 Good morning everybody. Welcome to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. My name's Doug Paul. I'm the Vice President for Studies here, and I'm currently so-called managing the Asia program. It's our good fortune. It wasn't planned this way, but a lot of attention will focus this weekend on Secretary Pompeo's visit to North Korea as well as other capitals in Northeast Asia this coming weekend, and so this is a timely gathering. We're bringing you a special morning edition of our Continuing Japan Speaker Series program, and we're going to address a familiar topic for the U.S.-Japan alliance, which is North Korea. We find ourselves in unfamiliar territory on this issue. It was just over a year ago that North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test in less than a year since its third intercontinental ballistic missile test. Maximum pressure was building all through last year. Last November saw North Korean guards fire over 40 times to prevent a defector from reaching the southern side of the DMZ, and he barely survived multiple gunshot wounds. But now guard posts along the DMZ are being taken down. Mines are being cleared. Secretary Pompeo is on his way for a fourth trip to Pyongyang following a whirlwind of summitry involving Kim Jong-un, seven in seven months for North Korea's leader with Presidents Moon and Xi and Trump. All to help move forward, we hope the cause of peace and to finally realize North Korea and denuclearization. So we're here to talk about how can we take advantage of this situation and opportunity. Our aim today is to look ahead and in practical terms consider what specific options we have with regard to pursuing these two goals, peace and denuclearization, and importantly to discuss the potential implications of our choices from an alliance perspective. We're honored to have two highly distinguished former diplomats from Japan and the United States with us here today, Ambassador Ken Sasai, who used until just this spring was Ambassador here in Washington, and Susan Thornton, who until very recently, a retirement, was the Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian Pacific Affairs. They both have a lot of experience on these issues, and we are grateful to all of our panelists and presenters who will help us look at not only the technical and logistical challenges related to denuclearization, but also sort through our alliance priorities and think about the best diplomatic course to accomplish our goals. Before we get to our panel sessions, however, I'm delighted to introduce a special guest who plays an important role on the front lines of maintaining peace along the DMZ, and we're fortunate for him to be here as our opening speaker. It's my pleasure to welcome to Carnegie Lieutenant General Wayne Eyre of the Canadian Army, who serves as Deputy Commander of the United Nations Command in Korea, a post he assumed just a few months ago. He's the first, I text as non-American, but I think Canada is still part of the North American continent, so the first non- U.S. Deputy UN Commander, which is an important reminder of the multilateral nature of the coalition that rose in support of South Korea's defense way back in 1950. General Eyre grew up in Saskatchewan and joined the Army cadets at an early age. He served in a variety of important command positions, including as Head of the Canadian Army in Western Canada, as Commander of the Third Canadian Division and Joint Task Force West, as leader of different UN detachments deployed in Cyprus and Croatia, and commanding various NATO Canadian forces in Bosnia and Afghanistan, including as Commanding General of the NATO training mission there. General Eyre will talk to us about the UN Command's current functions and activities and role it plays in the rapidly evolving security environment on the Korean Peninsula, and he's agreed to take a few questions after his presentation. So please join me in welcoming General Eyre to the podium today. Thank you. Doug, thank you for the introduction, and ladies and gentlemen, good morning. You know, firstly, I'd like to thank the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for inviting me here today to join you in this important discussion. So this is an excellent opportunity for me on behalf of the Command to engage the greater Washington DC government and policy community, and I'm thankful for the Carnegie's or Carnegie Endowment's continued examination of these very difficult issues. I have to say it's a bit daunting up front to be addressing so many experts in the field while I am still a relative neophyte at this, but I can assure you that the work done here, or all of you in the academic fields and the think-tank community, is of great value for those of us who have to turn policy into action on the ground. So your work is very important in shaping these policy decisions, and I thank you for your continued effort. Very much a privilege for me to be the first, as Doug said, non-U.S. deputy commander for United Nations Command in this very dynamic and potentially historic times. So you have to ask what is a Canadian who is supposed to be in Korea doing here in Washington? Well, thankfully, as a Canadian official, I'm not down here talking trade. So this is my third deputy commander role in the course of the last six years or so, and I've come to realize that the primary role of a deputy is to extend the command reach of the organization, to be where the commander can't, to deliver messages the the commander wants delivered, and to ensure alignment throughout the organization. So upon my arrival in Korea, one of the first things that commander of United Nations Command told me, General Vincent Brooks, well, he charged me with several efforts, but firstly he said, I want you to go engage, engage widely, talk about United Nations Command, go out to sending state capitals and drum up support for the command, educate on the command, dispel some myths on the command. Oh, and by the way, I want you to start with my own capital in Washington, because you're going there in a different uniform, we'll send a message all on its own. So thus, here I am. Now this event comes at a pivotal time in the history of Northeast Asia. The change between events just a year ago and today are nothing less than dramatic. Now, since the last major DPRK provocations, including the their last nuclear test of 3 September 2017, and their last intercontinental ballistic missile test of 28 November, it's been 10 months. And since those provocations, we've seen the two Koreas join at the Olympics, followed by a series of summits between them, between the DPRK, the Republic of Korea, the United States, other regional actors. And all of these are very positive signs of potential epic breakthroughs. Whether there's also the looming historical baggage of past negotiations and provocation cycles that failed to bear fruit. And at the center of this very fluid environment is United Nations Command in Korea. Now there's growing interest in UNC and what we do as the roller coaster ride of tension levels hit high and low points over the recent past. Some see it as a vehicle for enabling a lasting peace, and others view it as a relic of the Cold War. With like-minded sending states such as my own, there's a renewed interest in investing in the command as a way to positively contribute to a solution. And my own appointment is testament to that renewal. Now the organization can be misunderstood at times and confusing in its span of authority and use. So today I'd like to start off with just talking a little bit about the history of the organization, what we do, and where we could potentially go. So in terms of history, UNC is a direct result of the Korean conflict and has its genesis in United Nations Security Council Resolution 84, passed in the weeks following the North Korean invasion of 25 June 1950, which authorized the United States to form a unified command to defend South Korea and bring stability to Northeast Asia. Now these were these were early times for the newly established United Nations and its members were still figuring out its roles and uses in the international space. But 17 nations answered the call and fought under the UN flag on the Korean Peninsula. But one fascinating aspect of the passage of the UN Security Council resolutions at that time is that they were conducted in a timeframe when the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council and so was unable to exercise its veto. And at that time you'll recall that Taiwan was holding the Chinese seat, not the PRC. In July of 1953, three years after the beginning of the war, the Armistice Agreement was signed by the opposing forces, interestingly enough not by the Republic of Korea. And the Armistice was signed with the intention that further negotiations would lead to a political resolution, but this has not yet happened. And so the peninsula has remained in a state of semi-permanent conflict freeze. And because of this stasis, the role of United Nations command has continued. Following the signing of the Armistice, the command was directed to provide oversight and enforcement of the agreement over the friendly forces. Now this entailed monitoring the location of forces, facilitation of dialogue with North Korea, and oversight of the southern half of the demilitarized zone and the joint security area, or the DMZ and the JSA. Furthermore, its function of providing the headquarters for multinational forces from contributing countries remained. And throughout the years, it's maintained a number of subordinate organs. United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission, or UNC Mack for short, and its secretariat are charged with the direct oversight of the terms of the Armistice, including investigations of serious incidents, coordinating any passage through the DMZ, and conducting relevant negotiation with the DP RK People's Army, or the DPA. We have the UNC Security Battalion, which provides the security forces for the joint security area at Pamloon Jung, in order to provide a safe location for dialogue. We have a UNC liaison group, which is a group of liaison officers from the sending states, which for the most part are based on their defense attaches in Seoul. And this lively group remains engaged on an almost weekly basis, with the command on our ongoing activities. And finally, we have a UNC Rear, based in Japan, and it's a great relevance to the subject of this conference. The primary mission of UNC Rear is to facilitate support for UNC through Japan, as that's, we take a look at the lines of communication for supporting forces, that's where the majority of them flow through. An important aspect or important part of the command's ability to function is the status of forces agreement that we have with Japan. And that is exercised on a periodic basis. Indeed, over the course of the last year, including as we speak, UNC Rear has supported and is supporting the sanctions surveillance operations that are currently ongoing, with a number of sending states sending in surveillance aircraft and ships to take a look at the, or to monitor the ship-to-ship transfers that are ongoing as part of sanctions evasion efforts by North Korea. Also affiliated with the command is the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. This is an oversight organization that is enshrined in the armistice to provide neutral observation of the organizations enforcing the armistice. So currently Switzerland, Sweden, and Poland each contribute to the organization. Over the decades as the regional political situation evolved with different requirements and command relationships, a UN command has morphed as well into three different organizations. Each of these has separate lines of authorities and responsibilities, but they remain unified under a single American four-star general, currently General Brooks. Now these commands with which many of you are probably familiar include US Forces Korea or USFK and Combined Forces Command or CFC. And on first viewing, it makes for a relatively complicated picture, but I'll try and separate those out. Now Combined Forces Command is the ROC US Binational Warfighting Command. It was stood up in 1978 to take over the primary responsibility for the defense of South Korea from United Nations Command, and it was done in the context of increasing proficiency and capability by the South Korean military. On the other hand, USFK is the headquarters for all US military elements in Korea, and it provides the forces and the support necessary to enable the other two commands in their operations. Now the organizational structures and lines of authority of these three commands have distinct political origins and legal obligations that have been 68 years in the making, and despite the criticism of their complexity, they deterred aggression and given the Republic of Korea space to thrive over the course of the last half century plus. Over time, however, their