 Chapter 1 of On Interpretation What interpretation is, which is here discussed, of the symbols or exponents of the passions by the voice, of nouns and verbs? We must first determine what a noun and what a verb are. Next, what our negation, affirmation, enunciation, and a sentence? Those things, therefore, which are in the voice are symbols of the passions of the soul, and, when written, are symbols of the passions in the voice, and, as there are not the same letters among all men, so neither have all the same voices. Yet those passions of the soul, of which these are primarily the signs, are the same among all, the things also, of which these are the similitudes, are the same. Note these latter, we have spoken in the treatise, quote, of the soul, close quote, for they are parts belonging to another discussion. But as in the soul, there is sometimes a conception, without truth or falsehood, and, at another time, it is such as necessarily to have one of these inherent in it. So also is it with the voice. For falsehood and truth are involved in composition and division. Hence therefore, end verbs of themselves resemble conception, without composition and division, as quotes man, or quotes white, when something is not added. For as yet, it is neither true nor false, an instance of which is that the word, quotes, goat's tag, signifies something indeed, but not yet anything true or false, unless to be, or not to be, is added, either simply or according to time. Chapter 2 of the noun and its case A noun, therefore, is a sound significant, by compact, without time, of which no part is separately significant. Thus in the noun, quotes, fair steed, the, quotes, steed, signifies nothing by itself, as it does in the sentence, quote, fair steed, close quote. Neither does it happen with simple nouns, as it does with composite, for in the former, there is by no means the part significant, but in the latter, a part would be, yet signifies nothing separately, as in the word, quote, pirate boat, close quote, the, quotes, boat, signifies nothing by itself, but it is according to compact, because naturally there is no noun. But when it becomes a symbol, since illiterate sounds also signify something, as the sounds of beasts, of which there is no noun, quote, not man, close quote, however, is not a noun, neither is a name instituted by which we ought to call it, since it is neither a sentence nor a negation, but let it be an indefinite noun, because it exists in respect of everything alike, both of that which is, and of that which is not. Quote of filliness, close quote, indeed, or, quote, to filliness, close quote, and such like words are not nouns, but cases of a noun. But the definition of it that is, of the case is the same as to other things, with the definition of a noun, but it differs in that, with the verb, quotes, is, or, quotes, was, or, quote, will be, close quote, it does not signify what is true or false, but the noun always signifies this, as, quote, filliness is, close quote, or, quote, is not, close quote, for as yet, this neither signifies what is true nor what is false. Chapter 3 of the verb, its case, and of those called verbs, generally. A verb is that which, besides something else, signifies time, of which no part is separately significant, and it is always indicative of those things which are asserted of something else, but I say that it signifies time, besides something else, as for instance, quotes, health, is a noun, but, quote, is well, close quote, is a verb, for it signifies, besides being well, that such is the case now. It is always also significant of things asserted of something else, as of those things which are predicated of a subject, or which are in a subject, nevertheless I do not call, quote, is not well, close quote, and, quote, is not ill, close quote, verbs, for indeed they signify time, besides something else, and are always significant of something, yet a name is not given to this difference, let either be there for an indefinite verb, because it is similarly inherent, both in whatever does, and does not exist. So also, quote, was well, close quote, or, quote, will be well, close quote, are not verbs, but they are cases of a verb, and differ from a verb, because the latter, besides something else, signifies present time, but the others, that which is about the present time. Verbs therefore, so called, by themselves are nouns, and have a certain signification, for the speaker establishes the conception, and the hear acquiesces, but they do not yet signify whether a thing, quotes, is, or, quote, is not, close quote, for neither is, quote, to be, close quote, or, quote, not to be, close quote, a sign of a thing, nor, if you should say merely, quotes being, for that is nothing, they signify, however, besides something else, a certain composition, which, without the composing members, it is impossible to understand. Chapter 4 of the sentence A sentence is voice, significant by compact, of which any part separately possesses signification, as indeed a word, yet not as affirmation, or negation. Now I say, for example, quotes, man, is significant, but does not imply that it, quotes, is, or, quote, is not, close quote. It will, however, be affirmation, or negation, if anything be added to it. Unsyllable in the word, quotes, human, is not, however, significant, neither the, quotes, owse, in, quotes, mouse, but it is now merely sound. Still in compound words, a part is significant, but not by itself, as we have observed. Now every sentence is significant, not as an instrument, but as we have said, by compact. Well not every sentence is annunciative, but that in which truth or falsehood is inherent, which things do not exist in all sentences, as prayer is a sentence, but it is neither true nor false. Let therefore the other sentences be dismissed, their consideration belongs more properly to rhetoric or poetry, but the annunciative sentence to our present theory. Chapter 5 of Annunciation One first annunciative sentence is affirmation, afterwards negation, and all the rest are one by conjunction. It is necessary, however, that every annunciative sentence should be from a verb, or from the case of a verb, for the definition of, quotes, man, unless, quotes, is, or, quotes, was, or, quote, will be, or something of this kind be added, is not yet an annunciative sentence. Why indeed is the sentence, quote, a terrestrial biped animal, one thing, and not many things? For it will not be one, because it is consecutively pronounced. This however belongs