 Libya has an important geopolitical position. It's in the middle of North Africa's Mediterranean coast. It's bordered by Tunisia and Algeria to the west and Egypt to the east. And this is very important, as you will see in a second. But more importantly, it's southern, you know, the southern edges, border, Niger, Chad and Sudan. I'm mentioning this because the Sahel is very important. And when we go back to the beginning of this turmoil in Libya, which was back 2011 with the Arab uprising, you know, it had a fallout. Of course, in the Q&A, those who are interested in the fallout in the Sahel specifically in terms of what happened in Mali and to a lesser extent in Niger, it's all there. And now you see also, you know, troops being recruited in Sudan and so on and so forth. So it's very complicated. Another part is that it is the fourth largest country in Africa by land mass. It ranks 36 by population. In this respect, it looks similar to the Gulf states. In other words, small, small population and extremely rich. It's a very rich country, a huge country, has a nearly 6.2 million. But with the people who have left, it's probably less today because many people have fled to Tunisia, Malta and some other places. And Libya has the ninth largest proven oil reserves in Africa as well. So I start with talking about a failed revolution. You know that from 1969 to 2011, Libya was ruled by an autocrat dictator named and something important to mention. He did not build a state to speak of. You know, it was a totally different conception of the state from what we understand. The uprising started in Tunisia. Of course, Tunisia was the first to have experienced an uprising, a protest movement against yet another dictator in the region, which was Zinedine Ben Ali. And that spillover had a spillover effect on Libya, what it's like to make a story short. Then there was the NATO intervention. And I'd like to emphasize here that the interests, in other words, the reasons that pushed this intervention were not innocent. There were already interests involved in that. And when I cover the various players, you will see why they intervened. And why the US up to today is reluctant to continue or to be present or to get fully involved in Libya. So one of the important points I'd like to make is that the overthrow of Gaddafi had nothing to do with the human rights or the right to protect. But from the onset, the objective, at least for some of those who intervened, was particularly France and the UK to overthrow, to have a regime change in Libya. That's one. Because if you analyze the period, you will see that there was resistance to a political solution mainly from the African Union, which tried to broker some sort of exit for Gaddafi. I interviewed the then head of the African Union, Jean Ping. And he had all the evidence that they would not allow the African Union to try to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The consequences that, again, we can talk in the Q&A, were the destabilization of the Sahel, the emergence of new terrorist groups, and then eventually the implantation of terrorist groups within Libya itself and in the Sahel. And they both, it's still ongoing nine years after what had happened. The other point that I'd like to make before I go into the outside players is the different parties in Libya. They failed to find common grounds for the reconstruction of Libya. The country found itself with two governments, I'm sorry I cannot delve into the domestic aspects, it's too long, but you have two, basically you have two governments right now, one in the western part of the country in Tripoli and the other one in Tobruk in Syrinaikov in the east. And to make matters worse, as of 2014, a rogue, you know, marshal, self-proclaimed marshal who had returned from the United States where he had been living after he had self-imposed exile. He was part of the government of Gaddafi and he had fought in child, was humiliated in child, in fact lost the war like he just did recently. But he launched what he called the Operation Libya Dignity, claiming to be fighting terrorism, that's the claim. You're going to see that all the players in the Libyan crisis, they would say one thing and be doing something else, the other reasons would be there. That's the job of, you know, a researcher is to go beyond, you know, the discourse and to look at what the real interests are. And of course, you know, there was another one, you know, an Operation Libya Dawn, which was a coalition of militia from eastern and central Libya, from Tripolitana spearheaded by forces from Misrata. So this is just to complicate the situation for the audience, very complicated. Basically, if you look at the domestic situation today in Libya, the best way to describe it, I think, in my view, would be to use the concept of collapse state. Although, as I said, one might argue that Gaddafi never built a state in the modern sense of the term. He had his own idiosyncratic conception of the state of which, you know, he was the big master basically. So we have today two forces really that are in opposition, which is the Libyan National Army, led by Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Which has been targeting the GNA. So please remember GNA, which is the government of national accord. This is the government that is recognized by the international community. It's recognized by the UN. But what is happening on the ground, abuse of human rights, which is common terrorism, hundreds of thousands of Libyans internally displaced due to the ongoing, you know, military conflict, tens of thousands of refugees, you know, from Africa and so on. So some sub-Saharan Africa and of course asylum seekers. Since the war, as I said, most parties speak about a political solution. Everyone is in agreement that there would be no military solution to the conflict. But each time one of the parties has the upper hand, you know, it's of course does not want to negotiate. And the other party would like to negotiate. And I'll try to explain this in a second. However, the reality on the ground, as I said, is totally different. The UN has been involved. There's a huge, you know, lots of, you know, initiatives and so on. They all failed. And there were some other initiatives launched by either Russia or by Germany, by Merkel, you know, the last happened in January of this year, the Berlin Conference, it's also ended in failure. Even to bring a ceasefire has been, you know, very difficult and also resulted in failure. My argument before I move on to the outside powers is that because of the varied