessary condition to talk about M. So, they are causally not only causally sufficient, but also provide a kind of a necessary condition. Unless that happens, we cannot say that P would explain M. It is sometimes, if you remember that why I talked about the nature of intentional states, how when you talk about say mental, the realm of the mental, what shall calls the network of mental states. Now, when the network of mental states have certain causal power to realize, the network of mental states has a causal power to talk about the realization of a particular mental states. Say for example, the desire to have water. Now, this desire can be realized with reference to the network of other mental states. It is also true that Sarl is proposing this hypothesis, that this realization happens in connection with the neurobiological or the physical properties that we are talking about. But then, if you say that mental states are necessarily being realized by the network of other mental states or they are to be realized only with reference to the physical states. Because the physical states or the first order physical properties are not only causally sufficient, but also have certain necessary condition to talk about the realization of M or the mental properties. Kim also brings in the Forders argument, where Forders says to reduce a special science theory T M to physical theory say T P is kind in T M presumably represented by a basic predicate called T M must have a numerologically co-extensive kind in T P. So, this is important that you have to talk about theory and you know there are laws in the theories and Forders is interested to talk about what kind of mental theory that we are having and what kind of physical theory we have. Now, are these two theories connected with each other? If they are connected, what are the laws connect these two kind of theories or what are the kind of a laws which tries to bridge this gap between the two. So, Forders talks about the possibility of forming laws and what he calls the possibility of forming bridge laws shall come back later. So, to talk about laws we need to identify properties. So, what is the basic properties? If M has or M is a property is a mental property then how to determine or identify that property and further we have to talk about its correlation. So, identification and correlations are two important elements when elements required to talk about you know identification and correlations are two important features to talk about the formation of a scientific law. Then we also need to see this fact that how this higher order mental properties are connected to the lower order the complex properties. So, you have physical properties and if you say that this physical the first order properties are at the lower level as shall calls they are part of the lattice structures the micro level then what is happening at this level at a macro level. So, we need to talk about their identity theories. Now, as you know the identity thesis has two difficulties at one point if we argue in terms of the kind of neuro philosophy which church land advocate both Paul church land and Patricia church land advocate then that kind of thesis Kim says would take us to eliminativism that they nullify that mind has any kind of causal relationship with power they would nullify that mind has a causal power that it would cause some kind of action that is nullified. Now, once this power is nullified then it is nothing but an epic phenomenon. So, therefore, we need to talk about appropriately modellize this this notion of co extension that the mental the physical is co occurring with the mental and what kind of relationship they have now if you talk that then possibly we will talk about some now as Potter says we will talk about bridge laws law which will help us to explain this kind of special sciences. So, this is a theory where realization thesis is connected with the identity theory and Prof. Nath has talked about it with reference to the notion of emergence and functionalism. And the functionalist identity theory and how this identity theory is committing to reductionism. So, there is one way to look this theory in that particular perspective, but now I would take you back to Sal's understanding of this what kind of response the Salian thesis would suggest to us is very important because Sal is not an eliminativist though he talks about this fact that the mind or the mental states are causally efficacious in order to produce some kind of action what equal to the intentional actions. So, intentional actions are caused by mental states therefore, Sal talks about let us say mental mental causation. So, there is this causal power which I am talking about now they really cause actions which are intentional in nature because here is the case where you are intending to perform the action. So, this idea of intending or the notion of intending here refers to experience which Sal calls intention in action. The intention in action is about a fact that is the fact of experience where the performer is not only performing an action, but also experiencing it and that is what intention in action talks about. So, you are thinking about it, you are thinking how to go about it and you go about it that the very fact that you go about it and your this fact that it is happening now is referring to a particular concept called intention in action where the causal power is in fact intentionalized in Sal's because I am experiencing causality here. Whenever I write, when I write I experience this fact that I am writing, I desire to write, I believe that if I write I will understand it better and I intend it to write and I am writing now. So, a particular action called writing is an intentional action can be explained with reference to the desire, believe and intention and there are so many other mental states which are connected to. So, Sal talks about mental causation which is typically you know there to explain how intentional actions are to explain the nature of intentional action, but then Sal also suggest that this is not the way the mental states are realized. So, Sal the mental states when they are realized they are also connected to certain brain processes. So, there is a causal link causal link with the network of say mental states causing certain action or having the power to cause action and there is also a kind of a causal link to you know the brain processes which is typically a lower level phenomena and it is indeed complex phenomena. It is not a simple phenomena because there are millions and millions of neurons are working and causing consciousness. So, in that case Sal is shocked when we try to define that this causal connection or this dependent relation entails reductionism. In fact, he he defends his naturalistic position very clearly and tries to show us that this kind of position does not entail reductionism. And that is what we are going to study in the next slide. So, the irreducibility theses that Sal argues is with reference to dualism on the one hand and materialism on the other. Now, a dualist treat irreducibility of consciousness as a incontrovertible proof of the truth of dualism. The materialist on the other hand insist that consciousness must be reducible to the material reality and that the price of denying the reducibility would be the abandonment of our well scientific world view. The moment we accept materialistic faces there is this presupposition that materialism or naturalism in general holds on to kind of a reductionism. Sal says that is not true. All naturalists are not reductionists. Similarly, all dualists are not in fact catechian dualists. So, that is a kind of a position which Sal would try to