to another discussion. One annunciative sentence, moreover, is either that which signifies one thing, or which is one by conjunction, and many such sentences are either those which signify many things, and not one thing, or which are without conjunction. Let therefore a noun, or a verb, be only a word, since we cannot say that he annunciates who thus expresses anything by his voice, whether he is interrogated by anyone or not, but that he speaks from deliberate intention. Now of these annunciations, one is simple, for instance, something of something, or from something, but another is composed of these, as a certain sentence which is already a composite. Simple annunciation, then, is voice-significant about something being inherent, or non-inherent, according as times are divided. Affirmation is the annunciation of something concerning something, but negation is the annunciation of something from something. Since however a man may annunciate what is inherent as though it were not, and what is not as though it were, that which is as if it were, and that which is not as if it were not, and in like manner, about times external to the present, it is possible that whatever anyone affirms may be denied, and that whatever anyone denies may be affirmed. Hence it is evident that to every affirmation there is an opposite negation, and to every negation an opposite affirmation. Let this be contradiction, affirmation and negation being opposites, but I call that opposite which is of the same respecting the same, not equivocally, in such other particulars of the kind as we have concluded against Sophistical importunities. Of things, since some are universal, but others singular, and by universal I mean whatever may naturally be predicated of many things, but by singular that which may not, as quotes, man is universal, but quotes callous, singular, it is necessary to annunciate that something is or is not inherent at one time, in and universal, at another in a singular thing. Now if anyone universally annunciates of an universal that something is or is not inherent, these annunciations will be contrary. I mean universally annunciates of an universal as that, quote, every man is white, close quote, quote, no man is white, close quote. When on the other hand he annunciates of universals, not universally, these are not contraries, though the things signified may sometimes be contrary. But I mean by not universally annunciating of universals, as that, quote, man is white, close quote, quote, man is not white, close quote. For man, being universal, is not employed as an universal in the annunciation, since the word, quotes, every, does not signify the universal, but shows that the subject is universally taken. Now to predicate universally of what is universally predicated is not true. For no affirmation will be true in which the universal is predicated of an universal predicate. As for instance, quote, every man, close quote, is, quote, every animal, close quote. Wherefore, I say affirmation is opposed to negation, contradictorily. The affirmation which signifies universal to that which is not universal, as, quote, every man is white, close quote, quote, not, every man is white, close quote, quote, no man is white, close quote, quote, some man is white, close quote, but, contraryly, is between universal affirmative and universal negative, as, quote, every man is white, Close quote, quote, no man is white, close quote, quote, every man is just, close quote, quote, no man is just, close quote, wherefore it is impossible that these should at one and the same time be true. But the opposites to these may sometimes possibly be co-verified about the same thing, as that, quote, not every man is white, close quote, and, quote, some man is white, close quote. Of such contradictions, then, of universals, as are universally made, one must necessarily be true or false, and also such as are of singulars, as, quote, Socrates is white, close quote, quote, Socrates is not white, close quote, but of such contradictions, as are indeed of universals, yet are not universally made, one is not always true, but the other false. For at one and the same time, we may truly say that, quote, man is white, close quote, and that, quote, man is not white, close quote, and, quote, man is handsome, close quote, and, quote, man is not handsome, close quote, for, if he is deformed, he is not handsome, and if anything is becoming to be, it is not. This however, may at once appear absurd, because the assertion, quote, man is not white, close quote, seems at the same time to signify the same thing as, quote, no man is white, close quote, but it neither necessarily signifies the same thing, nor at the same time. But withstanding, it is evident, that of one affirmation, there is one negation, for it is necessary that the negation should deny the same thing, which the affirmation affirmed, and also from the same, i.e., either from some singular or some universal, universally or not universally. I say, for instance, that, quote, Socrates is white, close quote, quote, Socrates is not white, close quote, if, however, there is something else from the same thing, or the same thing from something else, that enunciation will not be opposite, but different from it, to the one, quote, every man is white, close quote, the other is opposed, quote, not every man is white, close quote, and to the one, quote, a certain man is white, close quote, the other, quote, no man is white, close quote, and to the one, quote, man is white, close quote, the other, quote, man is not white, close quote, that there is then one affirmation, contradictorily opposed to one negation, and what these are, has been shown. Also that there are other contraries, and what they are, and that not every contradiction is true or false, and why, and when it is true or false. Chapter 8 of opposition when there is not one affirmation, nor one negation. The affirmation and negation are one, which indicate one thing of one, either of and universal, being taken universally, or in like manner, if it is not, as, quote, every man is white, quote, not every man is white, close quote, man is white, close quote, man is not white, quote. no man is white, close quote, some man is white, close quote, if not which is white signifies one thing, but if one name be given to two things from which one thing does not arise, there is not one affirmation, nor one negation, as if anyone gave the name, quotes, garment, to a, quotes, horse, and to, quote, a man, close