mandates, their functions, and their staffs became intertwined, and UNC as a distinct command atrophied. Its staff personnel were double and sometimes triple-hatted with responsibilities for UNC, often being a secondary duty, and thus a lot of the command fell into less use and didn't evolve with the time. The last two commanders, however, recognized untapped potential in the command, especially in the context of increasing provocations, to address this atrophy and revitalize it to become a means to corral international support and increase sending state contributions to the peninsula, and also to enhance its function as an enabler of dialogue to ensure that the Armistice Agreement remained successful. So the decision was made over the course of the last several years to revitalize UNC. Much work has been put into defining the role of the command, increasing the strategic governance of it, and attracting more sending state contributions. In my own presence is a manifestation of that. Functions of the command have been clearly laid out. In Armistice, we enforce the Armistice Agreement. We are the enabler of dialogue through established mechanisms, primarily with the North Korean military, but with other international partners as well, and I'll get into that in a little bit. You know, and as necessary, we are the home for sending state contributions, for international contributions. So in the event of hostilities, this last function becomes our primary one as we facilitate the introduction of UN sending state capabilities into the theater through the coordination of their reception staging, onward integration, through coordinating their sustainment, through coordinating any necessary international agreements, through facilitating and massaging their command and control relationships, and all of the other complicated, messy issues that come with coalition warfare. And as such, we become a supporting command both to CFC and the ROC Joint Chiefs of Staff. In terms of governance, we're getting some renewed activity there as well. In June, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed a revised terms of reference for the commander of UNC. This was the first time it was updated since 1983. So against strengthening that strategic governance. It was done to reflect the changes over the previous decades and reflected the need to renew the organization. So the command relationship for UNC is somewhat different from the other two commands, whereas USFK has to go through US Indo-Paycom in Hawaii back here to DC. Commander UNC has a direct line to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. So that chain is still being rebuilt, and that's one of the reasons for me being here in DC, and I've had a number of meetings over the course of the last several days, and this afternoon with the US Joint Staff. The third change is increased UN-Sending State participation. Over the course of the last several years, their participation in the major theater exercises, key resolve, and Archie Freedom Guardian has greatly increased. This has allowed headquarters of UNC to function as stand-alone headquarters, but it's also included distinct force elements, such as division headquarters, such as some low density, high demand capabilities, like special operations forces, like weapons of mass destruction, detection, and in response. Moreover, the number of permanent staff, the staff that are permanently assigned to the command during armistice has increased, especially after General Brooks put out the call last January. So now we consider UNC to be revitalized, and what I mean by that, it has a new life, a new vitality that's been put into it. It's got good forward momentum, but we're still somewhat, we have ways to go before we can stand on our own, so we are continuing to evolve the command, especially in the context of the rapidly changing security environment. We have to do that to continue to be relevant. That regional environment has seen dramatic change over the last two years as North Korea culminated decades of nuclear weapons and missile technology research by entering into what we saw last year is that intense provocation cycle. I'm sure I don't need to recite the list of provocations conducted last year for this audience, but I'll just leave it by saying that those events prompted some serious strategic discussions on potential courses of action in many senior leadership circles. And then following their last successful missile test on the 29th of November, KJU declared success and shifted focus to the economy in what some have called his most recent charm offensive. So we've arrived now at a time where there's been several breakthrough events, including the just concluded third inter-Korean summit two weeks ago. And these events portend a new direction of political relationship on the peninsula and the potential for moving towards a lasting peace. So what's been the role of United Nations command in all of this? Well, we have been very active and I just want to give you a few data points, a few statistics for the last six, seven months. UNC DPA communications, regular communications had been reestablished after a hiatus of several years. We've got a phone line which is active at least twice a day, often far more frequently as we pass messages back and forth. There have been numerous kernel level and for the first time since 2009, general officer level discussions with the DPA. UNC has approved, coordinated and monitored over 5,700 personnel crossings of the or through the DMZ. And most notably, this statistic doesn't include the 400 plus during the time of the Olympics. In 2017, by comparison, there was zero, unless you count the defector that Doug talked about, and that was an official. There have been two remains repatriation events, the largest of which was the repatriation of 55 sets of remains on the 27th of July, where for the first time, a U.S. aircraft with U.S. general officer flew up to North Korea to Wonsan and brought the remains back. And the ceremony on the 1st of August was something else. You know, having been there, it was tremendously emotional and poignant to see those 55 sets ready, loaded, and hopefully bringing some sense of closure to family members back here. To maintain situational understanding, Commander UNC conducts monthly sending state ambassador round tables in order to update the diplomatic community on the situation and on-going events on the peninsula. This is a tremendous forum to assist with aligning messages, aligning activities, and just getting the word out as to what's happening. So that's an area where we facilitate international dialogue. Indeed, January's Vancouver Foreign Minister's meeting on security and stability on the Korean Peninsula arose out of discussion at this forum. And finally, especially right now, as we speak, we're heavily involved in the implementation planning for the confidence-building measures that were agreed to that came out of this last inter-Korean summit. The comprehensive military agreement is something that we view as assisting in the de-escalation of tensions on the peninsula. And we're working very hard, as we speak, to ensure its implementation will be successful. And indeed, over the coming days, we should see trilateral meetings between UNC, the rock military, and the DPA to discuss its implementation. So all this gives hope that the process is moving forward towards a lasting peace with a final, fully verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the peninsula. But at the same time, we got to be ready for worst case as well. And that's why the military gets paid big bucks to be ready for worst case scenarios as well. So the future going forward is not clear. But we do know we have our work cut out for us. And UNC headquarters is going to continue to evolve. And we've come up with a fairly significant work plan that's going to advance along five lines of effort. Firstly, we need to continue to strengthen our strategic governance. And this is going to facilitate our staff relationships, clarify duties and responsibilities at all levels, so that we ensure our linkages with the executive agent US government back here in Washington is absolutely clear. And again, that's been the subject of numerous meetings for me this week. We're looking to increase the membership and manning of the United Nations Command. This not only includes increasing our permanent staff from from UN sending states and the Republic of Korea military, but also increasing the number of sending states as other nations are interested in a positive outcome and want to want to contribute. Currently, as we speak, we have members from eight of the original 17 as sending states in the command, and we're working on increasing that. Our leaders at all levels are going to continue to engage and educate with the various stakeholders to increase their understanding of UNC and its role. We need to dispel some of the myths out there and and fill some of the gaps in understanding about your organization, while highlighting its relevancy and potential untapped potential as the situation changes. We need to generate and manage some key staff enablers and agreements. Our multinational personnel need the legal framework under which to operate on the on the peninsula that both respects rock sovereignty, but gives the legal protection that's required for international forces. Likewise, we need to establish information sharing interoperability standards, and all that host of necessary administration that goes with multinational operations. And finally, probably the most important is we need to focus on continuous evolution. As the dynamic situation on the peninsula changes, we have to rapidly adapt to remain relevant. Now this this entails robust planning capacity and brain trust, if you will, which were in the process of building. So UNC revitalization has not been without without its challenges, and some of these are going to continue. And new challenges are going to emerge. And one interesting challenge that remains is although UNC was created through a UN Security Council resolution, and we fly the UN flag, there currently exists no relationship with UN headquarters, other than submitting an annual report up through the executive agent US government to to New York. As recently mentioned by both the the PRC and North Korea at the UN, some members could see this relationship gap could use this relationship gap to call into question our legitimacy. Now that said, UNC is the only multinational security organization that exists in Northeast Asia. Now, albeit it's one with historical baggage, having been party to the conflict. But potentially, and I'm just throwing it out there, it could expand its functions to enable even greater dialogue for wider regional security issues. Another challenge, while UNC has very effectively maintained the armistice for the last 65 years, the Republic of Korea is greatly changed as well, and is a maturing democracy with very strong democratic institutions. The challenge is to respect their sovereignty while fulfilling our legal responsibilities enshrined in the armistice agreement. That's a very fine line. But the end of the day, we have to be a force for enabling a lasting peace. And in doing this, UNC reinforces the ironclad support that it gives to the Republic of Korea. Lastly, with the multiple calls for an end of war declaration, there will invariably be calls for the disbandment of UNC. And don't get me wrong, at some point, that has to happen. At some point, the command has to go away. But it has to be at the right time. But an end of war declaration is very different from a peace treaty, and the requirement to continue to have a mechanism to formally deescalate incidents needs to exist. Now, this issue was clearly addressed by President Moon's comments immediately upon his return from the third summit two weeks ago, when he stated an end of war declaration will in no way affect the status of the UN command. And until complete denuclearization is fulfilled, the armistice system would be maintained. So despite the challenges ahead, some of them existential, UNC will continue to be a central player in the ongoing, potentially decisive events that are playing out as we focus on deescalation in the, in the middle of abundant opportunities for miscalculation and further provocations. It's going to remain an important vehicle for military to military dialogue with the North for coordinating multilateral engagement for rate raising consciousness of the issues and bringing other international players into the field. And finally, providing a standing multinational framework for the integration of international forces into the command should operations become necessary to defend South Korea. In closing, once again, I am incredibly privileged to be in this position at this historic time as we work together towards achieving a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. So I look forward to your