 Thank you very much. My presentation is based on research done for the UN World Social Report, which will be released in December. So it hasn't been released yet. There's space to make some changes, so this feedback today will be very useful for that. The theme of the report is population aging. So as Carlos said, I'm going to focus on age-based inequalities in poverty, mostly not only. And just one caveat or warning is that my presentation is rather, the analysis I present is rather basic because the report is global and it's meant for a broad audience. The main focus is policies, so please bear with me. So leaving no one behind is a very useful policy slogan, if we may call it that, but analytically is a concept that is difficult to grasp. There's not one single indicator or not beyond a group, but indicators that one can use to answer the question. In my case today, I'm going to focus mainly on income poverty, but older persons, which is what I'm focusing on, face many spatial and social barriers beyond the purely economic that preclude their participation in economic and social life. We go through these in the report, but I'm not going to talk about them here today. Another question is who is being left behind. Older persons are a very heterogeneous group, if we can call them a group. So the question is what sort of groups of older persons are being left behind or are more disadvantaged? And another question that I'll show a little bit of research on here is can we say anything about the future prospects, looking at today's generation of youth and adults? So estimating poverty by age, I thought it was going to be simpler than it is, but we obviously work with household survey data, which do not provide information on the distribution of income or consumption within households. So without individual level information, it is often assumed that resources are distributed equitably among members of the household. But there's a significant amount of research that shows that they are not, that often women, especially and older persons, often have lower living standards than other members of the household. We cannot estimate that. So what we can say is what number of people or what number of older people are in poor households, not whether they live in poverty or not. There's other methodological challenges to estimating poverty, disaggregating poverty by age. One is the use of different equivalent scales, which I'll show an example later, but they have a big impact on the estimates. Then there's the issue of whether we're using income or consumption for estimated poverty. So there's there's a number of issues that makes the make the estimate some estimate somehow unreliable, but there's some of the finance that will present that hold that remain the same regardless of the methodological assumptions made. Well, having said that, I'm showing you the estimates. I'm using a relative measure of poverty and what the estimates show is that older persons, which we define as persons 65 or older, live more often in poverty that the working-age population both in developed and developing countries, although the differences are larger in developing countries for obvious reasons. For obvious reasons, there are less social protection systems are lacking and access to health care is much better, and so on. Children and youth by the way are also more of an relative poverty than the working-age population. As to who is in poverty, first by age is the the oldest poll, the population age 80 or older. They are poorer than any other age group both in rich and poor countries. Here are parentheses. I mentioned equivalent scales. The equivalent scale, equivalent scales are used to adjust for population size in estimating poverty. The equivalent scale we have used for our report is the square root scale, which I don't know if you are familiar, since it's a small audience. If you are familiar with equivalent scales, I can skip that, otherwise I can explain what it is. The square root equivalent scale assumes that... Oh, pardon. Can you hear me? Oh, you haven't heard anything? Okay. So the square root equivalent scale assumes that resources, the cost of living doesn't increase proportionally, which is a member of the household because some costs in households are relatively fixed. That's the case, for example, of the cost of electricity or even housing. The blue bars show the estimates are using the square root equivalent scale. Now, if we use a different equivalent scale, which is one that was with BioACD until recently, which gives a value of 1 to the first of all in the household, 0.5 to other adults in the household, 0.3 to children, the estimates we obtain are very different. So we just have to be aware of that. But again, some findings remain. One is that the population 80 or all this is the one that is the most often in pure households of all age groups. The other one is that all the women are more often poor than older men, no big surprise here. Oh, by the way, the Y-axis scales are not comparable because what I want to compare is men and women in each of the regions. Okay, the scales are different. But so all the women are more often poor than men. In fact, in rich countries, all age poverty is entirely explained by higher levels of poverty among older women. Older men are not poorer than working age adult men. Why is that? Well, there's a significant pension gap in pension coverage and in pension adequacy, both things between men and women. Women participate less in the labor market. When they do, they have lower wages. They have shorter working lives because care and domestic tasks are not distributed equitably between men and women. They, for the same reasons, they accumulate less wealth, also because property rights and inheritance rights even are not the same for women in many countries. And also they live longer than men. And as a result of that, they are often widowed and they live more often alone. And living alone matters. In fact, all age poverty is higher than adult poverty, mainly because older people live more often alone than adults. And that's especially the case for women. So here there's a self-reinforcing effect of one person households being poorer because it's mostly women's. Women's poverty being higher because they live alone more often. So it's like a self-reforcing multiple person households at a mixed back. They include intergenerational households, skip generation households, couples, older couples living alone. But surprisingly, the proportion of households living in poverty is quite similar regardless of the type of household. Be it older couples or multi-generational households, the levels of poverty are quite simple. It's one person household that stands out the most. I'm forgetting something. I'm going to go through this quickly. You look at the effect of many variables in explaining old age poverty in the report. One of them is education. Education obviously has a significant impact on the arts of living in poverty, both for men and for women, controlling for many other things, place of residence, living arrangements, employment history and so on. For men and women in developed and in developing countries, this is the table on the left-hand side of the slide. But education does not have such a significant impact in explaining the gender gap in poverty. So the women's disadvantage remains even when we adjust for education. I'm