interests, this is really my position, which, you know, you have various powers which would back one or the other side in the conflict. And that has continued. And I will give you which side is with who and so on. And so what I will discuss now is the foreign party's interests. And this will reveal basically this contradiction, this discrepancy between the discourse and reality. And so you have two governments, one in the east, one in the west. And so they get military support and other support from the players I would be talking about. But of course, the complication in Libya is not simply that there are these two governments, but there are somewhat what we call a sub-states that are controlled by either or by loosely aligned tribal militia and jihadist groups. So the alliances are made and undone, you know, done, undone, you know, at will. So your ally of today will be your enemy of tomorrow and so on and so forth. Internally, really the struggle, what is happening also is essentially a struggle for power and resources between locally armed factions. Because when Qaddafi collapsed, when the regime collapsed, many people had access to weaponry and some of which very modern weaponry. And some of it went to the Sahel region and some of it fell into the hands of militias and other search groups, including, you know, terrorist groups. So what will be evident and what I will be discussing is virtually none of the outside forces has any genuine interest in the Libyan people that I will emphasize. The Libyan political elites have also failed to reach consensus, which would have allowed either a ceasefire or reconstruction of the country, you know, post-conflict reconstruction. In this sense, I would say that the local elites are as guilty as the foreign powers in prolonging the civil war. And lastly, the continued civil war will exacerbate instability in North Africa and the Sahel. And I should add one of these points. This, if it continues for too long, may result in the fragmentation of Libya into at least two states, that is the Eastern and the Western state. So this interference, just to make it simple for my audience here, is that there are foreign powers that are supporting Haftar, Khalifa Haftar, the head of the Libyan National Army, supported by the House of Representatives, you know, that's the sort of parliament, the government in the East. And right now, he's currently in Egypt. My understanding is that he's in sort of exile in Egypt after the defeat, the recent defeat this year when he tried to take over Tripoli. So you have Egypt that supports Haftar, the United Arab Emirates, with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia financing and supporting the UAE, the United Emirates, Russia and France. These are the players that support Khalifa Haftar. Turkey, Qatar, Italy support the government of National Accord, which is the GNA based in Tripoli. So I would go over now the various countries and what their interests are. And please, Karima, I have a tendency of being carried away when I'm talking too much. Please give me about 10 minutes before my time is up, you should tell me so that I can jump into some other topics that I would like to share with your participants. So Egypt has some strategic reasons to be involved in Libya. First, it shares 700 miles, a border of 700 miles with Libya. In many ways, Libya has always been linked to Egypt. I just mentioned that Qaddafi was very, wanted to be the second image of Nasser who had ruled Egypt until his death in 71. And after the passing of Nasser, there were tensions with the new regime in Egypt and so on and so forth. And so for Egypt, since the fall of Qaddafi and the experience with the Muslim Brotherhood, please do remember this Muslim Brotherhood because it's part of this whole, it's sort of the ideological tip of the iceberg, but it's not really the main reason. As I would try to show, the other reasons are economic, military, strategic and so on and so forth. So the Muslim Brotherhood was accused of being a terrorist movement in 2013. And so there was a coup basically against the legitimately democratically elected Morsi. And so for Egypt to see this Muslim Brotherhood expanding in Libya is used as an argument to support Haftar. Haftar claims to be fighting terrorism. And of course, this appealed to the Egyptians. And so the Egyptians, of course, Egypt is ruled by a dictator, by Abdul Fattah Sisi, and they see Haftar as a strong man capable of controlling Syrian Nica, where most of the oil is located. So for the Egyptians, the controlled Syrian Nica can serve as a buffer zone against allegedly jihadist groups that could destabilize Egypt. So what also worries the Egyptians is this close, the close bonds between the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood with the GNA. That a major impetus for Egypt's support to Haftar and his LNA. And so if you look at Egypt, I mean, I can say a lot about Egypt. It has some legitimate concerns and others that are not so legitimate. And so Egypt has security and economic concerns in Libya. As I mentioned already, the Muslim Brotherhood. So but they are afraid that some members of the Brotherhood who radicalized could exploit the proximity with Egypt, because many of them are present in Libya, that they would somehow organize attacks against Egypt. The economic reasons are more are quite interesting because Egypt needs oil. It's not an oil producing country. It produces a little bit. But they have benefited from cheap oil since the Libyan National Army controls the eastern part where the oil is. So in exchange for the support that it provides the LNA, Egypt receives oil at a discounted rate. That's what it is. And so there is this, the fear that if the LNA loses the civil war, the oil supplies to Egypt would unavoidably be interrupted and it would result in steep rises of prices in the Egyptian market. Remember, the Egyptian economy is very dependent on the Gulf, on cheap oil. I mean, it's a real mess. So and before the revolution, there were two million Egyptian workers in Libya. And they were sent back, I mean, they used to send, by the way, remittances to Egypt and that helped the Egyptian economy and so on and so forth. So Egypt has developed a sort of dependency on subsidized Libyan oil. This needs to be, you know, to show you the economic importance of Libya to Egypt because Egypt has an ailing economy and so a stable Libya providing cheap oil and so on and maybe getting some workers, you know, as an outlet for the huge manpower. Egypt has about 100 million people compared to Libya, which has 6.2 million. You