 Let me introduce myself. My name is Clark Murdoch. I'm the director for the project on nuclear issues here I have to say this is probably my last official duty as the director for the project on nuclear issues in two weeks I will be succeeded by Rebecca Hursman who is recently retired from the Department of Defense as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for countering weapons of mass destruction and We'll bring much needed enthusiasm and youth into the program again During the time, but anyway, it's been a great privilege to serve as a director of Pony and This is a fitting way to end it I'd like to introduce the two Participants in this evening's debates the pony debates the issue has been one of our most successful programs for pony During that time Matthew Cronick is a social professor At Georgetown University a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council His bio and the number of things that he has written Are the recent things that he has written are included in his bio. So I won't go over that since you all have that Ted Galen Carpenter is also a senior fellow for Defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute We won't go over his publications because they're simply far too many to list to read through In this event during this time, but a prolific writer and producer of Analysis on these issues and this debate will be Moderated by the project coordinator for Pony Sarah Minot And she will explain the going-in rules and then begin the debate. Great. Thank you all for coming Welcome to our debate Just as a note for the people watching on webcast if you have questions You can go ahead and email them to me at s m i n o t at CSIS org And we'll be able to take questions from people that are watching on the live stream So everyone has the debate format set up here We're going to start with opening statements and move to cross examinations We'll look kind of rebut each other's arguments from the opening statements Then we'll open it up to questions from the audience So without further ado, we can go ahead and get started with Dr. Krayning Well, thank you very much for that introduction Sarah. It's a pleasure to be here at CSIS and Pony And I didn't realize this was going to be Clark Murdoch's last event So it's it's quite an honor to be speaking here at Clark's last event and indeed, you know Clark's done a wonderful job with Pony over the past 12 years So I think it might be appropriate to start by thanking Clark for for his service He's done a wonderful job. So thank you So the question we're asked to debate tonight is if or I guess the proposition is quote If Iran fails to make an agreement with the p5 plus one immediate action should be taken against them And I'm going to argue the affirmative So first, what does it mean if Iran fails to make an agreement? Well, I think it means that if Iran and the p5 plus one fail to come to a framework agreement by next week by March 31st That would mean we've failed to get an agreement or if we get a framework agreement by next week by March 31st but the p5 plus one and Iran failed to work out of a full agreement with all the technical details worked out by the end of June Which is the second deadline? If we fail to get that technical agreement by the end of June, then that would also mean that diplomacy has failed So why do I argue the affirmative? Well, I argue the affirmative for three reasons first Widely accepted a nuclear armed Iran is unacceptable Bill Clinton has argued this George W. Bush and President Obama and President Obama has been Especially clear about this President Obama has said not only that our policy is not to contain a nuclear armed Iran But that is not even possible. He said it quote a nuclear armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained in quote So there's bipartisan consensus in favor of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons bipartisan agreement in a policy of prevention So the question is not should we prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or not? But how best to do that? So the second point is that the the status quo is also unacceptable The status quo is untenable as the terms for long-term agreement After all if the status quo were acceptable for a comprehensive deal We could just declare the current situation to be a comprehensive deal and be done with it but everyone agrees that the Current status quo is is unacceptable The best experts estimate that if Iran were to if the Supreme Leader were to issue the order to build nuclear weapons That it would take Iran roughly two to three months to get to the point of no return So their nuclear weapons breakout time at present is two to three months, and that's too close for comfort So the point of the negotiations over the past 16 months has been to roll Iran's nuclear capabilities back to put enough limits on it To extend that breakout time to a year or more So nobody not Republicans in Congress not the administration not the p5 plus one not the international community is Prepared to live with an Iran two to three months away from a nuclear breakout So how do we get Iran to? To roll back its program to get this year breakout So this leads to my third point is that if we fail to get a deal by March 31st or by June 30th It will have shown that the current approach has failed It'll show that Iran was unwilling to accept this gift of a deal that we've been willing to give them And the problem is not insufficient time these negotiations are complicated, but not that complicated. We've had 16 months The problem is that the supreme leader is unwilling to make the concessions necessary to satisfy the international community that their Program can't be used to build nuclear weapons quickly So we need a different approach if we fail this round to get Iran to agree to make these concessions So one approach would be we could try to be nicer to Iran, but we know historically that Iran only makes Concessions when it's under pressure And so what it's going to take then if we fail this time is to bring more pressure to bear on Iran And I think there are five things that we should do in particular if we fail to get an agreement by March 31st or by the end of June So first we need to make it clear that it was Iran and not the United States Not the p5 plus one not the US Congress that was responsible for diplomacy's failure We need to make it clear that we've been putting reasonable proposals forward for over 12 years Which we have and that Iran has simply been unwilling to accept these reasonable proposals Now so far Iran's been better. I think in the public diplomacy than we have Prime Minister's reef and others have been very clever in the way They play the media to try to make it seem like they're the reasonable parties and it's the international community that's being unreasonable So first thing we need to do is to work diplomatically and through public diplomacy channels to convince Publix around the world that indeed this is Iran's Responsibility not not our responsibility And this leads to the second point the second thing we need to do is then shore up our international coalition against Iran So steps we're going to take to put additional pressure on Iran increase sanctions a potentially tougher measures down the road will require international support From the p5 plus one and from the broader international community So we need to work then diplomatically to make sure the p5 plus one is on board still with the negotiation With our proposals for additional pressure and make sure the broader international community is also On board for the next steps Third we need to increase the pressure on Iran through