 Right, this first session... ...we're going to be talking about identity theory... ...and why it won't work. First, I'll be telling you what identity theory is. In session two we're going to be talking about non-reductive physicalism. So I'll have to explain that to you, because first you need to know... ...what reductive physicalism is before you can understand non-reductive. Then I'm going to look at if physicalism won't work, what is the alternative? You'll be thinking, well of course physicalism is going to work, so that's not a problem. a'r drosfyniad yma, rwy'n gobeithio a'r clywed o чего ar y cwestiwn ysgol. Rwy'n gobeithio'r cwestiwn ysgol yn y ffordd. Rwy'n gobeithio ysgol yn y cwestiwn. Rwy'n gobeithio'n gweithio'n gweithio, ma'n gweld yr hynod o'r cyffredinol yn gwneud. Rwy'n gobeithio i sefydlu y sefydliad yng Nghymru, ac mae ymddangos cyd-ddechrau a'r cyfan y dyma. A'r fyddwn i'r cwestiwn ymddangos cyd-dedd gennych why identity theory was postulated so you know why identity theory was attractive at that time. I'm going to look at what identity theory is, why it's attractive generally, what the arguments are for it, and finally I'm going to look at why we shouldn't accept identity theory. So that's the outline of what I'm going to do. Let's get straight on and do it. Rwy'n credu'r cyntaf o ddynodau'r ddynodau, mae'n rhaid i'ch cymdeithasio ychydig, ond mae'n rhaid i'ch hyn o'r ddynodau. René Descart, yn y ddynodau 1600-rhyw, a'r ddynodau ar y ddynodau 1900-rhyw, ystod y teori, cartesian dualism, yw'r ddynodau'r ddynodau. Cartesian dualism yw'r ddynodau'r cyfnodau wedi'i ddynodau'r ddynodau a'r ddynodau'r ddynodau. Rwy'n cael ei ddynodau sefydliadau, mae'n ddynodau, yr ydym yn ddynodau, mae'n ddynodau'r ddynodau, ond yn ddynodau yn ddynodau, yw'n ddynodau'r ddynodau. are utterly different. So, okay, we're going to look at the present moment. So the properties of the mental and the properties of the physical according to Descartes are completely different. Well, okay, let's think about that. Let's just look. Descartes believe that the essence of the mind, the essence of the mind, in other words, the properties essential to the mind were various forms of thinking, okay, so what do you think various forms of thinking might be? Can you think of different forms of thinking? Different ways in which you might think or different thoughts that you might have different sorts of thoughts? Certainly problem-solving would involve thinking, wouldn't it, yes? Emotions, whether emotions are thoughts, I'm less sure about that, I would have thought that they, the essence of emotions might be to have some quality, so to love someone there's something it's like, isn't it, isn't it to love someone, there's something being angry, there's something it's like to be angry and philosophers call that those states have some sort of quality or qualia, there's something that it feels like to have them. Deduction is a different way of thinking, that's right, rather than a different sort of thought. Imagination would be one way of thinking, actually for Descartes that was a bit of a technical term, he wouldn't have thought imagination was a matter for the mind at all, but I'm going to put that on one side because I can see why you think it is and I don't think we need to go into it. You're thinking of different contents of thought and several of you are and that's perfectly reasonable. Planning, you're another one who's thinking of the same sort of thing. Intending would be one sort of thought, wouldn't it, so when you intend to do something that's a very specific sort of thought you're having. Wishing? All thought is rational, it really is, yes I'll come back to that in a minute, you might be surprised by that but actually let me quickly explain, the fact is that you can be irrational in your thinking but irrationality is a failure within the house of reason, you can't be irrational unless you can be rational, so this table for example can't be rational at all can it and it can't be rational either. Intuitive thinking, you wouldn't say that was thinking then. Intuition, I'd like to put on one side for a minute but again we'll come back to that maybe. Okay that's quite enough, I think in fact I think it's very good, we're doing very well, we're a pen. Right okay I now want to think we've got our feelings in for what the mind is like, what sort of thing are in the mind. I'm going to make a distinction here between the physical realm and the mental realm. Okay can you all see this? There, is that better? Okay this is the mental, this is the physical, we're going to look at things, we're going to look at properties and we're going to look at relations. You probably can't read that but it doesn't matter, I'll tell you what it is if you forget. Okay so the things in the mind, we've looked at intentions, we've looked at thoughts generally, what else do we look at? We looked at wishes, hopes and we looked at emotions, so things like anger and fear and love and so on. We might look at sensations like pain etc. Okay give me some things that you think of as physical, what sort of thing do you think of as physical? A table, yep rather obviously physical tables. Matter is physicality so I won't put that in a star I think we'll put in, yeah a star is physical. People, well can I say human bodies, human bodies are certainly physical, whether people are as we'll leave out for a minute. What else is physical? Feeling, feeling did you say? Well we usually think of feeling as mental don't we? Like air or water, cold hot like sorry, like air we feel air but can't see it. An ear? Air, ah air is physical, yes okay it is. You had sensations, sensations on that side so pain and tickles, well okay if I kick you and I wouldn't dream of kicking you Suzy but if I kicked you I would cause damage to your tissue and you would feel pain. We usually consider the tissue damage as physical but the pain is mental and it's the pain that's the sensation. You feel, you say you feel the tissue damage but actually what you feel is the pain caused by the tissue damage. So some people who've had a leg amputated will continue to feel pain, they'll even continue to feel it in their leg but as they have no leg this isn't the case, we know it isn't the case. Okay anything else that's physical can we have a few more molecules? Well all these things are made up of molecules, molecules are certainly physical but I'm thinking of more straightforward things like pens, I mean molecules we can certainly put in there. Pens, thank you who said that go to the top of the class David Partridge and it just learnt his name. Okay those are some things some of which are mental some of which are physical but what about properties of these things? Let's start with the easy ones. Give me some properties of physical things. Hardness, okay. What did you say? Entity? Density, okay shape, weight. Well it's shapes that can be, apprehension is a mental thing not a physical thing isn't it? So this, give me something square somebody, well actually don't bother, there's something blue will do. Okay so this chair is blue and I apprehend its blwness, I perceive that it's blue. The perception is a mental state, the blwness of the chair is a physical state. Okay, thank you. Well done, colour is a physical property. Yeah anything else? Extension, solidity. Extension means solidity so if there's something physical it'll take up space won't it in some form or other? It'll be three-dimensional even air is three-dimensional in that you can't, if it's there you can't go into it, the same place. Temperature, yep. That's an interesting one actually, I forgot to put extension in. Temperature is an interesting one because there's the temperature of the table say or the the radiator and there's the feeling of heat when I touch it. Do you see what I mean? So there's the feeling of heat but the temperature of the radiator. Okay what about properties of the mind? So what sort of properties do thoughts have? So like you can say that pen is hard or that table weighs a lot or that chair is blue. When you say that belief is frightening, that belief is frightening. Okay I'm going to put frightening