know, you can see where, what that means. So and again, I just say briefly about the presence of Turkey recently and that has really created a serious headache, as we will see, not only for Egypt, but also for France. That is a big issue, this presence of Turkey and I will explain why Turkey is there. So we are again in what we call a proxy war. Egypt, you know, supports the LNA and then the LNA had some, you know, at least Haftar thought that he would be able to take all over Libya, be the strong man, you know, a new dictator if you wish and so on and supported by the UAE and Egypt. But then, you know, the GNA called on Turkey, which intervened and not only stopped the advance of Haftar, but it also pushed back, defeated in the process, the group that's another backer of the LNA, which is Russia, pushed it back and now there is a sort of stalemate and that is another issue. So you have again now tensions between Turkey and Egypt plus, you know, the Turkey is also ruled by a Muslim Brotherhood, by the Muslim Party, which is based on Muslim Brotherhood ideology and so on and so forth. So Egypt again has continued to support this LNA, you know, providing training its forces in Western Egypt, launching operations from there and so on and so forth. So and all the equipment and what have you. So this move by Turkey has led Egypt to consider intervening in Libya, in eastern Libya. I don't believe that they would, but it's at least it shows how worried Egypt is about that presence. So I'm afraid I will have, I may have to skip to, because I have too much on Egypt, I will skip a little bit and take you straight to Turkey. Turkey, of course, you know, there is the history, today the Arabs are very worried, Turkey, the former Ottoman Empire and so on and so forth and Erdogan is the new Sultan who wants to revive this old domination over North Africa, like it did under Ottoman rule, that is, you know, Libya, Algeria and Tunisia, which were under Ottoman rule. So basically when Haftar failed, or at least when Asarraj, you know, the leader of the GNA called on Turkey to help and Turkey came to the rescue, this again created some problems. But before it happened, and here you will see the interest, how there was a signing of a memorandum of understanding between the GNA and Turkey on on demarcating the new maritime jurisdiction between them. And that basically the consequence of that had gone all the way to Cyprus, Greece created tensions between, and they are currently, as we speak right now, their real tensions between Greece and Turkey over the issue and the Greeks would like, you know, the European Union to intervene and so on and so forth. So because this deal may divide the, you know, the Eastern and the Western Mediterranean. So basically Turkey has started already exploiting, exploring oil in the Eastern Mediterranean and apparently there are the US government, the geological survey in the Eastern Mediterranean, you know, we mentioned that there would be about 700 billion dollar worth of natural gas in the part that Turkey now will start exploring or has already started exploring. So it's a huge reserve, you know, so Europe protested but that has not changed the objective of the Turks. So and of course what happened in Libya, this deal was, you know, to lead Greece, Cyprus and Israel and Egypt, you know, to start working on their own pipeline which will cost seven to nine billion. But of course the problem is that the deal with between Turkey and Tripoli would obstruct the plan since the pipeline would have to cross the Turkey-Libyan jurisdiction. So we will have some very considerable problems in the near future, not in the long term but near future. So what else is there for Turkey? Turkey has very important economic interests in addition to the oil, the gas, the Mediterranean and so on but the Libyan market in Libya. For decades Turkish businesses had been involved in Libya, especially in the construction sector. Before Qaddafi was overthrown there were about 100 Turkish construction companies that had signed contracts with the Libyan government. But because of the Arab Spring, Turkey lost about 19 billion dollars. Of course Turkey was not the only one that lost, China had also lost and Russia, which had invested heavily, we'll come to that later. So my prognosis is that- Yeah, you have ten minutes now. I'm going to give you the warning. Thanks. All right, thank you. So I will skip more on Turkey. I will take you to France. Recently France has had a very interesting position. That is, it says one thing and it does something completely different and we have discovered that mostly in 2016 when some troops were killed in Libya and a military helicopter had crashed in Libya. But now what you will hear is how a nerve France is about Turkey's presence in the territory. So some Libyans tend to remind us and correctly so that French interventionism in Libyan affairs dates through the 1940s when France tried to occupy and keep control of the southern Libyan province of Faisan. You know Libya is divided into three provinces, Tripoli, Tana, Serenica and Faisan. And France wanted to occupy that part for its economic and military interests. So basically France was one of the leading forces against the Qaddafi regime for the regime change. And Sarkozy, the former president who was behind that, supported the revolution against Qaddafi to restore basically France's domination or dominant role as a European military power. In 2014 France allied with the United Arab Emirates and supported the Egyptian and UAE sponsored Haftar. Although in rhetoric it is a negotiated solution etc etc. France is very interesting because it does exactly the same thing as Turkey has done but then criticizes Turkey, insults Turkey, gets in trouble with Turkey which is a fellow member of NATO. But you know it's just the game that nations play. But for most analysts without Turkish intervention the Russian and Sudanese mercenaries which are part of the LNA you know would have overland Tripoli and so on. So basically what France is doing in Libya is also pursuing its economic and security what it perceives as its security interest. So you know the alignment with now it's undisputable the alignment with Haftar is there providing military equipment training and so on. But unlike the UAE and Egypt France you know engages with the GNA you know with you know however as I said behind the scenes it does something else which has led to problems between not only with the NATO but within the EU itself and that is the problem that is happening currently with France's position