additional sanctions As I've said before Iran only makes concessions when its back is against the wall The only reason President Rouhani was elected two years ago the only reason we got an interim deal The only reason Iran has been at the negotiating table negotiating seriously for the past 16 months is because of the Unprecedented level of international sanctions and international pressure We were able to bring to bear over the past 12 years, but especially after 2012 on Iran's nuclear program So we had their economy on the verge of collapse They signed up to this interim deal and then we we let them up through the interim deal We've been providing gradual sanctions relief And so at this point the Supreme Leader is not willing to make the necessary concessions So we need to return to economic pressure increase the economic pressure on Iran And President Obama himself has said in his state of the Union address last year He said that if Iran fails to accept a comprehensive deal that he'll be the first one President Obama said he would be the first one calling for additional sanctions so again if we fail to get an agreement then The administration stated policy is to call for for more sanctions So this should mean that the economic relief that was provided as part of the joint plan of action as part of this interim deal Should be rescinded This means that Congress should pass the Kirk Menendez legislation that would put additional economic sanctions on Iran And the administration to work should work to implement these sanctions and to exercise extreme Discretion and using its waiver authority on these sanctions Fourth, I think we need to take steps to increase the credibility of our military option now some people including in the administration have argued that the alternative to Getting a deal now is war and that's a little bit misleading because we have to understand the asymmetric Stakes here when it comes to the possibility of a US strike on Iran's key nuclear facilities That's something we very much want to avoid But it's something the Iranians want to avoid even more and so if we have that credible military option if there's no doubt in The Iranians mind that if they try to break out it would lead to a strike Iran would likely be deterred from breaking out And so that will give us time then for this economic pressure to begin to work Now I think we need to be careful in how we do this We don't want to rub Iran's face in it. The Iranians are a prideful nation So we don't necessarily want to make these threats publicly But we need to communicate privately that there should be no doubt in their mind that if they're taking steps that we judge to be Then breaking out to build nuclear weapons that US strikes on their nuclear facilities will will follow shortly thereafter Next we need to communicate that this is our policy to our partners in the region Because one of the dangers here is that if our partners in the region doubt our resolve that they might take action into their own hands The Israelis might conduct a strike which wouldn't be in the US interest or other states in the region Gulf states might take steps to build their Own nuclear weapons capabilities potentially leading to a regional arms race, which also isn't in our interest So we also need to communicate to our partners in the region that As we have been but to continue to repeat the message that we're willing to do whatever it takes to stop Iran from building nuclear weapons Including using force if necessary Finally we need to Let the pressure work its magic With a credible military option in place with the increased pressure from international sanctions we need to Let the pressure work its magic and then be very clear to Iran that the door diplomacy Remains open if they're ready to come back to the negotiating table if they're finally willing to accept the concessions that would Reassure all of us that they're not building nuclear weapons that that door remains open So in some the goal still here remain here still remains to be Getting a good deal that puts verifiable limits on Iran's nuclear program We've been unable to get there through the current approach If we fail to get a deal by March 31st or June 30th, and we need to try a different approach So thank you very much for your time. I look forward to the discussion into your questions Okay, thank you now we're gonna move to opening works by dr. Carpenter Thank you very much my thanks again to both Clark and Sarah and again my Congratulations to Clark on a job very well done over the years excellent program. I Think we need to face certain realities in our negotiations with Iran and Overcome some persistent myths First of all, I would argue that setting deadlines is Decidedly unhelpful. I Realized that failing to set deadlines can have its own problems after all we had the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War that dragged on year after year after year Without any productive achievements, but setting deadlines. I think Entails its own problems and is generally counterproductive If we are going to get an agreement with Iran it is likely to take considerable time Far more than we have allowed to this point a second myth that we need to overcome is The imminence of Iran becoming a nuclear weapons state This has been a prediction that has been around a very very long time Then CIA director James Woolsey stated in 1993 That Iran would likely have a nuclear weapon within 10 years other predictions We have seen typically within five to ten years sometimes as little as three years With Benjamin and Tinyahu Iran is always within a few months of a nuclear break out and One would think after hearing the cry of wolf that many times. We are justifiably skeptical about such predictions We also need to face the Unpleasant reality that there are only really two broad alternatives to continued negotiations one of which Dr. Cronig has already mentioned intensifying sanctions But while previous rounds of sanctions have certainly inflicted pain on Iran's economy It has not caused Tehran to capitulate on the central issue and There is no evidence that a new round of sanctions would do so either in fact sanctions Probably rank as the most overrated foreign policy tactic The seminal work by Gary Huff bar Jeffrey shot and Kimberly Elliot some three decades ago and the follow-on research Has demonstrated pretty conclusively that economic sanctions generally fail to achieve their objectives And they especially fail to achieve their objectives when they're involving High priority policies by the target regime. There's no question sanctions can inflict pain on the population Of a target country the question is can it get the regime to change its policy and change it in the direction? We desire and the track record is pretty pretty miserable over a course of goodie a good many decades We have to understand that developing a nuclear capability Is a long-standing Iranian gold indeed its roots go back to the era of the shaw This is not just a plot by a handful of molas The other option to continued negotiations is war and I think we need to be blunt about that It isn't enhancing the credibility of our military option. It is in fact resorting to the military option Now most Hawks dance around that reality there are a few who have Provided refreshing Examples of candor Joshua Moff check for example in his recent Washington Post article. It's quite candid about it. Yes if these negotiations fail we ought to in Senator John McCain's nibbable words bomb bomb bomb bomb Iran But that would be a mistake on multiple fronts Has been noted by many experts. We probably can't eliminate all of the nuclear