quote, that, quote, the garment is white, close quote, this will not be one affirmation, nor one negation, since it in no respect differs from saying, quotes, man, and, quotes, horse, are, quotes, white, and this is equivalent to, quote, man is white, close quote, and, quote, horses white, close quote. If therefore, these signify many things, and are many, it is evident that the first enunciation either signifies many things or nothing, for, quote, some man is not a horse, close quote, wherefore, neither in these is it necessary that one should be a true, but the other a false contradiction. Chapter 9 of Opposition in Contingent Futures In those things which are, and have been, the affirmation and negation must of necessity be true or false. In universals, as universals, always one true, but the other false, and also in singulars, as we have shown. But in the case of universals, not universally enunciated, there is no such necessity, and concerning these, we have also spoken. But as to singulars and this is not the case. For if every affirmation or negation be true or false, it is also necessary that everything should exist, or should not exist. For if one man says that a thing will be, but another denies the same, one of them must evidently of necessity speak truth. If every affirmation or negation be true or false, for both will not subsist in such things at one and the same time. Thus, if it is true to say that, quote, a thing is white, close quote, or that, quote, it is not white, close quote, it must of necessity be, quote, white, or not, quote, white. And if it is white or not white, it was true to affirm or to deny it. Also, if it is not, it is falsely said to be, and if it is falsely said to be, it is not, so that it is necessary that either the affirmation or the negation should be true or false. Indeed, there is nothing which either is, or is generated fortuitously, nor casually, nor will be, or not be, but all things are from necessity, and not casually. For either he who affirms speaks truth, or he who denies, for in like manner it might either have been or not have been. For that which subsists casually, neither does nor will subsist, more in this way than in that. Moreover, if a thing is now, quote, white, it was true to say before that it will be, quote, white, so that it was always true to say, of anything generated, that it either is, or that it will be. But if it was always true to say that it is, or will be, it is impossible that this is not, nor should be, and whatever must of necessity be, it is impossible that it should not have been generated, and what it is impossible should not have been generated, must of necessity have been generated. Wherefore, all things that will be, it is necessary should be generated, and hence there will be nothing casual, nor fortuitous, for if it were fortuitous, it would not be of necessity. Nor is it possible to say that neither of them is true, as that it will neither be, nor will not be. For in the first place, the affirmation being false, the negation will not be true, and this being false, it results that the affirmation is not true. And besides, if it were true to say that a thing is at the same time, quote, white, and, quote, great, both must of necessity be, but if it shall be tomorrow, it must necessarily be tomorrow. And if it will neither be, nor will not be tomorrow, it will not be a casual thing, for example, a naval engagement, for it would be requisite that the engagement should neither occur nor not occur. These and similar absurdities then will happen, if of every affirmation and negation, whether in respect of universals enunciated universally, or of singulars, it is necessary that one of the opposites be true, and the other false, but that nothing happens casually in those things which subsist, but that all are, and are generated of necessity, so that it will neither be necessary to deliberate, nor to trouble ourselves, as if we shall do this thing. Something definite will occur. But, if we do not, it will not occur. For there is nothing to prevent a person, for ten thousand years, asserting this will happen, and another person denying it, so that of necessity it will have been then true to assert either of them, and it makes no difference whether any persons have uttered a contradiction or not, for it is evident that the things are so, although the one should not have affirmed anything, or the other have denied it, since it is not, because it has been affirmed or denied, that therefore a thing will, or will not be. Neither will it be more so, for ten thousand years, than for any time whatever. Hence, if a thing so subsisted in every time, that one of these is truly asserted of it, it was necessary that this should take place, and each thing generated always so subsisted, as to have been generated from necessity, for when anyone truly said that it will be, it was not possible not to have been generated, and of that which is generated, it was always true to say, that it will be. But, if these things are impossible, for we see that there is a beginning of future things, both from our deliberation and practice, and briefly in things which do not always energize, there is equally a power of being, and of not being, in which both to be and not to be occurs, as well as to have been generated, and not to have been generated, and indeed, we have many things which evidently subsist in this manner. For example, it is possible for this garment to have been cut in pieces, and it may not be cut in pieces, but be worn out beforehand. So also it is possible that it may not be cut in pieces, for it would not have been worn out before, unless it had been possible, that it might not be cut in pieces, and so also in respect of other productions, which are spoken of according to a power of this kind. Then it is evident that all things neither are nor are generated of necessity, but that something subsists casually, and that their affirmation is not more true than their negation, and that there are others in which one of these subsists more frequently, and for the most part, yet so that either might possibly have occurred, but the other not. Wherefore, being must of necessity be when it is, and not being, not be, when it is not. But it is not necessary that every being should be, nor that non-being should not be, since it is not the same thing for every being to be from necessity, when it is, and simply to be from necessity, and in like manner, as to non-being. There is the same reasoning also in the case of