questions and your discussion and learning, learning from you. Because as mentioned, I am a relative newcomer and am here to learn. So thank you very much. Thank you for those very informative remarks. I'm not going to get in the way of you and the questioners, but I just want to ask people if you were identified by the general to raise a question, please make it a question, not a comment. Please identify yourself and your affiliation and then ask the question once the microphone reaches you. Please do that. Thanks. So I'm going to put these on so I can actually see you out there. Please. Hi, I'm Tim Schorach. I'm a reporter with the nation magazine in New York. You mentioned the UNC could expand its functions. And my question is a couple months ago, we're actually right after Singapore, Secretary Pompeo made an interesting statement that the armistice could be altered in some way that President Trump might offer this to the DPRK, alter the armistice. And there was also a in depth analysis by the Nautilus Institute that included some former high ranking US officials saying how the armistice could be changed in some ways at some point to protect North Korean security and South Korean security. And they outlined a bunch of different ways that could happen. Do you have any thoughts on that in terms of like, you know, once a peace agreement is reached or a declaration of absolutely, it all comes down to how do you confirm that what you've agreed to is actually been done? How do you how do you confirm and verify and and fill that trust deficit that exists? So it's conceivable that there is a role for that that trust and verification piece. So for example, as you pull forces back, instead of just saying you've done it, is there an organization out there that could verify? Yes, this has actually been done. And we've seen it with our own eyes. Could UNC fill that gap? Well, conceivably, yes. But as I mentioned, is that palatable to everybody? Perhaps not. You know, I think back to my first operational deployment as a as a young officer that was to the island of Cyprus with the United Nations, where we patrolled the buffer zone between the the Greeks and the Turks, maintaining confidence on both sides that yes, the piece was being traded, that bird being being kept. Could that be a model? Well, perhaps I just throw it out there. In the back, please. Blue shirt. Thank you, Julian Borgia from the Guardian. Can I ask, is there a work plan or timetable for the confidence building measures and the DMZ taking down the guard posts and so on? So so there is a timeline that was published as part of the comprehensive military agreement. We are currently in discussions to to further refine that. I don't have the latest details on me because it's it's been ongoing this week as I have as I've been here. But yes, there is a timeline, but I can't give you the exact details on it. Right at the back, please. I'm Carlton Stoiber from the International Nuclear Law Association. One of the key verifying mechanisms in international nuclear law is the International Atomic Energy Agency. And it's safeguard program. And I wonder what kinds of contact you have had by the commission with the IAEA and what future role do you see for the International Atomic Energy Agency in verifying and inspecting some of these activities? Okay, so your first question is very simple. There's been no contact between us at United Nations Command and any organization. The second question, they are the experts. So from my perspective, yes, it would make perfect sense for them to have a huge role in the verification. Because the technical expertise is not something that is very common out there. I am not a denuclearization expert, but one could only surmise that the organization needs to be heavily involved over here. I'll get you at the back next one. Okay. Hi, I'm Josh Pollack from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Can you say a bit more about the UN Command's role in the negotiation of the military agreement recently concluded? Yes, so we had very good discussions with the Ministry of Defense in the weeks leading up to the agreement. We are very supportive of the agreement as a means to further de-escalate tension. And we are doing all we can to work with the Ministry of Defense to ensure that its implementation is successful. At the back. Hello, General. This is Young Kim from Voice of America. One question is, does UNC have any concern on no-fly zone to be designated through the Inter-Korean Summit? And also, Commander-in-Chief General Abrams said, suspension of joint military exercises last year weakened the readiness of the UNC. Do you agree with his assessment? Okay, I think he was talking, so to go to your last question, he was talking specifically about the readiness of the other commands, so USFK and NCFC. So I cannot speak to that because I'm here in a UNC capacity, so that's beyond my realm of responsibility. But anything from my perspective that we can do to maintain dialogue, to keep the talks going, to keep tensions de-escalated is good for maintaining the armistice, maintaining peace. And with our UNC hats on, yes, that is good. Going back to your first question on the no-fly zone, the same thing. UNC equities are not touched in that one, with the exception that we're currently working on, ensuring that we have access to medical evacuation should it become necessary from the demilitarized zone. The question you were asking touches on equities of US forces, Korea and NCFC, which again, is not in my realm of responsibility. Sir. Thank you for your remarks. Terence Taylor from the International Council for Life Sciences. I was interested in your remarks about the role of UNC rear, if I put it that way, in overseeing sanctions, possible sanctions breaches. I'm just curious of how that worked. I wonder if you could say a little bit more, because you don't have a direct link to the Security Council. How does the information get? Is it given by member states to the Security Council? How does all that work? Thank you. So firstly, for clarification, UNC rear is not overseeing the sanction surveillance. It is facilitating the basing of those surveillance aircraft and ships that come in to use the bases in Japan under the auspices of the SOFA that we have with Japan. In terms of sharing of the information, I don't have all the details, but based on what I understand, it is an individual state responsibility to make that information public with who they will. I was interested in your, Corey Hinderstein with the Nuclear Threat Initiative. I almost got the evil eye from Doug, so I had to jump in. I was interested in your comment about the significant increase from zero to hundreds. I think you said of people crossing the DMZ or coming into the DMZ. I'm wondering if you could say what kinds of people they are, what are they doing, who do they represent, what is the nature of that increased crossing? Most of it is in support of the various summits that have gone back and forth in the various negotiations, whether it is the inter-Korean summits, whether it is the U.S. DPRK summit. It is all of the staff that need to set the details of those. Some of it is to set up the liaison office in K-Song, but for the most part it is to facilitate negotiations. Grace Kong, former State Department and the Institute for Korean American Studies. My question goes back to your comments about the UNC's legitimacy and the idea of altering the armistice. Could you see the UN Security Council passing a resolution transforming the UNC into a UN peacekeeping operation with Chapter Seven powers? This would probably have to take place after a peace treaty is established, but has there been discussion of that kind of transformation and conferring the legitimacy of the Security Council on the command? So firstly, I'm not sure if it would be a Chapter Seven or Chapter Six, probably a Chapter Six peacekeeping operations because it would have the both sides would be willing to bring it in. You know, that's a very interesting question. We put no serious discussion into it other than floating the idea, hey, is this something that's within the realm of the possible? Again, it comes down to the palatability of it, and do you morph this organization or do you create a new one? Given that this organization has got baggage, has got historical baggage as being party to the conflict, and we most recently heard China two weeks ago in the Security Council saying, hey, this is a relic of the Cold War. So to do that, we'd be some challenges. One more question? Why don't we go to the back? Thank you. Jeff Selden from VOA. I was wondering what you see as the greatest dangers or the biggest threats for miscalculation as this process goes on between North Korea and South Korea, and what is your level of optimism that both sides will be able to get past the baggage of past negotiations because the U.S. has assessed that while on the one hand they see new opportunities, the intelligence community has also been firmly coming out and saying that they don't see any indications that Kim Jong-un is ever going to give up nuclear weapons. So in our view, the biggest challenge is the trust deficit. There are decades and decades of bad blood and experience, so that trust doesn't exist. And the real question is how do you build that trust? How do you fill that deficit? And so the approach that the South Korean government appears to be taking or is taking is build a relationship first, which leads to trust, which will lead to demonstrable action. That doesn't work for everybody because many want to see that demonstrable action first, which leads to trust, which may lead to a relationship down the road. So same ends, but different means. And how do you find that middle ground? That, from my view, is the most vexing challenge facing the current situation, because we're not going to be able to go forward without that trust. And if there are miscalculations, it could very easily lead back to where we were a year ago. But I guess I'm getting yanked here, but thank you very much for your questions. I look forward to engaging with you throughout the morning. Thank you, General. That was a terrific start to our program. Good morning, everyone. I'm Jim Scho from the Senior Fellow here at the Carnegie Endowment in the Asia Program. And we're going to jump right into our first session, and I'm going to turn it over to the moderator, Toby Dalton. Well, good morning, everybody. It's a pleasure to welcome you here. My name is Toby Dalton. I'm the co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program here at Carnegie. And as Doug Paul mentioned this morning, this is indeed a timely gathering to talk about the challenge of where to take the denuclearization issue on the Korean Peninsula with Secretary Pompeo and the new special representative for this issue, Steve Began, headed to Pyongyang, perhaps as we're sitting here, in fact. I'm not sure what time their flight was set to depart. But I think the real problem or the real question here that this panel is going to confront is how do you transition the process that has gotten us here, which is the high-level summitry and the few meetings that have begun to sort of scope this problem a little bit, into a technical negotiation? Where does the rubber meet the road? How do we scope this challenge from a technical standpoint? And in particular, how can you construct an approach, a roadmap, if you will, for getting to the denuclearization or in the parlance that's often used by the U.S. government, the final fully verified denuclearization, as agreed by Chairman Kim, which, as a term of art, is off to write it, at least on Twitter, as far as I can tell. And I think that General Ayer's comment at the end about the lack of trust and how you sequence trust-building in this, given that you have, presumably from North Korea's perspective, paramount concerns about giving up too much information in the absence of trust that then might lead to concerns about vulnerability later on. So what should be the first steps? How do we verify this thing? And thinking about the alliance context where the U.S. and South Korea and Japan have different objectives, how can you keep these countries on the same page, if it's even possible? So to help tackle these issues, I'm pleased to have on the stage three of my friends and colleagues. First, Nobuaki Yama, who is a noted expert from Japan, I think one of the sharpest analysts on nuclear issues in Japan. He's a professor at the Graduate School of Law and Graduate School of International and Public Policy at Hitotsubashi University. He's a sufficient expert that the Japanese government saw fit to put him in Vienna to work at the Japanese mission to the IEA for several years as a minister counselor to include on these issues. Next to him is Corey Hinderstein, who's Vice President for International Fuel Cycle Strategies at the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Before joining NTI, she was Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Security and Non-Proliferation Policy at the National Nuclear Security Administration, which is part of the U.S. Department of Energy. And then lastly, Joshua Pollock, who is a Senior Research Associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, also the editor of the Journal of the Non-Proliferation Review, which in our field is one of the more important journals. And I think has a reputation for being a careful observer of technical and policy issues on Northeast Asian has done a lot of excellent work trying to understand the technical basis and direction of North Korea's nuclear program and the fuel cycle program in particular. So welcome to all of you. So to start, Nobu, maybe you can lay out a few thoughts on how you see this particular challenge looking at it from Tokyo. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you. It's your preference. Thank you very much for kind introduction and also appreciate the Carnegie Endowment for including me in this very interesting event at very timely moment. I'd like to talk about the gaps between Japan and the United States or maybe some other actors regarding the approaches to the denuclearization. I think there are a couple of questions among the security communities in Japan about the denuclearization process. First, on North Korea's intention, are they really willing to completely dismantle its nuclear weapon programs? Some people said, yes, this time it's genuine and North Korea is really willing to dismantle given that the Kim Jong-un may reign the country for next 30 years, 40 years for that. Maybe economic growth would be important and in order to gain economic support, I think the Kim Jong-un must be serious about considering dismantling of the nuclear weapon programs. The other said, we should learn lessons from history. From the history of negotiations with North Koreans, we have been kept, kept being treated by North Koreans and then we should be really cautious whether they are really truly willing to dismantle its nuclear programs. And then in Japan, also the some concerns or questions about the U.S. intention as well, it seems to me that we had an agreement that we definitely pursue CVID, so complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of denuclearization or whatever. But then in July, Secretary Pompeo mentioned new terminology, that's FVD, that's finally fully verifiable denuclearization. And so the completeness, notion of completeness is dropped from this acronym. What does it mean? So that reminds me of two different types of approaches to the denuclearization. The one is like the so-called arms control approach and the objectives of the arms control approach. First, to establish a stable security relationship. The second, then the maybe the complete denuclearization will be the secondary matter and as long as you are able to establish the stable security relationship, then maybe denuclearization may not be kind of an important question. Why it's maybe kind of extreme position, but that's kind of the so-called arms control approach and that is maybe, so to speak, eliminate mistrust first, then disturb, if possible. The other approach is a non-proliferation approach that is to totally eliminate, physically eliminate the nuclear weapon programs, that lead to the kind of confidence building. So the question is that confidence building, trust building should come first or disarmament should come first. And of course there is no really clear cut division between two and of course these approaches, I mean confidence building and the disarmament must come in parallel, but the question is where do we put the emphasis on. So then how Tokyo views the offer by the Pyongyang declaration regarding the denuclearization process, it says the shutdown of Yongbyon nuclear facility if the United States takes a corresponding steps in line with the spirit of the June 12th DPRK U.S. joint statement and also shutdown of the Tonchaneli engine test ground and the rocket launch pad. Although these measures could cap on the future development to some extent, but it is the fact that they are not the action to disarm or dismantle DPRK's existing nuclear forces. And also another question is what shutdown, what does shutdown mean? In the past documents the shutdown was also mentioned and in these past experiences we found shutdown means just simply a closure, not the physically destroying of the physically destroying the facilities. So we have some questions on that and further specifically from the Japanese perspective the concerns are like this with regard to the nuclear aspect, there may be possible second and third enrichment facilities and they have already accumulated enough amount of plutonium stockpiles and it doesn't really make a reference to the thermonuclear material programs even though they are going to shut down Yongbyon nuclear facilities that kind of concerns remain. Then on the side of the missile programs that is probably more interesting and serious. So even though the closure provides no further testing opportunities for the liquid fuel missiles but it may not be necessary already. North Korea has already developed enough capacity to launch the liquid fuel missiles and also the more important for Japan is what happened to the solid fuel missile programs. In terms of the solid fuel missile programs and also maybe medium-range missile programs then if we look at the April 20 declaration at the Central Committee of Worker's Body of Korea it says there is a more they declare the moratorium of nuclear and missile testing we found only the ICBMs and IRBM but not MRBM which would pose most imminent threat to Japan. So I resuspect what would be the reason why they didn't really mention MRBM. So I don't want to really too pessimistic but with these evidences I think for Japan there is no really good reason to change the threat assessment of North Korea nuclear missile capabilities given that measures that North Korea offers a proposing in the declaration would not contribute to the threat reduction for Japan. And then next I would like to touch upon a little bit about the denuclearization process in a technical way since I've served in the Vienna and work the IAEA maybe that's kind of something I you know the organizer would expect from me. So but first of all I talked about two different approaches right one is arms control approach the other is the non-proliferation approach and in case of arms control approach I think there is an interesting quotation by the Paul Nietzsche at the foreign relations committee testimony. He says we want to be sure that if the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily in any militarily significant way we would be able to detect such a violation in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side benefit of the violation. So that's kind of a very important concept of the arms verification for the arms control approach. But on the other hand from the IAEA's viewpoint or non-proliferation viewpoint the this verification process or mass comes with a declaration first and after declaration IAEA conduct inspector inspection activities then concludes with the confidence that declarations are complete and correct and the safeguards activities are properly in place with regard to facilities and materials for the peace through purposes so that they are not divided into military purposes. And so the arms control approach focuses on establishing confidence and achieving sort of strategic stability. And I'm curious whether that would be the other goal for us in dealing with North Korean nuclear threats. On the other hand the non-proliferation approach focuses on minimizing the risk of militarization of peace through nuclear programs and that declaration must come first and followed by safeguards and IAEA verification. That desirable. Then question comes is it really something what North Koreans are willing to accept? So here's a dilemma but at the same time so we have to be a little bit more flexible about approaches. If as long as we stick to the IAEA approach fundamentally then probably there is no kind of a there is no start for the process. And then but at the same time if we try to accept the North Korean terms and conditions for the playing game of this denuclearization by accepting the Pyongyang declaration approach then we keep on wondering what will be the end goal and how can we achieve how do we establish the process of denuclearization after that. So I think it is what is important for us is to carefully design the carefully coordinate among Japan, ROK and United States. And for us particularly it is important keep us posted and also keep us coordinated because as I said the North Korean, nuclear and missile threats are most imminent to Japan more than United States or ROK. And then maybe a couple of technical questions once again if the international for the non-proliferation regime if declaration would not come first then how can we have a sort of a scheme for the scheme or kind of arrangement with North Koreans to accept for them to accept the you know submit the full list of their nuclear activities materials and facilities without harming their security interests because for North Koreans if they are going to submit the list of such activities and facilities it means that they are going to provide the list of targets of the American tax. I don't think under current circumstances without the sufficient level of confidence they are not really going to give up such a kind of information to us and also the verification requires intrusive sort of a visit of the various facilities which could be really sensitive for national security of North Koreans. So it is probably really difficult to start with the declaration and verification process first. So I think the we have to be very flexible but once again I would like to emphasize that flexible approach must have the end goal clear vision for the end goal which is shared by Japan, United States and ROK then that process also have a clear vision of the reassurance by the United States on the security of Japan particularly given that once again I keep on saying that the threat that there is a difference is the threat perceptions among us and coordinating the threat perception and understanding each other probably would increase there is very important political process to reassure the security the alliance commitment among each other and that eventually lead into the success of the the nuclearization process so thank you very much great all right well thanks nobody that you you laid on the table for us a number of issues to to pick up both terminological sequential end game issues oh and by the way the reassurance issue which is a really critical one and I hope that we have a chance to get there and certainly the second panel will will touch on it as well next Corey how does this problem look from from Washington? well um similar in a lot of ways different in some important ones and I think most importantly we don't have a common vision and I would say not only do we not have a common vision between the US and Japan and ROK I don't think we have a common vision within any of those communities either and so I think what I'd like to do with thanks in advance to Toby and Jim and and Carnegie for the invitation to be here is to talk a little bit about some of the basic concepts because I think one of the things that's been really interesting is somebody who's been focusing on verification and the safeguard system and facility assessment for many many years is that suddenly we have a whole lot of people talking about verification and in you know to quote the princess bride sometimes I want to say I don't think that means what you think it means so I would like to talk about some of the real core questions so question number one what is verification and with apologies to some of my political science friends I'm going to start with some basic concepts I mean it seems simple but it's actually a complicated concept in principle verification needs to be associated with a specific agreement or set of commitments and I learned the lessons of the state department lawyers well you know an agreement is something official with and where there's a common understanding about what has been committed that doesn't mean a statement like both sides recognize that that's not an agreement we observe is not an agreement we should is not an agreement we will is an agreement and right now no matter what anybody is saying we have no agreements with North Korea about denuclearization there are some other basic concepts that I think get conflicted and conflated sometimes one is so I'd say stability and then compliance and then verification and these things are linked stability is something is a strategic determination where the security of some of a counterpart is essential to your own determination of security compliance is the condition where the