in because I want to think about it. Credible did somebody say. If it's a belief, I mean credible means believable doesn't it? That a belief is believable. Whoops. We usually think of rigidity over here actually because rigidity is a physical state isn't it? So what do you mean when you say that a belief is? Yes we do say that don't we and what is rigid thinking because we don't mean it's rigid like that do we? Stuck in what? Let's come back to that because I think we can come back to that. Intensity. A belief can be intense. There are some much simpler things beliefs can be. What about true? Don't we think a belief is true or false? We're thinking of properties of thoughts at the moment. We're not thinking logical. Okay we'll put logical in there. Actually I won't put logical in there and I'll tell you why in a minute. Sorry. Calm. Okay serene. It's very interesting. You're going for a lot of interesting things. You'd obviously all make good creative writers here. I'm going to put justified in because we think of thoughts as more or less justified don't we? So you wouldn't say of a chair that it could be justified or of a glass that it could be justified but thoughts can be justified can't they? So is that belief of yours justified or not? They're certainly not always verbal. They may be always verbalisable but they're certainly not always verbal because I dare say you have thoughts to which you don't give voice. I do every now and again. So truth and falsehood. I think compelling could be on the list but I suspect that compelling actually means justified. What makes a thought compelling and what is it for a thought to be compelling? It's valid. By that do you mean true? Okay I'll tell you what. Let's move on to relations because rational relations come in the relations section. So physical things can be causally related can't they? So a pen's rolling off the table sorry my pushing the pen can be causally related to the pens falling off the table. Causal relations there are temporal relations in the physical world. One event is before another. There are also temporal relations in the mental world and there are also causal relations in the mental world. One thought can cause another but notice with thoughts that's often a malfunction of a thought. What you want with thoughts is the rational relation between them. You want one thought to be a reason for another. If one thought causes another well let's look at wishful thinking. Here my desire for something that my husband isn't having an affair for example causes my belief that he isn't having an affair. Now notice that there isn't any rational relation between that desire and that belief. There's simply a causal relation and that's a malfunction in mind isn't it? We don't think that the desire is a good reason for the belief at all. So there is causation in the mind but let's put a question mark there just to show that perhaps we wish there weren't. We want it to be rational rather than causal. So those of you who say thoughts are logical yes indeed thoughts are enter interlogical relations with each other so if you say if the dog barked sorry if the dog saw a stranger it would have barked the dog saw a stranger it barked yes there you are you see you're all rational people you can immediately see what you can deduce from the two beliefs that I talked about and that's because your beliefs are rationally related to each other and your they enter into logical really you can logically deduce one belief from two other beliefs but there aren't any rational relations in the physical world are there this this pen doesn't entail anything the way that the two beliefs I just gave you entailed the conclusion you came up with you can't get two physical things that are consistent with each other whereas you can have two beliefs that are consistent with each other so to be consistent is for two beliefs to be true oh sorry such that they can be true together well given that tables can't be true and pens can't be true how can you say that the pen is consistent with the table you can say that the belief that the pen is black is consistent with the tables being under the pen for example but those are beliefs you're talking about not tables and pens now what do you mean by consistent here but that's whereas um rigid was a metaphor a physical metaphor for thoughts consistent is a mental metaphor for physical substances and oil and water are inconsistent aren't they rather than consistent yes I thought you mean that they don't mix well what does inconsistency mean in the rational realm let me tell you it means to for two beliefs to be inconsistent it means that they can't both be true together and they can't both be false together okay they can't both be true and they can't both be false so if one is true the other is false and if the other is true the one is false see what I mean that's what it means in the in the mental realm but if you put it in the physical realm you can see where the metaphor comes from can't you um but there's one right but there's one table in the room yep and then I say can you speak up so everyone can hear then I say a few moments later um there's that table in the room and there's that other table in the room yep quite ridiculous different than me of course those two tabs are inconsistent now okay what bob said is if I say there's one table in the room and then later on he says there's two tables in the room um those two facts he says are inconsistent what's what's he got wrong can anyone say sorry bob I apologize I know you can take it hang on I love this I love this because it's such an easy one to deal with I'm going to run out of um flip chart here which is going to be very frustrating um bob said if I say there are two tables in the room and then I say actually can I make it properly inconsistent um there is only one table in the room okay these two facts are inconsistent okay is that what you said bob yes okay um what do what does statements like that express if you say there are two tables in the room what are you expressing your belief that there are two tables in the room right if you say there is only one table in the room what are you expressing your belief that there's one table in the room is the belief there are two tables in the room inconsistent with there is only one unwaith those two beliefs are inconsistence, therefore, the two statements are inconsistent. The facts are only inconsistent by extension, if you see what I mean. Those two facts couldn't both obtain deb… There is one…. I mean couldn't both be true your belief that there is one table in the room and that there are two tables in the room. Zero.... there are different levels there's the level of. I'm going to run out of. No, I'm not. There's a whole other one there. OK, there's the level of? Of this flum. thumb, it's still suffering from the accident. I have an accident in which I broke my thumb and that was over a year ago and I still can't turn pages. There's the level of the world, if we like. There's the level of thought and there's the level of language. So there's the property of redness. There's the thought, the concept if you like, is red and then there's the word is red. That's a predicate. You can say red has three letters. You can't say of that of the concept because concepts don't have letters. And you can't say that of the colour because colours don't have letters either. You with me? This you can say it's a colour. But you can't say of a concept that it is a colour. It isn't, it's a concept. And you can't say of a word that it is a colour either. Do you see what I mean? These three levels have to be kept separate in your thinking the whole time because if you slide from thinking I'm thinking I'm saying this and you get confused between what it is you're saying and what it is you're saying it's of or between the world that you picture and your picture of the world it's very easy to get confused. Do you see what I mean? We're trying to keep these three levels separate and what Bob was doing there was sliding from what he could say and in doing so express his beliefs and to what he was saying it about. It's not the facts that are inconsistent. It's