because you had the conference to try to bring about peace and so on and so forth but it you know it created more problems because of this alignment with the rogue marshal. I'm gonna skip I'm sorry because I need to talk about other players Russia and Russia here is very interesting as well for students who are interested. You're gonna see also a double game that Russia plays you know it supports Haftar tooth and claw basically militarily and so on and so forth but not for for him to take over and that would be it no they want to give him enough power to have a big say at the negotiation table. Unlike other countries which recognize only the GNA Russia believes that Haftar should have a place in the Libyan landscape political landscape of course things might change because of the defeat that the recent defeat of Haftar in Tripoli. So what is happening here in the last two years you'll see Russia organize meetings negotiations between Tripoli and Haftar and but of course each time it's disappointed because Haftar has no interest in having at least until recently had no interest in having he wanted the whole country rather than than you know like power sharing or what have you they wanted to be the new cc of of Libya. So Russia continues like others to violate you know to violate the United Nations Security Council resolution of 1970 which banned the the armed sales to Libya and and so on. So but Russia is not basically I mean implicated with its own troops and so on and so forth there are what there is a group called the Wagner group which is a proxy of the state of the Russian state and so so Russia supplies it with because when you say the Russians you are implicated they say no so these guys are recruited you know to fight in in Libya but of course you and I do not believe that but for Moscow, Moscow has a very interesting strategy which I cannot go in depth and but it is multifaceted and it has different aspects and but Russia's presence let's put it this way simply you know worries the United States and we come to the United States later so but as long as the United States is absent which it is currently you know Russia will continue you know with this with this with this conflict and you know active. The other actor is the UAE very big actor the UAE has intervened in Libya it's a small state it's anti-democratic wants to undo wants to stop anything that could have succeeded through the Arab uprising in terms of democracy and so on and so forth whatever you know whichever way you define it but they are also worried that this kind of success with the Arab uprisings you know and establishing the rule of law democratic mood so on would have a spillover effect on the Gulf countries and that's why they resist that so so basically the UAE has been one of the biggest sponsors of the Haftar military the Libyan national army and so and they espouse his rhetoric of being prostability you know and so that's how it justifies its presence although it talks about you know humanitarian presence but it has bombed positions they have committed atrocities and so on and so forth so so much for the UAE I have much more but since my time is limited my prediction is that the UAE will especially since it's supported by France as well will continue supporting Haftar to prolong Libya's divisions and showing up you know the LNA you know the LNA's control over Libya's east and its oil fields so let me go to the United States the United States you have to look at it in terms of the United States if you're a student of US-Libyan relations although Libya was a headache for the United States but it was never important for the United States because first of all the United States did not import much oil from Libya so it has never been at the top of its foreign policy agenda even in the Middle East so Libya was something different it's annoying but it was not really important it was always the the American foreign policy makers Libya was was the problem for the Europeans and others and the region not not not of the United States not very important so it was always looked through the lens of other competing interests in the in the region but terrorism military requirements for other conflicts and so on and so forth and you all know about the reluctance of Obama president Obama to intervene in Libya it was pushed by Hillary Clinton Samantha Powell and Susan Ross you know the three ladies have pushed for intervention but he was very reluctant to do so and even proclaimed later he regretted that to make a story short the United States was involved there are different stages it was very much involved after you know to go after the terrorists who had killed Christopher Stevens who was the US ambassador to Libya in 2012 in September 2012 and then when when the Islamic so-called Islamic state settled in in Libya the United States organized about 500 airstrikes you know to diminish the potency of of ISIS so the US has been pushing for the UN the European allies and some regional partners to assume to assume leadership in in in this in the Libya's stabilization and reconstruction so so basically if you look at the recent statements coming from the United States is basically to encourage others or to have a settlement but expressing real concern about the presence of Russia the fear that Russia would establish military bases and have a a continued presence in in Libya so that's that's for for the United States now I think that I need to talk a little bit more before in the last few minutes that I have is to talk about the immediate neighborhood that is Algeria and Tunisia maybe I will submit to you here maybe we do that in the Q&A because we okay yeah all right okay so I have covered the I have covered the the foreign powers and of course if you need more I will be happy to thank you thank you very much and I'm sorry it was a real real tour de force as they say in French so it's excellent and a lot of food for thought I have a few questions here I'll start with them the first one from John and he says can you please talk a bit about why friends aligned with Haftar were there was there a deterioration in relations between France and the GNA there's no deterioration of relations between the the GNA really it is a way or some people are even arguing that the French policy is led by UAE policy and and France is very much how should I put it impressed by the UAE first for financial reasons but also because there is this sense of the UAE just like France being opposed to Islamism however defined it is but also because the UAE helps France in sub-Saharan Africa in many countries