contradiction. To be or not to be is necessary for everything, also that it shall, or shall not be. Yet it is not requisite to speak of each separately, but I say, for instance, that it is necessary for a naval action to occur or not occur tomorrow. Yet it is not necessary that there should be a naval action tomorrow, nor that there should not be. It is necessary, however, that it should either be or not be. Wherefore, since assertions and things are similarly true, it is evident that things which so subsist, as that whatever have happened, the contraries also were possible. It is necessary that contradiction should subsist in the same manner, which happens to those things which are not always, or which not always are not. For of these, one part of the contradiction must necessarily be true or false, not indeed this or that, but just as it may happen, and one must be the rather true, yet not already true nor false, so that it is evidently not necessary that of every affirmation and negation of opposites one should be true, but the other false, for it does not happen in the same manner with things which are not, but which either may or may not be, as with things which are, but it happens as we have said. Chapter 10 of Opposition with the Addition of the Copula Since affirmation signifies something of something, and this is either a noun or anonymous, i.e. indefinite, but what is in affirmation must be one and of one thing, all affirmation and negation will be either from a noun and a verb, or from an indefinite noun and verb. But what a noun is, and what the anonymous has been shown before, for I do not reckon, quote, not man, close quote, a noun, but an indefinite noun, for an indefinite noun signifies, in a certain respect, one thing, just as quote is not well, close quote, is not a verb, but an indefinite verb. Still, without a verb, there is neither an affirmation nor negation, for quotes is, or quote will be, close quote, or quotes was, or quote is going to be, close quote, and so forth are verbs, from what has been already laid down, since in addition to something else they signify time. Hence the first affirmation and negation will be, quote man is, close quote, quote man is not, close quote, afterwards, quote non man is, close quote, quote non man is not, close quote, again, quote every man is, close quote, quote every man is not, close quote, quote every non man is, close quote, quote every non man is not, close quote, quote, and the same reasoning holds in times beyond the present. But when quote is, is additionally predicated as the third thing, then the oppositions are enunciated doubly. I say for instance, quote a man is just close quote. Here the word quote is, I say is placed as a third thing, whether noun or verb, in the affirmation, so that on this account there will be four, of which two will subsist with respect to affirmation and negation, according to the order of consequence, as privations, but two will not. But I say that the word quote is will be added to quote's just, or to quote not just close quote, so that also negation is added, wherefore there will be four. We shall understand, however, what is said from the underwritten examples, quote a man is just close quote, the negation of this is quote a man is not just close quote, quote he is not a just man close quote, the negation of this is quote he is not not a just man close quote, for here the word quote is, and quote is not close quote, will be added to the quote's just, and the quote not just close quote, wherefore these things, as we have shown in the analytics, are thus arranged. The same thing will happen if the affirmation be of a noun taken universally, as for instance, quote every man is just close quote, of this the negation is quote not every man is just close quote, quote every man is not just close quote. Except that it does not similarly happen that those which are diametrically opposed are co-verified. Sometimes, however, this does happen, these two, therefore, are opposed to each other, but the other two are opposed in respect to quote's non-man, as to a certain added subject, as quote non-man is just close quote, quote non-man is just close quote, quote non-man is not just close quote, quote the non-just is not man close quote, quote the not non-just is not man close quote. There are not, however, more oppositions than these, but these without those will be by themselves, as using the noun quotes non-man. In those, however, wherein quotes is, is not adapted as in quote he enjoys health, close quote, and quote he walks, close quote. Here it produces the same when thus placed, as if quotes is were added as quote every man enjoys health, close quote, quote every man does not enjoy health, close quote, quote every non-man enjoys health, close quote, quote every non-man does not enjoy health, close quote, for it must not be said, quote not every man, close quote, but the negation, quotes not, must be added to quotes man, for quotes every does not signify universal, but that the thing is taken universally. This is, however, evident from quote a man enjoys health, close quote, quote a man does not enjoy health, close quote, quote non-man is well, close quote, quote non-man is not well, close quote. These differ from those, in not being universally taken, hence quotes every or quote no one, close quote, signifies nothing else, then that affirmation or negation is of a noun universally assumed, wherefore it is necessary to add other things of the same kind. But because the contrary negation to this, quote every animal is just, close quote, is that which signifies that quote no animal is just, close quote, it is evident that these will never be either true at the same time, nor in respect to the same subject, but the opposites to these will sometimes be so, as quote not every animal is just, close quote, and quote some animal is just, close quote, but these follow the one, quote no man is just, close quote, follows, quote every man is not just, close quote, but the opposite, some man is just, close quote, follows, quote not every man is not just, close quote, for it is necessary that some man should be just. In the case also of Singulars, it is evident that if a man being questioned denies truly, he asserts also truly, as, quote is Socrates wise, no, close quote, Socrates therefore is not a wise man, but in the case of universals, what is similarly asserted is not true, but the negation is true, as, quote is every man wise, no, close quote, every man therefore is not wise, for