moving on to another topic. I said I was going to just keep snapshots of different parts of the report. I don't have a long consistent story, just snapshots. One thing we look into in the report is what can we say about the future of older persons by looking at today's youth and adults and there are good news. Consecutive generations or course of people are increasingly healthier. They have longer life expectancies. They are also more educated despite the effect of the COVID crisis. So they can be more productive and they can be more productive until later in life. At the same time, they are also economically more unequal and in some cases more economically insecure. And I'm going to just focus on these bad news for a minute if I have time. These graphs shows income inequality measured by the general coefficient across successive cohorts, birth cohorts by age. The birth cohorts we can look at right now are the course born between the 1920s shown in the brown or orange line and the course born in the 1980s shown in the blue line. In developing countries, at any given age, there's an increase in inequality measured by the general coefficient from one cohort to the next. In developed countries, too, with exceptions, and I can maybe try to explain these exceptions later if there is time, but the point is that up to the generation of the 90s, the course of the 1980s, there is an increase in inequality. Now we don't know about the next course, but at least for the next 25 to 30 years, we can expect, based on these trends, that older persons in the next 20, 30 years may be more unequal once they reach full age. All else may be equal. What are the drivers of this increasing income inequality? A very important one are labor market trends. They have been discussed in other sessions. There is clothing, labor market polarization, but there's other things happening, too. Now, I know that unemployment is a very partial and incomplete indicator of labor market conditions, but I'm able to show it by cohort, so that's some value. And we see that unemployment has increased from one cohort to the next, both in developing and in developed regions. Use labor for participation has declined across cohorts. Here I'm mixing developed and developing countries, but the trends are similar in both, including even among younger women, even among women aged 25 to 29 throughout the most recent cohorts. There's obviously part of this is due to the fact that people are staying in education for more years, but there's also an increase in the number of discouraged young workers who are available to work but are not actively looking for work because they don't have opportunities. They don't see opportunities. And in the number of youth who are neither in education, not in employment, the so-called NEETs, which we can observe in some countries only. There's other trends that have also been described, and I don't have cohort-specific data for this, and I don't even have trend data for this, but we know that there's a persistent informal employment. Informal employment is stubborn. It's where we have trend data. We see that informal employment is rarely, the percentage of informal employment, total employment is rarely declining. It's one of the most intractable problems in the labor market. In addition to that, there's an increase especially in rich countries of casual work, meaning part-time and temporary work and on-call work, self-employment, work for different employers as part of the Geek Economic Party, but not public. So what do these trends mean? It means that there's an increasing economic insecurity that may spill over into old age so that we have to, for policymakers, the message is that they have to take that into account when they think about the future of social protection and retirement policies and so on. Because that's the next question. So what can be done? What can we do to leave no one behind in old age? It's keeping a little bit forward here. The main broad message we give is that policies in old age are too little too late, that poverty and inequality need to be addressed along the life cycle. We take a life cycle approach in the report. We show how much early life conditions matter to explain the well-being of older persons, that the policy conclusion is that we have to start having at birth or before birth and the policies that have to be implemented here have been discussed in other sessions. I will not go into them again here, just maybe to highlight how important labour market policies are and also to highlight that there has been a lot of talk during these three past three days about the importance of social protection. But what is happening is that social protection programmes are increasingly disconnected from trends in the labour market and the reality of today's lives, people's lives and that's something that has to be taken into account in expanding or even reforming social protection systems. When it comes to policies in old age, in developed countries the whole policy debate is focused on the fiscal sustainability of old age pensions and in the report we do not go into answering whether this concern is justifiable or not. We just say that many of the policies and policy reforms that are being put in place in response to these worries about fiscal sustainability are regressive, meaning they affect low-income workers more negatively than high-income workers. For instance, how much time do I have? Okay, can I just put an example of why some of these policies are regressive? Raising the age of retirement, for example, low-income workers have lower life expectancies on average than high-income workers. So by raising the age of retirement they lose more from lifetime earnings in the sense of pensions than high-income workers. Say, for example, the move from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes also regressive because low-income workers have less ability to save privately, they have less access, they have less financial knowledge and less access to financial instruments and so on. We give some recommendations on alternative measures that can be put in place to fix this regressive effect of these policies. But the other issue is that in countries that do not have comprehensive access to pensions or social protection systems, the fiscal sustainability debate is premature that what these countries have to focus on is expanding pension and social protection coverage more in general and making social protection systems more adequate to the reality of today and creating the fiscal space also to expand social protection systems. I can go into more detail on how this should be done but just to say all these policies that we recommend will affect disadvantaged groups favorable including women. There are additional policy measures that can be put in place to address high levels of poverty among women including older women and they have a lot to do with care. We have an equal distribution of care so they have to do with policies and employment policies that allow women and men to balance work and family life. They have to do with investing in formal care services promoting the formalization of the care economy which is mostly informal for now promoting equal rights access to inheritance and property rights for women and in terms of social protection expanding non-contributory or also called tax funded pension schemes. I'll stop here.