installations So a bombing campaign would likely just delay Iran's ambitions Indeed I would argue that an attack would create a huge incentive for Iran to redouble its efforts and Move toward actually deploying a nuclear arsenal not just developing a nuclear capability We have to acknowledge that Iran Would be a larger and much tougher adversary than Iraq or Afghanistan both of which have given the US fits It's both a larger region and a larger population Moreover yet another US-led war against the Muslim country would validate the accusation That Washington is waging a crusade against Islam That is a great recruiting tool for terrorists and any other extremists Beyond that we need a decent relationship with Iran beyond the nuclear issue because of an assortment of other issues Iran whether we like it or not is an important regional power And indeed it is now a de facto ally of the United States and the West in the war against ISIS US officials and opinion leaders have difficulty setting priorities. We constantly want to accomplish everything We want to destroy ISIS. We want to get rid of Bashar Assad. We want to eliminate Iran's influence all at once I Think we have to attain more Reasonable objectives the goal of getting Iran to return to nuclear virginity was unrealistic from the outset What might be attainable Verifiable limits on Iran's nuclear program with international inspections but again the devil is always in the details and Frankly, I am not optimistic on that score. I think that a more attainable goal is One of getting a commitment from Tehran not to build and deploy a nuclear arsenal That Iran would remain one screwdrivers turn away from that point Having that capability is not especially destabilizing deploying an arsenal would be I Think we need to focus on Convincing Tehran that a deployment would be a bridge too far That it would likely trigger a regional nuclear arms race Leaving Iran less rather than more secure than it is now Now we also need to have US guarantees Iran has seen how the United States treats non nuclear adversaries such as Serbia Iraq and Libya and Libya I think was an especially Unfortunate precedent because Gaddafi of course gave up his nuclear program and what was his reward for that? Support by the US and its allies to overthrow his regime We need to convince the Iranian leaders that we are now out of the forcible regime change business That would not be easy, but we must make that attempt And as I will discuss in subsequent portions of the debate tonight Even the worst case scenario that if Iran bills and deploys an arsenal That's a bad development, but it is not necessarily an intolerable event And I think we need to make that distinction. Thank you Great now. We're gonna move into the cross-examination Dr. Cronig, if you would like to start Well, thank you very much for those comments dr. Carpenter You said many things many of them I agree with many of them I disagree with but nothing you said called into question my conclusion You didn't argue that we shouldn't increase pressure on Iran and you didn't argue what an alternative course of action would be if we Don't increase pressure on Iran So I think we can continue to the continue the discussion because it's interesting But I don't see that a debate has has formed here First we we shared the goal the goal is to make sure that Iran doesn't build nuclear weapons. I agree with that Second we need to make clear to Iran that if they Do what we want them to do that if they Agree to a deal that rolls back their nuclear program that convinces us that they can't use build nuclear weapons then We need to provide them assurances that we won't Attack anyway Thomas Schelling the great deterrence theorist argued that deterrence Threats are always combined with a promise do what you don't want us to do and there will be Punishment do what you want us to do and there won't be punishment. So we agree there To the degree that you had a proposal It's an unworkable one you said we should let Iran get one or two screwdrivers turns away from a nuclear weapon But that's not a workable solution because once Iran gets one screwdrivers turn away from a nuclear weapon What's going to stop them from turning the final screwdriver once we let them get to that point? There's no reason why they wouldn't go ahead with it. We can't physically intervene to stop them So the key then is to get Iran to a point even if we're prepared to let them have a nuclear capability To have enough breakout time to where if Iran were to cheat on that agreement that the international community would have time to Detect that violation would have time to build political support For taking action against Iran again for that violation and have time to use economic sanctions First as a lever and to follow us fails as a last resort military action So that's where this 12 month breakout time came from this wasn't pulled out of the air It was there you can debate it But it was basically assessed that that's how long it would take to respond to any Iranian violations and stop them So 12 months away is essentially for all intents and purposes the one screwdriver turn away That's as close as we can let Iran get before Essentially giving up the game So the question then is how do we get Iran to roll back its program to get that 12 month breakout time? And that's what I argued here I laid out a strategy for how we can do that and dr. Carpenter made several interesting points but nothing he said called into question or What I've said or laid out an alternative strategy I'll just comment on a few of the other points, but but that was the central one First he said that setting deadlines is unhelpful You know, I think that's debatable But the fact of the matter is we've already set a deadline the p5 plus one and already p5 plus one in Iran Have already set a deadline. So that's the reality. We're living with Second I think a deadline is helpful in this case because again this two to three month breakout time that Iran has now is Too close for comfort. And so we're unwilling to live with this as the permanent solution It was always meant to be an interim solution a permanent solution needs more breakout time So we can't live with this forever. We have to set a deadline as to when either we get a deal or we don't Next dr. Carpenter said that many people have been making outlandish predictions about how Iran was going to have nuclear weapons in two seconds for decades I agree that that's true. Many of these people just didn't know what they were talking about But the fact of the matter is now we have a very good idea of what Iran's nuclear capabilities are we have inspectors on the ground We have many of the best experts in government and outside of government doing technical Analysis of how long would it take Iran to produce one bombs worth of material given what we know that they have now and that Numbers two to three months. So this maybe the numbers in the past were bad. This is a good number He said that a resorting to the military option is Is a bad option and I don't think anybody disagrees with that But the question is if Iran dashes to a nuclear weapons capability and it's the last resort either we take military action Or let Iran have nuclear weapons, which is worse. So it is a gut-wrenching decision. It's not easy but the my assessment That I've written about in in my recent book and the assessment of the US government is that a military strike would be less Bad than living with the nuclear armed Iran. That's why President Obama has been so clear that we'll do what we must Quote do what we must to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons that the military