through funding it did that with the G5 in the Sahel where the UAE promised I don't know how much of it they they they gave but they talked about at the time at the time when France was trying to get funding for the G5 if we're not familiar with the G5 this is what France came up with this sort of organization between five Sahelian states under the leadership of of France and France was looking for financing from different sources the European Union gave some others didn't want to they was gave some money but didn't want it to go through the UN and so on and so forth so it's not a fallout France is playing on two two sides on the one hand it proclaims that it deals with you know it recognizes the legal government the legitimate one which is the GNA but on the other hand it has opposed any sanctions against Haftar for instance so so it it believes that Haftar would give total the oil company you know access to to the oil and and so on and so forth that if Haftar wins France will have a privileged position in Libya and since when France supports democratic regimes in North Africa anyway it's always dodgy runs in between us my gribees we know that very well but I have another question from Dana she's asking about China's geopolitical interest in Libya can you shed more light on that I mean particularly in relation to the current conflict we haven't heard about China's role or China's interference very good I was expecting that question China was very much involved in Libya economically and it was very important it had more than 38,000 workers in Libya until you know the overthrow of Qaddafi and of course it was one of the best examples at least for China it it repatriated exfiltrated it's 38,000 without any loss of life in 2011 with the help of course of Tunisia to put you know some of them there but it lost billions because it had invested billions of dollars it's estimated at 20 or 30 billion dollars that it lost and when there was a transition government in Libya you know China has these principles of non-interference so they did not recognize the transitional what was it called NTC transitional national transition committee until late so there were these suspicions between China and the transition committee but eventually China is basically positioning itself for reconstruction it can come up with you know the money that is necessary to rebuild Libya it keeps its distance I think it recognizes the GNA has no involvement with the rogue martial so so China is in a sense neutral you know China is not known at least in the Middle East and North Africa of having really played a mediation role it will call on all the parties to find a political solution but it has not been an active player in in Libya so I have a question by Stephen and Mehmet which are both similar and they are both both asking about whether you think there is a way forward in terms of finding peace for the Libyan people do you think that the different militias within Libya as well as the foreign states that are interfering in the conflict can find a way forward can sit down and negotiate and find a solution this is the one billion dollar question it's a great question but as I have been hinting at you know the foreign powers don't want to the US has not gone to the UAE and said stop supplying weapons the EU has not been able to tell France stop in fact there was a problem between Italy and France so they are not interested I think there would be and and there was you know there was a the region like there was an Algerian Tunisian sort of a proposal to you know to speak to all the parties to bring them together but everyone every outsider and every insider that is the ones who are inside as long as they they get this foreign support they feel that they can continue having the upper hand right now it's the GNA when the GNA was able to defeat the LNA you know in Tripoli and push it back you know and Turkey advancing you know the the LNA said in each negotiation but of course the GNA was not going to accept because figured the moment you start negotiating the other side will be bombing anyway or will continue or would be pushed by Egypt to do something different so so to me as long as the United Nations Security Council does not put enough pressure but then again you have Russia which is both involved in the field and is has a veto power at the United Nations Security Council I think that only the Libyan people if they're you know and but the political the political elites in Libya I think are are also you know corrupt you know they are in the pockets of outside powers and they have not shown any interest in moving forward to national reconciliation and national reconstruction it has been on the table you know the the elites have come to Algeria for instance and they have met you know separately Algeria has proposed to them to sit around the same table and find a way out to to stop this bloodshed and so on but they haven't done it and this has been my argument since the overthrow of Qaddafi is to say hey now you have to rebuild reconstruction reconciliation you know don't keep you know hold grudges against the ones who served in the old regime and so on but you have to to have this kind of reconstruction but it has not happened and now you have the militias how do you design the militias and sometimes the militias are playing a positive role because they guarantee the security of neighborhoods and so on and so forth but they are also manipulated from the outside serving some interests that are not those of the Libyan people so Yahya what would you think in the I've got many more questions but on that the recent US approach to the conflict with the meeting that a high official in the American government had with Sarraj on the possibility of building a military base in Libya do you think because that's that's kind of again another strategic game because they need to control the Sahel going back to the Sahel and of course none of the migraby state wanted to have the base so it's only I mean now Libya seems like a good place and and if that happens would that allow kind of the American coming behind the Sarraj UN back the government and will kind of tip the powers or you know get get them as you said with the Khalifa Haftar is not really in good terms now with the Egyptian UAE the Russians and the others because he lost so he may be changed another figure may come up who could be more conciliatory do you see any glimpses of hope that just very briefly like the recent yeah yeah yeah the Russians toyed with the idea of bringing in Sahel Islam you know Gaddafi Islam so