restraint of somebody else is essential to your own and that's a political determination or political conclusion but verification is in the end of political determination that takes a lot of factors and so let me explain it what I mean by that if I say that stability is about comfort it's about sustainability it's about and I think that's why it's strategic this is about something a situation where neither side is compelled to change the status quo and that the status quo is working for both sides some could argue that there have been points within the last 20 years that we actually have been in a relatively stable position with North Korea that's different than determining whether a situation is politically acceptable and it's certainly different than determining whether there is a situation where one side is is compliant is in compliance and compliance is about you know what is one actor doing as it relates to a specific set of commitments or agreements and do I care about it and that's I think a really important question there have been certainly many times in history in the nuclear field as well as lots of other fields where one party is in non-compliance but we determine it's not material what it needs to say it's not militarily significant compliance is not something where it automatically flips a switch and then something changes in the strategic determination and all of this is wrapped up into the concept of verification so what is the definition of verification that I like to use I like to use and I'm going to read it because it has taken a long time to hash out in my mind a set of national and cooperative activities tools, procedures analytical processes and fundamentally judgments about what is happening with regard to a specific set of activities as defined in an agreement so it's the process that leads to that political decision compliance is a judgment but not a measurement so it has to be in service of the agreement and it has to be based on monitoring data that you collect and so I say that on purpose to say monitoring also not verification monitoring is an input to verification so having described a little bit about the complicated nature of this of verification as a concept let me talk about it in practice and what our thought process is in North Korea so that leads me question number two who verifies this is not a straightforward question and there's a lot of debate within the international community there's a lot of debate within the US community and the US official community as to who should verify the international atomic energy agency Carl mentioned in his question of general air and I think there is a question when is the role of the IAEA appropriate in a DPRK denuclearization scenario why should the North Koreans want the IAEA on the ground I think this is a really important question because at some points it's been said that if there's one thing the North Koreans hate more than the Americans it's the IAEA and this has been a problem over the years where at certain points they've seen the benefit of bringing the IAEA in because it helps their communication and at other points they've said no way to the IAEA and they've been burned by that judgment in the past they've invited the IAEA in including in the early 90s when they thought that they could get away with keeping some activities hidden and discovered that the IAEA capabilities were much more significant than they had expected if you believe that the North Koreans will enter into agreement for which they have every intention of complying with which they have every intention of complying then they should want the IAEA on the ground because I don't think they will want the Americans or the South Koreans or the Americans and the South Koreans and the Japanese in whatever configuration to be the one saying that they're violating an agreement we look at the current dynamic I'm going to mention the JCPOA dirty word and for some people but you know what is the what are the Iranians constantly saying now 11 consecutive IAEA reports have said we are acting consistent with the agreement you know so that is a that's politically powerful to have that independent viewpoint why should the U.S. want the IAEA in on the ground I think in this case it's pretty clear it's not only for that independent judgment but it's also for that force multiplier that capacity the IAEA does have a capacity that no national program has and if a national program or an ad hoc group had to duplicate the capability the IAEA it would be exceedingly expensive it would be exceedingly human resource intensive and it would probably take time to figure out how to do that why should the regional partners want the IAEA on the ground I think they share some of both of those factors that I mentioned for the North Koreans and for the Americans but I will say there's a distinction between verification activities related to the production infrastructure for the material for highly rich uranium or plutonium and the production infrastructure related to nuclear weapons and here we have to come back to the NPT the non-proliferation treaty not only says that nuclear weapon states will not share nuclear weapons capability with non-nuclear weapon states it also puts article two puts the burden on the non-nuclear weapon states not to seek and acquire nuclear weapons technology and information and I think that's really important because we have to be protective of the NPT and make sure that we don't proliferate nuclear weapons information through a process of verification so what does that mean there are a few different models I think there still is a role for the IAEA here as a backstop in the South Africa case which I won't you know if we want to talk about South Africa as a model we can it's come up a lot but in this case specifically all I will say is the IAEA figured out a way to get nuclear weapons expertise in their building and working in a small team that was accountable to the director general and to the member states but did not share the information that they had beyond those who were able to observe it and view it and evaluate it and so they had a Russian expert a British expert an American expert a French expert that came from those nuclear weapons programs to limit the proliferation consequences that same model actually worked in Iraq too although Iraq didn't have nuclear weapons and I'm talking about after the 1991-92 in that time period but they did have nuclear weapons information including designs and so that was being evaluated by nuclear weapons experts within the IAEA so I think that there's a role for the for the allies and a role for the region here both as part of the IAEA you know we need those experts to be part of the team the Japanese and Chinese and Koreans and Russians have a significant amount of nuclear expertise that they can contribute to an overall international inspection effort there might be an ad hoc group on transparency some sort of group that is kind of the interested parties to whatever agreement is reached and they may have a role in evaluating the verification and from or the monitoring information and might make that determination that verification determination that political judgment and then of course on missiles there might be a role separate from the nuclear weapons themselves on what the role is on missiles so then question three when does verification happen does it come first when does it end I think there are a lot of questions here because one could imagine the verification task asking for decades and at a certain point we need to transition from a denuclearization verification process to an ongoing and sustainable verification or inspection or safeguards process like any other country in the world and so I think it's important to talk about what does the what is the end point of an agreement and the reason I mentioned this now is that has to be baked into the agreement we have to decide when the end point is is it when fissile material is under monitoring by the IAEA okay that that we can consider that material denuclearized is it when it's rendered inaccessible it's been placed in a location or or like a repository or some some way that it's physically separated or has it been rendered unusable and that would be something like where the material has been changed in its physical form or chemical composition so we can say all right that material is now out of a weapons track these are important issues because the agreement will have to define it and then the verification just tells you how to do that how to be sure it's happened verification doesn't make that you know isn't the determining factor there um what is the role of the declaration nobu mentioned this I think we we can get into it more in discussion it's come up quite a lot lately in this proposal of declaration for declaration I would only say that there is no verification without a declaration because you have to know what you're what you're verifying full stop does the verification have to be of a declaration that is all encompassing and includes everything all at once up front not necessarily there are pros and cons to that and there you know the idea of a full declaration is has political baggage again to quote general air there are there is history there they also recognize that a declaration doesn't have to be a stack of 12,000 pages that's just plunked on a desk a declaration can be elicited and evolved and in fact likely has to be so the important thing is to recognize that declarations are a not all or nothing b they are an early test of cooperation so they they matter in that sense and that for the North Koreans omitting information from that a declaration would be a huge gamble they don't know what we know even among our allies we don't all know what the others know and omitting information would be a massive gamble so I think we have to assume that if we get to the point of a declaration we have to be skeptical but we have to at least be willing to accept that they are sharing everything they have have to share and approach it with that open mind we can come back to that point so then my fifth question how fast can it happen I only mention this because a lot of people there's been you know can it happen within one year can it will it happen by 2021 I would say I have a very definitive answer for this I have no idea because we don't know what the agreement is therefore we don't know what the verification system will be to match that agreement and so we don't know how long it will take we don't know how those end points will be defined but I will say while there are physical limits on what you can do they are they are not necessarily overly determinative so it will take time to do certain things you have to move processes through you know a certain list of kind of check points it will be entirely dependent on the relationship between the inspectors and the inspected that can make things go extremely fast or it can make things drag out for a long time but there are early steps you can do so if you say will verification be done in a year I don't think so not necessarily not likely but will it could we have some early wins within the verification system and can we establish some monitoring in a way where we know we've set a baseline I think that that can happen early those would be things like establishing continuity of knowledge taking some early measurements establishing ground rules of interaction and doing initial site familiarization visits all of those things are part of a verification system and they can happen quickly and will give us a good temperature measure of how how things are going so I think I'll leave it there and we'll come back to some of the other issues in the Q&A thank you thank you so next Josh is gonna kind of give us a critical evaluation of what we've heard and hopefully offer some points to resolve all of the challenges ahead how many how many minutes do we have I think if if you you take one thing away from today's discussion should probably be Corey's point which is there is no agreement between the United States and North Korea on nuclear weapons there's nothing to verify no deal I would expand on that a bit I would say not only is there no agreement there's no negotiating process right now if you look at the record of what is unfolded and since January 1st when Kim Jong-un initiated his charm offensive really there has been a north south process that has been fairly intensive a lot of routine engagement three summit meetings now between the leaders increasingly substantive written agreements and you know the saying about oral agreements which is they're not with the paper they're written on there also is a North Korean Chinese process in the background you don't see texts emerging out of that but we do see repeated high level interactions and it is my suspicion at least a suspicion that some of the unilateral commitments that the North Koreans have made along the way this year have been in