this is false, but this, quote not every man then is wise, close quote, is true, and this is opposite, but that is contrary. Opposites however, as to indefinite nouns and verbs as, quote non man, close quote, and quote non just, close quote, may seem to be negations without a noun and verb, but they are not so, for the negation must always of necessity be either true or false, but he who says, quotes non man, does not speak more truly or falsely, but rather less than he who says, quotes man, except something be added. Still the assertion, quote every non man is just, close quote, does not signify the same as anyone of those propositions, nor the opposite to this, namely, quote not every non man is just, close quote, but the assertion, quote everyone not just is not a man, close quote, means the same with, quote no one is just, who is not a man, close quote. Nouns and verbs indeed, when transposed, have the same signification as, quote he is a white man, close quote, quote he is a man white, close quote, for unless it be so, there will be many negations of the same thing, but it has been shown that there is one of one, of this, quote he is a white man, close quote, there is the negation, quote he is not a white man, close quote, and of the other, quote he is a man white, close quote, except this be the same with, quote he is a white man, close quote, the negation will either be, quote he is not, not a man white, close quote, or, quote he is not a man white, close quote, but the one is a negation of this, quote he is not a man white, close quote, and the other of this, quote he is a white man, close quote, so that there will be two negations of one affirmation, where for it is evident that when a noun and verb are transposed, the same affirmation and negation result. End of chapter 10. Chapter 11 of On Interpretation. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. On Interpretation by Aristotle, translated by Octavius Freer Owen. Chapter 11 of The Composition and Division of Propositions. To affirm and deny one thing of many, or many of one, is not one affirmation, nor one negation, except that is some one thing which is manifested from the many. I mean by one, not if one name be given too many things, nor if one thing result from them as, quotes, man, is perhaps, quotes, animal, and, quotes, biped, and, quotes, mild. Yet one thing results from these, but from, quotes, white, and, quotes, man, and, quote, to walk, close quote, one thing does not result, so that neither if a person affirm one certain thing of these is it one affirmation, but there is one articulate sound indeed, yet many affirmations, nor if you affirmed these things of one would there be one affirmation, but in like manner many. If then, dialectic interrogation be the seeking of an answer, either of a proposition, or of either part of a contradiction, but a proposition is a part of one contradiction, there would not be one answer to these, for neither is there one interrogation, not even if it be true. We have, however, spoken of these in the topics. At the same time it is evident that what is it is not a dialectic interrogation, for a choice should be given from the interrogation to enunciate this or that part of the contradiction, but the interrogator must besides define whether this particular thing or not this be a man. As, however, there are some things predicated as composites, so that there is one whole predicable of those which are predicated separately, but others are not so, what is the difference? For in respect of, quotes, man, we may truly and separately predicate, quotes animal, and quotes biped, and these as one thing, also quotes man, and quotes white, and these as one thing, but not if he is, quote, a shoemaker, close quote, and quote, a good man, close quote, is he therefore also a good shoemaker? For if, because each of these is true, both conjointly should be of necessity true, many absurdities would follow, for, quotes man, and quotes white, are truly predicated of a man, so that the whole together may be, again if the thing, quote, is white, close quote, the whole conjointly, quote, is white, close quote, where for it will be, quote, a man white, white, close quote, even to infinity, again, quote, a musician, white walking, close quote, and these frequently involved to infinity. Once more, if, quotes, socrates, is, quotes, socrates, and, quotes, man, quotes, socrates, is also, quote, socrates, man, close quote, and, if he is, quotes, man, and, quotes, biped, he is also, quote, man, biped, close quote, where for it is evident, if a man says conjunctions are simply produced, the result will be that he will utter many absurdities. Let us now show how they are to be placed. Of things predicated, and of those of which it happens to be predicated, whatever are accidentally enunciated, either in respect of the same, or the one of the other, these will not be one, as, quote, man is white, close quote, and, quote, a musician, close quote, but, quotes, whiteness, and, quotes, music, are not one thing, for both are accidents to the same thing. Neither if it be true to call what is white musical, yet at the same time will, quotes, musical, quotes, white, be one thing, for what is, quotes, white, is, quotes, musical, per accidents, so that, quote, white musical, close quote, will not be one thing, where for, neither is a man said to be, quote, a good shoemaker, close quote, singly, but also, quote, a biped animal, close quote, because these are not predicated of him per accidents. Moreover, neither are such things which are inherent in another to be added, hence, neither is, quotes, whiteness, to be predicated repeatedly, nor is, quote, a man, close quote, quote, a man animal, close quote, nor a man, quotes, biped, since, both animal and biped are inherent in man. Still, it is true to assert it singly of someone, as that, quote, a certain man is a man, close quote, or that, quote, a certain white man is a white man, close quote, but this is not the case always, but when some opposition is in the adjunct, which a contradiction follows, it is not true, but false, as to call a dead man a man, but when such is not inherent, it is true, or when something contradictory is inherent, it is always not true, but when it is not inherent, it is not always true, as, quote, Homer is something, quote, a poet, close quote, for instance, quotes is, he therefore, or quotes is, he not, for quotes is, is predicated of Homer accidentally, since quotes is, is predicated of Homer because he