right now to be quite honest with you the US if you take into account the context of US policy right now no interest in getting involved in Libya the only consensus in the administration in the Trump administration is that we should watch out about Russia's involvement but they're too busy with COVID with the election so I don't know of a base being built in fact you have one in Niger very close you know drones base there was talk about a base in Tunisia you know the Tunisians swear that it doesn't exist but some people think it does I don't think a base is going to add anything the US is just watching but the game is now and that's the I think what is happening the two big players remain Russia and Turkey and Russia and Turkey it's not solely about Libya is also about Syria you know each one watches the move of the other and how it will affect their policy in it absolutely they had a pact in in Syria in Idlib province which is very ironical they seem to have packed somewheres and then they engage in active force somewhere else I have another important question because we have a lot here yeah here excuse me so this one is from Leo he's asking about you mentioned something about the division of Libya along with west east lines you know the western Libya with the capitalist Tripoli the eastern one with Benghazi and he is wondering that kind of bring colonial memories of European drone national borders in Africa and how that had serious repercussions and do you think if that happened the Libyans will think about your unification ah that sounds a bit horrific as well but he also wants to ask an excellent question about the civil society and whether there is any Libyan civil society that could bring a resolution to the conflict and was the other different militias to sit down and negotiate tough question but you know Libya until 51 was three provinces and they brought them together to constitute the state um what is happening today is again the talk uh if we continue like this then there might be a division one being under the influence of Turkey Qatar Italy in the west and then the rest which is the east you know with with Russia the UAE Egypt you know I don't know whether it will happen again I hope for the Libyan people that this would not happen the other good question is about civil society what happened uh on the ground is how the there was a burgeoning civil society on the moral of the overthrow of Qaddafi and then for some weird reason uh dozens and dozens of civil society activists were assassinated including the woman you know Boracis who was a leading force in human rights and so on and so forth so right now it's uh even the diaspora is is divided nobody really know I mean there is this sort of um stubbornness on the part of the elites no one seems to want to give an inch to allow the reconstruction of this beautiful country it it has the potential of becoming a japan in the Mediterranean 6.2 million people extremely rich we talked about oil we didn't talk about the water you know that under Qaddafi they they build the grid grand dam I forgot the name of of it you know with a lot of water that is underneath Libya could become a real major power now for the Europeans the interest is you know the fear of refugees and migration that that's really what it is and and Turkey now if it's too provoked by France can unleash you know refugees from somewhere else either from Syria or so it it's again I have said it all along it's not a Libyan-Libyan war absolutely I guess Yahya would you say because this fragmentation which was inherited from the Qaddafi regime who in way he did not left a state a structure of a state but a fragmented state and that has and the way for example he in a sense pushed the eastern province into marginality in terms of power sharing and and how that came out immediately after 2011 in terms of seeking revenge of the way they've been marginalized despite the fact that they have all the oil reserves in the eastern province but I was also thinking in terms of the absence of a nationalist discourse that you usually associate with states which could be part of the fact that there is no unitary aspect on on on the conflict itself but I have another very good question as well about the from I don't see the name but they want to ask you about the Syrian mercenaries that Turkey sent to fight with the western bloc with the Tripoli bloc with the UN backed national government how do you see their role I mean I skipped it it was in my slides but see Turkey brought in it didn't you know Erdogan got the okay from the Turkish parliament to send troops but he did not send troops he sent advisors military advisors trainers and so on but brought some Turkmen ethnic Turks from the the Syria zone brought about a thousand or four hundred or so but by the way it's not just Turkey once again the the UAE recruited Sudanese yeah you know they told them you're coming to to the UAE to Abu Dhabi or Dubai to work in security sectors and so on and then they send them to die in Libya so so that's why by the way I forgot to say one thing that is extremely important you talked about civil society but there is an issue that if prey that it does not happen there has been talk about arming the tribes and that would be disastrous for live for Libya and again I will carry my few alarming and I know at the risk of sounding even pro-Qadhafi which I have never been everybody can read my writings on Qadhafi but at least there was it was not totally favoring one region against another that Qadhafi the Qadhafi tribe was a sort of pondulum created a sort of balance between all the tribes that was if there was one success that Qadhafi had it was how it he was able to balance out the various tribes one time it's this bringing you know someone from this tribe another from that tribe to be in the government and so on so what he did not do was to create institutions there were no institutions he did not create institutions his revolutionary committees and all that that stuff that he created you know probably he read somebody suggested he reads Rousseau's Jean-Jacques Rousseau's you know the social contract and just he imagined his his green book you know to create this semblance of democracy you know popular democracy and so on so he had no this is why the the state collapsed so easily without much resistance it was a very weak state and no institutions absolutely absolutely right I have another question from Hiba who is asking about the role of Algeria and Tunisia I know that Morocco hold a meeting in 2015 in Scherat which was quite crucial in forming