 Hello, my name is Ali Virgi and I'm pleased to welcome you to today's event hosted by the Africa program at the United States Institute of Peace, USIP. For more than 35 years, USIP has been dedicated to the proposition that the world without violent conflict is possible, practical and essential for US and global superiority. In today's USIP event, we'll be discussing the two most important political transitions in Africa today, those that are concurrently ongoing in Ethiopia and Sudan. Both Ethiopia and Sudan are experiencing moments of great promise, but also great peril. And while these two tenuous transitions are clearly different in many respects, there are also a number of striking parallels from how each transition is experienced outside of the center, beyond the capitals, to the internal tensions within each country, to the state of how inclusive the transitions are, to the economic and environmental pressures, and, most recently, the effects of the coronavirus pandemic, both direct and indirect. Now, today's event is a little bit experimental. It's organized in two parts. First, we will hear from interviews I conducted earlier with each of our four guests, Elver Gattachu, the Ethiopia Country Program Manager of the Life and Peace Institute, and Aaron Mashow, one of Ethiopia's leading journalists, both in Addis Ababa. Speaking about Sudan are two of my colleagues at USIP, Manal Taha, the Sudan Program Advisor, and Peyton Knopf, Senior Advisor to the Africa Program. In the second half of the event, our four speakers will join me live to respond to your questions. So please send in your queries now to us on YouTube, using the chat box function, or on Twitter with the hashtag tenuous transition. So first, the Sudan. I began by speaking with Manal Taha and Peyton Knopf and asked them for their reflections on the last year in Sudan the year since the Sudanese Revolution occurred. If the transitional government want to do the reform, only in Khartoum, it's not going to be successful, transitional period. The revolution did not start in Khartoum. Revolution in Sudan started in the regions where people revolt against Bashir, demanding change and reform. I think that consolidation of revolution's achievements depends on what happened throughout the country, specifically in these regions, not only just in Khartoum. And the achievements could be, like, actually measured by, to what extent people in this region see some reform and changes in their daily life and in institutions that they are dealing with day by day. I believe there is a specific complexity and threat that the foreign war is abhorring to this stability and this transition. It's because there is a specific element in the four war that demand more work and attention from the government. Starting from the legislation reform, security sector reform, economic reform, so they can see really some changes happening in terms of the reforming and people's life changed in these war zones and in other zones, too. Talking about security sector reform is not a new thing in Sudan. What makes it so difficult to achieve in Darfur, for example? The security reform, it's more complicated in Darfur. You have too many arms groups and it's very challenging for the transition if there is no addressing for security reform and armed groups in Darfur. Hayden, how do you evaluate the year that has passed since the revolution took place? On the one hand, the expectations for the pace of change have inevitably been somewhat unrealistic since Bashir was deposed from power a little over a year ago. But on the other hand, there's this real sense of opportunity for renewal and the possibility of reinvigorating Sudanese pride and culture and patriotism in a way that was tarnished by the brutality and oppression of the previous regime. And despite what could have been a vacuum after Bashir was deposed, somewhat encouragingly, the various factions involved in both his removal from power and in the establishment of the transitional arrangement that we have today have demonstrated with somewhat halting progress a nonetheless a remarkable ability to balance competing interests and ambitions in a way that, at least to date, has certainly avoided the worst-case scenarios of state fragmentation or a severe escalation of violence. Manal, you wrote recently in an article for USIP that youth and women have largely been unrepresented in the transition in Sudan. You said the lack of youth engagement and the limited participation of women is a notable weakness of the transitional government. Women and youth appear to be in the back seat of today's processes. So what really has changed for women in Sudan? We have the courage to speak. A Sudanese woman now, they have the courage to speak up. So that was not there before during Bashir regime, which is the big changes. Now women can speak up, they can demand their rights, and also they can build alliances, and also they can talk with other women about women issues. And there will, there's some women reach up to the prime minister talking about why women are not on the table. If you see now, they can raise their voice, which is very good. Still we have a long way to go. Women, Sudanese women have a long way to go to achieve what they want. Women are not lucky, unfortunately, because there is not a lot of being changed. And for my, in my opinion, that's not because there is no political will. Could be like there's a political will. There is a very an active voice is coming from women. But it goes back to structural, social structure of the Sudanese culture itself. Sudan is a patriarchal culture. So it's very hard for women to navigate their way up in that culture. And that is required in structural reform, structure work on the culture itself. And that's actually now reflected in many ways. It reflects now, it reflects on the even the political institutional structure itself for political parties in Sudan, for example. It's very, it's still adopting the patriarchal model, most of them, majority, you know, if they are not all, if they are not all of them, this patriarchal culture is adopted by the institutions, for example, the political parties itself and then the government institutions and then the decision making itself. Also, it goes through a lot of heavily influenced by the patriarchal norms. For example, if you have now the state governance, women, they submit their resumes and the counterpart male submit their resumes, you find that they look at women resume with critical eyes, with more critical eyes and length than they look at the resume of male candidate. And that's actually, it goes back to the way that they value women, the culture itself. So there's not a lot of luck for women, unfortunately, unless there is like a structural change. And what I see now in Sudan, very important part is missing. I can see it, I'm a Sudanese woman myself, the woman to woman solidarity, regardless of the political affiliation, regardless of the institutional affiliation, woman to woman solidarity is the first step for women to claim some of the power. And that's need to be consolidated and that's need to be worked out. As a part of fine woman, part of any institutions, any decision making, woman to woman solidarity is the first step on that ladder. Let's turn now to Ethiopia. Aaron Mashow, if you think back to the first days of Abir Ahmed becoming prime minister of Ethiopia and the sense of optimism and change that existed in those early days, how have things changed today? That sense of optimism was conspicuous across the country, with Abir's appointment. And his rally, his first rally in the center of Addis, encapsulated that. You had a rally that took place in the center of Addis in Mesca Square that attracted tens of thousands of people, many of which broke down into years as he spoke of democracy and reconciliation. But those days are long gone now. And what we've had ever since is a country that's turned quite fragile, a country which is just being ravaged by an escalation of ethnic tensions and rivalry. And this has led in the last three years to the displacement of around three million people. I mean, we've had displacements in the country, in particular in the East, for some time now. But that was largely down to climate change or droughts. Whereas now what makes this different is its displacement that resulted from ethnic violence. So you've had this