is a poet, but not per se, or essentially, therefore, in whatever categories, contrariety is not inherent, if definitions are asserted instead of nouns, and are essentially predicated, and not accidentally, of these a particular thing may be truly and singly asserted, but non-being, because it is a matter of opinion, cannot truly be called a certain thing, for the opinion of it is, not that it is, but that it is not. Chapter 12 On modal proposition These things, then, being determined, let us consider how the affirmations and negations of the possible and impossible to be subsist with reference to each other, also of the contingent and the non-contingent, and of the impossible and necessary, since this has some doubtful points, for if among the complex, those contradictions are mutually opposed, which are arranged according to the verb, quote to be, close quote, and quote not to be, close quote, as for instance, the negation, quote to be a man, close quote, is, quote not to be a man, close quote, not this, quote to be not a man, close quote, and the negation of quote to be a white man, close quote, is, quote not to be a white man, close quote, and not this, quote to be not a white man, close quote, since if affirmation or negation be true of everything, it will be true to say, quote that would is not a white man, close quote, if this be so, in those things to which the verb, quote to be, close quote, is not added, that which is asserted, instead of the verb, quote to be, close quote, will produce the same thing. For example, the negation of, quote a man walks, close quote, will not be, quote non-man walks, close quote, but, quote a man does not walk, close quote, for there is no difference in saying that, quote a man walks, close quote, or that, quote a man is walking, close quote, so that if this is everywhere the case, the negation of, quote it is possible to be, close quote, will be, quote it is possible not to be, close quote, and not, quote it is not possible to be, close quote, but it appears that it is possible for the same thing both to be and not to be, for everything which may possibly be cut, or may possibly walk, may also possibly not be cut, and not walk, and the reason is that everything which is thus possible does not always energize, so that negation will also belong to it, for that which is capable of walking may not walk, and the visible may not be seen. Still, however, it is impossible that opposite affirmations and negations should be true of the same thing, where for the negation of, quote it is possible to be, close quote, is not, quote it is possible not to be, close quote. Now it results from this, that we either at the same time affirm and deny the same thing of the same, or that the affirmations and negations are not made according to the additions, quote to be, close quote, or, quote not to be, close quote. If therefore, that be impossible, this will be to be taken, where for the negation of, quote it is possible to be, close quote, is, quote it is not possible to be, close quote, but not it is possible not to be. Now there is the same reasoning also about the being contingent, for the negation of this is not to be contingent, and in like manner as to the rest, for example the necessary and impossible, since as in those it happens that, quote to be, close quote, and quote not to be, close quote, are additions, but quotes whiteness and quotes man are subjects, so here quote to be, close quote, and quote not to be, close quote, become as subjects, but quote to be possible, close quote, and quote to be contingent, close quote, are additions which determine the true and false in the annunciations, quote to be possible, close quote, and quote to be not possible, close quote. Similarly as in those, quote to be, close quote, and quote not to be, close quote. But of, quote it is possible not to be, close quote, the negation is not, quote it is not possible to be, close quote, but quote it is not possible not to be." and of · It is possible to be · The negation is not · It is possible not to be . it is not possible to be ·. whereever · It is possible to be . it is possible to not to be . will appear to follow each other for it is the same thing · to be possible to be close quote, and quote not to be close quote. Since such things are not contradictory of each other, namely, quote it is possible to be close quote, and quote it is possible not to be close quote, but quote it is possible to be close quote, and quote it is not possible to be close quote, are never true of the same thing at the same time, for they are opposed, neither at least are, quote it is possible not to be close quote, and quote it is not possible not to be close quote, ever true at the same time of the same thing. Likewise of, quote it is necessary to be close quote, the negation is not, quote it is necessary not to be close quote, but this, quote it is not necessary to be And of, quote, it is necessary not to be, close, quote. The negation is this, quote, it is not necessary not to be, close, quote. Again of, quote, it is impossible to be, close, quote. The negation is not, quote, it is impossible not to be, close, quote. But, quote, it is not impossible to be, close, quote. end of, quote, it is impossible not to be, close quote, the negation is, quote, it is not impossible not to be, close quote. In fact, universally, as we have said, quote to be, close quote, and quote not to be, close quote, we must necessarily regard as subjects, but those things which produce affirmation and negation, we must connect with, quote to be, close quote, and quote not to be, close quote. We ought also to consider these as opposite affirmations and negations, possible, impossible, contingent, non-contingent, impossible, not impossible, necessary, not necessary, true, not true. Chapter 13 of the sequences of modal propositions. The consequences are rightly placed thus, quote, it happens to be, close quote, follows, quote, it is possible to be, close quote, and this reciprocates with that also, quote, it is not impossible to be, close quote, and, quote, it is not necessary to be, close quote, but, quote, it is not necessary not to be, close quote, and, quote, it is not impossible not to be close quote, follow, quote, it is possible not to be close quote, and, quote, it may happen not to be close quote, and, quote, it is necessary not to be close quote, and, quote, it is impossible not to be close quote, follow, quote, it is not possible to be close quote, and, quote, It does not happen to be, close quote, but, quote, it is necessary to be, close quote, and also, quote, it is impossible not to be, close quote, follow, quote, it is not possible not to be, close quote, and, quote, it is not contingent not to be, close quote. What we say, however, may be seen from the following description. 