take. Now, why consciousness is irreducible? Consciousness or consciousness and experience form reality which is different from the physical events that is linked with. So, it is a kind of a reality the mental states or the network of mental states which I talk about constitute reality which is different from say the physical reality. Now, what kind of reality they constitute? Does it have a deep level consequence? Now, we said that there are surface features where we talk about subjective experiences. Hot is what feels hot to us. Cold is what feels cold similarly with colors red is what looks red to normal observers under normal conditions. The course to produce the surface features is nothing but the molecular movements causing the sensation of heat and cold. The molecular movements are observer independent. Now, Sal says in what way these surface level properties which are generating sensation like hot and cold or giving the impression of the color are different from the properties which are causing this. So, Sal says there are molecular movements happening at a deeper level of the phenomena and these movements cause the surface level properties. So, for example, solidity of this table is caused by particular molecular structure or molecular movements. So, solidity is a macro level properties whereas, molecules and molecular movements are happening at a micro level. The macro level properties are causally sufficient to constitute a reality. In what way they constitute realities? This is this is very fact that there they can cause or generate a kind of an impression. So, for example, feeling of hot or feeling cold an impression which is different from the kind of molecular movements that is there at state of the lattice structure. So, that is what Sal is trying to talk about. Now, we would like to see that what kind of facts are observer independent and what kind of facts are observer dependent and that is need to be clarified. Now, Sal says the kind of molecules or molecular movement happening at the lattice structure or at the at the micro level are observer independent. Carbon, oxygen, nitrogen all these provide a kind of a substrate. These elements carbon and oxygen, nitrogen are observer independent. Sal says they are all brute facts. So, the actual pattern of facts if you talk to talk about then at a at a one level we are talking about certain physical facts like temperature to be defined. Another point I am talking about this fact that it is hot here in this room. So, at another point we have experiencing this heat. So, the experience of this particular fact this experience of heat is experience which talks about mental facts. So, there is a kind of a fact which is mental experience itself is something mental something to do with the mental life of this biological entity. So, but the temperature can be defined in physical terms. So, there are physical facts and there are mental facts. Now, Sal says I quote this once we know all facts about heat facts about the molecule movements impact on sensory nerve endings, subjective feelings etcetera. The reduction of heat to molecule movements involves no new fact whatever it is simply a trivial consequence of the redefinition. The very fact that if I try to see that temperature is reduced in a sense defined in terms of certain physical properties because they are dependent on this physical properties and the physical properties are generating heat and that is why this feeling of hot or feeling of cold and that is why one experiences things according to Sal the moment I try to deny or nullify this fact that experience per se or experience of this particular phenomena is dependent on certain physical things I jump to a kind of a reductionistic position and Sal says that need to be restricted and that is how it sounds very trivial he writes we do not first discover all the facts and then discover a new fact the fact that heat is reducible whether we simply redefine or that reduction follows from the definition by this redefinition does not eliminate the subjective experience of heat or color from the world they exist as same as ever. Say for example that one day we will find out a Sal believes that we will find out what exactly the causal link between the brain processes and the mental states meaning thereby this realization condition if are causally defined with regard to the brain states then what will happen will it eliminate this very fact that somebody is experiencing this things like color and sound etcetera or we will only have this reductionistic position Sal says it will be trivial if we say that the discovery of a new fact would eliminate this notion of experience from the discourse of philosophy of mind and that is a kind of a triviality which Sal is talking about that is not the case experience will not be eliminated from this discourse and cannot be eliminated there may be the discovery where we may exactly tell in scientific terms that this is how is the case but that would not deny the existence of experience is a kind of a reality and mental reality. So, Sal further talks about what is the status of this reality we have been in philosophy talk about appearance and a reality distinction whenever we have discussed about the ontology of consciousness or in general we have talked about the ontological status of the reality whether it is about mental facts or about the physical facts we have encountered this epistemic dilemma whether what we see is a real or the real is something not real given to us it is something beyond our observation. Sal says pertaining to this notion of consciousness he says consciousness as a surface level of reality is subjective appearance the subjective reality is nothing but the molecular facts consciousness consists in where the appearance is connected we cannot make the appearance reality distinction because appearance is the reality appearance themselves. So, what is important here is that Sal says consciousness as a surface level anerman is an appearance and the appearance itself is reality. There is no reality beyond this when you talk about consciousness we need to talk about the conscious behaviors conscious actions feelings experiences etcetera that is what this appearance is all about. So, there is no appearance reality distinction so far as consciousness is concerned. So, hence reductionism eliminates subjectivism or subjective experience and then I am quoting Sal given its existence its irreducibility is a trivial consequences of our definitional practices its irreducibility has no untoward scientific consequences whatever furthermore when I speak of irreducibility of consciousness I am speaking of its irreducibility according to standard patterns of reduction. No one can rule out a rule out apriary the possibility of a major intellectual revolution that would give us new and at present unimaginable conception of reduction according to which consciousness would be reducible. Now that like a kind of a negalian thesis so one day we will have a complete third person perspective of consciousness a new scientific apparatus or a new technological innovation will give us the detail account of how consciousness is being caused by brain processes that will not eliminate the notion of experience or consciousness from the discourse of philosophy of mind. Hence consciousness is irreducible whatever may be the progress the scientific progress that Sal talks about will not deny this very fact that there is something called experience and experiences are subjective are to be viewed from the first person point of view and experiences are not mysterious reality so with this I would like to conclude Sal's approach to the concept of reduction and realization.