response to Chinese intruders that they don't just come out of nowhere but that's probably where they're coming from so why do we have this sense that the United States and North Korea are engaged other than there have been a few meetings I think the United States is being brought along as an adjunct to the North South process by virtue of really two factors one is South Korean President Moon's sensitivity to the need to maintain alliance solidarity so he has played a catalytic role and the Blue House has played a catalytic role in bringing Americans and North Koreans together and in trying to keep those discussions moving or restart them as the case may be the other consideration has been President Trump's impulsivity and he's willing to grab for the offer of a summit meeting which was something that the South Koreans informed in the North Koreans had offered the North Koreans for their part have denied they ever offered it they seem to believe it comes from the US or South Korea or somewhere which says something about the oddities of this process so what do we have to show for all this well we have the bullet points that emerged from the Singapore summit these are broad shared objectives United States and North Korea they're not very detailed there's little sense of sequencing or procedure or anything which suggests that if we want to turn this starting point into a real negotiating process there will have to be some kind of working level talks established that's why I was very encouraged by the American appointment of an envoy but it seems that since mid-September or so when Steve Begin was announced in this role that it's not clear that he's he's met with any North Koreans that he's interacted with anyone that the North Koreans are interested in meeting with him so that raises the question what will happen in Secretary Pompeo's upcoming meetings in Pyongyang I think a lot of potential will be focused on does Kim Jong-un appear or not that's interesting but what's more important is what this meeting leads to does it lead to the establishment of ongoing sustained working level talks toward reaching an agreement that would be led at the envoy level or something equivalent or does it simply pave the way for a second summit meeting perhaps without even much of an agenda you'll probably guess I don't think the latter would be terribly constructive whereas the former would be constructive but we'd have to be patient it will take time to reach any kind of an agreement at which point I think it would be appropriate to talk about verification it just strikes me that it's too soon if you consider what has been done so far verification is is fairly worth discussing in April Kim Jong-un unilaterally declared that there would be no more nuclear tests and no long-range missile tests those are very easy to verify by virtue of the investments that the United States and the international community have made over decades in verifying in doing nuclear test monitoring and also in creating a space-based architecture to monitor for ballistic missile launches so that's taken care of then there are the unilateral commitments that Kim Jong-un has made to dismantle a static engine test stand which came up earlier in the discussion that structure is visible from space so while apparently Kim Jong-un has offered to complete its dismantlement with international observers present that strikes me as a dog and pony show you can look in any commercial space imagery service you'll be able to see if the structure is present or not you don't need boots on the ground for that there's also been this now this offer emerging from the latest inter-Korean summit has been an offer to dismantle the launch pad at the main space launch site it's not clear what launch pad means does that mean just you know the piece of concrete that the rocket stands on next to the launch tower does it mean the whole site I inquiring minds want to know as the saying goes it's really unclear what this commitment amounts to and but again these are these are outdoor structures for the most part it won't be hard to to verify from space then there is this this dangling of the Yongbyon complex and and that's that's different there's no not only is there no agreement there there's not even a unilateral commitment everything has been hedged presented conditionally if the United States does enough then North Korea might do things such ads permanently shutting down the Yongbyon nuclear complex so that would probably require a presence on the ground but that's something that generally speaking we know how to do the IAEA has had a standing presence at Yongbyon before in better times for for for these on and off again negotiations over the decades kind of know how to do this I I I know there have been tensions and problems and sometimes the United States has had to take the lead with the IAEA tagging along but but I think those details can can be worked out from a technical perspective there's not not not not any insurmountable challenges I would imagine but from from this broader perspective I think that the demands for a full declaration in a way are are really I think part of a debate about what we want from the North Koreans what kind of an agreement would satisfy us the United States and and there's not a lot of internal consensus here on that talk about having a complete and far-reaching agreement that that's I think is just a way of begging the question of what we're negotiating for it it shows you though that if that is the hard line in the United States and I think it is then Japanese concerns have largely been bypassed there's no discussion of missiles there's certainly nothing about biological or chemical weapons which which the Japanese Prime Minister has raised in his remarks on on this issue what also is missing from the picture so far is any reference to the space program if North Korea is never going to flight test an ICBM again the question arises are are they going to launch satellites with launchers that perhaps even look a lot like their ICBMs other than this reference to the launch pad and at the the so-hey site which is very ambiguous and it's only one of two launch sites they have we haven't heard any any even unilateral commitments about them from from limiting their space program everyone noted correctly who watched their September 9th parade that there were no nuclear capable missiles shown in the parade but I went back yesterday just to get ready for this talk and and watch the parade and notice that after all the vehicles had gone by they had the thematic parade floats expressing their their vision for the future their desire for economic and scientific progress and one of them was space themed which suggests that they're not ready to let this issue go quite yet and since they have never been willing to compromise this on well I'm it's too much to say they've never been willing to compromise on on space that's not true but we've we've never concluded an agreement with them on this point that would be true so what what kind of approach should we take assuming that a real negotiating process does get underway which which cannot be taken for granted Nobu talked about arms control versus nonproliferation I I think there's a a simpler way of saying it which is managing the problem versus solving the problem I'll be very brief about this if if we want all or nothing and that is the approach that this administration generally has has brought to this question even the relaxation of the time constraint I think is a way of reinforcing we want to get everything in other words we'll be patient we'll hold on to sanctions until North Korea gives us everything we want if you insist on all or nothing judging by what the North Koreans have said and done so far I'd say that's a pretty good formula for nothing thank you I'm glad you didn't bury the lead there Josh on the all or nothing point so I'll I'll bring questions in from the audience in a little bit but I want to drill down first on the declaration for declaration point because this has really been I think kind of asserted in the discourse here as this is how we're going to get into this negotiation they give us a declaration we verify it and that's how we're going to proceed right and we've seen statements from North Korean officials we've seen sort of KCNA commentary along along these lines it says no of course not we're not going to declare everything right so we're kind of in this in between period right now well is there going to be a declaration is there not going to be a declaration so I'd like to put it to each of you let's assume there's not going to be a declaration for declaration a full final complete everything declaration but imagine a process where they would give us a partial declaration of a facility that you could then begin to have some sort of monitoring process to build up the trust to sort of create some early early wins for this process to establish pattern of cooperation that then might lead to other things down the road so first can you imagine that for setting aside the political acceptability of it here and secondly if you were to do that what would you want them to declare but what's your priority area as this would be a sign of sincerity and something that would be acceptable for North Korea that they would feel comfortable declaring over your answer right well I think as Corey mentioned if North Korea is willing to declare something and maybe we even even if we know that it's not a complete I think maybe we should accept the beginning but then if North Korea insists that is the that final declaration and then that is not something we can make a deal with and so that lead me into the kind of recollection on the process of 90s when North Korea made initial declaration and the IAEA got into the request special inspection they rejected and so that was actually beginning of the North Korean nuclear problem so the I think if as long as North Korea understand that the declaration verification cycle is not the one-shot cycle but it's kind of continuation process I think we should accept the initial declaration and then they remind them that it be continued and of course that's not the exception for North Korea and Japan keep on receiving the inspectors from United States IAEA every year and so and if there is a kind of unclear activities then I think the even Japan or any other countries are willing to accept kind of special inquiries and our responsibility to respond to that so I think North Korea should understand that and we have to keep on requesting that kind of standard standard procedure but one thing can I add one one more thing well but the problem is North Korea so far has not mentioned IAEA even once in this series of dialogue so my gut feeling is that North Korea is not willing to accept IAEA terms and differences of the inspection rather as I said I think they are more willing to arms control that is the verification between the stakeholders of this arrangement it's the most likely to be at its safe so I would say partial declarations are not acceptable full declarations of only a piece of the complex would be and I make that distinction because I think a partial declaration indicates that you've defined a problem in a certain way but you still have a fundamental lack of shared understanding about what you're talking about so if you say could I accept a partial declaration if we said all right North Korea you need to declare your entire fissile material production infrastructure everything related to weaponization everything related to missiles everything related to chem bio you know cyber you know you could scope it as large as you want but in this case let's just say a complete nuclear declaration and they say okay and then they give a they give a very spotty declaration I don't think that's acceptable and I don't mean that if they give of what appears to be a broad declaration and through a verification process you identify oh we're missing a piece here we're missing a piece there that's the normal process but where it's very clear that they've held that then that's not acceptable what I would find acceptable though exactly your point on early wins is if the negotiators define a scope of activity around which they can start to share information and say okay we will discuss we will declare everything you know at young beyond that could be a start they could declare everything related to uranium enrichment they could declare everything related to plutonium production and separation they could declare so if you define it but once you've defined what did it what that scope is you have to expect the counterparts to be a full declaration otherwise you're not involved in an honest process and the only thing I wanted to add one more thing on young beyond based on what nobu said there has been this discussion about is a freeze again however we might define it but a freeze at young beyond is that an acceptable first step and I would