option remains on the table to do that He said that we need a decent Iran a decent relationship with Iran and we need to set priorities I agree we need to set priorities and I think everyone agrees that an Iran with nuclear weapons is much more threatening Then than anything else Iran might be doing is is the cost of a nuclear armed Iran outweigh any benefits We might get in terms of cooperation on ISIS. So I agree with the point on priorities Priorities means stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and the other aspects take a backseat to that He said getting nuclear virginity with Iran is not possible. I agree with that. That's kind of a false choice we both agree that the solution is to get Limits on Iran's nuclear program and again the question is how to best do that. I've said the way to do that is to Increase pressure. I didn't hear an alternative from my colleague. So I think I'll stop there. Thank you I Guess the fundamental disagreement I have with dr. Cronig and with others who Advocate military action as an option that must remain available Is that a nuclear armed Iran would be bad a War to prevent that would be even worse That would be inherently Stabilizing to the Middle East it would poison our relations with Iran probably for decades to come And I have to admit I experience a sense of deja vu with this with people who argue that Iran is Not containable That for some reason deterrence doesn't work with Iran That this is the great exception the crazy mohaz thesis That if Iran had nuclear weapons It would certainly threaten to use them and might well use them If not on the United States, and I think most people even on the hawkish camp would Acknowledge that it would be utter suicide for Iran to attack the United States a country with several thousand nuclear weapons and the sophisticated delivery system and There is no evidence that the clerical leadership is Suicidal in fact, there is plenty of evidence that in fact it is calculating and quite rational or The alternative argument that Iran would give nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations and Attack u.s. Allies in the Middle East Primarily Israel Again, I think those dangers are far-fetched at best An attack on Israel would be almost as suicidal as an attack on the United States The worst kept secret in international affairs is that Israel has a nuclear arsenal of a hundred and fifty to three hundred weapons again Iran is not likely to undertake that kind of risk What about giving nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations well Consider the fact that Iran has had a rather extensive chemical weapons arsenal for decades again going back to the days of the shawl it is also sponsored worked with organizations that have Used terrorist tactics has below of course being at the top of the list And yet there is a dearth of evidence that Iran has ever transferred chemical weapons to any of its clients any of its non-state clients If Iran was not willing to take that risk with regard to chemical weapons Why would it do so with regard to nuclear weapons? When Iran would be at the top of a very short list of suspects if that client used such a weapon I Think again, that is a false danger Iran is in my judgment quite containable would we prefer to have Iran without a deployed nuclear arsenal absolutely Could we live with an Iran that did have such an arsenal? I believe we can And the distinction between the one screwdrivers turn away and actually deploying an arsenal is a very important one And I think we need to look at what happened with India and Pakistan That reached that one screwdrivers turn away in the 1970s and yet did not deploy arsenals for another two decades until Conditions changed and tensions robes I'm not saying that Iran would forever forgo deploying such an arsenal But it doesn't mean that just because it developed a Capability to build nuclear weapons it would automatically move to the next step and deploy an arsenal. I Mentioned the sense of deja vu when I hear the hawk say that Iran Cannot be contained. We cannot allow Iran to have nuclear weapons I'm reminded of the same comments eerily similar comments about Maoist China in the 1960s and how The blood-curdling statements from Mao and his associates indicated that a Chinese communist government with nuclear weapons Would be an utter disaster That they could not be deterred they would definitely use such weapons against either the United States or its allies And the statements from Mao and his associates. I would argue worse far more frightening than anything We have heard from the clerical leadership in Iran This was a leadership that actually argued that it was possible To fight and win a nuclear war with the United States Even if China lost as much as half of its population Hawks in the United States proposed air strikes against Chinese nuclear installations And the Johnson administration. I know for a fact seriously considered that option Imagine what our relationship would be with China today if we had followed the advice of the hawks of that era It's highly unpleasant even contemplate that and what happened when China did acquire a nuclear weapons capability it actually acted in a more responsible manner in part because its own Insecurities were reduced we can deter Iran and Given its importance in the region we need to learn to live with an Iran Preferably one that doesn't deploy an arsenal, but even if it does We need to learn to live with that reality rather than trigger another war in the Muslim world One with unpredictable but likely disastrous Consequences, thank you. Great. I think we're gonna get ready to open it up to Q&A from the audience We have a couple people in the back co-bring around microphones. Please state your name and where you're from and keep your questions brief Sorry, they're just getting organized back there. I think right up here Hello, my name is Hermes Levy. I'm from WS My question is What do you what will be your comment about a third alternative? Which would be trying to engineer inside your own a friendly government? So the question was what about a third alternative to try to engineer a more friendly government to come to power in Iran I think it was the question So I think that would be wonderful if we could get a new government in Iran that was more democratic that respected the human rights Of its own people that was willing to work with the international community that was willing to abide by its international obligations And so the United States has had some programs in place over the years to try to support moderates in Iran I think the problem is there's really no evidence that Major change in regime is going to happen internally within Iran anytime soon And the basic problem is the the clerics are willing to the current regime is willing to kill to stay in power and The opposition isn't willing to die to take power and I think as long as that's the case We're not going to get a change in government that we were close and or we had at least a protest over the elections in 2009 The green movement, but the government cracked down harshly put people in prison exiled them And that really demoralized this this opposition movement So a new government would be great, but I think for the time being we have to work under the premise that we're going to be dealing with this government I Would argue that given Washington's history with Iran a u.s. Blessing would be the kiss of death for any alternative movement I mean going back to the CIA orchestrated coup in 1953 The Iranians have long memories and to be blunt. They don't really trust us and our protestations about democracy and human