the beliefs that are inconsistent or the sentences that express them. If you took away the word only then you thought said only and one person said there's one cake when there's one more and the other person said there are two cakes. Both of those facts are true. They're different but they are both true. Both of the sentences are true maybe. Because they're saying I believe. But there are two in those in the one. Say them again. What are the two sentences? If one person said, Bob said there is a table, there is one table in the room and Pauline said there are two tables in the room, both would be two leaps because one doesn't understand. Each of them would be expressing their beliefs. It would be true of Bob that he believed whatever it was he said he believed. It would be true of Colin that he believed whatever it was he said he believed. Whether their beliefs are true is a completely different question. Isn't it? Because if we say let's move this over so I can use this one as well if I can reach it. Actually Bill, could you put that over there for me and make it easier? Thank you. What's your name? Mary. Good, I can spell that. Mary believes Mary Ann is wearing red. Notice there's a sentence embedded within another sentence. There's the embedding sentence which is Mary believes that Mary Ann is wearing red and there's the embedded sentence Mary Ann is wearing red. Now I think that's probably true and that's probably true as well. We'll call this skirt red. No quibbles about maroon or anything like that. But could that be true and that false? Yeah, Mary could have a false belief. Could they both be false? Yes, I might have put my yellow skirt on today. Now I've gotten which way around I need to go. Could that be true and that false? Yeah, you see the truth value of what's true about Mary's belief differs quite independently about what whether Mary believes is true. I got my syntax mixed up there but you can see where I was going. One more question then we're moving on. I think you said that when Bob said there is a table in the room, that was his belief. No, he was expressing his belief in a sentence. So, I mean are you saying that the table only exists by virtue of it being perceived? No. No, no, no, no. If I said that I'd give a much better argument for it. So you could say that the table is in the room is the same fact, it's not the same belief. The fact, the table, the tables being in the room makes true the sentence the table is in the room and it makes true the belief the sentence is in the room. For that reason we call it a fact, we might say the fact that the table is in the room makes it true that the statement the table is in the room, etc. But we have to distinguish the fact that makes true the statement and the belief. That's what's important to keep separate here. Okay, let's move on. I need more pens. Let's move back to where we were going here. Because we haven't even got on to identity theory yet. Okay, I'm going to add in here. We had all sorts of other things threatening, compelling, which I believe was a sort of justification and so on. What I want to point out is how very, very... Oh, there's something we've left out here. Bill, you did say spatial, didn't you? Well, I read your thoughts then. The cup, the glass rather, is on top of the table. The water is in the glass. The glass is in between Mary and me. Okay, so in the physical world there are spatial relations. But do we have those in the mental world? Do you say that a desire is on top of a belief? No? We might say it metaphorically, but that's what we mean. What about one belief being in between another? We could say that, couldn't we? We would mean temporarily in between, wouldn't we? We wouldn't mean spatially in between. Beliefs don't seem to occupy space. They don't seem to enter into spatial relations. What I'm getting at here is why Descartes thought that the mind was quite different from the body. He would look and he'd say, well, hang on. The thing about beliefs is they can be true. They can be justified. They can enter into rational relations with each other. Tables can't be true. They can't be justified either. They can't enter into rational relations with each other. Pens can be hard. Pens can be weighty. Pens can be black. But beliefs can't be hard, weighty or black. The thing about mental states and physical states is they have completely different properties from each other. We haven't actually mentioned qualia here, but qualia, the feeling of awful feeling of pain or the pleasant feeling I get when I look at Susie's jacket. Red happens to be my favourite colour, et cetera. What it feels like to be in love. What it feels like to be angry. These are not physical properties. This table doesn't feel these things. It's true that we are human bodies which are physical and we feel those things, which is quite interesting. But what Descartes thought that meant is that the thing about human beings is that they are persons. When a human body is occupied by... sorry, is housed by a human mind, then you get the intermingling of the mind and the body and that is what a person is. So that's why when somebody said persons here, I put human bodies rather than persons because persons are a mingling of the mind and the body to Descartes. So that's why Descartes thought the mind and body were completely distinct. Now let's move on. It seems obvious that if two states differ in their properties, then they can't be identical to each other. Can they? If two things are going to be the very same thing, they've got to have the same properties, haven't they? They can't have different properties. So as long as we believe that mental states and physical states differed with respect to their properties, indeed their essential properties, we also believed that they had to be states of two different kinds. And this is where dualism came from. The idea that mental states, physical states, have completely different properties, therefore they can't be the same thing. One question, David, and then I want to move on. If a thought is extended in time, then can't it be extended in sort of space time and be different aspects of physical space? Well, a thought is extended in time, isn't it? A thought can take a while to come, although actually I think a process of thought is extended in time rather than thought itself. But why does that mean it has to be extended in space? Well, if you go along space and time is the one thing. If you think space and time are one thing, then you would have to say it was extended in space, but we don't usually think of thoughts as being extended in space. We can't say a thought is six inches long, can we? Not in ordinary world. Anyway, we're going to look at identity theory now, so let's look at it. Okay, so that's when I was going to do what I've already done, so we'll move on from that. Okay, there's undoubtedly a problem with the belief that mental states are not physical states, because if mental states are not physical, which is what Descartes said, and which is what everyone believed on the strength of his argument for so many years, but how could they interact with physical states if they are not themselves physical states? Difficult problem that. In the 20th century it started to become intolerable because we think of physics as causally closed. In other words, if any physical event occurs, it will have been caused by another physical event. There can't be a cause of a physical event that itself falls outside physics. That's what we think, and if that's true, then either mental events are physical events or mental events don't causally interact with physical events. Well, yes they do. If I throw my pen at you, you'll duck when you see it coming. Seeing the red of the traffic light causes me to put my foot on the brake. When I have a headache, I might take an aspirin and that will do away with the pain of my headache. My thought that there's water in the glass causes me to take a drink. We think that mentally interacts with physical all the time. We don't want to get rid of the idea that mental and physical events causally interact with each other, but then how can we continue claiming