of the national government but going back to Hiba's questions about Algeria and Tunisia do you see any active role of these two countries despite their internal tribulation as Hiba put it in terms of the economic and protest movement look by the way what you said about Morocco was that was not Morocco as such it was the UN it was the Scherat the meeting in Scherat right this is the Scherat agreement which came from the Libyan political what was it called a court and then it gave the the GNA that led to the GNA and to the recognition of that party there were many attempts like that the role of Algeria Algeria shares 1000 kilometers with Libya one advantage that Algeria has well because Algeria right now is spending so much money to protect its border and that of Tunisia because Tunisia and Algeria in a sense are allied on this question very much so they see eye to eye what's going on now what no one understands up to today the UN secretary general appointed an Algerian a former foreign minister to be the special envoy the mediator you know to replace Rassan Salami for some weird reason even the US ambassador could not say why it was vetoed by the United States and now there's no one now Algeria has offered an in fact even Aguila was was was in Algeria not long ago Sarraj went to Algeria after Algeria is probably the best potential broker because it knows all the sites it knows the Gaddafi that the tribes it has even some of the militias and it has that experience of brokering reconciliation approaches like it did in its own domestic when it had its own civil war so it learned from that experience and tried to you know share it with the Libyans and it doesn't have a preference for either you know whether it's Sarraj or what have you and it has a history of mediation it has mediate mediated several conflicts including Eritrea Ethiopia US Iran and so on and so forth so it and and and ice in Tunis now is also in agreement with that and they are against the presence of foreign forces and France says oh I share your position there's Algeria I share your position but then it goes it goes in sides with Haftar so again the entrenched interests of each of the foreign parties that I talked about is preventing a resolution of the conflict in Libya and Algeria I'm I'm afraid does not have the necessary weight in this big game to be allowed it's not being allowed in in other words even if it comes up with the best possible solution it contradicts the interests you know of the other players so as Egypt is in competition with Algeria which wants to have its own influence over Libya and so on and so forth Algeria doesn't really like Turkish presence I had interviewed officials I am the one who tried to convince them that if it hadn't been for Turkey you wouldn't have had a balance of power then you know Sarraj would have been defeated and so later it seemed that what happened you know some parts of the government agreed but they were not too happy with Turkish presence if it were up to the Algerians it should be left to the Libyan to the Libyans themselves you made an important point there about a glimpse of hope that the resolution could come from neighbors who knows the you know the geopolitics of tribes and affiliations and the east and the west division and all that so possibly the Algerians will take an interest because so far they were quite not interested but mainly because their house was also has always also been in a bit of a mess going back to another question about Turkey so Xiaoli is saying that Turkey has established two military bases in Libya and of course they may be kind of geopolitical outcomes would the region face I mean you touched on that a bit so a brief answer please yeah yeah yeah two bases there again Turkey has made those secrets of its of its presence and support for the Sarraj government and there's almost a modus vivendi between Turkey and Russia that you know what happens in the west is George what even happens in the east is mine and so on but I I am not sure whether a reconciled Libya and reconciled with its neighbors as well would allow the existence of permanent bases in Libya at least this is my my understanding right now yes Sarraj needs Turkey without Turkey he would not be able and Turkey needs to also have a government that mirrors its own a conservative government based on Muslim Brotherhood principles and so on and so forth so I don't think even Russia would would build a permanent base because it already has base in bases in Syria I am not so sure that it would but it would to basically provoke or force the Europeans to recon with with with with with Russia in terms of migration refugees and so on and so forth so I think that Russia has for now you know to supply because the US has uncovered with the imaging and all that there are Suhois migs that are present in Libya that you know that were used by the Wagner group and so on so forth so it's there whether I think that a a resolution among the reconciliation between the Libyans would end that that presence eventually okay great thank you I'm thinking there of as well talking about the European Union about the role of Italy because Italy of course is the one that is very much worried about the influx of the migrants from the Sahel and from Africa because Libya always had that border I think and of course it has sided largely with Haftar because they think that he is going to keep those well he's been persecuting this immigrant I mean there are few atrocities committed against them so he makes you think I think there was an early question about France loses its reputation I think John had the follow-up about siding with a clearly a dictator who was who could be as worse as as Gaddafi and putting you know that supporting or backing from some countries in the European Union which is extremely problematic I have another question about from Abdus Salam about the division between you know the Greenleica Borca and the Tarablos you know the that traditional division that existed in in Libyan history throughout the Ottoman Empire and when the San Nusi dynasties brought the two regions together but it seems to come back and haunt Libya that eastern western divide along tribal lines and he's asking do you see this as a colonial legacy or do you see it as something that is part of the making of Libya itself that which I guess is is part of the making of most nations I mean going back to that idea of a nationalist unifying discourse that Gaddafi failed to come up with in a way I think it's both there's the colonial legacy and there's I think that was my argument