rights Secondly, I think it's it's a mistake on two levels to see the clerical regime as a monolith It's not there are factions within the clerical regime. There are certainly reformers and Even if you look at the at the post of the presidency, there's a big difference between Rouhani and Ahmadinejad That's reflected down the various levels of the regime Secondly, the regime is now about to enter its third generation Revolutionary intensity tends to fade with time. That's that's almost a universal truth And so I would be patient let Iran work out its own internal political destiny Without trying to Orchestrate regime change. We haven't exactly had a great track record over the decades Around the world with that strategy and I wouldn't try it in this case In the tan shirt up here. Thank you. Everyone was any from University of Maryland. This is to dr. Chronic As you went down your list of measures You know none of them sounded new in a sense that we tried all five of them Simultaneously for ten years and all we got was a more expansive more comprehensive and Nuclear fuel cycle program when they run inside they went from zero center fuges to You know to 20,000 now and Upward counting so what makes you think that now things would be any different than they were for the past decade Thank you I think the first point that I would make is that Foreign policy is hard and the Iranian nuclear challenge is hard and so we have no good options There are drawbacks to all the options The question is given where we are now What is our best option to try to get a deal and I think this is the best option to go back to the pressure track And I guess I would disagree a little bit with what you've said and what Dr. Carpenter said as I think the pressure track has been shown to work in the past We look at when Iran's made major concessions before it has been under intense international pressure whether it was in the Iran-Iraq war Whether it was in 2003 when Iran voluntarily agreed to suspend its nuclear work because it feared it might be next after the invasion of Iraq And if you look back two years ago I think the economic sanctions were critical to getting Iran to come to the negotiating table To striking the interim deal and to sitting there and negotiating over the past 16 months So I think our only hope of Getting an even better deal Than the interim deal of getting a true comprehensive deal is returning to the pressure track increasing the economic pressure because the the economy the Iranian economy was under real stress in November 2013 when we struck this deal we essentially had Iran on its back and then we let them up And so the bet I'm Hazard trying to make here is that if we return to that pressure track They saw that things were only going to get worse economically unless they were willing to make real concessions That's our best hope of getting a deal now. Maybe a deal is not possible. Maybe we are at the end of the day going to face this tougher Choice between acquiescing or taking action, but I think if we want to get a deal. I think that is everyone's goal I think this is our best best path forward Thank you. Thank you Clark board. I I Asked about another scenario Recent reporting has indicated that what were p5 plus one Negotiations with Iran are really us Iranian negotiations right now And that there are some who believe the French are reported to be in that camp Believe that on major elements the United States is moving closer to Iran's position On several important regards in terms of trying to get a deal What if we instead of saying no deal? What if we get a bad deal? What do you do if we get a bad deal? I guess I would ask you first to define what is a bad deal in your view I Guess I would argue that even an imperfect deal Would be better than no deal at all and it's certainly better than the military scenario so again Is that a desirable outcome? No, not particularly. It's just better than the alternatives So I do have if I could take a moment to respond also I do have concerns with the direction the negotiations are headed in from some of the reports I'm getting back because if we remember the point of all this going back 12 years was to get Iran to give up enrichment completely that was the international community's position for Decade or so there were six UN Security Council resolutions requiring demanding that Iran suspend enrichment And then we got the interim deal in which we promised that Iran would have some enrichment capability And I think the Iranians had been pretty clever in kind of tying their own hands and making the case that they couldn't accept any deal that didn't allow at least some token enrichment capability and Convince many people in Washington including the administration and so the administration began making the argument We need to accept some enrichment capability in order to get a deal So when they started to make that case then I and I think others were prepared to accept some kind of token Enrichment capability to allow Iran to save face but to get a serious breakout time From the reports it seems like we've gone way beyond that according to the recent reports We're going to allow Iran to keep something like six thousand five hundred centrifuges Which is way more than just this kind of token capability. So I do have concerns about it That said if the p5 plus one if the Obama administration signs this deal It does seem to me like it's going to be Hard to to undermine that hard for Congress or anybody else to undermine it there has been support in Congress for passing sanctions or for an up-or-down vote on any deal whether it's a good deal or a bad deal And according to some of the vote counting, they're close to a veto-proof majority But you know, it's easy for Democrats now to say that they're opposed to a bad deal When we actually have a deal when it's being celebrated when the administration says the alternative to this deal is war I think some of those Especially Democrats are going to waiver and I think it's going to be really hard to get a veto-proof majority against a deal so it seems like Even if we strike a bad deal that it's going to remain in place at least until the next presidential administration and of course a new administration could decide to Take things in a different direction could decide that it doesn't think it's a good deal and try other approaches But if we get a deal again, I think it's it's hard to see it being undermined in the short term Craig West OSD So I'm curious for both of you to answer the question regarding proliferation. So if the Iranians were to get nuclear capability Even a rudimentary capability the likelihood of other countries in the region going ahead and getting their own nuclear Capabilities seem, you know within the realm of possibility particularly Saudi Arabia possibly Turkey So the question is would the US be willing to commit to attack Iran to prevent proliferation And maintain some semblance of status quo under those circumstances Sure So dr. Carpenter talked about some of the risks of a nuclear armed Iran He said that deterrence can work and he said that it's unlikely that Iran would transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists And I think I agree with both of those assessments but I still think that a nuclear armed Iran is would pose a grave threat to international peace and security and That Three presidential administrations have been correct to say that it's unacceptable and that the Obama administration has been correct to say that We must do whatever it takes include use force to stop it Because there are many other threats than the ones that he mentioned and so the first as you point out is