that mental events are not physical? That's the thought. I'm going to look at one of the theories. There were several theories before identity theory. You might have heard of behaviourism. Behaviourism says that mental states are behavioural patterns. So, for example, having a pain is engaging in avoidance behaviour or saying ow or something like that. But that was very quickly discredited because we think of pain as what causes behavioural patterns of pain, don't we, rather than what is the behavioural pattern? But this is identity theory of mind. I would be prepared to bet that at least 50% of people in this room, actually I secretly think that at least 99% of people in this room probably hold an identity theory, but I'm now going to tell you why it's wrong. First, I'm going to tell you what it is. The aim of the identity theorist is to discover empirical evidence for bridge laws. Now, a bridge law, there are different sorts of law. There are bridge laws and there are causal laws. A bridge law says that all X effects and a causal law says for all X it is caused by G of X, sort of thing, if and only if. So, a bridge law is actually a statement of identity. It says that all Fs are G. In this case, I've got all pains are identical to C-fibre firing or all believings P are identical to activations of neural state N or something like that. The idea is that you're reducing the mental to the physical. You can use these bridge laws so for every mental predicate is an intention, is a pain, is a feeling of love, is this and that and the other. You can correlate it with a physical predicate in such a way that you can say the mental state is the physical state. They are one and the same state. You see this in the newspapers all the time. They say love is oxytocin activation or something like that or the belief that P. I mean, you'll see, I think we're going. I just want to say here that I'm talking about non-reductive physicalism later. So, identity theory is reductive physicalism because it uses these bridge laws to reduce the mental to the physical. And the idea is that anything you could say about mental states, you could translate, if you like, into physical statements by means of these bridge laws. So, if all pains are the same thing as a C-fibre, if there's no pain that isn't a C-fibre firing, anything you could say using the word pain, you could also say using the word C-fibre firing. If you like, they are ontologically the same thing. And it's important to note here that the notion of identity being used is that of numerical identity, not qualitative identity. What do I mean by that? If we say two dresses are identical, we mean that the dresses are alike in their qualities, don't we? But they're still two dresses. These dresses are qualitatively identical. But when we say that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, we mean that the planet named by the name Hesperus is the very same planet as that named by Phosphorus. They're both the planet Venus, and here it is. So, we're talking here about numerical identity. We're talking here about qualitative identity. And when we're talking about psychophysical identity theory, we're also talking about numerical identity. So, two dresses are qualitatively identical. Hesperus is numerically identical to Phosphorus, and identity theory believes that mental state types, like pains, because pain is a type of mental state, is identical numerically to physical state types such as C-fiberfaring, or in the case of the belief that P, neural state, N. One question. Well, two questions, I think. Are you inferring in five? Sorry. Can you have something numerically identical but with not qualitative identity? And obviously, you probably can. Hesperus have two questions, one thing and the other one, one thing. Well, we're not talking about yet whether numerically identical things could have qualitatively different properties. All I want to do at the moment is distinguish numerical identity from qualitative identity. Any other questions about this distinction that I'm making here, which is actually very important for understanding? Overcoming, again, this is clarification to me, but I don't see correlation when I look at these terms. That's not what's being stated, isn't it? This is it. The claim being made is a much stronger claim than a claim that the mental states are correlated with physical states. The claim is that mental states are the very same thing as... So it's a hugely strong claim. You're quite right to distinguish the claim A and B are correlated from A as numerically identical to B because those are two quite different claims, aren't they? Is it qualitatively numerical on the same objective and subject? No, definitely not. The numerical is just stronger. It's identical. Was it qualitatively? No, qualitatively identical is more than kind of like it. It would have to be identical in its qualities, but not the very same thing. So, again, going back to the two dresses, these two dresses are identical in various qualities, not all their qualities because they're not in the same place, etc., which gives you a hint for where we're going. They're qualitatively identical, but they're not... What are those dresses missing that makes them not numerical? They're not the same dresses. They're different dresses. If you have two things, they cannot be the same thing, can they? I don't think I understand bridge law. Bridge law? Well, actually, if you wait, I think I'll answer that question. Okay, are you happy with the difference between qualitatively? Was that another question at the back? Nope? Okay, let's move on. So identity theory is the claim that mental state types, like panes, are identical to physical state types like C-fibers, or beliefs that P are identical to neural state N. Okay, that's what identity theory is, and if you'll think you're happy with what it is, I'm going to go on to why we might believe it, and later on, why we might not believe it. Yep. This is useless, because this is finished. And I can't even... Yes, I can, I can turn this over. Bill, could you help me? Actually, no, don't worry, because I can do it myself by the look of it. Look at that. Efficiency way? Or what? Now all I need is pens that work, then I'd be fine. I forgot what I'm about to ask. I was asking how a type, as opposed to an entity, can be numerically identical to that. Okay, is a pain... Okay, there's a mental predicate. This is the relation, and all these are members of that relation, or if you prefer, this is the class of pains, and these are all members of the class of pains. Are you with me? Then if you have is a C-fibre firing, you would also... The class of pains would be exactly the same thing as the class of C-fibre firing, so every token that is a pain is a C-fibre firing, and every token that is a C-fibre firing is a pain. That's what the identity theorist is claiming. Does that make sense? One, then two. Is that meant to people to show... I'll talk about that in a minute. I haven't said why we might believe it yet. At the moment all I've said is, this is what the theory is. Okay, I promise I'll go into that, so I will answer that question. Are mental states another word for consciousness? Consciousness is a property of mental states, or a type, if you like, of mental states. So anyone who has mental states will be thought of as somebody who is conscious. What is it you're conscious of? Your beliefs, your desires, your hopes, your fears, your pains, your sensations? Okay, let's look at why identity theory is attractive. Okay, here's the first reason. Some of our behaviours seem straightforwardly to be a function of events in our environment. What's your name? We're in the purple t-shirt. Julie, if I throw my pen at Julie, she'll duck. If I throw it hard enough and she sees it coming, she'll duck. Her ducking seems to be straightforwardly a function of the fact that my pen's coming towards her. Others are explicable only on the assumption that they're a function of the way the world appears to us. So imagine that I'm drinking my water, as you've seen me do several times, and then I put it here and it crashes to the floor. Okay, how would you explain