1. It is possible to be. It may happen to be. It is not impossible to be. It is not necessary to be. 2. It is possible not to be. It may happen not to be. It is not impossible not to be. It is not necessary not to be. 3. It is not possible to be. be. It may not happen to be. It is impossible to be. It is necessary not to be. 4. It is not possible not to be. It may happen not to be. It is impossible not to be. It is necessary to be. Therefore, the impossible and the not impossible follow contradictorily the contingent, and the possible and the non-contingent, and the not possible, and vice versa. For the negation of the impossible, namely, quote, it is not impossible to be, close quote, follows, quote, it is possible to be, close quote. But affirmation follows negation for, quote, it is impossible to be, close quote, follows, quote, it is not possible to be, close quote. Since, quote, Quote, it is impossible to be, is affirmation, but it is not impossible to be, is negation. Let us next see how it is with necessary matter. Now it is evident that it does not subsist thus, but contraries follow, and contradictory are placed separately. For it is not necessary to be, is not the negation of, it is necessary not to be, close quote. Since both may possibly be true of the same thing, as that which necessarily is not, denot of necessity be. But the reason why the necessary follows not, in like manner other propositions, is that the impossible being enunciated contrarily to the necessary signifies the same thing. Or what it is impossible should exist, must not of necessity be, but not be, and what is impossible should not be. This must of necessity be, so that if these similarly follow the possible, and the not possible, these do so in a contrary mode, since the necessary and the impossible do not signify the same thing, but as we have said, vice versa. Or is it impossible that the contradictory of the necessary should be thus disposed? For what, quote, is necessary to be, close quote, is, quote, possible to be, close quote. Since if not, negation would follow, as it is necessary, either to affirm or deny, so that if it is not possible to be, it is impossible to be. Therefore it would be impossible for that to be, which necessarily is, which is absurd. But the enunciation, quote, it is not impossible to be, close quote, follows the other, quote, it is possible to be, close quote, which again is followed by, quote, it is not necessary to be, close quote. Since it happens that what necessarily exists does not necessarily exist, which is absurd. But again, neither does, quote, it is necessary to be, close quote, follow, quote, it is possible to be, close quote. Nor does the proposition, quote, it is necessary not to be, close quote. For to that, both may occur, but whichever of these is true, those will be no longer true. Or at one and the same time, it is possible to be, and not to be. But if it is necessary, either to be, or not to be, both will not be possible. It remains therefore that, quote, it is not necessary not to be, close quote, follows, quote, it is possible to be, close quote. For this is also true in respect of what is necessary to be. Since this becomes the contradiction of that proposition which follows, vis, quote, it is not possible to be, close quote, as, quote, it is impossible to be, close quote. And, quote, it is necessary not to be, close quote, follow that, of which the negation is, quote, it is not necessary not to be, close quote. Wherefore, these contradictions follow according to the above mentioned mode, and nothing absurd results, when they are thus disposed. Still, it may be doubted whether, quote, it is possible to be, close quote, follows, quote, it is necessary to be, close quote. For if it does not follow, the contradiction will be consequent, namely, quote, it is not possible to be, close quote. And if a man should deny this to be a contradiction, it will be necessary to call, quote, it is possible not to be, close quote, a contradiction, both which are false in respect of necessary matter. Nay, on the contrary, it appears to be possible that the same thing should, quote, be cut, close quote, and, quote, not be cut, close quote, should, quote, be, and, quote, not be, close quote, so that what necessarily, quote, is, may happen, quote, not to be, close quote, which is false. Nevertheless, it is evident that not everything which can, quote, be, and can, quote, walk is capable also of the opposites, for in some cases this is not true. In the first place, in those things which are potent irrationally, as fire is calorific, and has irrational power. Rational powers then are those of many things, and of the contraries, but not all irrational powers, for as we have said, fire cannot heat, and not heat, nor such other things as always energize. Yet even some irrational powers can at the same time receive opposites, but this has been stated by us, because not every power is susceptible of contraries, not even such as are predicated according to the same species. Moreover some powers are equivocal, for the possible is not predicated simply, but one thing is called so, because it is true, as being in an energy, as it is possible for a man to walk, because he walks, and in short, a thing is possible to be, because that is already in energy, which is said to be possible. On the other hand, another thing is said to be possible, because it may be in energy, and it is possible to walk, because a man may walk. Now this power exists in movable natures only, but that in immovable. But with respect to both, it is true to say, that it is not impossible to walk, and that a man is now walking, and energizing, and has the power to walk, hence it is not true to predicate that which is thus possible, in respect of necessary matter, simply, but the other is true. Wherefore, since the universal follows the particular, to be able to be, but not all ability, follows that which is of necessity, and indeed the necessary and the non-necessary may perhaps be the principle of the existence, or of the non-existence of all things, and we should consider other things as consequent upon these. Hence from what we have stated, it is clear that whatever exists of