proliferation I think it's very likely that other countries in the region would try to get nuclear weapons in in response Saudi Arabia has already said whatever we allow Iran to get as part of a comprehensive deal They're going to get the same capabilities They've said if Iran gets nuclear weapons, they'll build nuclear weapons in addition I think Iran would likely transfer sensitive nuclear material and technology I wrote a book on this issue called exporting the bomb And I think Iran is a country that would be at risk of providing centrifuges enrichment technology to other countries around the world And all these things would weaken the non-proliferation regime more broadly So I think there would be a major risk to the non-proliferation regime if Iran acquired nuclear weapons Second Iran would likely be more aggressive We know that Iran restrains its foreign policy now because it fears that if it goes too far It could invite military attack from the United States or Israel but if it had nuclear weapons it would have the ultimate security guarantee and that could provide something of a shield for it to step up its Support to terrorist its course of diplomacy in the region Iran explicitly says that its goals to become the regional hegemon and with nuclear weapons I think it would take steps to achieve those goals would lead to an even more Less stable Middle East So if you have a less stable Middle East with the nuclear armed Iran and nuclear armed Israel and nuclear armed United States for all Intents and purposes present in the region in the future potentially other nuclear arms states Then I think there is a real risk of nuclear war And I think deterrence would work in the sense that the supreme leaders aren't gonna the supreme leaders not gonna wake up one day And say today's a good day for nuclear war But I think there would be crises between these nuclear arms states and whenever you have high stakes crises among nuclear arms states There's a risk of things spiraling out of control So the United States got into these kind of crises with the Soviet Union during the Cold War President Kennedy said the risk of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis was between one-third and one-half So looking back on the Cold War, I don't think that deterrence worked I think we we got lucky to some degree and if Iran acquired nuclear weapons I think there is a real risk that nuclear weapons would be used So for all those reasons a nuclear armed Iran is unacceptable for all those reasons the administration the international community Should be willing to do whatever it takes to stop Iran from building nuclear weapons. I Think that's a very important point when you say that it's unacceptable You must be prepared to take the ultimate action and that is to go to war Let's not mince words about that and I think that is much too great a risk to take With regard to proliferation I think it's fair to say that the non proliferation System has been slowly eroding for decades We have not had the nightmarish predictions of the 1960s come true Namely that we would have several dozen nuclear weapons states by the turn of the century Namely the beginning of the 21st century But we have seen erosion of the non proliferation system and I think that's likely to continue Whether or not Iran acquires a nuclear weapons capability. I think that is a trend that we're going to see gradually develop That being said, I think we should not be too hasty to say that a Nuclear Iran would automatically lead to extensive proliferation in the Middle East That certainly is a danger. I think we would likely see some of it but I Have backed away from an assertion that I made a couple of years ago that Such proliferation was a virtual certainty if Iran deployed an arsenal It's a little more complex than that because Governments make their decisions about whether to acquire a nuclear arsenal based on quite a number of variables quite a number of factors and Certainly concern about a regional rival is at or near the top of the list But it's not the only factor elements of national pride and prestige of Risk benefit calculations those all go into each of these decisions secondly It is Conventional wisdom that proliferation is automatically destabilizing But as we know, that's a controversial Position within the international relations field and has been for better than three decades ever since the debate between Scott Sagan and Kenneth waltz waltz made the argument provocative as it was That at least in some cases proliferation can be stabilizing not destabilizing And I think it is interesting that I mentioned when China acquired a nuclear weapons capability Its behavior actually became more moderate more constructive India and Pakistan I would argue have been at least moderately more risk averse once they deployed their arsenals So it's not a clear-cut case That proliferation is always destabilizing The jury I think is still out on that and again it may depend on the totality of circumstances Within a particular region Right up here Hi, my name is Sonna Beardling. I'm a Swedish journalist. I wonder if If there is a deal and if Iran could come back to the table as a partner in the region How big role could Iran play there? That is an excellent question and especially giving the given the Shiite Sunni dynamics in the region Iran being by far the leading Shiite power The United States and its allies having more than a few difficulties with militant Sunni forces at the moment Iran is a large capable power and One that I think if I don't think it's going to be the regional hegemon I think there are too many competitors for it achieve to achieve that status But it may very well emerge as the first among equals in terms of Middle East powers Accepting Israel. I'm putting Israel on a separate category, but if you look at the other powers Iran may be this emerge eventually as the single strongest power, but that's still far short of being a regional hegemon So this is a huge question that could be the subject of its own debate and a little bit Further field from the debate tonight, but I'll just make a brief comment I mean, I think it raises a bigger question about America's alliances and partnerships in the region and I think the United States Essentially has to choose between aligning itself with with its traditional allies Israel and the golf partners there are problems with that But that's traditionally been the way we've done it or aligning ourselves with Iran and so there are some people in this town now arguing that we should switch that we should align ourselves With with Iran and I I guess I disagree with that because I think in addition to the nuclear threat, which is a major challenge Iran has his post problems for the United States and for allies in the region for many years I think it's only been getting worse recently Iran essentially controls Five countries now or has undue influence in five countries Iran of course Iraq Syria Lebanon Yemen And so the United States has had a policy for decades of preventing any one country from from dominating the region and So I think in addition to solving the nuclear issue the United States should step up its pressure against Iran and try to counter this malign influence in the region and Shore up our relationship with our traditional partners Israel and the Gulf States If I may just add on that Unfortunately, at least one of our traditional partners Saudi Arabia is about the sleaziest government one can possibly have And I might add has probably done more than any other single country in the region To jeopardize American security and undermine legitimate American interests If that's our partner, I