kind of give the same answer I just gave sure I mean anything's a good first step I want to be moving us away from crisis not towards it so anything is a good first step as long as we understand what it really means and I really push back on people including a lot of experts in our field my friends and colleagues who call this a cap a freeze at young beyond would not cap anything anything because we don't we don't know that it captures their fiscal material production broadly we don't know that material that's already been produced at young beyond might it where where that material is where it might be sitting and how it might be it might play into an ongoing weaponization process so I would just say it's it can be valuable but it's not a cap sorry I think Josh let me let me put a question to you I think there's a presumption here based on our historical experience that tends to place more value on fiscal material as something that we should focus on early what about the missile program I mean you mentioned this earlier Noble mentioned it as well so could you imagine that instead of giving us a declaration about the amount of fiscal material they've produced at young beyond whether in the plutonium program enrichment program let's say they they gave us an ICBM declaration that would be interesting for sure but also a verification nightmare we know how to construct fiscal material production histories they the techniques aren't perfect or all-encompassing but there's been a tremendous amount of work put into these issues since the end of the Cold War what some call nuclear archaeology there's really nothing equivalent when it comes to missiles and it's one of the reasons I think that strategic arms control treaties have confined their attention to deploy systems by and large it's not true across the board but that's much easier to identify what is or isn't present at a given list of sites than trying to establish comprehensive production history I mean think about it this way I know some people hate automotive metaphors but I'm going to do it try imagining how to how to verify how many cars a particular factory has where all those cars are now that that I cannot imagine where you begin you could look at the records to do forensic analysis of the records I suppose when is this paper from when was the introduction altered but there's there's no obvious technical approach that would let you get to to verification of such a definition could be confidence building without a strong verification dimension but I think that's the most we could say so the the reason I put this challenge to you is that I think there's something that isn't quite well understood in the kind of surface level discussion of this problem which is this is a really unique problem we've never done anything of this comprehensiveness in terms of designing a verification approach Corey mentioned South Africa earlier that took a long time but we're talking about six weapons that were of one type right and a very few facilities North Korea a much more massive scope and to address problems like missile production tell production vehicles for launching missiles we don't have established procedures for these things and this is why the IEA role is so valuable I think is because they do have established procedures for doing this thing right in in the nuclear field yeah in the nuclear field but not not for missiles I'd say that the closest we come is is the experience of uncommon on the back where missiles were within scope might be worth revisiting some of those experiences but again I'm skeptical that that we're going to get to to that point of an all-encompassing disarmament regime for weapons of mass destruction really have to defeat an adversary in war I think to realistically anticipate that sort of activity and even then it was not so easy to do when we talk about a comprehensive declaration my concern is that this is an echo of people's memories of Iraq in 2002 and we're simply not in that position absolutely not least having gone to battle for it right so Nobu I want to pick up on this dichotomy that you presented between arms control and non-proliferation the argument for non-proliferation is that North Korea has violated the NPT and needs to return to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state as part of this de-nuclearization process the argument for arms control is well gee they have maybe 60 weapons that's kind of a reality now that we have to realize so are we managing the problem or are we solving the problem as as Josh put it so what's your sense in Japan of the politics of this de facto recognition of North Korea as a state with nuclear weapons if you got verified measurable constraints and you know some sense of a road map where de-nuclearization however you define it is at the end of that road can Japan live with North Korea as a state with nuclear weapons for that period of time well I think if there is a kind of clear pathway or kind of a workflow for the dismantlement of the nuclear programs and then maybe we can manage our expectations and then manage the sort of our threats and then we can coexist we can coexist with the nuclear North Korea for the time being but if there is no prospect and then if you know big if United States again is with North Korea on the kind of partial solution for the North Korean nuclear programs and then decided to allow North Korea to possess the nuclear capabilities for a time being that may raise some concerns on the decoupling of course that should be managed for the strength in the reassurance between allies but at the same time you know unless we find any concrete pathways to eliminate the sort of nuclear capabilities of North Korea given that there is an absence of the confidence between Japan and North Korea and so far there is no concrete steps changing at the state of school I think we have a kind of relatively narrow the margin for atolling the North Korean nuclear status and so I think but from North Korean viewpoint you're accepting the IAEA service or the declaration process is mean it means to accept non-nuclear weapon status and so I don't see any kind of prospect the North Korea for a time being follow the kind of standard declaration verification procedure for non-nuclear weapon status and that we are in the IAEA So Corey not to speak out of school but at a meeting yesterday you offered some thoughts about this sort of status question and how it might mean something different for the U.S. versus our allies and what's your sense about how important this is politically here at this moment Yeah well I mean first of all thank you for bringing up comments I made in an off the record meeting Absolutely No it's absolutely it's a good point that it was a good point of discussion around the table and I think it's because we kind of we default to this this phrase that we've been hearing and using for decades now we can't accept a nuclear North Korea and I think that you know that's one of the reasons why I started my remarks to talking about stability I think what we should seek is a stable environment with North Korea but we should still I'm not willing to give up on the on the goal of a denuclearized North Korea again we can can and maybe should talk more about the definition of denuclearization but a North Korea without an active nuclear weapons program but I'm realistic about the prospects for that certainly in the near term and I think that that here in Washington within the people who are grappling with the problem I still think that people are are being challenged to deal with that those questions that face value how can we get from where we are to zero in North Korea I think that the Department of Energy is working very hard to think about the components of a comprehensive nuclear verification raising whoever would be in charge of the different elements of that I think the State Department is trying to think about a diplomatic approach that would get there but I think what we also have to do is recognize that while we're in the process between here and there even if we never get there we have to make sure we're going through that process in a way that may maintain a degree of stability along that along that path and that might mean we're never going to politically accept the nuclear North Korea but we will likely have to create an environment in which we can we're living with it Josh there's a prominent North Korean defector Tae Young Ho who's now living in Seoul and he's been quite critical of the approach that the Moon Administration has taken including in a commentary today which he said that accepting the North Korean approach that they have signed posted in the Pyongyang Declaration is a tantamount to salami slicing if you're looking at this problem from the American perspective is there is there a way to accept the North Korean approach but not call into salami slicing that is you know take some sort of initial step whatever it is and tie it to an end game I wonder what salami believes is being sliced in the hands I mean there's that has a couple meanings the the strategy of small steps where your adversary takes and takes and takes but never takes so much at one step that it gets a response that that's a problem but on the other hand just to be clear I think his his view was they're offering up things that don't matter old facilities or capabilities and to sort of bleed our leverage if you will okay right well they they are bound to trade away the things that matter to them less I once did a study on on the historical patterns of their missile exports years ago and eventually came around to the conclusion that the reason in the 1990s that they were willing to talk about trading away their their missile exports to the Middle East is they didn't have any orders on the books so it was not going to cost them anything and I think that that is is part of their modus operandi par for the course it's still of some value to us I think to get commitments and assurances things that we might worry about for example on on nuclear testing seems like they've done all the testing they want to do but but their demolition of the the tunnel entrances is still valuable valuable as a gesture of assurance so you can think of it as a kind of insurance policy so I wouldn't say that that these things are of no value but then that's just just be realistic that's what they're going to leave with the hard stuff comes later and our real leverage is in the sanctions regime so far the United States has not been willing to budge on the sanctions regime that that may create some headaches for President Moon but in that sense I don't think Taion Hall is is right the United States is holding back any movement on that I want to bring in the audience at this point so if you have a question the microphone will come to you and I call on you please identify yourself and as Doug had suggested earlier earlier clear questions rather than extended commentary is appreciated sir I see you first here oh thank you my name is Mitchell Nakai Reagan Foundation and Heritage Foundation I have two questions I was told that in order to denuke completely it takes about 10 to 15 years I'm talking about nuke that technology Corey maybe you can answer that number two uh Nobu-san South Korea is trying to make complete peace with North Korea as you know and China seem to be pulling strings in behind the scenes I'm speculating my question is what can Japan do for the Korean Peninsula I mean I want you to go outside the box and just kind of try it thank you so how long is it going to take well okay so it depends on what you mean what it means right so that's what I was going to say we've been dancing around this question but we might as well confront it what what do we mean by denuclearization and then I promise I'll try to answer your question I won't ignore it completely I I I think Mitchell when we talk about denuclearization there have been a lot of different versions of that put on the table over the course of many years that I don't think there's a common understanding does it mean no more nuclear weapons that okay that would be a one way to define it that would take the kind of the most urgent threat off the table does it mean no nuclear reactors you know they have an experimental light water reactor that they've been building domestically at Yongbyon include in fact so that brings me back to the question whether that would be in any freeze at Yongbyon but that's you know that they see that as part of their you know their science and technology leadership and and kind of future look I don't know how many people have been to North Korea but you know when you go to North Korea because there are no commercial billboards all the billboards are propaganda and the billboards are propaganda I don't mean just for the leadership but for the concepts that inspire the sense of self and the sense of nationalism and one of those is fundamentally science and technology and futurism and so