ethnic violence taking place across the country. The number of displaced was in some sense shocking. But what is the situation with the displacement today? The numbers have gone down largely because the government itself has pressured displaced populations to return back to their communities. However, it does not mean that there won't be further eruptions of violence in the future. And for now, coronavirus, the pandemic has caused a lull in this virus. The conditions are already there. And it's clear that the government is struggling to ease tensions across communities. So the big question we have now is, of course, on the ground is the palpable fear in the country over how this is going to play out at a time of transition. And also further down the line when elections are eventually held. Emma, let's bring you into the conversation. Some people have criticized the trajectory of the political transition in Ethiopia. If you think back to the first days of Abiy Ahmed becoming prime minister, how have things changed in your mind? What are the risks to the political transition today? Now, two years later, the government is trying to claw back and consolidate its power and try to build institutions in its own reflection or mirror image. And in this process of consolidation and in the effort of building its resilience and gain back control, it seems that clashes of some sort are inevitable. And point in case Western Oromia and you see a lot of military interventions in some part of the country to quell tensions and also violence. The relationship between the state and non-state actors will continue to change in the shift. And if there is no further checks and balances in place, we might see a scenario to backslide into authoritarianism and also maybe a kind of a morphed state of a hybrid regime where you have the combination of autocratic features and also democratic ones. Recently, the two major Oromo affiliated parties, the Oromo Liberation Front, the OLF, and the Oromo Federalist Congress, OSC, asserted that, contrary to the early days when the current leadership assumed office and promised to open the political space, it has taken actions in recent months that have reversed those early positive changes. Intimidation, mass incarceration of party leaders and members, all point to a return to the old authoritarian days. That's a quote. Emma Bet, do you agree with that assessment? I partly tend to agree with that statement and assessment, but my assessment is also that it's too early to tell that democracy has arrived in Ethiopia simply because you need to look at democracy in a spectrum between what we call authoritarianism and democracy and anything in between the two. And we have, maybe we might have slightly shifted away from the heavy handedness rule, but it doesn't mean that we are in a state of democracy simply because we didn't build the infrastructure, we didn't build the enabling conditions for democracy to flourish. The challenges also yet come with due to the fact that right at the beginning with the new transition or political dispensation, the Ethiopia center was incoherent and that lack of coherence and uncertainty, especially within the ruling party, be it in terms of ideology, be it philosophy and the path or the kind of end destination where the party needs to go was not clear. And that incoherence was something to be seen as a big factor. Emma Bet, we heard earlier about the situation for women in Sudan. Now, in Ethiopia, women have been appointed as president of the Republic, chief justice, head of the electoral board, the cabinet is gender balanced. These are all achievements that have received a lot of praise, a lot of notice. But what has changed for women more broadly in Ethiopia since the political transition began? The appointments in and of itself are a very good gesture, very important sign that Ethiopia is also ready to have this inclusion of women in different key positions. What I think you asked about the implications for women in general and society is it's going to be a long way ahead of us because it has been historically and also deeply entrenched with beliefs, values of women occupying political, economic positions or have the value to contribute in society. And I think more than half of the population being women, I think the women who are in these key positions will be important to have contribute to women policies that are relevant and are beneficial to women in different sections of the society. So I can't say now that things have changed for sure for women who are not in these visible places. And if you are working on the economy, if you are working on the political representation, it's a matter of time, but these little efforts would be building up or piling up and helping women also to improving women's lives in general and society. So I think these gestures are very important and it's important also to replicate it not only at the highest level but also at the very local level, I would say. Payton, let's turn back to Sudan. We heard earlier from Manal about the difficulty of security sector reform in Darfur. One of the most important actors in the revolution that removed Omar al-Bashir was the Sudanese army. And in addition to the army, Sudan also has had a very powerful intelligence service as well as the so-called rapid support forces that had militia origins in Darfur but are now a national entity. It's clear in the transition in the military, civil cooperation hasn't always been smooth. How do you feel Sudan's security sector has changed compared to Bashir Sudan? When we look now over the last 12, 13 months since he was deposed, the primary change in the security sector and the security landscape is that the various security entities and the leadership of them is now much more diffuse than it was before April of last year. And the conventional wisdom in Sudan is that the transition is a binary contest between military and civilian actors, which in many ways it's actually the divisions within these camps now in the context of the transition that are the more important part of the story, not just on the security sector but with regard to economic reforms. And in fact, one of the thorniest issues will not surprisingly be the extent to which various security entities remain enmeshed in the private sector in a way that is impeding the reforms necessary for dealing with the economic crisis, frankly, which was the proximate cause of the demonstrations and certainly preceded the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic but are going to be exponentially exacerbated by it. So it's a bit hard to see success, quote unquote, if one defines it as one of winners and losers. So as we look forward, in my view at least, it's going to be critical that there's a process that builds a new consensus around the purpose of the security services in a democratic society that gives equal emphasis both to the importance of civilian oversight and to the role that security entities rightly play in a functioning government that is providing security for the country's citizens, for the Sudanese people, as opposed to the Sudanese government. Payton, even before the coronavirus, Sudan's economy was in serious trouble, certainly contributed to the fall of the previous government. And it remains a serious threat to the success of the transitional government today, not to mention to millions of Sudanese. What do you make of the economic reforms that have been attempted so far? It's been a bit disappointing, I have to say, both on the international side but also the discourse between the international community and the major donors including the United States and the transitional government on economic reform, it stagnated to some degree. I don't think it's unfair to say, even before, as you said, the pandemic or the implications thereof became clear. On the one hand, as the pandemic unfolds, that's obviously can be quite devastating to not have seen more concrete economic reforms and frankly more concrete international assistance for those reforms. But at the same time, the pandemic I think also provides what could be a necessary sort of reality check and an opportunity to kind of reset this discussion on economic reform and on international assistance. The Sudanese economy was in dire straits to begin with. And when you look at the sort of second and third order consequences of the pandemic, whether