don't want to have that partner We'll go right here. Yeah, I am Laura Saregosky journalist from Finland. My question is for mr. Chronic Given the unfortunate experiences of the United States in Iraq How would you see the war or strikes on Iran playing out on the long-term? Thanks, so many people in international politics reason by analogy When we're negotiating with the country people talk about the lessons of Munich when people talk about the use of force they talk about Lessons of Vietnam or the lessons of Iraq but often reasoning from analogy gets you into trouble because cases are so different And so I think any conflict with Iran over the nuclear program would be very different from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan So first difference is you know one of the major Failures of the war in Iraq was we had poor intelligence about the state of Iraq's nuclear program So we went to war in a situation where we potentially could have avoided it That's not a danger in the Iranian case We have IA inspectors on the ground. They're visiting these nuclear facilities every day writing detailed reports every three months so we know that Ron has an advanced nuclear capability. We know where these facilities are We know how many centrifuges we know how the stockpiles have blown rich uranium and we have these estimates of if they were to Dash how long would it take them? So there would be no danger in this case that we'd be going to war for no reason We have a much better sense of what Iran's capabilities are and how close they are a second difference is part of the reason the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were so costly is because United States and international coalition went in over through the governments put hundreds of thousands of troops on the ground and stayed for 10 years Nobody's talking about that kind of a conflict with Iran So you know first of all nobody's advocating we go to war with Iran over its nuclear program That would be as a last resort if everything else failed in order to prevent them from building nuclear weapons But at that point the options that would be considered would be limited strikes on Iran's key nuclear facilities So this would be done through air power or strikes potentially from US naval vessels at sea We're not talking about boots on the ground Then Iran could potentially retaliate But Iran doesn't have impressive military capabilities to be frank. It doesn't have a conventional army It has these asymmetric options. It could hit back with ballistic missile strikes It could sponsor terrorist attacks. It could cause problems in the Strait of Hormuz But it's really hard to see I think a limited strike on Iran's key nuclear facilities becoming Some kind of large large-scale war So I've written about this in detail I have a book on Iran's nuclear program about all the options including the military options So if you're interested in more detail, you can you can go there But I think it's a mistake to think about this in terms of as something similar to the war in Iraq It's about it would be about airstrikes on Iran's key nuclear facilities and in limited Iranian retaliation if I might add I Mean we might want to keep a war limited that doesn't mean that it would necessarily stay limited and I think Dr.. Kronig is entirely too casual about the nature of an Iranian response and In turn the likely us response We start having American ships sunk or American troops killed or American planes shot down. I Cannot imagine a rational debate in Washington taking place That emphasizes well. We wanted to keep this very limited and we intend to continue doing so When the John McCain's and Tom Cotton's of the world start taking to the Senate floor and demanding escalation Against this outlaw regime that has now killed Americans If we set this in motion There is no guarantee whatsoever that we can control the extent of a war with Iran Right over here. Thank you Ross Harrison Georgetown University We've talked about a good deal and a bad deal But we haven't talked about sort of what if if Iran accepts a Good deal or accepts or Iran's willing to accept a good deal or is not willing to accept a good deal Sort of where does the fault lie here? Iran's Question is if the deal falls through the assumption is that somehow Iran has acted in bad faith or that Iran has somehow failed to live up to the Expectations of the international community if you're looking at the deal from the perspective from the Iranian perspective Is there a deal that makes sense for them? Assuming for a minute they're willing to accept the modalities that have already been laid out in terms of the number of centrifuges In terms of the breakout capability do we have enough on our end to deliver that is that they will that make sense for them to be able to Politically give up what they need to give up in order to sustain the kind of deal that is on the table. Thank you So I think the first step to answering that question is asking what does Iran want from the negotiations? And I think what Iran wants from the negotiations is a nuclear weapons capability and sanctions relief to And the problem is we're not that's unacceptable to us We're not willing to let Iran have nuclear weapons And so we want reassurances that they can't build nuclear weapons So that's that's the problem that Iran is facing right now They're not willing to take the steps to roll back their nuclear program To to reassure us so it may be possible that there's just no overlap between what they're trying to achieve and what we're trying to achieve But if you take Iran's cover story at face value that they just want a nuclear energy program Then it's pretty clear that Iran is at fault here We've time and time again over the past 12 years given them a number of offers that would allow them to have a peaceful nuclear Energy program and sanctions relief bring them back into the international community And they've been unwilling to take the steps to prove that that's all that they're interested in So if we fail to get a deal, I think it's pretty clear that the default lies with Iran if you if you believe their cover stories But as I pointed out in my opening remarks I think we need to do a better job in diplomacy and in public diplomacy of making that clear Because I think the Iranians have been a little bit better in their public diplomacy and have confused that narrative a little bit It was an excellent question And I've always wondered even if the Iranians gave us everything we were seeking in an agreement Could we actually deliver our end because certainly one of the things Iran Wants is not just sanctions relief not just a partial lifting of sanctions. They want a comprehensive lifting of sanctions and Much of that requires congressional action. I have substantial doubts whether this Congress especially Would approve the measures necessary to lift sanctions in a comprehensive way and If if it so happened that we got a desirable agreement and then in essence we double crossed the Iranians and Kept the sanctions in place I think that would have a tremendous potential To poison Relations over the long term and again the United States unfortunately has a nasty habit of Reninging on promises one of the things we did in on the Korean peninsula throughout the Cold War Especially the latter stages was promise cross recognition of the North Korea and South Korean regime if Moscow and Beijing would recognize South Korea We would in turn recognize North Korea. Well, of course Moscow and Beijing did recognize South Korea and The United States found ample reasons not to recognize North Korea. I suspect the Iranians believe that we would