how does nuclear energy fit into that I think is an important question at one point in the past somebody said that true denuclearization in North Korea would mean burning all the physics textbooks so you know how we define this really matters and so say we take it at what I think is kind of the minimum acceptable definition of denuclearization in this context which to me would mean no more nuclear reactors and for me it likely means no civilian nuclear energy activities with direct dual use consequences so I would I would try to say no enrichment and reprocessing I personally would be okay with nuclear reactors under safeguards you know within some sort of international monitoring so what would that mean as far as timeline part of it has to do with these estimates on numbers if you go at the low end of the numbers you can think of a nuclear weapons dismantlement process that could take you know a couple of years if you go at the high end of the numbers and again we don't want to just we're not going to throw all the nuclear weapons in a pit and blow them up you know that's literally how they destroy some chemical weapons but we're not going to do that with nukes so we have we want to do it in a safe way we want to do it in an accountable way and we want to do it in a transparent way so that's going to take some time and even in the United States where we are processing nuclear weapons through a dismantlement process on a daily basis there's a limit as to how many you can do per year again those are advanced nuclear weapons we're trying to preserve some of the components so I'm not saying it's a direct analog but it's only to say this isn't something you can just snap your fingers and do you're talking about bringing nuclear facilities especially those that have operated and that therefore have some contamination bringing those down to Greenfield true decommissioning and then down to Greenfield you're talking about decades but we also know how to do that that's something that we have that toolkit you know some have said the quickest version of the nuclearization my last point on the nuclear weapons is to put them on an airplane and fly them out I would just argue and I'm looking at the only military commander I see in the room I don't know any military commander from the U.S. or any of the the allies that would be willing to put North Korean nuclear weapons on their planes and fly them over their territory I can't imagine what the environmental impact statement of bringing North Korean nuclear weapons into the U.S. would look like I mean let's just top bureaucracy it's important Indeed Josh further on this point we have other models to look to and you've referred to Iraq South Africa has come up and you know how do those experiences inform some concept of time in this regard I'd say Zed if you really would like a point of comparison by the cooperative threat reduction program in Russia and the other former Soviet republics now the scale of the the Soviet nuclear program vast and I'm sure it's not much larger than anything like that will ever achieve nevertheless those types of activities involving the no direct access to to warheads but there was down blending of highly rich ram there was cutting apart missiles even some submarines a variety of activities on this front and this was a decades long undertaking so I would say don't underestimate it on this question of of taking a nuclear facility down to Greenfields I'm not sure that the Hanford experience here confirms that we do know how to do this at least at least not well I mean that that's our young beyond and of course we operated it for for what it's from the 40s to the 80s and it's a much larger facility but even so we're far from done cleaning that place up although I did say decades not centuries and technically with Hanford we're still in decades we might get to centuries and optimists all right noble how can Japan sort of help actually before answering the question I I have a one clarification question is US legal system allows the United States to bring back you know Korean the warheads to bring into the US soil I I don't think this is a question that has been that I've seen asked and answered by the US legal system I will say that there we we likely do have some authority to bring to full material back to the United States I would have to look specifically from the US even if it's not the US origin correct we've done that with with some within the Department of Energy removal system but I would have to look at exactly how that scoped and it would probably at least some of the timelines might have already run out on some of that but at least we know how to do we go through that thanks so thank you very much for the question I think there is a more appropriate person to respond to your question here in front of us so maybe I maybe I should defer to Ambassador but my take is there are maybe three things that maybe Japan can and should do one I think is the politically support the rapprochement between North and South Korea I think this is very important generally the other rapprochement between two Koreas definitely contribute to the further stability of the region that's one thing and the other is it's inevitably kind of natural thing for us to provide economic assistance for maybe kind of economic development of North Korea and then third I think that Japan really needs to jointly with the United States and other partners to consider what we the kind of the post-event sort of North East Asian security environment or kind of architecture we have to think strategically what what happened after the nuclearization or North-South kind of a rapprochement happened including the thinking about how China reacts to that other questions from the group that I see you first pick two this time I'm Grace Kang what about proliferation isn't that as high of a priority as next gentleman just behind Paul just two back thank you very much Terry Taylor International Council for Life Sciences I hope the business of how comprehensive an agreement might be really takes us from a showstopper who make it too comprehensive for obvious reasons shouldn't we think about it in a different way and that it might be some separate agreements there might be an agreement on nuclear and I'm avoiding using the word denuclearization but on nuclear capabilities along with the delivery means I think it would be dangerous to not separate those two but that would have to be within a subset of other steps which might be DPRK during the chemical weapons convention in which case there'll be a whole process that will be engaged just becoming a member doesn't necessarily have to be part of a comprehensive agreement there's the issue of conventional forces which mustn't be overlooked because in building as some speakers have already said including general air is the overall security from a DPRK perspective South Korea perspective Japan and other neighbors so there would have to be it seemed to me that's an abused steps taken in this area which might be confidence building measures there are thousands of artillery pieces within range of so for example I mean it's huge important to take some steps whether it's having some withdraw some oversight and there are other examples and other parts of the world about conventional confidence building measures of various degrees of success thank you very much good thank you North Korean proliferation I'm against it I'm really glad to hear that how do we cover it well well perhaps they can come into the nuclear suppliers group at the same time as India oh they're and Iran yeah there is a long history here and that is a genuine concern for supplied a plutonium production reactor to Syria various murky interactions with Pakistan and Libya involved supplying some and possibly other technologies as well this is something where I think they're willing to give us assurances verification is hard you'll you'll catch them if you catch them and we won't if you won't but but I think it will be that's low-hanging proof and I'm certainly not to supply with your technology yet already made some some voluntary commitments yeah yeah I think that the existing Security Council architecture creates opportunities if there is some sort of nuclear agreement to transition that to verify that both three is complying with its maybe we should be you thinking about in this to go back to the the comparison with cooperative current reduction is the equivalent of an international science and technology center to employ technical personnel useful areas if you're worried about the spread in technology I would say look at the level of expertise and there are people who are kind of going out of business maybe you want to keep tabs and then make sure they're getting to the input I think the another aspect to a proliferation concern is that yeah I hear some voices that if North Korea are keeping producing nuclear weapons that may have an implication on Japan's choice on its nuclear options but I as far as I discuss with my colleagues in Japan within the security community there is no strong there is no strong voices about the Japanese Japan choosing the going nuclear I must be clear here that it's a very minority view and we I'm confident the Japanese security community is rational enough not to choose the nuclear option despite of the the nuclear nuclear North Korea though that it does not necessarily mean to endorse the option to allow North Korea to possess the nuclear weapon forever and I think we have to be very clear to share the other goal of the the denuclearization and we have to have a nuclear zero at North Korea so then the second question the three-dimensional chess of how you fit all these things together and it is kind of goes back to some forward-looking remarks that general air made earlier about if you're going to make a fundamental transformation of the security structure in the Korean Peninsula we're having a hard time thinking about sequencing of denuclearization how do you then bring in conventional force transportation other WMD missiles et cetera I mean this this is in theory those things have to kind of go hand in hand or at least be sequenced in some way that you arrive at an end state where you put all of the pieces in place that result in that transformation and I would just say that I think that any country that's looking to deal with North Korea and address the challenges that that it poses has to make its own strategic determination and ideally we have a common view within our within the regional allies of what what those priorities are and so and so I would say Terry that you do have to start somewhere you have to I think looking to have the one you know the one treaty that covers every concern we have with North Korea is I mean if there's one thing that's even more challenging than looking at complete denuclearization it would be that and we just can't I don't think we should think about it this in their all or nothing perspective but what I think is important is putting these pieces together through into an overall context of strategic objectives and looking at how they play off each other looking at where we might be able to gain something I mean we might even if they're not all within one umbrella you still might be able to get something we want over here because there's something they want over there that's the basic nature of thinking about for example the nuclear program and sanctions within the same breath so I think it's the only way to go fundamentally and then the real question is whether we can have some sort of and to me this is where it comes out if we could have some sort of statement of that objective that is commonly understood with all of the relevant parties including North Korea at the beginning then it gives us a guide star and I really think that we that if we just keep looking at piece by piece by piece without thinking about what that end goal is and having any common sense common understanding with North Korea of the end point then it risks kind of diverting off onto exit ramps consistently over time so that's why I still think why I still hold on to denuclearization or removal of the nuclear weapons threat as being something important to hold on to because it would be great if we could have some sort of statement of objective even if it's something like article 6 of the NPT it's you know a lot of people would argue that there are a lot of countries that aren't working diligently enough towards complete nuclear disarmament in the context of general and complete disarmament but it's still the goal and every time we make policy of strategic decisions we have to justify it against that goal and I think that would be helpful well I think that's actually a really good transition point for the next panel which will look at pros and cons of these various options in a regional context so please stick around for that we'll take a 15 minute break to reset please join me in taking our panel thank you