that? It was vodka, says Alan, here at the front. He's so mean, giving away my secrets. Okay, can I put that a little? I would consider it more precisely, but I'm putting words in your mouth so you can tell me if I'm wrong. I put it there because I believed the table was there. So it was my false belief that caused me to put it down. So if I put it there, you don't even notice it, because why did Marian put the cup there because the table's there? But if I put it here, you move from explaining my behaviour in terms of the world to explaining my behaviour in terms of the way the world appears to me. Do you see what I mean? You move from thinking about the world that we picture to our picture of the world, or in this case, my picture of the world. We often do that when things go wrong. So you believe you've left your coat on the hook at the beginning of the party, and then you go to get it at the end of the party and it's not there. I thought I left my coat here, you'll say, immediately going from I left my coat here to I thought I left my coat here. Do you see what I mean? The error shifts you back because something has gone wrong. If your belief had been true, you would never have even noticed that you had a belief. But because it's false, you're pushed back into thinking about your beliefs about the world rather than the world about which you have beliefs. See what I mean? So we need to appeal to beliefs when something goes wrong. But hypothesis, how do you explain this? Well, inside our heads, there's something that causes me to put my glass down on the table. Okay, so the belief that the table is there. Now, sometimes that belief is true, the table is there, in case you don't even notice it. Sometimes that belief is false and you do notice it. But inside my head, there's one in the same neural state that's causing the action on both occasions. On one occasion, the world isn't willing. And on the other occasion, the world is. But there's something in my head that is both, it is the case that P, and it appears to be the case that P state. Do you see what I mean? So... If you once left it there and somebody moved it, my belief would still be... How would you recognise that? Because you had left it there and you believed you left it. Okay. Here I come, I move up and I put my coat here. And in the meantime, Bill moves my coat. Go on. Just do it, will you? Okay, so I continue to believe that my coat is there, don't I? And then I go round and... Ah! Now I might express that. I could say I believe I left my coat there, which would be a true belief, or I believed my coat was there, or is there, which would be a false belief. So it doesn't... Now it's going through my pocket. So do you see what I mean? As long as you get the content of the belief right, you can track it through, but it doesn't matter how you do it. If the belief is false and you... So you believe something's true and it turns out to be false, you'll be immediately pushed back into... I'm going to draw you another picture. This is why I need so many flipcharts. And this is... Okay, here's the world that we picture. And here's our picture of the world. And usually we're conscious only of that. We go through the world and we're conscious of tables and pens and watches and curtains and things like that. We don't ever think about this lot. But then something goes wrong and we suddenly think, oh, I thought my coat was there. And actually what you are here is in your constructive picture of your picture of the world, aren't you? So instead of thinking that your coat is on the hanger, you're thinking my belief that the coat is on the hanger is false. See what I mean? So here you've got coat on hanger and here you've got belief coat is on hanger is false. So here's the object and here's the predicate, the subject rather, and here's the predicate. And here's the subject and here's the predicate. Completely different. And here, what have you got here? Can anyone tell me? Well, actually, no, don't bother about that. It's just getting too complicated. And I can see cans of worms coming up in front of me. But do you see why we would think that there's something in my head that is the same whether my belief is true or not? And so it looks as if beliefs are in the head, we think. Well, we know what goes on inside the head now. Actually, Descartes would have known too. There are neural states that activate in response to environmental stimuli and that causally impact on our behaviour. So my putting the glass down, there's going to be a neural state causally implicated in the production of that behaviour, whether that behaviour is based on a true belief that the table is there or based on a false belief that the table is there. See what I mean? Obviously beliefs are in the head. Obviously they are. And obviously they are neural states. There is a neural state in there that is both, sorry, that is the belief that the glass, the belief that the table is there and whether the belief is false or true or not is something to do with the world, nothing to do with what's going on inside my head. Because inside my head it looks the same to me whether the belief is true or false, doesn't it? Think about hallucinations. Okay, that's the first reason. Second reason, well, we've looked at this reason but not as a reason. We dearly want to think of the mental as causally efficacious. We want to think that it's the fact that we love our partner that caused us to marry him or her. We want to think that it's because the glass is full that I put it to my lips and take a drink and so on. But because we think of physics as causally closed, in other words, physical events don't just pop out of the physical and pop back in again, we think that everything that causes a physical event causally interacts with a physical event must itself be physical. Given this, if mental states are not physical states, it makes mental state causation look problematic. But if mental states are physical, which is what the identity theory said, no problem. Of course they can causally interact with physical states. No problem. So three, sorry, that was two, three. Occam's razor, of which you may have heard, tells us that we shouldn't multiply entities unnecessarily. We should take theories if we have two possible theories, both of which would explain a phenomenon, then we should take the simplest theory rather than the more complicated one. Because there's no reason to take the more complicated one if both of them explain it, then... So dualism will explain psychophysical... Well, actually dualism doesn't explain psychophysical interaction, but physicalism, reductive physicalism of this kind does explain causal interaction and what's more, it's ontologically more parsimonious. That was a good word, wasn't it? So reducing the mental to the physical immediately halves the numbers of entities that we've got to admit into our ontology. Ontology, I should have said, is our list of what exists. So if you believe in ghosts, then on your list of what exists, you have ghosts. You admit ghosts into your ontology. So if we say that mental states... So we have an ontology that says, okay, there are ghosts and pens and tables and mental states and physical states or neuro-physical states. And we've just said that these two are the same thing. So our ontology is immediately looking much neater. Get rid of a whole class of entities and say that they're the same as the other class. Oh, look, a fourth reason. Okay, the fourth reason is that science... And this is the one that... This is the reason why you are all identity theorists in my guesses that you're all identity theorists. Science appears to have already found correlations of precisely the sort that we'd expect if mental states are physical states. If mental states are physical states, then you don't get a mental state... Sorry, you don't get a pain without a C-fibre firing. You don't get a C-fibre firing without a pain. And science has come up with this. This, according to neuroscience news, these are thoughts you can see on this functional magnetic resonance imaging scan. And here you've got pain, and here you've got empathy. So this person is actually feeling pain. This person is merely empathising with somebody else who's feeling pain. So here you've got the so-called mirror neurons. Sorry, there's a forest of hands that went up then. You've said science appears to have already found many correlations. And previously you've said that bridge laws were stronger than correlations. Bridge laws go further than correlations, that's right. Bridge laws say that A is identical to B. But what is your evidence for saying that A is identical to B? Often, not always. The same properties. Properties in common. That they have properties in common? What else might you... And correlations are quite... In science, correlations are a very good thing to point to. I mean, it's certainly the case that you wouldn't get identity without correlation. But you're absolutely right to think that correlation isn't sufficient for identity. But whether it says to imply to one, should apply to the other, you should put yourself with a similar result. That would be evidence for identity. But actually most... In science, judging from the newspapers, which is a very bad way to judge science, you would think that finding a correlation is sufficient for finding an identity. And actually, reading a lot of papers by various people, you would think that many scientists also think the same. They think quite clearly, for example, that you can measure action potentials and measure the time at which an action potential occurs before an action occurs, and what you have measured is the intention with which the action was performed. In other words, the intention is the same thing as whatever the physical state. Your saying is incomplete. Well, I'm not saying anything at the moment. All I'm doing is putting the reasons for why we should believe in identity theory. I was going to make the same point. All science has done is shown that particular parts of the brain showing activity are correlated with some sensations, but they have no theory for explaining why that is so. Will you all stop ruining my theory that you're all identity theorists? OK, you may not be. You're absolutely right. What I'm doing is I'm giving the reasons why you might believe in identity theory and why people did believe in identity theory. What they believe was... Go back just quickly over the four reasons. OK, the first one, there seems to be something... The way the world appears and the way the world... Sorry, your belief that P, whether it's true or false, seems to be the same in respect of how you act. So, whether your belief is true or false is completely irrelevant to what you do, and that's one reason for believing identity theory. Second reason for believing it, we want to think of the mental as causally efficacious. We can only do that, apparently, if the mental is the physical. Thirdly, it's nice and parsimonious. We can make life simpler if we say mental states are physical states. Fourthly, and this is the one that most people will cite when they say that they are identity theorists, science has already found the correlations would expect if identity theory was true. And we would expect these correlations if identity theory was true. And what you're giving voice to is whether finding these correlations is a sufficient reason for thinking that the mental is identical. And, of course, I sympathise. It seems that identity theory is much more dynamic than it usually is, in that we're really not talking about things as they are, but how they are behaving. No, no, both there is dynamic as each other. The reason I'm bringing behaviour into it is we think of both brain states and mental states as causally implicated in the production of behaviour, don't we? So, none of you would want to deny that when I put my glass on the table there was something going on in my brain that was causally implicated in my putting the glass on the table. I suspect you also wouldn't want to deny that there's my belief that I'm putting the glass on the table is causally implicated in my putting the glass on the table. So, in both cases, behaviour is what mental states and mental states explain. That's why behaviour came into it. I was saying, Descartes, Descartes didn't even talk to me so much about behaviour. Descartes would have talked as much about behaviour. I mean, I've only given you sort of five-minute introduction to Descartes. If you read him, you would see he talks quite a lot about behaviour. Yeah, yeah. Okay, right. I've done that and I've done that. So, we've got both philosophical and scientific reasons for embracing identity theory. And what I'm going to look at now is why we should reject it, why identity theory is false, even though we've got all those reasons for believing it, there are better reasons for rejecting it. Goodness, I'm going to do Cripci in 20 minutes with questions from you. All right, identity theory was suggested in the 1950s and the early 60s. But in the early 70s, it was blown out of the water by a logician called Saul Cripci. And I think he looks like the nicest man you could ever hope to meet, doesn't he? It was one of the shortest-lived theories ever in philosophy, perhaps even slightly shorter than behaviourism. But here's why. Now, get your thinking claps on because you're going to do some logic. Okay, here's the argument. Numerical identity is a logically necessary relation. If A is numerically identical to B, then A is numerically identical to B in every possible world. Okay, I'll explain all this in a minute, but let me just read it out. Premise 2 tells us that, logic tells us that the relation between the mental and the physical states isn't a logically necessary relation. There may be a correlation, but the correlation isn't a logically necessary relation. An identity is. The conclusion is that the relation between mental and physical states, whatever else it might be, isn't that of numerical identity. Now, this argument is valid. By that I mean if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Okay? If it's valid, and it is, believe me, the only way we can question it is by questioning one or other of the premises. Okay? Does everyone want to agree with me that this argument is a valid argument? Does anyone want to dispute that? No? What a shame. But you're absolutely right. It is a valid argument. You can't dispute it. So, the only way we can question that conclusion is by questioning one or other premise of this argument. So, let's have a look at those now. Okay. Why should we believe premise one that numerical identity is a logically necessary relation? It's a law of logic that everything is numerically identical to itself. It's the famous law of identity A equals A. I don't know where I would go if you wanted to question that law. No. Go on then, Bob. Question. Well, I've been reading this. I'm trying to understand it. The example... Cripkey. ...is that the evening-style cortical hesperus is identical with phosphorus. People didn't know that for hundreds of years. I know what you're going into. All I want you to look at at the moment, I am going to go into the objection you're looking at, but you're jumping far too far ahead. On to the moment. Does anyone want to question this law of logic? That A is identical to itself. That everything is identical to itself. Everything is numerically the same thing as itself. Bob, shut up. Much as I love you, this is not the moment. Yes. As long as you're not going to question. I was just going to say that this excludes to not allow any thinking in terms of possible worlds. Do you like to get into that exploration of thought? If something is a law of logic, then it's true over every possible world. No, I really wouldn't think of Gru at this point. So much so that I won't even explain what Gru is to everybody else who doesn't know. If we had an hour, I might try and recreate your thought and see where you were going wrong, but we don't have an hour. Exactly, which is why we're just not going there. But do you accept that? I do, yes. Jolly good. You're quite right to do so. Premise one is okay. We're not going to question premise one because it's a straightforward law of logic. You can use less incendiary language by talking about all possibilities, all possible situations. You don't have to say all possible worlds. So as long as you believe that there are... I mean, do you think it's possible that I was wearing jeans today? No? I could have been, couldn't I? Exactly. So there's a possible world. Philosophers might say there is a possible world in which I was wearing jeans. And all we mean is that this world is such that there is a possible way it might have been, which is I was wearing jeans. So a possible world talk isn't really as arcane as it sounds, unless you're cryptic, in which case it is. No, Lewis, not cryptic. Why should we believe premise two? Premise two is logic tells us that the relation between mental and physical states is not a logically necessary relation. Well, what do you think our reason for believing that is? All the things we went through before when we were looking at Descartes, we thought, OK, well, hang on a second. Do we really believe that if it's a sea fibre, it is pain? So if we see somebody who's clearly in pain, who hasn't got any sea fibres, but is clearly in pain, well, actually, let's just move on to the next. Oh, this is an explanation for the last one. Leibnitz law, the indiscernible of identicles, tells us that if A is numerically identical to B, then any property that A has will also be a property that B has. No, we've got to relativise this to time. I mean, I had properties when I was a baby that I don't have now. But if you relativise it to time, if anything is identical to me, then if I have a property, that thing is going to have the same property, isn't it? How could it not if it's the same thing as me? I'm not going to talk about Cambridge changes, if you don't mind. A Cambridge change... You were talking about Cambridge changes. No, OK, I'm not going to talk about them. Right. Leibnitz law tells us that if pain states are numerically identical to C fibre firings and beliefs that P to neural state Ns, then any property possessed by a pain will also be a property possessed by a C fibre firing. And any property possessed by a belief that P is also going to be a property possessed by neural state N. Can you see that? You wouldn't want to question that, would you? This means that if pains are identical, numerically identical to C fibre firings and beliefs that P to neural state Ns, then there couldn't be anything with the property of being a pain that doesn't have the physical properties of being C fibre firing. Nor could there be anything that is a C fibre firing that isn't also a pain and ditto with neural state N. So it would be simply impossible, logically impossible, for there to be a pain state that isn't a CFF or a belief that P that isn't a neural state N. Logically impossible. It might be logically impossible, but surely in neurophysiology you can stimulate a C fibre and get it too fine and you can have the patient unconscious or you can elistise the definition. Yes, that actually is just... You would have a pain if the person was... Oh yes, I see what you mean. Okay, but actually there are more... Sorry, that's interesting, but there are more interesting ones. Here we go. We've got good empirical reason to believe even this is a world in which there are pains that are not C fibre firings. Do you believe dogs can have pains? Yeah? Well, dogs don't have C fibres. In which case, how can... How... Maybe they do, but if pains are C fibre firing, then you cannot have a pain that isn't... Let me finish. You can't have a pain that... We could say that, but I'll come on to that in a minute. The fact is, do you agree with me that if we say pain is C fibre firing, pain is numerically identical to C fibre firing? So if you get a pain, then you get a C fibre firing, then you cannot have a pain without C fibre. Do you accept that? Okay, now we see immediately that this has got to be wrong because there are dogs that have pains but that don't have C fibres. Okay, well, you know, we can get round this. Surely we can relativise it. We can say that pain is C fibre firing in a human being, not in a dog. Okay, is that what you want to say? Well, you could have phantom pain in a limb that doesn't have a C fibre. Sorry, don't sneer like that when you say empirical. There's nothing wrong with empirical. I knew you were all... It can't become logically necessary. If pain, you are overestimating, or are you underestimating, I'd have to think about that. The thing is, the identity theory was as simple as you are now seeing that it was and seeing why it's wrong. The identity theory says pain is C fibre firing. The reason it can't be is because there's an empirical reason to think that there are pains that are not C fibre firings in the fact that there are dogs and other animals that have pains but don't have C fibres firing. Also, if there was an alien, a margin, who seemed to be intelligent, who came along and said, well, how did you make this spaceship? Pretty good stuff this. It goes very fast. It goes faster than mine. Oh, my leg, he says. Not leg, he doesn't have legs. My tentacle, thank you. Oh, and you think, well, he doesn't have C fibres, can't be in pain. Would we think that? No, because C fibres have got nothing to do with what being a pain is. The essential property of being a pain is that it feels awful. The essential property of being a C fibre is that it has a particular shape or pattern of firing or whatever. We just do not believe that pains are numerically identical to C fibre firing. So when we consider the properties peculiar to pains and beliefs, the properties without which these states wouldn't be the states they are, these properties just aren't necessary to any particular state in the way that they're necessary to a mental state. And it's simply a fact, empirically established in the case of sensations like pain, that mental states are multiply realisable. In other words, one and the same type of mental state can be correlated with different physical states. Okay, so this might be a C fibre, but this might be a D fibre, and this might be something completely different. It's also a fact established by conceptual analysis, i.e. logic, that we would attribute beliefs that pee to an alien if doing so was the only way to make sense of his behaviour. And we would do this quite irrespective of his physical make-up. Wouldn't matter. I mean, we're wondering whether we should attribute beliefs to computers. Well, computers don't have brains. We don't have brains. If we think we even possibly could attribute beliefs to the computer, it's not because they are physically identical to us. And this shows us that identity theory is just a non-starter, absolutely a non-runner. Pains cannot be numerically identical with C fibre firing, and beliefs that pee can't be numerically identical with activations of neural cells. And beliefs that pee can't be numerically identical with activations of neural state N. Therefore, identity theory is false. And I've now got ten minutes to look at problems for this argument, so I'm not going to take any questions. I'm just going to take a drink. Okay. It's interesting to note, by the way, that Kripke's argument is an updated and logically grounded version of Descartes' argument. It's exactly the same argument as Descartes. It's just based on a bit more logic. Descartes was also based on logic, but not quite as obviously. But hey, that all happened rather quickly, didn't it? We introduced identity theory. Everyone thought it sounded like a lovely theory. Lots of good reasons for it, but suddenly it's gone. Surely there's something wrong with Kripke's argument, given how attractive identity theory is. Okay, let's see how we might object to it. Here's your objection, sir. What's your name? Leo. Even if we can't find bridge laws that are entirely general, mightn't we find bridge laws that are species-specific? So we can't say pain is the same as C-fibre firing, but we can say human pain is identical to C-fibre firing. Okay? That would be okay. So we just weaken the identity claim and thereby make it stronger. Okay, response. We'd still have the problem of unusual species members. If somebody seemed from everything he'd said and did over time, and