Pull a similar bait and switch With regard to any agreement that they reach here and that that is a major All right, I think we have time for one more question right in the back I'm for double ISS Just to continue to a point that dr. Carpenter was making So there is actually a state that has a nuclear bomb which is effectively ostracized and that is the state of North Korea And something tells me that the Iran would be unwilling to take that bargain So the question is how realistic would it be in your opinion to cite the North Korean experience or North Korean case to Determine Iran's nuclear capabilities. Well, I think that's an argument that the administration in the p5 plus one has tried to make that Pursuing nuclear weapons will make Iran less secure not more secure that it will Make it ostracized from the international community And so I think that's an important argument to make I think it becomes harder if we get a so-called bad deal in the international community essentially blesses Iran that is a screwdriver's turn away from a nuclear weapon as dr. Carpenter put it the difference with North Korea is that we were never willing to accept the international community was never willing to accept Iran's Or North Korea's nuclear capability All the agreements we've been negotiating were for a complete and irreversible nuclear dismantlement in North Korea And so we've already given Iran more ground there and if we get a so-called bad deal that blesses Iran's nuclear capability then I think it's harder to Replicate the kind of model with North Korea in Iran Okay, great. We can move on to closing arguments. Dr. Kraynig if you want to start So in our discussion in the Q&A section We got into a right wide-ranging discussion about all kinds of things about North Korea about Iran's role in the region about Possible military options, but I just want to remind everyone what the discussion What the discussion topic was today, which is if we don't get a deal by next week Or if we get a deal next week, but we don't work out all the technical agreements by June 30th should the p5 plus 1 and the United States take additional action against Iran And my argument was that we should that we should take a number of steps To increase the pressure on Iran that that's our only hope of getting a good deal So I reminded everyone that a nuclear armed Iran is unacceptable. That's been a consistent position of the United States for three presidential administrations That the status quo is also untenable that Iran is too close for comfort. We need to get Rural Iran's new Iran's nuclear capabilities back again. There's bipartisan consensus on that And the key to doing that is to bringing more pressure to bear So we need to make clear that Iran is at fault for diplomacy's failure Strengthen our international coalition. Make sure the international support is in place Three increase pressure on Iran through increased sanctions For increase the credibility of the military threat through private channels and then five keep the door open For a good deal if Iran is willing to come back and make additional concessions My colleague didn't really offer a counter to that. He raised a number of interesting points But never articulated what an alternative would be and to the degree that he did he essentially as I heard it Argued that we should give up and allow Iran to have nuclear weapons He argued that we should let Iran be one screwdriver turn away from a nuclear capability But at that point we wouldn't be able to physically stop Iran There would be nothing to physically stop Iran from building nuclear weapons. It would likely go ahead and build nuclear weapons Dr. Carpenter argued well for some time they might stop Indian Pakistan remained non-nuclear for a while, but eventually they went nuclear and Iran might eventually go nuclear But that we can live with it So his argument to the degree I heard it again was to let Iran go nuclear and that we can live with that But the argument that we can live with the nuclear on Buran is outside of the the mainstream Nobody in positions of power in the United States not the Republicans in Congress not the administration Believe that a nuclear on Buran is acceptable the bipartisan consensus is that we have a policy of prevention And the real question is how to do that and as I have articulated if we fail to get a deal Our best hope of doing that is by increasing pressure. So thank you. I Guess I would argue that Bipartisan agreement is at least one sign of folly we we've had a bad history of Bipartisan consensus that proved to be Disasterously wrong and Again to bring back the the comparison with China the idea of tolerating a nuclear-armed China was considered Absolutely unacceptable to both political parties in the 1960s utterly unacceptable and To a large extent having a meaningful relationship With a communist China was considered utterly unacceptable And then voila Richard Nixon managed to change the parameters of that debate and we have developed an extremely Constructive relationship not one without complication certainly But on balance a very constructive relationship over the decades. I have a similar hope with Iran Often in international affairs the choice is not between a good option and a bad option It may be between a bad option and a worse one And I think that's what we face here. Is it desirable? To deal with Iran that could break out and become a nuclear weapons state or Even worse in Iran that is already a nuclear weapons state No, clearly. That's not a desirable outcome. That's a bad outcome But a worse outcome is pretending that economic sanctions will achieve what it has singularly been Unable to achieve over a period of many many years or we resort to war Another war against a Muslim country Which would validate every narrative of the extremists that we are waging a war against Islam a War that would destabilize the region to an even greater extent than it has been and would have Unpredictable but almost certainly disastrous consequences that is a worse option. I Would also like to touch on a point that we we barely discussed tonight And I think it's an important one the p-51 negotiations Do we have an international? consensus About what to do with Iran if the current Set of negotiations fails to produce a desirable result. I Have my doubts about that on multiple levels for one thing Some of the European powers appear to have gone along with the sanctions approach Primarily because they have been afraid that otherwise the United States would do something really reckless so how Reliable is their support for a stronger stance against Iran. I think that is at least very much an open question secondly one of the powers Russia We have seen a rather serious deterioration in relations between that country and the United States and its allies Russia, I am sure would prefer To see Iran remain non nuclear But how much diplomatic and political capital is Vladimir Putin willing to spend? To support what is primarily a Policy of the United States and its closest allies again I think there are very serious questions about that Given the current context of Russian Western relations We may find that we think we have an international coalition an international consensus To support our hard-to-line policy Against Iran and we may well discover that that is largely an illusion. I will close with that We obviously have a complex topic here and again, I would return to the argument Often the choices between a bad option and an even worse one. I'm afraid the Hawks Want to embrace the worst possible option And on that, would you all please join me in thanking dr. Carpenter dr. Chronic for participating