it's and related economic challenges globally, whether it's the plunge in oil prices, the near complete cessation of remittances from the West and from the Gulf into Sudan, which is an important part of the economy, and the other challenges of food insecurity, etc., it may less be the health emergency and more the economic emergency or worsening economic emergency. That's the real challenge for Sudan. And so I think that suggests is that both the transitional government and the international community need to think much more creatively, much more agilely and really sort of rise above a number of the assumptions that had guided the economic discussion to date and think both bigger and more boldly about how to best inoculate Sudan against what inevitably is going to be a spiraling economic crisis. Aaron, can I ask you about the economy in Ethiopia? The Abbey government has made the need for economic reform very prominent. It is argued that the current state led economic development model needed to be reformed. Indeed, Abbey's renamed political party is called the Prosperity Party. Government advisers have spoken about the need to increase the role of the private sector. And now, of course, we have the coronavirus which throws all sorts of assumptions in the air. But before we come to the impact of the coronavirus on the economy, can I ask you to evaluate how successful the economic reform strategy has been so far? It's still early days. All the announcements have been made and, of course, committees or a panel of experts have all been set up. But then if you take the example of telecoms, which is the centrepiece of the privatisation plan, but that's been indefinitely delayed. So they haven't really given reasons for that delay. But I think with coronavirus, it seems like this pandemic has thrown a spanner in the works, the government's plans to push forward with this privatisation slash liberalisation of the economy plan. Emma, but even before the coronavirus, there was a lot of concern about the prospect of Ethiopia's upcoming elections, which were first scheduled for May, then for August, and now have been postponed indefinitely, in part because of the uncertainty caused by the pandemic. This electoral delay raises legal and constitutional questions to which there are no definite answers at this point. But beyond the scheduling of the elections, whenever they might be held, what are your biggest concerns about the electoral process of the whole? One of the litmus states for this transition is to hold a free, fair and credible elections. If you look at the cycle of elections, in terms of the pre-during and post-election period, we need to also put a context to the election cycle. And three important contexts need to be considered. One is whether the independent board, the national election board, was sufficiently prepared to hold elections or not. And as you can see from the composition of the election board, it has been in the process of reconstituting itself by recruiting members, by providing new laws and directives, and also to appointing local officials at different parts of the country. So this part of the process was incomplete, even before COVID. Also, the second part should be looked at the political parties themselves. And the political parties are new, some of them are new, and some of them were rebranding and forming coalitions and so on. And this makes itself also the election timetable because some of them were pushing for or demanding for postponement of elections. And in that context, you can imagine that the political parties were not sufficiently prepared. The third, I would say, is was the environment conducive enough, especially looking at the peace and security of the country, where political parties, were they able to campaign freely? And were they able to move to the country without any problem? I doubt that was the case. And that was the reason why many political parties were demanding for postponement of elections. So I think in the time of COVID, now we have different multi-layered issues composed of the constitution as well. I think we can look at this moment as an opportunity for both the government and the opposition to find a negotiated timetable for elections. Aaron, can I ask you about the elections as well? Does the delay really matter? Surely being the incumbent, put Abby in the strongest position to begin with, does the delay really change that? We don't have polls in the country to suggest who leads or who's trailing behind. But on his appointment, of course, in the country, there was euphoria, the honeymoon phase had ensued. But then ever since we talk regionally, from a regional perspective, you have a rebellion that has kicked off in Oromir, in Western Oromir. And there are accusations of a strong armed response and civil rights violations of the hands of government troops. That will likely, likely have an impact on how Abby would perform if the elections were ever held in Oromir. At the same time, you go to Tigray and then there is a sense of alienation. You have the governing party there, the TPLF, which is actually announced officially that they will hold elections in August. You could see this in many ways, one of which is them trying to capitalise that sense of marginalisation already in Tigray. And then you go to the south, a region which is home to over 50 ethnic groups. We live at a time in which several communities, several ethnic groups, want to be recognised as ethnic groups. And some of the activists there are accusing the government of not fulfilling its pledges for them to actually be recognised. So all these issues could play out in the elections and how his prosperity party would perform at the end of the day. So Aaron, if I were to ask you to sum up the situation in Ethiopia, how would you describe it? Very fragile. I would say it's very fragile and can take turns for the worse. Of course, one issue to highlight, one issue that encapsulates this as well is the political spat with the TPLF. They're going to be, it seems, they're bent on holding an election on August 29. We had a response from the government in which they actually said we will take all necessary measures against the TPLF if it does go on, if it does hold elections without any agreement with the federal government. I can sum it up as a very, very fragile process that can go anywhere really. And Manal, let me put the same question to you. How would you sum up the situation in Sudan? The title of this event is Tenuous Transitions. Does that accurately describe the situation in Sudan? Transition in Sudan is facing a lot of challenges, starting from the unified strong political leadership that has vision and one unified project that can lead people through the difficult times, then the lack of international sponsorship for this transition. It's very clear that there is no one strong power behind this transition to lead and to support and to advocate and mitigate for them through these hardship situations and hardship time. So I mean by international sponsorship, a regional mechanism, or a country, or a friend state, or a partner that can really, or regional power that can really help to move and support and push this transition and help to strengthening the situation in Sudan. Then the last things I can see the role of civil society is also thought to be very fragile because of the civil society itself is thought to be highly politicized in Sudan. And then I may add one aspect of the lack of the communication, strategic communication between the government and policymakers and the local communities in Sudan. So all these factors actually is pushing the transition to a very weak and fragile situation. Well, thank you to all of our speakers for your earlier contributions. And now we move to the second part of the event, which is the live question and answer session. So please send in your questions on YouTube and continue to do so. We have some already. But before we get to those, I just want to turn to Emma Betts and Aaron and ask you, since we've made these recordings, to just update us on this. There's a lot of legalities to this that are a bit complicated to understand. But what I want to ask you is what are the implications of the constitutional options that are being considered for the transition Ethiopia? So if Emma Betts we can start with you and then we'll go to Aaron. Thank you, Ali. So according to the Ethiopian constitution, the incumbents term will come to an end on the 5th of October. So that means the government also preemptively stepped in and proposed four options. And those four options were also considered to be from depending on where you stand. People, political parties said that was that's not an option that we were looking for. I think the options primarily have to do with one, you know, extending the state of emergency, second to dissolve the parliament and also form caretaker government. Third to also have the constitutional amendment and fourth soliciting constitutional interpretation. So these are the four options that were presented by the government and it passed through parliament and approved, the parliament approved that it should be considered, the constitutional interpretation should be considered as one, you know, for the government to consider for constitutional issues. I think the process in terms of the constitutional interpretation by itself also depending again where you stand, the political parties asked where this is another jurisdiction of the parliament and also the fact that the parliament passed that the constitution to be interpreted to the council of constitutional inquiry and the council also had live debates, very interesting moments where people, especially the amicus curies have been invited to suggest or to have legal expertise and legal interpretations. And I think for the first time in the country, because it's historic, people were very excited, but at the same time, there were dissenting opinions that were left out and the process were not considered to be an inclusive one. But again, depending on where you stand, largely, we can say that the process has been a fair one because we never had this kind of process. Sure. Yeah. So Aaron, just to add to that, I mean, Annabette's outlined the options and the possibilities and we know that there's still a lot of legalities to this. But what I want to ask you is the implications of whatever is decided ultimately and however it is resolved from a legal point of view, we know it's going to result in a delay. That's not in doubt. So what are the implications of that if that continues to be uncertain? Maybe it is outlined the whole thing, yes. But yeah, so responses to this have ranged from your outright criticism, the government as if this was part of the Prime Minister's power grabbing intentions to others who accept the fact that these are extraordinary circumstances and they need extraordinary solutions to it. So you have opposition groups who believe the country is better off if the ruling party extended its mandate with a reduced mandate, extended its tenure with a reduced mandate. There are others who believe also that a caretaker government should be put in place. So it's very varied in response and also it's very heated. But of course I think any repercussions we'll see will depend on how long the elections will be delayed as well, how long coronavirus the pandemic has an impact on Ethiopia. Yeah, and Aaron just one more question for you before we get onto the audience questions. Before we recorded earlier, we had recorded you talking about telecoms and there have been some developments with telecoms since we did that recording. Can you just bring us up to date on what's happened and what's the implication of that? Will the government be able to move ahead with the plan it's now announced? Yes, it does seem like now they're going to move ahead with the plan. So what's happened is this month earlier the communications body, they announced that they're seeking bidders and invited participants to submit expressions of interest. So this will take place for a month until June 22 from then onwards. The interested companies which range from, you've got some heavy weights there, the likes of Fond du Pôme and some French companies and some South African companies as well who've all expressed their interest. So they're supposed to also submit a request for a quotation. I think that's so that they would submit that and from then onwards it seems like it's a clear path to having licenses be given. But of course, I think it's important to note that I think there's a beauty here that reflects what this shows you. While the intentions are there, but there's a lack of strategy and that's why there's been a delay for this long. But it seems now that they're moving ahead with it. Okay, thanks. So let's go back to Sudan for a moment and bring in Manal and Payton into the question and answer. So the first question I want to put to both of you comes from the audience which says the transitional process in Sudan is largely hindered by the collapsed economic state. Now Payton, we talked earlier a little bit about the economy and there's a further comment about how sanctions imposed on Sudan and still being on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. That's the US government list. And that's accumulated are affecting the transition. So can you just help us understand this a bit more long legacy of the sanctions, the SST list? What does this practically mean for what actually can and cannot be done both by the US government but also by international financial institutes? And then I'll ask Manal to come in after Payton's responded just to talk about where you see the implications of sanctions still ongoing in Sudan today if there are what can be done from your point of view. Thanks Ali and thanks for pulling together this discussion today. I think the state sponsor of terrorism designation or question of whether Sudan should be delisted is as you know sort of top of the agenda and has been of the transitional government since it came into power. And the argument is that effectively it impedes two primary functions that Sudan needs for its for its reform efforts in order to address as you said the economic crisis. The first being it's an impediment to private sector investment not just from US companies but there's a it discourages investment from other western companies as well. And two as you alluded to it prevents the United States from voting in favor of assistance packages from the World Bank and from the International Monetary Fund. There has been a fair amount of effort expended to explore whether Sudan can be delisted. That process is still ongoing and as I said that's been a main priority of the transitional government of Prime Minister Holmbach. I think as we talked about though in the first session the first part of the discussion it's really important to appreciate how significantly the COVID-19 pandemic and the implications of it on Sudan may require a sort of shift in strategy. I think first for example the likelihood of private sector investment given the global economic downturn coming to Sudan in the near term is not high and so to predicate addressing the economic crisis in the country on that may not be the most effective strategy frankly in the near term or in the medium term. With respect to the IFIs though which I think can play and should play a crucial role at least in mitigating the most severe fallout economically of the COVID-19 pandemic in Sudan and the inevitable damage that would cause to the reform agenda holistically of the transition. There's this question of the IFIs and in that instance it's very important to understand that the SST listing while it does prevent the United States from voting in favor of assistance for Sudan it does not give the United States a veto in these boards. So it is possible for assistance to to proceed absent support from the United States. The impediment is as you alluded to the arrears that Sudan owes to these institutions accumulated during the Bashir regime. Now I would argue that the given the inflection point that the transition is at excuse me given the scope and scale of the consequences of the pandemic that those institutions and the member states of the board should explore with some urgency creative ways of finding how to best assist Sudan at this crucial time. Yeah thanks Payton. So now we've heard a bit more about the background to sanctions the SST and what could be done and Payton's calling for more creativity to be expressed. What for you can be done to improve the economic situation in Sudan given the very real reality of the situation being as dire as it is at the moment. So let me go to the exactly what's the implications of the sanction now that can then we can navigate some creative solutions. For examples I just want to give you examples life examples now Sudanese are suffering during the COVID-19. The cash transfer over-compliances from the banks around the world because of the sanction implications of the sanctions now if Sudanese people want to send money to their families using the just the cash transfer through the bank they cannot do that because the banks have over-compliances then the telecommunications it has a problem that doesn't open their IP addresses in Sudan so people even zoom a Twitter Google services they're not exist there so cut off all this Sudan out of these services. This is part of it it's it's complications of this problem. The creative creative approach that could something could be done is exactly it's in the lives of the some Sudanese to reach out to these private companies to guide them through their compliances and we are hoping that the US government can really help to reach out to these private companies or the Sudanese diaspora themselves can reach out to these companies so because Sudan really depend on money coming from diaspora to large extent families that they need this money so that's it was a source of income for a lot of families in Sudan so but now they the the meaning the meaning to transfer this money through like like a banks a legal banks it's difficult and we heard from Peyton about the reality of remittances also coming under stress also for broader economic reasons but now I just want to put another question to you about something else that's come in what can be done to bring justice to those who were killed in the revolution in Sudan we're coming up to a number of anniversaries of violence again protesters in cartoon but also outside of cartoon and there's a there's a broader question of this justice has been in the news again because of the anniversaries that is to those who have suffered in the revolution in Sudan yeah so what is missing here is the transparency and the appearance of what's happening there is a committee that doing investigations but most like Sudanese communities they don't see what's happening there there's no there's no statements coming out of this a lot so they can make sure that Sudanese understand there is justice processes going on so first we need to bring the transparency to these processes what's happening there and then also we need to get people hold people accountable accountable I know it is a very very critical situation giving the security sector issues involvement of many actors on this so it needs to be if we if we need really to emphasize on the institutional and institutional and legal and legal reform we have to emphasize on everybody under the law nobody above the law so that's that could be the first approach and then Sudanese respect that people that talk to them tell them what's the truth explain for them is there is a mistake is there is gaps you say to them so that's that's what is missing here transparency reflecting what's happening inside these committees to to public thanks for now there've been a couple of questions about the grand Ethiopian Renaissance dam that I think everyone will have some views on but let's first go to Aaron and Emma bet on that there's a lot to talk about when it comes to the dam which of course has been under construction for a number of years and has steadily progressed towards completion and these talks that have been on and off again with Ethiopia Sudan and Egypt but I want to ask you a more domestic question and this is sort of what I think is important when it comes to the transition first is what is the effect of this issue on the transition in Ethiopia because if we go back a few months ago there was a narrative in the country that Ethiopia might be pressed into a deal and this might not be advantageous to Ethiopia's interests and that produced a lot of nationalist sentiment of well actually this is an Ethiopian issue and we're all Ethiopians and nobody should really be interfering in our internal affairs and perhaps a degree of support for the government so I just wanted to ask you if you agreed with that sort of swell of support whether that was just a temporary moment or whether as an issue of political transition the question of the dam in Ethiopia also has electoral potential or potential for Abe or others to gain support within the broader Ethiopian constituency so Aaron first and then Emma bet. I don't think of I can't think of any issue that really binds together Ethiopians as much as the Grand Renaissance does so anyone across the spectrum shares the same opinion of the importance of the project of a country's economy and electrification at the same time generating foreign currency through exports as well so if you can speak to everyone from the staunchest critic of the Prime Minister to any affiliated parties they will they do see the importance of this project but as far as either the talks are concerned yes so they've ground to a halt Ethiopia is pushing through with the project but for me I think you know at the heart of it I think there's just deep mistrust between the two on one hand you have Egypt which doesn't seem to which seems to you know to be convinced that Ethiopia has other ulterior motives that Ethiopia plans to build irrigation projects I think that's at the heart of you know at the heart of why it's been stuck so far that they haven't really known foreign talks on the on the other hand you have Ethiopia which does which which is suspicious of Egypt's motives you know at several points Ethiopia the talks have dragged on Ethiopia believes Ethiopia Egypt is trying to push the agenda towards the share the lion's share of the well we'll come back to Egypt's role in just a second but maybe Emma bit just to comment on the domestic angle of this obviously there are wider regional aspects to consider but just thinking about how this issue plays inside the country what's your view I totally agree with Aaron I think the Nile the Grand Renaissance Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is the one I think one one significant national agenda that unites Ethiopians across the board and you can see from the inauguration of the you know when the dam was announced when the building of the dam was announced the the all Ethiopians I would say across the boards were even buying bombs from you know shoe shine guides to you know someone working in the public sector and the private sector so I think the issue of the Nile is something that unites every Ethiopian and it's existential as it is existential to Egyptians so it's because it's yeah so because it does unite people is it something which can be used by the incumbent government and how will that work I mean is it something that will be useful to it in an eventual election for example possibly I think like I said if you remember in 2011 when the whole Arab uprising began in Egypt and in the Middle East you you've seen the tensions rising at that time in Ethiopia as well and you know at that time the late prime minister uh Melissinawi you know used that agenda to unite everyone in Ethiopia so you can use the agenda to unite everyone in Ethiopia based on you know the benefit that it provides and also the uh you know it it can divert any divert attention from the political uh tensions that are building up so even at the time of COVID people are really strongly uh uh you know backing the government's position to go front and center on that right Peyton there are wider regional questions when it comes to the the Nile and the dam and all of the downstream and upstream implications of this Sudan is in the middle of this Sudan has interest and equities in both directions looking north looking downstream as well as looking upstream and so far has sort of managed to balance its role I don't know how you would evaluate it but it seems fairly successfully to the extent that there is success in this equation Sudan is now also proposing that it could perhaps get more involved in the discussions between Egypt and Ethiopia that may occur I mean how do you evaluate how do you assess things moving forward well I mean as you may have seen I mean just within the last week Prime Minister Hamdok convened a meeting of virtually of Egyptian and Ethiopian officials including Prime Minister Abi precisely to that end and I think has been the United States some months ago launched its own mediation efforts between Egypt and Ethiopia to find a way forward my understanding is that the Sudanese have been asked to assist with that by the US administration and you know there's reason to believe as you said that Sudan could perhaps play a useful role as an interlocutor between Egypt and Ethiopia whose politics I mean as our colleagues from Ethiopia explained politics both in Egypt and in Ethiopia are extremely locked in on this issue and there's a lot of passion and emotion around it so certainly if Sudan could play a role in moderating that that could be very helpful I must say I think I think it's a source of great risk and and possible tension and escalation in the coming months so I'm glad actually that this Nile issue has been raised today because when you think about it in the context of how tenuous the Sudanese and Ethiopian transitions are and the and the range of external powers that have engaged in those transitions not just because of the dam but but can be certainly caught up in that it certainly heightens the risks to some extent of regional volatility at potentially precisely the wrong moment right as you're heading into this very sensitive constitutional discussion in Ethiopia and amidst all the challenges that we've elaborated on with respect to the Sudanese transition and and Manal I want to pick up on that last point of payton for you the Sudanese transitional government has plenty to do and we'll talk about some of those things later but when it comes to the dam obviously Sudan is not the the principal actor in this conversation is it really a useful thing for Prime Minister Ham to get involved in given all of the other priorities of the Sudanese transition or how do you see Sudan's involvement potentially detracting from many other priorities and many other limitations of the transition in Sudan I I totally believe that Sudan needs to expand and the regional connections especially it's East Africa and Ethiopia and Egypt they are very important for Sudan stability itself so having having a lot of to do and the Prime Ministers and the transition government plates uh it's yes it's overwhelming but extend extend them to outside as a regional um regional issues it's really important especially the dam between the the building of the dam it's it's important for Sudan itself it's important for Sudan for the economic of Sudan and also uh it may affect positive or negative Sudan it needs to be involved in this part of the then it's about diplomacy and about reaching out and connecting Sudan with the regional dynamics so it's not just about Sudan as a country is it's very important and it's very smart move to have Sudan the leadership to extend their diplomacy their involvement at the regional level even the international community has to look to Sudan as a regional dimensions not from from the regional dynamic dimensions not only just country as a country because Sudan is actually has a lot of impact on the other neighboring countries and in the whole region right so that's that's that's I think it's it's it's must be we have to we have to involve in the regional okay because we are a player right uh Emma there's a question specifically directed to you but I'll also ask Manal to comment which is about the role of local CSOs civil society organizations and the question is do you think that local CSOs could have a role in bringing the discussions amongst the political parties and if so how and Manal I'll ask you after Emma Betz finished also to respond to that question because you mentioned the the role of political parties in the Sudanese transition but starting with Ethiopia how can CSOs play a more effective role uh amongst the political parties uh thanks for that question it's very important one I think the last at least one and a half years since you know the new the new dispensation we've seen the role of civil society to you know to come and play the role that any civil society in any country would do I think unfortunately in Ethiopia the space has been to some extent closed for the last 10 years and for civil society to come out and do the role that is expected from them was a difficult part we've seen that in the last one and a half years and they're already you know in the state of reluctance and you know to come out and have a discussion not only on the politics but also on different agendas that the country is driving so the role of civil society in different aspects of the country has been not really significant but I would I wouldn't say even to to the extent that they would come and you know create the space for political parties to negotiate but I think you know now the time during this period it's it's also very difficult to for civil society to come and bring political parties to have a debate or to have a discussion that would chart the way forward for the country so the the I think the one important aspect would be the state of civil society the last in the last 10 years haven't been conducive and really led to a situation for civil society not to fulfill their roles in any situation like that so but I hope I hope that it will come sooner and Manal what about Sudan is there a role for civil society organizations when it comes to political parties and perhaps more widely if we can talk about in terms of the transition as a whole in a transitional government what's the role for civil society there so let us let us agree first we need strong political parties and we need strong civil society to have a real democracy in Sudan what's happening in Sudan in the few past years Sudan one of the biggest hub for humanitarian aid so our the civil society in Sudan is mostly oriented towards humanitarian support and also service providing which is taking a lot from the real the the political role for the civil society to play in the political as a political players in the transitional democracy so that's that's that's what's being said uh the the current situation for political for the civil society is it starts to be interacted with their political parties political parties so it's very highly politicized they the that's the role the anticipated role for civil society in the democracy is about monitoring the process and the performance of the government now what's happening is actually there is a lot of interaction there is a lot of mix between the political parties and civil society the civil society is really following what's their political parties want them to say which is really taking a lot from their um anticipated role in democracy so that's one of the one of one of the challenging one of the challenges on this on the civil society and in the country and then the maturity itself the maturity of civil society and how to handle the the the movement the democratic democratic movement so they need experience exposure and especially during the past years the briefest dream really make it very narrow space for them to have more maturity on term of understanding the role of civil society in democracy yeah um Aaron let's come back to you there's a comment and a question and i'll just combine them there's a comment that the federal system in Ethiopia is breaking down and you spoke earlier in the recorded session about the situation between the central government and the tigre so i would just ask you if you agree with that sort of characterization is the federal system in Ethiopia breaking down and relatedly what kind of transition are we talking about in Ethiopia what has really changed is it just a matter of faces and do we know our collective destination when it comes to Ethiopia so um Aaron if you could respond to those comments i wouldn't do as far as saying it's broken down but i would certainly say it's commander's dream uh you know you have the administrations of uh in the administrations in provinces uh they themselves they're making their own decisions and taking their own actions for instance like case in point is you know the uh relationship between the the administration in the central government is one one example we also have other cases too i i think it's it's varied in some places uh uh for instance in Amhara they've had issues with the central government uh you you see them taking unilateral action so it's definitely under strain but i wouldn't really go that far saying it's it's it's uh it's broken down but of course the elections if they ever are held held at the end of the day i think you don't have huge implications on or what sort of relationship they will have between the the center and and everybody else and what about the reality what about the reality of the transition what's really changed is it just a matter of faces and do we know our collective destination or does Ethiopia know its collective destination in fairness to to to to prime minister abhi i think you know the in some you know uh groundbreaking uh changes have taken place in the country uh some are still uh at the early early phase so it's it's changes have definitely taken place but then more are bound to happen but the litmus test obviously will be the election um and which we don't know when it will ever take place uh so from from that perspective you might say you know it hasn't really gone as far as it should but at the same time there are circumstances have also led to it's to it's uh postponement delay as well so uh so we have a lot a lot coming up there in the next months or year or year as well next 12 months or year and am a bit am a bit let me put the same question to you about the collective destination do you feel Ethiopians know the collective destination of the country and relatedly what are some ways you think leaders throughout Ethiopia could address rising tensions whether those are ethnic or regional or interpersonal or intercommunal of other kinds of what can leaders throughout Ethiopia do to address tensions and do you think Ethiopia knows its collective destination um thanks i think by uh collective destination i don't know what i'm you know in terms of uh because if it if it comes to the political uh domain or the political parties the government i don't i mean there is like i said there's incoherence and there is actually from the ruling party the reform started within the party itself and it had rolled out different policies reforms so which is is a kind of a way to something but i don't think there is a destination that is being mooted from you know different parts of the opposition and be it also with the government but there is the notion of prosperity which i don't know how people will relate to uh the you know individuals ordinary people in Ethiopia how they would feel or how they would relate themselves with the that proposition of prosperity so there is you know ideological gaps there is also philosophical gaps so that is actually the one that makes the transition very difficult because people have different interpretations even the party the members of the party have different interpretations of the ideologies so the common destination i don't know if that's where you formed the second question you raised was the second question is what can leaders do to address rising tensions yeah i think the the grounding rule should be the the escalation and in any peace and conflict issues you have to escalate tensions rising from beats at the local level at the federal level all we see now between you know altercations between regional governments and also federal government has to be maintained and managed in a conflict sensitive manner and so if we really apply the rules and you know principles of peacebuilding the Dunoham approach and conflict sensitivity should be applied across you know government across civil society across activist media all of this should be you know combined and work together to to abate or reduce tensions in the country thanks there's a question specific for you we could come back to Sudan for a moment there's a question about internal security issues and splits and security civilians how does it in Sudan and regional foreign policy of Sudan in particular you cut out a little bit Ali but i think if i understood the question correctly it was about the intersection of internal fissures within security elements and regional politics as i we sort of talked about in the initial part of the discussion i think the the conventional wisdom has been to look at Sudan as a binary contest between civilian and security actors and that to a great degree obscures the diversity and to some extent the polarization within the security elements of the country and frankly within various civilian groups and factions within within Sudan and not surprisingly from frankly prior to the to Bashir's removal from power but certainly since then a number of regional actors have identified various security and civilian partners in Sudan who they believe may best advance their own interests and i think certainly the United States and and other Western actors need to be very careful in not losing sight of this i think when you look north to the situation in Libya it provides a cautionary tale for Sudan and and illustrates the significant risks of when a conflict and in Sudan's case a transition becomes internationalized to such an extent that internal factionalism is exacerbated by the import of regional of regional interests and the stakes are so high for Sudan at this critical time that i think it is a real risk one of the challenges as everyone is aware facing the transition is in fact the conduct of foreign relations and because the constitutional declaration itself is somewhat ambiguous on which parts of the transitional government have the lead on foreign relations it's become a particularly fraught and and tension inducing issue and the United States and others i think need to work with the full range of Sudan's neighbors of those in the near abroad and the Middle East Turkey elsewhere to make sure that that some of the fault lines within the country are not further exacerbated by by regional interventions and as i said by the sort of internationalization of the transition which will will only undermine its success thanks Peyton but now let me ask you to also comment on the Sudan foreign policy question and the question really is about these internal splits between civilians and between the security actors how does that affect the conduct of Sudan's foreign policy and what are your concerns yeah so um the the the the partnership between the military and the and the and the civilians uh to a large extent it's affecting the the international foreign policy because the civilian representation the representation for Sudan has to be civilians but at the same times the the military leadership are heavily engaged on the region especially there is some uh power regional power has interest to be engaged directly with them so that's actually taking a lot from the uh demographic um civilians to be actually at the at the phase for this uh for this transition so giving that um the interactions and the interest between some regional power and the military and uh security forces is taking a lot from the international appearance for the civilians leadership that's what that's in one hand and then internally itself or also it's um it's created a lot of attention and created a lot of um uh it created a lot of questions i mean about where this uh partnership will lead the country right but now one more question for you which is where are negotiations in Sudan going in terms of creating a secular country or secular nation can you comment on that so that's actually that is the one million question because now we are half we are here like the the the negotiation in juba is really uh became like a little bit um isolated so there's not a lot coming from juba to the rest of the world but uh going back to boy oh i mean to Sudanese communities going back to your questions as the secular states Sudanese uh revolution when they came out against the Bashir they are claiming and justice and and um democracy which i.e. is it the secular state because they've been persecuted by under the name of the religions for a long time that statement itself it doesn't give the guarantees for a lot of political parties to claim it again so it exists it's in Sudanese a call for the revolution having that uh there is a legitimate struggle for some groups like nuba nuba people it's a legitimate struggle it's a legitimate demand because there is not all of them they are in one page they want the uh they actually i mean they want um they don't want to be under any religious regime and they went through a lot so there is some legitimacy on their questions but um at the same times um that's what's make the the transitional government makes it very difficult for them to wait in between and to balance between this demand at the same times Sudanese the majority are Muslims and it's been manipulated the world of secularism itself it's been manipulated through the history so it's become like something that people will feel that it's not good it's insulting for their beliefs and for religions so that's what it needs to be gone through educations so um if we need an stable democracy we have to have a freedom of religious we have to respect of religious so that could be like um discuss of the come out in the kind of situations yeah thanks manal um let me go back to emebet and aran so emebet is their trust can there be trust that abhi ahmed prime minister abhi ahmed will implement democracy in ethiopia so if you could address that question and aran let me put the question about is it possible to have a true federal system in ethiopia and if so is that the best political solution for ethiopia in your view so first emebet yeah i think uh again i think that it's two years of transition and i think the way uh every the expectation from the political parties from every corner of the section of the society expects democracy to be delivered and one litmus test like i said earlier is the conduct of free fair and credible election and if abhi abhi ahmed is considered to be one who facilitates that transition i think democracy is at least we say we are in the beginning of democratic transition and if that uh if that hope is quashed i think there will be a lot of uh disappointment okay aran what about the question of federalism is it possible to have a true federal system in ethiopia and is that the best solution for ethiopia i think it's it's the only solution for ethiopia i think uh you know as as activists and other historians have said ethiopia is a a nation of nations and not a single entity so anything but that sort of system can is a recipe for disaster the question is is implementation and it hasn't been implemented well i think the focus should be on on rectifying the wrongs done in the past to to make it a workable situation of course right now there is a view that the prime minister might have a different plan for for the country in terms of the way he wants to govern it and that emanates from the fact that he united the ruling party into a single party the prosperity party but there's absolutely no indication that he has any other he harbors any any other other plans but i think i that's for me that's the only system that can work in the country and aran if i can just ask you to comment very briefly on a follow-up question and which is about abhi ahmed as well some say abhi ahmed was too soft on law enforcement in the early days of him coming into office which led to a breakdown in peace and security so is the recent consolidation a good step just a brief response to that if you would yes there are accusations that he was quite soft but i think he was trying to bring everyone on board initially but right now it's completely different in oromere the army has been deployed they are they are carrying out an offensive against rebels so so i think those get those days are gone he's he's pretty much involving the military now in terms of trying to to to stabilize unstable areas of the country i want to put a question to all of you and we're just coming to the to the end almost of our time but is there a role for regional bodies to aid a smooth transition and this is relevant to both countries of course it's always interesting when we talk about this in the ethiopian context because ethiopia has historically been a very important player in the region for all the other countries noted not in also including sudan so is there a role for regional bodies when it comes to ethiopia and then we'll take that question to sudan so emma bet just very briefly if you could respond to that yes i think what comes first in mind is one ethiopia especially adzawa is the host of the continental body the african union and whatever happens in the ethiopian context will affect directly affect the african union so it's not by choice but by necessity that the african union should be active and engage with the different actors especially one in terms of early warnings putting in place mechanisms in terms of mediation and also i think the the big aspect would be the elections and the political affairs of the african union for example can you know assist and help the ethiopian government but also the institutions to democratize and also help it to become successful transition and i think the role of egat has been also immensely big in terms of mediation roles and also having the current executive secretary as ethiopian would have also a big role to play in my opinion and i'll just briefly what more from the region would you like to see when it comes to sudan you've talked about international sponsorship can we be more specific when you talk about the region what can the region do to help shore up the sudanese transition i might be more specific and we really need the the the regional power or regional partnership in two two areas first in economy we have an opportunity coming in berlin for the international conference with the sudan friends and partners which is really if we have a country like like ethiopia which is have a amazing experience in bringing outside investors international investment to their country they can really help to bush for sudan and specifically on the file of the economy and and then we have i'm i i want to see more role for egat in peace these talks in juba so they have amazing experience in the past during the south sudan peace agreements so we want to see that role actually more activated and we wanted to see more strong so and also commissa the the the the regional mechanism is africa does all this role we need to to see it thanks manel heyden we're coming to time so i just want to put a final question to you and then a final same question to um aran and emebet we've heard lots of differences lots of similarities in terms of two very fraught and tenuous political transitions in two very important countries do you see things that can be learned from one transition to another are there things that might be applicable to the ethiopian context from the sudanese experience and vice versa uh you know maybe i'll answer that question related also to your previous question which is that i think one of the um success stories actually about international engagement in sudan was the extent to which the african union took a very strong position early on about the necessity of having a civilian-led transition and was prepared to back that not just with the threat of punitive action against those who would obstruct that transition but by withholding legitimate recognition of the transition until it had a civilian character and i think as we look at both the transition in sudan but also also the transition in ethiopia it's going to be crucial for the full range of international actors to underscore consistently and on a sustained basis that the reform agenda of both needs to remain front and center i think the risk certainly at this time of the pandemic and an economic crisis will inevitably be a tilt towards authoritarian and securitized responses not just in these countries but elsewhere and it's all the more important that multilateral institutions and governments around the world underscore as i said consistently that the reform agenda that animated these transitions in the first instance needs to remain the core of the process going forward and that they cannot be personalized around the ambitions of specific individuals either in ethiopia or in sudan and aron the last word on that question to you just very briefly are the things that can be learned from the two transitions do you think there are lessons that can be identified even at this early stage uh yes very tenuous both i think one needs to be done in both cases is having expanding the pool of stakeholders as much as you can i think abhi abhi is trying to do that my analysis is in a far better position to tell to speak about sudan i think i think those these are the shared shared similarities between the need to to bring everyone on board in this very tenuous stage of the country's history well thanks to all of you for joining us and staying on the line and responding to so many questions and macho and emebe gattachu and adizaba malata and patent often wash about usip please visit www.usip.org thanks thanks for hosting us