from the beginning today to say there's one part which is the their own doing the Libyans own doing and one part is you know the the outsiders exploiting those divisions by the way I need to correct something you said that somebody said that Italy supported Haftar Italy is nominally on the side of the DNA of Sarraj but it did once receive Haftar as if he was ahead of state but in reality Italy is more has more interest with the gna especially for its old company and I and so on and so and it feels it feels this is what neocolonialism is it feels that because it was the former colonial powers power it should have more of a say in Libyan affairs but again its attitude is ambiguous as France I mean it's not very clear who they played a double game which is not helping with the resolution resolution of the conflict thanks yeah yeah I'm regarding France and that's something I did not finish Turkey has basically destroyed France's plans in Libya completely and France had not played its card more honestly either supporting the gna correctly and seeking a resolution when it alienated its fellows at the European Union and in NATO and Turkey now you know you know it has nothing what is the card that France has right now in in Libya I mean back to what you said about the emergence of the new Ottoman Khalifat with Erdogan and the idea of controlling part of the Arab world because Turkey now is really a major player in the new Arab Cold War you know in the way it sided with Qatar against the UAE and the Saudis and so it's quite another dimension that is that's going to have a big role in the coming months and years I'm going to ask the audience does anybody wants to raise their hand and ask a question directly to Yahya is there anybody who wants to to unmute themselves and ask a question hi Karima hello Mahjoum it's so nice to see you here hi thank you Yahya for your great presentation I'm sorry I was in a meeting so I joined a little bit late those who don't know me my name is Mahjoum I'm the director of Gulf Study Center at Qatar University I just want to add I think you correctly defined the crisis it's about the role of players from outside and you know insiders seem to be basically following rather than initiating and this applies in Syria applies in other cases and I just I want to elaborate on on on the the role of the Gulf in the whole thing it's obvious that the division in the Gulf the echo the reflection of that we saw it in Libyan crisis because the Gulf was divided between a pro-Arab Spring and you know counter-revolutionary so that division reflected there and the example we saw in in Libya it's obvious that Saudis and Emiratis with the support of Egypt they invested a lot because they wanted to maintain the status quo and you know make sure that the whole concept and the outcome of Arab Spring failed and that's the way they can basically survive and it's obvious that with the with the role of Turkey the whole thing that upside down now I think it's obvious that Saudis and Emiratis now they are struggling to maintain the status quo they have and the obvious that Qatar is not actually doing them a favor and the problem they are facing they don't have either option they don't have plan B they don't have even save a deal Qaddafi is not the right person according to them according to their own calculation so even if he suggested I think from what I see and following up is not the right person and I think the main dilemma they are facing now is actually who is the person if they said if they shown their red car to Haftar who will be the person replacing him I think that is the main dilemma and that is the momentum was given indirectly to Turkey and the government to survive and to your main you know able to gain this kind of international support and it's obvious that you know as long as you know the Gulf will have its impact I think with the uncertainty now with international politics American elections you know the crisis the epidemic and even the crisis in Lebanon it's obvious that we will have this uncertainty until the start of 2021 and I think we is expected to see this very clear on Libyan front because of this all of these elements again thank you Yahya and thank you Karima for inviting me we appreciate thanks Mahjub thank you Mahjub I want to add a little line you know all of a sudden everybody is talking about trying to prop up some Arab nationalism coming even from the Gulf against the Turks they did it against Iran for Shi'a you know that you know that that's the main enemy which you know suggest that we should align with Israel and so on and so forth against you know Iran and now it's Ottoman of course Erdogan is playing down that too for for the domestic you know by the way I was going to cite to you I have the the latest survey in Turkey he got a lot of support on what he's doing in Libya he got more than 60% because he's playing you know and we are back he had given some signs you know he was rebuilding the Kachawa Mosque in Algeria you know vestige of Turkey and so on and so forth but I you know I am not naive I know neo realism what is happening is Turkey's national interests that's simple Ottomanism you can use it as a symbolic but the reality is Turkey is playing game a solid game and has the willow to do what it needs to do it did it when Saraj said I need you okay I come they didn't go by themselves and by the way among all those who have intervened in Libya and I'm going to be hated by the Arabs here you know the only country that has a legitimate right to be in in Libya is Turkey why because Turkey was called in by the recognized government and it says just like France went to Mali it went legally because you know the the government of Mali asked the the French to come to the rescue and that's recognizing international law yeah I mean it's fascinating also that Erdogan is very popular in the Arab world he is extremely popular so he has got the back he speaks to the Arab publics and that I mean he's hated by some government but he does speak to the Arab publics and what he's doing is highly approved among the people anybody else thanks thanks very much anybody wants to raise their hands and ask a question otherwise I think we've exhausted Yahya so I think it's been fun it's it's been a huge pleasure to have you thank you so much for waking up so early to talk to us from Marseille and thanks everybody for coming and we have another public lecture coming up soon so we'll send you the details about that thanks very much Yahya thanks everyone thank you very much for having a good evening bye bye everyone bye bye