necessity is in energy, so that if eternal natures are prior in existence, energy also is prior to power, and some things, as the first substances, are energies without power, but others with power, namely those which are prior by nature, but posterior in time. Lastly, there are some which are never energies, but are capacities only. Chapter 14 of Contrary Propositions But whether is affirmation contrary to negation, or affirmation to affirmation, and is the sentence which says, quote, every man is just close, quote, contrary to the one, quote, no man is just, close, quote, or the sentence, quote, every man is just, close, quote, to, quote, every man is unjust, close, quote, as, quote, Calius is just, close, quote, quote, Calius is not just, close, quote, quote, Calius is unjust, close, quote. Which of these are contraries? For if things in the voice follow those which exist in the intellect, but there the opinion of a contrary is contrary, as for instance that, quote, every man is just, close, quote, is contrary to, quote, every man is unjust, close, quote, it is necessary that affirmations also in the voice should subsist in the same manner. But if there, the opinion of a contrary be not contrary, neither will affirmation be contrary to affirmation, but the before named negation. Hence it must be considered what false opinion is contrary to the true opinion, whether that of negation, or that which opines it to be the contrary. I mean in this way, there is a certain true opinion of good, that it is good, but another false opinion, that it is not good, lastly a third, that it is evil. Which of these therefore is contrary to the true opinion? And if there is one, according to which is it contrary? If then a man should fancy contrary opinions to be defined by this, that they are of contraries, it would be erroneous, for of good that it is good, and of evil that it is evil, there is perhaps the same opinion. And it is true, whether there be many opinions or one. But these are contraries, yet not from their being of contraries, are they contraries, but rather from their subsisting in a contrary manner. If then there is an opinion of good, that it is good, but another that it is not good, and there is also something else, which is neither inherent, nor can be in good, we cannot admit any contrary of the rest. Neither such opinions as imagine the non-inherent to be inherent, nor the inherent to be non-inherent, for both are infinite, both as many as imagine the non-inherent to be inherent, and the inherent to be non-inherent. But in those things in which there is deception, therein we admit contraries, and these are from which there are generations, generations however, are from opposites, wherefore deceptions also. If then, good is good and not evil, and the one is essential, but the other accidental, for it is accidental to it not to be evil, and of everything the opinion is more true and false which is essential. If the true be assumed, the opinion that good is not good is false, in respect of that which is essentially inherent. But the opinion that it is evil is false, of that which is from accident, so that the opinion of the negation of good would be more false than the opinion of the contrary. He is however especially deceived about everything who holds a contrary opinion, for contraries belong to things which are the most diverse about the same thing. If then, one of these is contrary, but the opinion of the negation is more contrary, it is evident that this itself will be truly contrary. But the opinion that the good is evil is complex, for it is necessary perhaps that the same man should suppose good not good. Once more, if it is requisite for the like to occur in other things, it may seem to have been well said in this case also. For the opposition of negation is either everywhere or nowhere. But whatever things have no contraries, of these the opposite to the true opinion is false, as he is mistaken who fancies, quote, a man, close quote, quote, not a man, close quote. If then these negations are contrary, the other opinions also of negation are. Besides, it is the same as to the opinion of good that it is good, and of what is not good that it is not good, and also the opinion of good that it is not good, and of what is not good that it is good. To the opinion then of the not good that it is not good which is true, what will be the contrary? Certainly not that which says that it is evil, since it may at one and the same time be true, but truth is never contrary to truth. For whatever is not good is evil, so that it will happen that these opinions shall be at one and the same time true. Nor again will that opinion that it is not evil be the contrary, for that is also true, and these may exist at the same time. Wherefore, the opinion of what is not good that it is good remains as a contrary to the opinion of what is not good that it is not good, and this will be false, so that the opinion of good that it is not good will be the contrary to that of what is good that it is good. That there will be no difference though we should propose universal affirmation is evident, for universal negation will be the contrary, as for instance to the opinion which supposes everything good to be good, that nothing of good things is good will be the contrary opinion. For the opinion of good that it is good, if good be universal, is the same with that which opines that whatever is good is good, and this differs in no respect from the opinion that everything which is good is good, and the like takes place as to that which is not good, so that if this be the case in opinion, and affirmations and negations in the voice are symbols of conceptions in the soul, it is clear that the universal negation which is about the same thing is contrary to affirmation, for instance to quote everything good is good close quote, or that quote every man is good close quote, the negation is contrary that quote nothing or no man is good close quote, but this that quote not everything or not every man close quote is good is opposed contradictorily, it is however evident that true opinion can neither possibly be contrary to true opinion, nor true negation to true negation, for those are contraries which subsist about opposites, but about the same things the same may be verified, but contraries cannot possibly be inherent in the same thing at one and the same time, end of on interpretation by Aristotle translated by Octavius Freer Owen, recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards