 Yeah, why don't you just Good morning everybody. I think we've got our choreography organized Welcome everybody. My name is Nancy Lindborg. I'm the president here at the United States Institute of Peace and I'm delighted to welcome everybody here for the launch of USIP senior study group report on China's role in Myanmar's internal conflicts and I'm especially delighted to welcome two very dear friends and partners the Dan Twining who's the president of the International Republican Institute and ambassador Derek Mitchell who When this study began he was our senior advisor For Burma, but he is now as of just last week I think two weeks taken up his position as the head of the National Democratic Institute So Derek big congratulations on your new role We of course miss you here and how appropriate is it that we now have is the two chairs of This study the presidents respectively of IRI and NDI the day after democracy day to talk about this So we couldn't have planned it better. We're just we're just delighted I'd like to also give a special warm welcome to professor David Steinberg a very distinguished expert on Burmese history and politics who helped us really put this discussion into historical context and I'd like to acknowledge and welcome ambassador Oolong from the Burmese Embassy Thank you very much ambassador for joining us for this very important conversation And we have with us here in the front row the very distinguished members of the study group So thank you everybody for your contributions And for joining us here for the launch of the report I think as most people know USIP was founded by Congress in 1984 as an independent nonpartisan national Institution dedicated to reducing and resolving violent international conflicts And we believe very much that a world without violent conflict is very possible That it's fundamentally a practical endeavor and of course it's essential for our collective Security and so we pursue this mission by working around the world with partners Providing tools education resource, but we also very much use this This global headquarters building to convene these kinds of conversations bringing people together from different views and perspectives to try to solve difficult problems and That is exactly what today's discussion is meant to do The China Burma senior study groups report China's role in Myanmar's internal conflicts is an extremely relevant and timely topic We are seeing China becoming increasingly engaged in and active in Burma's conflicts in particular in Rakhine State in Kachin and Sean States And we're seeing China taking active role in hosting various meetings in Burma around some of the particular conflicts and this really reflects a trend That has been growing over the past decade We're seeing China flex more and more of its muscle internationally investing heavily in countries across Africa and Asia Playing a more active role in both regional and international conflicts So this is the focus of a major line of effort here at USIP To help understand better China's role in conflict and competition How it affects what we may do or should do and starting this year USIP has convened a series of bipartisan study groups senior study groups to Examine China's influence in conflict dynamics around the world. So the China Burma senior study group is the first in the series Last week. I had the privilege of joining the first meeting of the second Senior study group, which is focused on China's role in negotiations with North Korea And I would note that in addition to the work with our senior study groups USIP has also convened a bipartisan task force at the request of Congress To which is composed of eminent former officials renowned policy experts with the task of Suggesting new approaches to preventing and addressing the underlying causes of extremism in fragile states with a focus on The horn the Sahel and the Middle East These are regions where China is also playing a prominent role And the task force just last Monday released an interim findings report that probes these questions Of how to address the underlying causes of extremism But also how to understand and adapt to China's growing influence in fragile states So I'm delighted to Today that we're able to continue these efforts Delighted to be able to welcome everybody here today to this important conversation And before I turn things over to get the conversation underway I'd like to encourage everybody who's joining us today including those watching online To participate in today's conversation using the hashtag USIP China SSG Hashtag USIP China SSG Follow us on Twitter at USIP And with that I'm pleased to introduce Jennifer Statz who's the director of USIP's East and Southeast Asia programs and director of the China's senior study group series With that, please join me in welcoming Jennifer Well, thank you Nancy and thank you to all of you for joining us here today for the launch of this report Now as Nancy mentioned this report is the first in a new series of USIP reports In which we will convene small bipartisan groups of senior experts to look at China's role or influence on conflict dynamics around the world This first group of course was focused on China's role in Myanmar's internal conflicts And as Nancy mentioned we'll start looking at other conflicts in the subsequent groups And the goal of these groups is really to offer new insights into China's objectives and role vis-a-vis these various conflicts And to generate new recommendations for ways that the US government and other key stakeholders May account for China's impact in their work to prevent and resolve conflict and support lasting peace Before we dive into the substance of the report and its findings I want to take just a minute to introduce the co-chairs and the members of the study group As Nancy mentioned, we've been incredibly lucky to have two tremendous co-chairs with Dan Twining and Derek Mitchell Dan of course is the president of IRI Before joining IRI he served as counselor and director of the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States here in Washington and also served as a member of the US Secretary of State's policy planning staff as a foreign policy advisor to US Senator John McCain and as a staff member on the US to the US Trade Representative Derek Mitchell of course is the president of NDI Having recently served as the US ambassador to Myanmar where he was America's first ambassador to the country in 22 years He's also held many distinguished positions at the Department of State and Department of Defense as well as serving as a senior fellow at CSIS a Senior advisor at the All Right Stone Ridge Group and most importantly a senior advisor here at USIP We really could not have asked for better leaders for this project Dan and Derek have been incredible They both bring really deep expertise and extensive experience in this region And they brought together a terrific group of experts to really explore these issues in detail and craft this final report Several members of the study group are with us here today in the front row several others couldn't be with us But are obviously here through the substance of the report and the members of that group include Jonah Blank from the Rand Corporation Priscilla Klatt from USIP Christina Fink from George Washington University Carla Freeman from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Murray Hebert from the Center for Strategic and International Studies Satu Lumay from the East-West Center Michael Schiffer from the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations David Shambaugh from George Washington University David Steinberg from Georgetown University who we'll hear from shortly Jonathan Stivers from the US Economic and Security Review Commission and Jonathan Stromseth from the Brookings Institution And finally before we get any further I want to stop to thank and acknowledge two of my colleagues here at USIP who have really been instrumental in pulling this all together Jennifer Chang and Rachel Vandenbrink who have been working incredibly hard over the last nine months to keep this project on track and Really make sure this report was as strong and as accurate as it could possibly be So we're very grateful for all the work that they have put in And we will hear from Derek and Dan about the substance of the report here in just a minute But before we do we would like to set the stage with a brief overview of the history of China-Myanmar Relations From one of the leading experts on the topic Dr. Steinberg and most of you probably know him But for those who don't he is distinguished professor of Asian Studies Emeritus at Georgetown University And he has had a diverse and impressive career that spans academia work in NGOs and senior positions in government We opened our very first SSG meeting with a presentation from Dr. Steinberg on the history of China-Myanmar Relations And we wanted to start today's session that way as well. So Dr. Steinberg the floor is yours Thank you very much Mr.. Ambassador ladies and gentlemen, it's an honor to be here and I'm glad I would not to talk about the report because other people more competent will do that But I will give you an idiosyncratic view of China-Myanmar Relations, which are intimately involved with the US as well I will read most of my report My comments unfortunately because otherwise I would attend to go on forever My style is not lapidary as they say so I apologize for the length The varying intensity of Sino-Burmese relations has been intimately connected with the US-Myanmar Relations These relations have as the leitmotif the status of many of the Various ethnic minority groups who comprise about one-third of the population of the state Some of the sorted weaponry and insular aspirations Many of these ethnic groups along the ethnically irrational China frontier Effect relations involving all the three international states for the same groups straddle the border That's it is most appropriate for the US IP to consider this important complex conjunction of conflict and potential development Our beginning text today is from a close associate of chairman Mao it Chun Yi in 1956 wrote a poem I'll read from that poem just for a moment. It's called for friends in Burma I live by the river's head you live by its tail Limitlessly we love each other. We drink the same river's water. I drink from the upper flows You drink from below endlessly the river flows. We share everlasting happiness We are neighbors our friendships last Anti-imperialism begets freedom. We are peacefully United we are pub paw siblings Our languages are connected We are united and help each other pieces powerful living by the river We praise its breath climbing mountains. We sing of the majesty the mountains face north the river flows south In a classical Chinese balance parallel Minds the poem creates myths and illusions that continue to influence policy Puck paw meaning siblings born from the same womb is a term continuously used to describe a desired but not actual relationship Fear and concern are more realistic appraisals But as China has public illusions about relationship So has the United States Japan India the Myanmar government and each of the various ethnic groups in that state Their interactions are a large part the story of Burma and Myanmar The single most important and critical factor in Burmese foreign policy since independence in 1948 has been neutralism in the Cold War and balance thereafter in 1961 Utham became Secretary-General of the United Nations not because he was internationally known But because Burma was the quintessentially neutral country on which East and West could agree He was after all a rather minor official ambassador to the UN and he got that job because he happened to be UNU secretary before If the single most important foreign policy of Myanmar has been balanced the most important internal policy issue Are the relations between majority and minority ethnic groups a problem? Unresolved by all Burmese governments civilian or military This attempted foreign policy balance or equilibrium as a basic tenet is like a calm sea But with waves and tides Myanmar Burma has seen undulating waves or tides of foreign influence the waxing and waning of Chinese and Western Especially US impact each has influenced the other, but the Burmese have been very pragmatic They live in the dangerous and important neighborhood and need good relations with their phyrologer and more powerful neighbors as UNU once said Burma is a tender gourd among the cactus Burma was early important to the PRC because for some years it was the only non-communist contiguous state that recognized China and was the portal for Chinese traveling abroad or visitors to Beijing Shortly after independence the pro-Chinese and fear of China poke ball period was in part a product of us Unadmitted clandestine military support for retreating Chinese national a koumen dong troops that sought refuge in northern Burma and Resulted in the you the Burmese expelling the US aid program for a period China was always suspicious of Nae Win's socialism after 1962 and Chinese influence faltered with the cultural revolution explosion into Burma in 1967 Resulting in dozens of death occupation of the Chinese embassy and withdrawal of ambassadors for some months Even though the Chinese and Burmese had resolved three critical issues facing the Burma state the citizenship of Chinese residents the koumen dong problem And the border dispute which was a clear Burmese victory Who knew and Joe and I were quite close. It was not until 1988 1989 period with the disintegration of the Burma Communist Party along the Yunnan frontier that relations improved China supported that party claiming party party relations were different from state to state ones This opened the quote ports of Yunnan province to overland trade both legal and illegal and the influx of massive Illegal Chinese immigration into Myanmar for economic advantage causing considerable Burmese Resentment this was approximately the same time as the 1988 failed people's revolution and his brutal suppression by the military the suppression of 1988 and the coup that followed and the imposition of direct oppressive military hunter resume a rule Resulted in the U.S. withdrawal and the closure of the economic aid program the secession of military training and anti-narcotics programs and after 1990 and the unrecognized election defeat of the military the attempted isolation of Burma Myanmar by the U.S Whose was policy was regime change and the recognition of the National League for democracy and Aung San Suu Kyi In fact government She effectively made us policy toward that country Ironically as the U.S. tried to cut Myanmar off from the world with various imposed sanctions Myanmar's albeit ineptly trying to open at least in part having titularly abandoned socialism in 1988 and Had proclaimed the first foreign investment law and encouraged tourism China took advantage of the West's retrenchment and a strong Chinese tide ensued military equipment training and aid poured in close relations developed to a degree that the Burmese themselves felt the International Equilibrium needed to be restored to maintain balance. The Chinese tide was running too high As a new Burmese constitution of 2008 was approved in a manipulated referendum and equally corrupt elections followed in 2010 the Burmese and what has been called a quasi civilian government moved to correct this balance Quiet signals and negotiations with the U.S. followed with the release of political prisoners and considerable liberalizations China was still important and the first foreign visit in May 2011 by the newly installed President Thane Sain a former general and prime minister was to Beijing Where he signed the first ever comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership with China To the chagrin of the Chinese however, he suspended the Chinese construction of the mitzvah and dam in September The Chinese claiming that this was because of Burmese civil society complaints fostered by the U.S The tide changed and the Chinese felt the rise of U.S. and Western influence and they began to search for who lost Myanmar and diversified his diplomatic engagement with Myanmar that wave continued with the election of the Aung San Suu Kyi government in 2015 and Chinese efforts to reach out to the beyond the military to the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi herself Where that pokeball relationship was again invoked on her trips to Beijing Now the tide is once again shifted the strong Western US UN Denunciations of the treatment of the Rohingya Muslim population The group broadly to vilified by the Burmese as Bengali and thus foreign Resulted in ethnic cleansing and charges of even possible genocide It has led again to the rise of Chinese influence in Beijing back by the Burmese military position This upon Chinese are especially sensitive to any Muslim issue because of their concern of the Muslim Uighur unrest in Xinjiang But the vehemence and extent of Burmese antipathy to the Rohingya is difficult for foreigners to comprehend Central to the interplay of Chinese and U.S. interests in Burma Myanmar has been the treatment and position of the many ethnic minorities and the best armed of whom are on or near the China border Majority Burman and minority relations have been the central issue facing the nation since independence and no government has resolved some fair Mutually agreeable in some Burmese sense distribution of power and resources Between and among the majority Bermans and the ethnic groups some of which are armed and his forces numbers some estimated 50,000 troops The China-Myanma border is ethnically porous with major populations of minority people straddling the frontier Leading to unrest and extra legal activities of both an economic and a security nature With officials from all sides illegally benefiting from such activities Yunnan province itself sometimes appears to have less than consistent policies with Beijing Although the nature of any inconsistencies is subject to deliberation Sino-Burman interests along their mutual periphery claim to be complimentary the Burma the Burma-Myanma military demand a unified state in Finally even admitting it may be of a federal nature China wants a stable border no refugees public and private business opportunities and no Americans along the frontier a stable border for China means more access to Myanmar economically Which is very important to Yunnan province and more strategically access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean China views the US enhanced role claiming coordination with Japan Japan's investments in age as encirclement or containment of China in an area that has been traditionally regarded as a sphere of interest To the Chinese This is the second containment policy following the Cold War and the CETO the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization era the US pushes for democracy and human rights and it's pivot to the region or the Indo-Pacific region as we call it today the various ethnic groups some of whom are essentially Christian seek support and lobby the US Anathema to both Myanmar and China and want some form of federalism on which they cannot agree and which the military and Civilian Bermans have not yet approved beyond a vague concept Suspicions and mistrust abound Between states and among groups and leaders all feel vulnerable though some of these fears are as yet illusions Fear of a small Muslim minority of some four percent overwhelming and 88 percent Buddhist population There is no likely early solution to these multiple and intellect interconnected dilemmas if China had an illusion of some form of quiet hegemony over Myanmar in the Pug Power Relationship the US had an illusion of instant democracy under an Aung San Suu Kyi civilian government The Myanmar military has had the illusion that arms would solve the minority issues It's subservient civilian leadership that denial would assuage foreign critics of the Rohingya debacle the ethnic groups Sometimes creating mythic mythic pasts cannot agree on united front for their aspirations Japan and India may believe their assistance will mitigate China's role, but that is likely to be an illusion as well The peoples of the country suffer the tensions remain Illusions continue and changing policies is difficult For his Arthur Kessler once wrote nothing is more sad than the death of an illusion And I leave you there and we listen to the discussion now. Thank you Thank you very much dr. Steinberg. I fear we gave you the nearly impossible task of covering a very long history and very complex Relationship in just ten minutes, but you still manage to do a wonderful job hitting the high points and the main Points that I think are really useful for framing the discussion today So thank you very much for doing that and I'll now turn it over to our co-chairs To provide an overview of the report and its findings and recommendations Okay, thank you very much Jennifer and thank you all and when I was ambassador I used to open with a low mingle about come Yeah, so with the ambassador here mr. Ambassador friends from the embassy and anyone else who speaks Burmese Myanmar Welcome and thank you for coming out First of all, I want to say thank you to David Steinberg for as usual a very thoughtful and thought-provoking Meditation on not just China Myanmar relations, but Myanmar's thinking generally and I think his point about illusions is extremely well-taken I think everything that we should be doing in foreign policy international relations and certainly when it comes to Countries in Asia and elsewhere We have to get past illusions. I used to say in my embassy that facts without context is not truth And which is why I was very interested to have Professor Steinberg here Provide that historical context so that we can get an understanding not just of the facts of the current moment But the context in which we are talking and then we can get out the full truth and try not to to move out based on illusion or We can debate what the illusions are but illusions that are not unaddressed Certainly tend to to metastasize and cause problems. So thank you for that as an introduction I did leave here about two weeks ago to be part of NDI be president of NDI So it gives me an opportunity to say publicly a few things that I wish I was able to say and better privately and publicly Which is a few thank yous chair relevant for this report first of all I want to thank Nancy Lindberg for her leadership of USIP a tremendous institution This is and what tremendous leadership that she provides to this place. It was an honor for me to be associated Andrew Wilder Jennifer stats for her great leadership of the China and now Asia program Kay Spencer who's over here was a great Partner in all things and particularly the two who were most involved in this project Mentioned earlier Rachel Vandenbrink and back and Jennifer Chang who was here I don't know if she's still here. She walked out a moment ago But anyway, they were absolutely central to putting this thing together and doing the the research and writing And I just want to make sure they get their their do in public. So thank you all for great work I also want to thank the senior study group members here in front not all of whom are here But everyone who who was out there I asked Dan twining to do this as a co-chair When I knew him as a great partner in the think tank world as an Asianist I'm an Asianist that'd be great to have him involved. Yeah, okay, he's NDI chair But no one here is operating based on their formal titles. I'm not here as NDI. He's not here as IRA But it's funny when we get the report out It's NDI and IRA who are who are releasing this thing. We are here as individuals. We are not here as institutions But it is real pleasure to be a partner and have a one little bipartisan cell in this town and in this country Well, it's us And we want to take whatever NDI and IRA can do together as friends as believing things that are beyond partisanship It starts with this report And it will continue on in the realm of democracy and in US foreign policy from here on But I want to give him a chance to say a few words first I'll talk a little bit more about the substance of the report and some of the terms of reference of the report But he was an outstanding co-chair and thank you for that. And then we just turn to you Dan for some Thanks, Derek. So I would also just like to add my thanks It's really an excellent team here at US IP including both Jennifer's and racial and the whole team What one learns really quickly in co-chairing a study group is that having an expert staff to actually Produce the report and make sure we got it right is at the center. So thank you I'd also just like to thank the study group members, you know the Great benefit to me other than working with Derek and the great team at US IP Was getting together every month to listen to our real experts our senior study group members Just elucidate the complexities around China me and Mar relations It was sort of like being back in graduate school and I'm sorry. It's over because I'm ready to keep coming to class I Also think we were lucky us IP is also planning similar studies around Pakistan North Korea several other, you know Difficult conflicts with big national security implications of the United States and I think we got lucky with me and Mar Just given the extraordinary story of that country's opening given the extraordinary potential of That country to change the future of its population and also the entire region, right? So I think we'd say we are still optimists. I'd also again just like to thank us IP Really, I think there is a core national interest in the United States in understanding difficult conflicts and the Conundrums they present for American policy and you're not going to find this in Journalism you may find it in academia, but it will be much harder to read and I think they've done a public service for the United States in in producing these sort of studies that really I think help our Policy makers to act wisely and we can make a long list going back several centuries of Conflicts that the US has gotten involved in or engaged in or not gotten involved in Where perhaps we didn't have such expertise behind our officials So I'm not going to tell you anything about me and Mar you don't know sitting between these gentlemen I would like to just kind of broaden the frame a little bit and give you an outline of some of the wider Implications that we discussed and then Derek. I think is going to talk you more specifically through many of our findings So I'll go broad and he'll go deep But really first observation China is a central internal player in the me and Mar conflicts You know, I think sometimes we think there's domestic policy or domestic politics and there's foreign policy, right? And in me and Mar it's harder to make that case given China's central role given its relationships with the different ethnic groups Given its singular position in the country, which is a factor not only of geography, but of long historical cultural Connectivities that spans so many dimensions. So me and Mar decision makers are factoring in the role and Interests of China for better or worse When they are making domestic political sit decisions around the conflicts and I think that's true of China more than of any other External actor for sure. That's point one Point two is just not to do a broad historical sweep But really just to think about the last seven years and how far we have come I mean my narrative around me and Mar is that it began to open in this 2010 2011 period To the world partly as a result of the then military government's anxiety Around the fact that the tide had gotten too high right to use that metaphor around China's influence in me and Mar and you saw this dramatic Rejection of the mitzvah and dam project which China had been leading and then this very historic opening to the world that Derek Mitchell was such a central part of along with many others here, right? But this is not a linear story because here we are in 2018 and there is one country that is protecting me and Mar and its government more than any other from diplomatic and other forms of international pressure arising particularly from the Rohingya conflict and that country that is doing so is China and So just in the last seven years seven eight years. You have seen kind of a waxing and waning A rise and fall and rise of Chinese influence in me and Mar around these conflicts and particularly today around The crisis in Rakhine that I think we should really spend some time thinking about and talking about point three Is really to just for a minute kind of explore the strategic consequences of China's very intensive engagement in me and Mar again, there's a big part of this that is a domestic political story and Is a driving factor in the negotiations with Different groups within me and Mar about the future constellation of peace and security in that country But there is also a wider story of China pushing Through me and Mar through vast Infrastructure and other forms of projects into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean and the fact that this could transform The fate of the endo-pacific right this is not simply a story of me and Mar, but but this Study looking at China's role in the me and Mar conflicts is a fascinating case study of China's use of different forms of influence in order to perhaps achieve broader strategic and security Objectives I would love to again come back to that in the discussion But I think we have to understand that this is really not simply a report about China and me and Mar If you ask Indians they see a very central interest for them in what is happening in this relationship If you ask Japanese if you ask other Asians They are acutely aware of the strategic implications of an expanded Chinese presence in me and Mar fourth I'm getting towards the end here, you know We both run democracy organizations that work out in the world in more than a hundred countries to help people govern themselves freely and justly right there are consequences for the me and Mar people of China's footprint and influence in their country and in its relationship with both the civilian side of the government in napedal as well as the military leadership and its enduring influence I would argue That to truly solve the conflicts the internal conflicts in me and Mar Really what you need are broad and inclusive institutions You need transparent and accountable and open politics You need very robust rule of law free media all the civic factors that could help this country Civic and political factors that could help this country unite around a plan for peace internally, right You don't necessarily have that today You have something quite different I would like to just mention in this context one key finding of our study, which is on place seven page seven Which is that genuine peace in me and Mar risks China's strategic position in that country continued friction between central authorities and border populations provides Beijing a major source of Influence over napedal, right? So on the one hand China will play a central role in the peace constellation in me and Mar On the other hand A true peace that unified the country internally that brought peace to the whole country Possibly could diminish China's position and influence there and that's sort of a profound insight finally, and I will stop just with the sentence that Me and Mar's fascinating case study as we think about China's role in the world as China moves out as a global actor Obviously, there's a lot of interest in what China China's influence in Africa and Latin America in the Middle East in the West in Europe But really its neighbors are a very good test of what kind of power China will be in the 21st century And so again, I think I see this study not simply about China and its role in the me and Mar conflicts But really about what kind of world The Chinese system wants to shape and particularly what kind of Asia the Chinese system wants to shape. Thank you Thank you Dan very very important big picture thinking on this and outstanding analysis of what we've done and And what is happening in Asia with China? So let me get to some of the issues with a report, but let me start with one one broad point as well Kind of a caveat in this town now or just anywhere Anything related to China that any that the US does is inevitably viewed in great power competition terms So if we have a report on China's involvement in conflicts and people are going to say, oh, yeah The United States has an alternative as a ulterior motive and there's an agenda here And I think there are some in Myanmar that may feel that China feels that sometimes and I'm particularly sensitive not so much to China, but to the Myanmar people the Myanmar context They don't want to be part of any great power competition They don't want to have other great powers think about things over their head And I don't want this report to be viewed that way I don't want a sense that this is the United States thinking about China Involved and therefore we have to be engaged in some way In a great power way either in competition or even cooperation over the heads of the people of Myanmar This is about understanding is about our understanding What is China doing as part of a whole series at US IP is about around the world and affecting peace? US Institute of peace is about how do you mitigate conflict? How do you deal with conflict situations? China is more and more engaged in the world They're having more and more impact no more so than on their borders So in order for us to understand how we can engage ourselves to mitigate conflict We need to know how other major powers are doing so and China is a major power doing so So I don't want this to be viewed as somehow the US Working over the heads of a small country and thinking on their terms So I'm a little bit sensitive to that point having lived in Myanmar and knowing that if I ever mentioned the word China I think aha US and China. It's all about the US and China This is really about how do we understand and help? Myanmar get to a place of peace by understanding the roles of all the major players And then we have to do no harm in engaging in that in that context now How we conducted this we had both a lot of Myanmar sources that were in town or that we had Skype's way They did phone calls with Chinese sources both written and personal What we came to are observations based on both my own personal observation other personal observations of Americans But firsthand accounts of Myanmar and Chinese sources themselves and we draw drew up a list of questions in terms of reference to think about What are China's historic interests in the country? The internal decision-making processes inside China The different differences in interest among stakeholders in China What activities contribute to conflict or mitigate conflict that China's engaging in and where there might be areas of cooperation And where there might be areas of competition How do we mitigate those areas of competition again in the interest of promoting peace inside the country and So we go through some of the findings of the report We had a whole section on China's interests in the country I think to a great extent David Steinberg listed them already very quickly very well, so I won't go through those Too much more than than I need to but there are four primary interests that David mentioned that are important number one Chinese interest stability along their very porous border That means the refugee flows. It means drug flows. It means illicit activities I mean sometimes bombs wayward bombs would fall on Chinese territory. They have a great interest That there be stability along a very vulnerable border 1300 kilometer border that China has with Myanmar very practical issue when it comes to their desire to mitigate limit conflict In in Myanmar to as mentioned access to the Indian Ocean I think it was my friend thought me a new talked about Myanmar as being the west coast of China potentially west coast The China doesn't have a west coast. They have a southwest area that should be developed But access to the Indian Ocean pipelines road and rail links are very important for strategic reasons Potentially naval access though those are questioned whether that can be done Certainly no basing can be done in Myanmar according to the Myanmar constitution But China would like to get more access to the Indian Ocean and that runs through Myanmar Third is those broader economic interests a lot of it again Yunnan 25% of its trade is done with Myanmar It will run in the Shan and Kachin states And those are the very high conflict areas So broader economic interests elicit and illicit illicit infrastructure development very important to China's interests and then The issue of a geo strategy limiting American US Western and US influence in the country was very obvious When I was there. It was actually explicit at one point when the Chinese ambassador said to me One of the three that was there to choose which one it was won't say publicly But he said we don't want you to go to Kachin state or Shan state So you have to respect our interest Which was an interesting I'll get to some of the the observations we had based on those types of That kind of rhetoric that kind of conversation But they clearly felt threatened by the United States kind of zero some mentality if I may say About us involvement in Myanmar, so they didn't want us near a porous border anywhere near their their border And I think that can have an effect on peace because some of the ethnic groups have long-standing relationships with the West They desire to have a little bit of backup. They feel vulnerable to the center. They may feel more confident making Concessions if they felt they had the international community behind them So China's zero some mentality in this case can actually potentially constrain peace again This is up to the people of Myanmar to decide What is the right constellation for peace for their they'll make their own decisions? But I know for a fact that some of the decisions during my time were made Against their own interest because China didn't like it China didn't like something something didn't happen And that I think to me that crosses certainly crosses a line And I think it's the China's mentality which is unfortunate. We should be thinking about what's best for Myanmar Myanmar's peace which is so essential and so needed for that for that country so Let me give you a sense of Observations and recommendations and they're very quickly then we'll get to questions and comments first one it gets to this Question I just raised an issue I just raised of China being engaged very directly on some of these key issues of peace and war China has set aside in Myanmar It seems it's non interference policy almost explicitly and one can observe that maybe elsewhere in the world Just as they're setting aside hide-and-buyed those who do China policy Maybe they're setting aside non interference more and more because of their global interests strategic interests and their basically tangible interests they have personnel in countries And very intense reason to be involved in others internal affairs And this is a case where they have been very much involved in the kitchen state and the peace process They've offered to mediate peace They've forced the ethnic armed organizations for better or worse to the negotiating table And they've kept the US out and kept others in the West out So that non interference policy that China has promoted for so long Has certainly been set aside in Myanmar and we should watch elsewhere again as Dan said maybe a indication of a broader Kind of a test of a broader change in China's approach to the world Secondly though Myanmar does view overall and all we found in our discussions Myanmar does view China's constructive in its approach that Maybe at all a scene China's involvement is helpful in part in getting ethnic armed organizations in and involving them It's not as if they're they're Twisting arms in a completely negative way. I think the ethnic armed organizations have no choice to go along with it They may not like it at every point, but in talking to them. They say well, they haven't been really obstructive so much They've been overall You know constructive so far But they'll have to watch to see where that leads But there is as a third point there are I think widespread questions about China's motives whether they truly are interested in Have the same interests that the people of Myanmar have And as Dan said and as we say in the report and many have said this that the suspicion is that China does has neither an interest in hot war Which as we say can flow across the border nor a complete piece Because that can reduce their leverage with Napida with ethnic armed organizations along the border You know in such so I think You have to watch they do want a kind of piece, but whether it's a complete piece and whether it serves their interests And whether they whether they will end up obstructing who knows but that suspicion is certainly there Whether China has the same interests going forward and there's a history there and people Myanmar remember China And they have a long history a long border. They won't forget that and frankly I think they have that view of all great powers. They might be suspicious of the United States as well or anyone Involved in their affairs, but with a border as they do with China. Those suspicious or court and suspicions are quite Front and center Fourth China has shown very little interest in coordinating their efforts Inside the country on peace or on anything we're kind state anything like that We had coordinated mechanisms on the ground the UN Norway EU the United States others We all had tried to coordinate so we were working together and didn't duplicate efforts And so Napida can see an international all in one room the internationals and we can work with them in that Coordinated fashion help the government think about us as a group China would never be involved in that They always work separately, which I think is not has never been very helpful And we'll get to that later in terms of recommendations fifth there were there were hinge a crisis I think enabled as Dan said enabled China to recover its primacy among the various international players in Myanmar It's played a role in covering for what's going on there I think they do that in large part because of their substantial political and economic interest in the country and certainly in Rakhine state Though even as the investment in Myanmar has declined Chinese investment. They still have I think Gotten back in the game in a way Because the West is viewed very poorly now Over the Rohingya issue sixth China has strengthened its central control and direction of policy there was always a local central dynamic Yunnan has driven policy locals of driven policy the central government has seen that as unhelpful and seen Detriments to that approach so they have strengthened their central control over the Yunnan authorities but at the same time private actors have Continued to play a role cross-border engaging in illicit activity very tough I think to control that but China has not controlled that very effectively and it has both underwritten the conflict They play all sides. They buy the resources. They give money to illicit actors from the military from from local governments as well as the ethnic armed groups But that's what happens in conflict. You have that type of illicit activity in China Private actors are playing a very strong role in that which is going to be a constraint on a complete piece and finally the ultimate issue which is I think again what Dr. Steinberg talked about Myanmar is a small country among great powers. It's their history is their geography It's the mindset the vulnerability to great powers with the United States or Great Britain whoever And they will seek an over-reliance on any one of them whether it's China or the United States or others they need They need options and they they need to balance us off each other to some degree So there may be a little bit of a constraint on the extent of Chinese influence at least constitutionally inside Myanmar at least their their instincts And there's certainly various questions about the way the Chinese do business And I think is what Dan was talking about is what kind of country does Myanmar want to be? How does it want to develop and you certainly hear they don't want to develop according to Chinese norms? The way Chinese do business in places whether it's labor norms or debt trap norms Predatory lending all these things are certainly present in Myanmar And I think it behooves the international community to demonstrate an alternative vision a way that actually empowers the people of Myanmar to make Decisions in their own interest Both personally and for their country going forward. So ultimately there might be some constraints on China, but Over-reliance on China, but we'll have to see how that goes going forward very quickly recommendations, which are just a few and they extend from these these observations First is that China should open it up itself to international cooperation should be involved in the coordinating mechanisms if they truly want to Demonstrate they're interested as much in Myanmar's interests as their own and that they make it easier for us to all coordinate And not have the zero some mentality that just because the West are involved or the US is involved that comes at their expense We should take the great power competition out of Myanmar and just focus on how do we help stability? We have a lot of common interests there help this place achieve what has been unachievable since independence Which is peace and stability and development and I don't think any of us should be involved in and making that very complicated problem more complicated and If I may be very Frank, I think China had done that certainly during my time there We all have I think an ability and we should try to contribute to peace as comfortable to the people of Myanmar Secondly We have to be more I think they should be more transparent in their activities It's kind of a corollary to that not very transparent about things There will help in this process number three Guests to this issue of the norms corporate social responsibility you hear that term from the Chinese They are perhaps learning on this they did renegotiate the Chakbu port They can away that was more comfortable to to Myanmar But taking local concerns into account will also help peace the way business is being done in some of these conflict areas We'll tell the ethnic Darm groups whether there will be a peace dividend or a peace remains They will have they will be victimized once more. This will be just open season for folks to rule in there Take advantage economically and that can be a constraint to ethnic groups taking this very difficult step So China can help with that if they are truly transparent and responsible and we as well everybody the United States everybody be Firm corporate social responsibility principles in partnership and finally when it comes to Rakhine State the Rohingya issue Which is dominating all of our thinking for good reason? Certainly that it dominates because it is such an awful awful tragedy China should join in assisting Myanmar and the UN to implement the a non-commission Recommendations they're accepted by the government Myanmar. They're accepted by us. They're very difficult to implement They need to be implemented urgently and the China should be putting itself strongly publicly With the international community and Myanmar government of finger figuring out a way to in a timely fashion implement those guidelines which get to all the issues of citizenship of a dignity of livelihoods of freedom of movement Health all the things that every person deserve deserves and certainly the Rohingya and there are kind people deserve and spades and We would welcome China's involvement in that going forward. So that is The report in a nutshell I think the report in some ways goes deeper on certain issues. We have very nice maps for you a lot of data Makes it a little understandable and again I credit Jennifer and her team and Rachel and in the other Jennifer for their help on that But do we welcome further conversation and discussion on this and hope again What us IP we've wanted to do when I was here and is continuing is to get deeper understanding of these very complex issues in The Washington context so we can have an ongoing conversation and make policy based on facts and not illusion. So thank you Thank you Right. Thank you, Derek and Dan both for your very helpful comments to help frame this today We will open the floor for questions and answers from the audience But before we do that I want to give the members of the senior study group a chance to say something if anyone has additional comments They'd like to make The floor is open and would welcome your your additional thoughts at this time. Do you do it? Good morning everyone Well, thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to say a few words today and thank you to Derek and Dan for Shepherding your leadership of putting this report together and really for your voices for democracy, which are so important right now, especially So I come to this issue having looked at the China development model both from when I was the head of the Asia Bureau at USA ID When we were negotiating directly with the Chinese Both in individual countries and more globally in terms of China's participation in international forums but also as the US China on the US China Commission where we're looking closely into the Belt and Road Initiative and China's involvement in Asia and Myanmar in particular But the main point that I think we should emphasize that has been as been mentioned already is that China is pursuing a complex But it's a coherent strategy that maintains the status quo in terms of division and ethnic conflict and While Beijing doesn't want conflict to spin out of control in Myanmar It believes that the current conflicts and the ethnic divisions are in its strategic interest and provides it leverage and a key fact That we found is that you know while China is providing arms to the Tatmadaw and it actually it's one of the biggest suppliers to Burma's military that's committed abuses including against the Rohingya It's also providing arms and political support to the United Wa State Army Which is the largest ethnic group that fights the Tatmadaw and on page 29 of the report We really go into that in-depth in terms of China's support for on the illicit activities and The military activities of the United Wa State Army and that this isn't a contradiction It's a strategy to keep the ethnic conflicts going to achieve its strategic interest And I think that you know while China is always going to be involved in Myanmar and always going to have a strong a strong position there It's important that the government of Myanmar use focus on Utilizing the United States using the international community in terms of our involvement in terms of trying to mitigate the dependence on China And I think that's very important finding and again China is pursuing a coherent strategy here. It's not a contradictory strategy And I failed to provide an adequate introduction. Thank you. Jonathan Syvers from the US second advocate security review commission Does anyone else want to say anything? Do you? All right, we will open the floor for general questions from the audience Someone will come around and give you a microphone. It's your turn to speak and please Provide your name and affiliation and if we can try to keep the questions relatively short then I'll give us more time to hear for more people Thank you Hi, Hunter Marston from the Brookings Institution. Thank you for the fantastic readout of the report sounds good And I look forward to getting into it at length My question is a bit big picture, but how does China feel about Myanmar being more of a democracy these days than it was Just five ten years ago When China enjoyed overwhelming influence in the country, I'm wondering if If it has good relations with both civilian and military leadership and if if prospects for true stability Mean its influence could be undermined. Thank you. Thank you very much, and I'm echo mine Thanks for the wonderful analysis in the report. I'm Mac Darrow from the UN Human Rights Office I have a question on the development aspects I'm not sure if I might have read too quickly But I'm not sure if I saw reference to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the report I asked the question because of the well-documented ways in which bad development can actually fuel conflict within and across borders and Multilateral development banks play a particularly important role in setting a signal for investors as well as the financing they provide and This is a particularly difficult environment for development to happen sustainably At the same time as the AIB is consulting on draft Information policies and accountability mechanism that look like they might if they go forward in the current form undercut Existing multilateral development bank standards. So to the extent that transparency and accountability as was pointed out in remarks are Important that this might be a risk factor that that warrants looking at so I just want to pose that question as well as the question of the security issues that were examined in the report My former boss that was there right. I was saying who spoke on these issues here. In fact several months ago Warned in the Northern Rackings state of the possibility of a regional confessional conflagration If these issues if the Rohingya issue was not dealt with Well, and so just want to ask that question as well. Is that something that you analyzed in the report and could comment on? Thank you Hello My name is Allison Chen. I am a journalist focused on China's political repression and social movement for seven years now I'm a student in the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University And I have two questions. The first question is from my reporting experience there There has been There have been increasing cases suggesting the Chinese policemen is directly cooperating the Myanmar's policemen is directly cooperating with Chinese policemen and allow Chinese policemen to get into the country and take back some of their Plectical prisoners and this case is like happened very fast that it shouldn't be formal Like when a police when a political prisoners go into Myanmar for two days and China's government directly Chinese policemen can directly take him back from Myanmar. So this kind of direct Corporation is it like normal? Have you considered it into your report? And is this change the relationship of China and Myanmar what is exactly happening is look it doesn't look like a Country-to-country Relationship already and this is the first question and the second question is about recommendation a lot of the recommendation you talk about is begin with the phrase China should but how is like This institution or the US government can tell China what they should do. I mean Nowadays it seems like China is not really listening and what if if China do not do this kind of thing or Keep doing things in his his way. What are you suggesting or what are the US going to do with this kind of situation? Thank you Yeah, actually that's five Three good questionnaires are five questions Try and go through them and not I mean some of them are touch into the issue of the report And others are a little bit separate, but still we should answer all of them China's view of Myanmar's democracy I think they were Stunned when it started to happen. I mean Dr. Steinberg talked about the who lost Myanmar moment where and things started to drift away and I think the the previous government wanted to Lean a bit more towards the West at least to have balance Options and maybe have some leverage that way too or they appreciated what we're having to offer and our values and such So China but China today, I think they're very realist I mean, I think they feel there's probably a little bit of concern about the Demonstration effect along their border when there's a successful democracy And whether that can then inspire others across the border that democracies can work in Asia And they could be stable and multi-ethnic environments like like Myanmar But I think China privately what I'd heard is they felt that this was going to take a long time for it to really take hold That they knew the peace was going to take a long time that Democracy was going to be difficult that maybe the military was not going to give up is going to so They I think they realized as things were moving away from them Strategically not just in terms of political system That they were trying to catch up with Dossu and the NLD and so when she won They made a major sort of charm offensive There was a major push to get her to come to to Beijing in which she has I don't know five times now to reach out to her to try to You know to work on the the issue that she cares most about that gets to this issue of peace I mean this is right at the top of her list of her legacy issues because this was a legacy of her father This is the defining challenge of the country. How do you get peace in a place that hasn't had it since independence? So yes, I think the Chinese figured out how do we get through to her The peace process will help her with that will try to turn twist the arms of the ethnic armed organizations So they accommodated to her Even as they I think were worried that the democracy thing may mean Constitutionally and just instinctively they that means they will be more oriented towards the West So and as we were saying they've done pretty well and they've taken it They're wonderful at taking advantage of opportunities and there were kind-state issue They were hinge issue has given them that opportunity to pull back and say we're the only ones that are backing you And it's back to where it was ten years ago. Basically where they're standing up in the UN and blocking resolutions and investing while the others are pulling out so China is a little bit of a complex view with their real estate. They'll do with Myanmar as it is I'm going forward AIIB issue of standards This is an important issue and something to watch early on You know well first we were threatened by AIIB which was foolish I think should try to shape it and be thoughtful about it and then AII be early on look like it was just working with the World Bank and was conforming to good standards reasonable international standards I haven't followed it but if it is as you suggest that standards are starting to be shaped in more the Chinese direction the AIB that's a real concern that becomes a competition of Norms and rules and standards which is essentially the competition of the 21st century. We see any way happening under Xi Jinping I mean the first time since the Cold War we're seeing an ideational challenge from major powers Towards the US or the Western kind of ideas of openness transparency all this kind so and of democracy So this is should be watched very much and should be of concern a concern if AIB is moving in that direction We don't deal with it in the report But the issue of norms and standards and how the second part of your question how case into involved in conflict It should be watched absolutely Regional implications of the Rohingya issue. Yes, absolutely. I've always felt this is not just a national issue It has certainly Bangladesh and they have their own problem with extremism and terrorist cells There are issues when the Rohingya were on boats when I was there and going to Thailand and Indonesia and Malaysia If there's desperation That's where extremism festers and it doesn't just stay in one place. You see it Happening in Philippines and elsewhere. So absolutely. This is a regional issue And it's that I think Myanmar needs to recognize that it's not just an internal affair Issue of police cooperation When I was there that happened there was a Dissident that I knew about it late. I guess it was too late to try to help in any way It was just along the border and Myanmar police before we knew gave them back to the Chinese police Not a whole lot we can do about that. I mean their political asylum standards But not much we can do about it if Myanmar police feel they have to they don't want to be harboring People and be a safe haven which can really put you in bad stead in Beijing. So that continues It's extremely unfortunate and wrong For a democracy to do that what a country that believes in human rights not much we can do and Guess they're second part when we say China should it's because we believe this is in the interest of broader interest of stability security for international security for Myanmar's Peace and peace and stability So all the things that we recommend are for the broader interest. That's not we're doing it because do it for America We're doing it for Myanmar's peace Myanmar stability regional stability regional security And if they don't do it, then they should answer frankly to broader region or regional interests If they're not conforming to the best interest of Asia best interests of Myanmar best interests of Southeast Asia Then I would hope that others would stand up and speak out about this and not just the United States because when it's just the United States It becomes a great power competition And that's what we want to avoid if it's China versus the region and smaller powers It's norms and standards and that's where we need to get to Can I just say a quick word about the Rohingya crisis? if you wanted to Seed the stage for extremism and radicalization This is really what it would look like, right? I mean I've seen this on the Bangladesh side. I haven't seen it in Rakhine How desperate do you need to be to flee to a very poor country Bangladesh where you have no property rights? You cannot work you have trouble getting off the beach. You're living under a plastic flap You know, I think also about China's when we think about China's diplomatic and material role in Allowing this crisis to continue to unfold. I mean it's very different, but I think we also think of what China's policies are doing in Xinjiang and I think this is the problem with the nature of the Chinese decision-making system under one party and one man rule is that Actually, it is not in China's self-interest for the kind of regional Crisis you are seeing out of the Rohingya crisis. Just like it's not in China's interest to have its Western population ever more resentful of rule from Beijing so I Think it's an example of sometimes people sometimes Strategists and experts paint China as pursuing this very sophisticated grand design to remake world order and in fact It looks I think to me Like these are strategic errors, right? And the neighbors are watching and I think other groups in Myanmar are also watching. I mean, there are many more experts than me here on Myanmar's internal Politics, but if you wanted to create a scenario for ethnic reconciliation Among all the groups in Myanmar You would not allow the Rohingya crisis to unfold in the calamitous way that it has because other groups will note that And there will not be positive effects on Reconciliation more broadly. I mean the Rohingya crisis. I don't think can be compartmentalized, right? Thank you Congratulations, you guys have made a terrific presentation today. Is it working now? Is it working? Okay? Thank you very much for a terrific presentation all of you It's fairly wonderful, and I particularly like David Steinberg's idiosycratic few of history And I would like to associate myself with it There's another aspect here that I think is missing but it comes up in some of these questions Illiberal democracy right right now the world is sort of caught in a Cold War between liberal and illiberal democracy Illiberal having a wide spectrum, but going all the way from bad governance to dictatorship and illiberal Leaders the leaders of illiberal democracies tend to see liberal democracy as an existential threat to the cohesion of their societies and it is indeed a very messy form of government as we know well and so when we talk about China's Fear of US presence in Burma. It's not a fear of a military presence It's a fear of a political presence and and that becoming a backdoor in to influence Internal political events in China That's a big problem in China and that has come out in my discussions with Chinese about Myanmar very strongly Secondly the development of a liberal democratic strain which Represented by the NLD in Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma was a great fear as you noted to China So when they saw it moving Towards democracy in that particular form. They wanted an Asian form of democracy not liberal democracy so they have been able to because of The embattlement of the NLD government. They've been able to form a very strong relationship with them Hoping to draw them in the direction of illiberal democracy I would say and that's something that we need to think about it's very important for us to be supporting The proponents of liberal democracy in the country no matter how bad the conditions and not shutting ourselves off from that Because there's a there's a struggle going on there. It's not a US-China thing. It's a struggle in a sort of political thinking Political ethic and and that's something that we need to be concerned about and I'd be interested in whether or particularly Dave and Derek whether you agree with that Thanks very much fascinating reports, so thank you very much for that. I'm Miwa Hirano from Fulbright fellow at Abad Kennedy School. My question is to what extent is The the widespread question about China's motive you mentioned which is China is not interested in hot war no complete peace actual deliberate policy by the Chinese government the reason I say this is related to the another question of who is China and You mentioned that there is a wide range of Chinese actors working and the Chinese government is really finding it hard to control them And I think that's absolutely true and the evidence that is you oftentimes reported Haven't read your report. So I don't know about that. But oftentimes reported is that drug sorry arms Provision to conflicting parties. It's done by the Chinese, but it's done by the Chinese companies There's another Chinese element coming in that is not necessarily controlled by the Chinese government So my question is what is the evidence that the Chinese government deliberately wants Myanmar to be neither a hot war No, complete peace the big question to leave you with is that what's the difference between? Non-interference as you mentioned and the influence and I think that might have a good implication for the broader debate. Thank you Hi, I'm Edmund Downey. I just finished a Fulbright scholarship in at Yunnan University in Southwest China looking at Chinese Investment and economic engagement with Southeast Asia and the agriculture and energy sectors My question is somewhat similar to hers But it kind of flip side about varied interest within the Myanmar state So what are the different thoughts on? Relations what kind of relationship Myanmar should have with China that come out of the army civilian sectors Business community party players. That's a lot choose what you want choose what matters But I'd like to hear about that different political landscape in Myanmar and the different visions of how to relate with China that come out of that Thank you, Paul Donowitz. I oversee global witnesses work in Myanmar sort of following on the Alison's comment Seems the recommendations are very China should China should transparency CS CSR Looking at US foreign policy and US policy right now driven by the administration and Congress and maybe what they do Or they don't do if you could potentially talk about Ways that the US government should be modifying its current policy with regard to China Myanmar China would be helpful And I just wanted to also make a plug because I know that the ambassador is here today I think it's important that we raise the issue of the Reuters journalists and the crack them as a whole society I think it's important to continue to focus on those issues as well Those are very very difficult questions are good questions. Well, I I agree with you Priscilla I think that's a very interesting point and it's it's another side of my Sort of thinking about those norms and standards and what whether it's political tug-of-war of what type of political system, but I agree with you. I think Myanmar is somewhat of a challenge to it It's sort of soft underbelly and viewed as potential threat by Western influence that can work its way through the Southwest I mean China thinks in terms of encirclement and containment and of a sphere of influence and the need for Ensuring that they're they have a buffer of some kind. So I don't think anything that you said I think it's a really fascinating way of putting it and not a way. I've thought about but something I'll think about more and maybe others here will have thought on that a liberal versus liberal democracy Perspective But I'll move away from that because I just I associate myself with your thinking This issue of what evidence we have Of a hot war of them wanting neither hot war nor complete peace and then the issue of who is China. Why do you assess? Who wants what there? That's a difficult one. That's actually a very difficult thing, too But we have we went by in some way Scholars here who have looked at this very very closely And talked to people in Yunnan who are specialists folks in Beijing and that was the assessment of Very leading scholar. I think you and sona could say and there's her assessment Of how China views the situation there and we matched that up to how China is engaging and The incentives the leverage they do have now and made a judgment that it seems that China gets a great value out not out of having a terrible hot war But that if they were complete peace there would be a situation there that would be more Little less to their strategic advantage So it's it's a judgment we make but it's from talking to many different actors Inside China and those who are talking to the actors inside China of how they view the situation and in part I mean what we would hear is Chinese don't believe that peace is going to come very soon anyway They're pretty confident that there's not going to be a complete peace very soon so they can be engaged on this In their way and and work as best they can on facilitating peace without worrying about Actually becoming true a complete peace just like ten years ago. They used to say to the United States You know what you should do you should stop isolating China and get rid of your sanctions Then we we engage China Engaged me and Marmin and got rid of our sanctions and Chinese said you're trying to encircle us Just and we did exactly what they wanted us to do to get rid of our sanctions and to engage them Then they said oh, well, you're you're a ulterior motive and my theory on that is China never actually believed that we would get rid Of our sanctions and engage me and Mar but when we actually did they were stunned and they were they had their readjust So anyway, the evidence is hard, but it's I think it's it's pretty compelling by talking to many different actors Relationship of Myanmar And the Chinese who is this the Chinese state and write that down right With the Chinese state other different players in Myanmar having a place the relationship There are infinite number of different players the ethnics have a different I mean they want China to back them up and do business the central government wants them to block access for whether arms and material money to the ethnics Businessmen just want to do business any way they can It's an infinite number of interest, but get what you can from the big power both both political and economic power that they have so that's a very long kind of Discussion to have and we don't much time us How does how should the US modifies policy towards Myanmar or China in Myanmar? I Think that's a really huge question. I'm not sure where you start on the policy side to be honest Yeah, we should coordinate stick with Myanmar certainly But it's complicated when you get to how do we modify our policy? There's a lot there we have to get very specific on modify what for what purpose we have to stay true to our principles We have just traced the state true to the absolute tragedy going on and not forget about it and focus on those human beings that are without any kind of dignity or or Anything right now no identity But also there are other people in the country that have suffered greatly and we should stay true to them too How you balance those two is a very difficult challenge on the USG policy question I think there's one overarching consideration that the government will in need naped all will need to factor in Which is that Congress in the United States for so many years was a champion of this relationship and of Burma's Democratic promise and potential and If the goal of the government in Myanmar is to achieve the kind of balance Professor Steinberg outlined That's gonna get a lot harder without Congressional champions and let's be honest the mood in Congress is much harder on this country as a result of the journalists imprisonment as a result of the Rohingya crisis as a result of the Dashed hopes for democracy in Myanmar that so many members of Congress including very prominent ones like Mitch McConnell and John McCain Supported on Sun Tzu Chi on for so many years and I think this is going to make it much harder for the Myanmar government to achieve balance Final final word I guess on the issue of the Reuters reporters. I'm just I do want to spotlight as well It is a very unhappy situation and we should not forget about anything going on there But we we do it to put it all in context, but that particular issue shows a regression. That's very unfortunate Yes, a few comments. I think when we talk about China It's like talking about Washington There are lots of different elements and one of the critical elements is Yunnan compared to Beijing and We know in the past that there have been differences sometimes constructive sometimes not for example they say that the The pipeline the oil or gas pipeline of our boy pipeline from the Middle East through Myanmar Was an idea from Yunnan University. It was not from Beijing, but it obviously was in Beijing Beijing's interest the 2009 Kokong uprising Was supposedly What was not predicted or by the UN and the UN government Which caused Beijing to send the PLA to take over some of the functions that Yunnan did before because they didn't trust Yunnan Yunnan's position has been sometimes as they say If Beijing says we can't do it then we can do it But that may not always be true, but that creates some sorts of tensions and if you go to the API door You'll see innumerable delegations from Yunnan coming in to talk about various Policies so there is this this particular Question on China There is I argue a kind of Chinese arrogance towards Myanmar. We have our own form of arrogance Because we are great power China's form of arrogance goes back to a Dependency a sphere of influence That Still I think affects some sorts of Chinese attitudes towards towards Myanmar and Southeast Asia in general But Myanmar specifically I think this plays a role and Chinese have overplayed their hand I mean Chinese influence was exceedingly important According to the Burmese sources two-thirds of all Burmese military trained abroad were trained in China The provision of equipment and so forth has been Very very important whether that equipment was of the standard that the Burmese wanted is another matter One can argue about that But I think we have to understand that Burma is always concerned about China and say it's not pop boy It's fear and fear starting with the with the takeover of the PRC actually in Chinese revolution Burma watch that very very carefully and was very fearful of it and and US in fact let them down on this question of the gomondang troops in In Burma in 1949-50 and and thereafter until about 1960 There are many issues that people have raised I Can't go into them now. I think that the US policy Has been the the previous influence of Aung San Suu Kyi has been so important and On the both the Republicans and the Democrats and this is a bipartisan thing Although Mitch McConnell and was with the most avid advocate of her in the Congress, I believe but this the fall from grace if you will that is taking place is I'm tragic Well, except for her but it for the country itself because it does have an impact on the US role It has an impact on investment. It has been packed on tourism and that impact on All kinds of attitudes towards that country Many influential people that one talked to before said I wouldn't go to Burma because Aung San Suu Kyi's under house arrest Until that's resolved. I refuse to go but now we're seeing a problem again Should we go should we what is our attitude towards this country? And this is a severe problem for the government and I'm afraid the government has avoided the issue Aung San Suu Kyi specifically and this is going to cause problems for our relations with Myanmar and For our relations with Aung San Suu Kyi too Yes Thank you very much. I'm not going to pose any questions to you but to just to say a few words First of all, I thank the US IP for organizing this This event and also as a representative of Myanmar. I come here to show How interest we are in listening to the concerns of the stakeholders in the United States? especially the democratic institutions how you see us With regard to our relationship with you with with China this will also be very useful for Not only for the government but also for other stakeholders in assessing what will What we will need to do in our respect of our our relationship with China, so Meemar is a very young democracy United States have has helped us a lot in the past to reach this position. We are Grateful to these people of the United States and the government of the United States and As a young democracy that is on the cause of an Asian building, please do continue to support us We have many issues and Dr. Steinberg has are Re-pointed the complexities of the issues the Problems in our country not only the problems in our country, but also the problems that We have the complexities between our relationship with China So since who all are these scholars of Myanmar you Know how complex the situation is but we are dedicated to resolve all the difficulties With your support and I and we are doing in good faith. Yes What the recommendations that Contained in the report is very valid for us the with regard to the recommendations that The report has made on the advisory commission's recommendations. We are taking seriously on these issues and also The situation in Rakhine state and also with regard to the Sentencing of two reporters. We are serious on it. Maybe one day a time will come when this Official secrets egg will be eliminated and also reporters will be able to Obtain the classified Documents as you have in the United States or other Western countries and also Reporters will be able to get information on the military operations like you have With in the Western world since this is a very young democracy. Please understand our situation. Thank you very much Thank you ambassador. Thank you all for joining us today. This has been a great discussions and wonderful questions I'm sorry. We didn't get to everyone I want to thank our two wonderful co-chairs again, Dan and Derek for leading this effort. Thank you, Dr. Steinberg for his remarks Thank you to all the SSG members for all of your work on this project over the last several months To all the experts here and in Myanmar and other places around the world who did late night Skype calls and other Fact-checking with us. We thank you for your support and really this has been a great project And we're really proud to put this report out today So, please take a hard copy when you leave for those of you watching online You can find a soft copy of the report and the executive summary on the US IP website But thank you again for joining us today And we look forward to carrying this tradition forward in our next SSG report in early 2019. Thanks again