after covert scrutiny, of course, if he seemed to be in pain and yet to lack C-fibre firing, would we continue to insist he couldn't be in pain? No, we wouldn't. We think he could be in pain. We would be much more likely to go for the idea that the brain can be plastic, that other brain states can take over the function of pain when, for some reason, the C-fibre firings are knocked out. We also, we wouldn't insist that our alien couldn't believe P, or even that great apes couldn't believe P. So does that strike you as a non-secretary? At the moment, maybe I'm just not seeing... Anyway, if it does, ignore it. I probably had a reason for putting it there, but it's... Okay, so we can't relativise it to species. That's not going to work either. The fact is, if it's not an identity, it's not an identity even relative to species. Well, what do you mean by pain? When your dog... No, let's forget your dog. The dog is behaving in the same way that I might behave if I had a pain, but if I know that that's caused by something different, which I don't know whether they have... You might not call it pain. I might not call it pain, yeah. Okay, no, hang on, that would be a way of... Okay, the objection to identity theory is, hang on, the dog's not got C-fibres, but it is in pain. Response to that in defence of identity theory is the dog is not in pain. It's exhibiting behaviour when a human being would be pain. But it's not in pain. Do people think that... People have thought that way, yeah. They can't actually believe dogs couldn't be in pain, but for a slightly different reason. No, you could save identity theory if you like by denying that anything different from a human being can't be... So only human beings can be in pain. Myself, I wouldn't go for that. Well, I think... I think it could be... ...theory holds to logically. Logically, a perfectly good way of responding to quickly and saving. So let me write it down so that you see I really mean this. You can save identity theory by denying that things without C-fibres can feel pain. Yep, you can definitely do that, and that would save... Myself, I would rather reject identity theory. But if you really want to keep identity theory, you can do that instead. Yep. I don't think you want to, I don't want to. No, but you... Logically, you could. Yeah, absolutely. I just... I wouldn't want to. How many other people would? Something which is distressing and awful. But we don't have to call it the same thing. No, we could call it different things. Yep. Okay, let's move on. I'm sorry, I'm concerned that I'm only getting... I haven't yet got to the most important objection, which is this one. We might want to say that the law of identity doesn't always hold. Do you remember when we talked about A is A? And I said you can't even question this. Well, that's a very bad thing for a philosopher to say, because of course you can question everything. Now, take an identity statement. The Marianth Talbot is the director of studies in philosophy at OUDCE. Is that a true identity statement? Yes! Okay, but it's true in this world, but it doesn't hold in every world, does it? There are worlds or possible situations, if you prefer, where Marianth Talbot is not the director of studies in philosophy at OUDCE, i.e., any world where someone else got the job. Then it wouldn't be true, would it, that Marianth Talbot is the director of studies in philosophy at OUDCE? That's what? No, I might never have got the job. It might never have been true that I have, but I might not have done. There is a possible world in which I am not director of studies in philosophy. That's not the actual world, in the actual world I am, but in another possible world I might not be. So as long as you accept that Marianth might not be director of studies in philosophy, you're accepting that this is not a necessary statement. Okay, well then why shouldn't there be worlds in which pain isn't identical to CFF, even though in this world pain is C-fibrapharring? Okay, why shouldn't there be? Why shouldn't identity statements be contingent in the way the one I'm looking at here is? Here's the response. There are identity statements that are logically necessary, that are contingent, something's contingent if it's not logically necessary. All of them are flanked by at least one non-rigid designator. I'm sure it's really tough to make you do this logic at this time before your coffee's served. Okay, a non-rigid designator is a designator that names different things in different possible worlds and therefore can't track individuals across possible worlds. A rigid designator, I'll give you an illustration of that in a minute, a designator names the same thing in every possible world and can therefore track individuals across possible worlds. Okay, if we ask could the director of studies in philosophy be anyone other than Marianne, the answer is clearly yes, and what you do is you track me through other possible worlds, don't you? You think is there another possible situation in which Marianne, that person might not have been director of studies in philosophy? Is that what you do? So you use my name to track me through different possible worlds, don't you? And the director of studies in philosophy is a designator, but it's non-rigid. You can't use it to track the same person through different possible worlds because it names different people in different possible worlds. It's a logical fact about designators that they work in these two different ways. This one works simply by description. So if I say, would the gentleman in the yellow shirt please stand up? Yes. Yeah, there you are. There's a gentleman in the yellow shirt. Now, that isn't a necessary description of David, is it? But it does happen to be a description that uniquely identifies him in this room, okay? So it's a designator. I got him by using it, but it's not a designator that can track him across different possible worlds because I can say, is there a possible situation in which David isn't wearing yellow? Yes, there is. So David is a rigid designator, but the man wearing the yellow shirt is not a rigid designator. See the difference? So if an identity statement is flanked by two rigid designators, then it's necessarily true. And if it's flanked by even one non-rigid designator, then it's contingently true. MT equals MT. If this track is the same in every possible world, and this name is the same person in every possible world, then if this person is that person in this world, you can see that this is going to be this person in every possible world, yeah? Whereas if you have MT equals D-O-S-O-U-T-C-E, and this name is a different person, can you see that would be a contingent identity statement, and that would be a necessary one. So if pain is a rigid designator, and if C5 are firing is a rigid designator, and if these two are rigid designators, then Kripke's argument holds. Are you with me? That's really very difficult to understand, but you'll be able to track that through with what I've given you here. Is it fairly quick? I don't know. Are there any rigid designators? Are there any rigid designators? Yes, I don't think there are any, because you could have a different name. Oh, okay. I could have a different name. What would that mean? Say I was called Lucy Smith. So there's a possible world in which Marianne Talbot is called Lucy Smith. Do you see what I mean? You're still tracking me through the world by using my name, but you're looking at the world in which I was called Lucy Smith. It's exactly the same. So is called Lucy Smith. It's a non-rigid designator, whereas Lucy Smith would be a rigid designator. You just use your intuitions to ask yourself whether a word takes you through different possible worlds picking out the same thing. So does the word pain in every possible world pick out something that feels awful? Could there be a world in which pain didn't feel awful? No, there's some people who like feeling awful, right? Pain seems to be a rigid designator. It seems to designate that horrible feeling, which comes in many different forms, as we know. C-fiber firing seems to rigidly designate... It's the concept of the word. It's the way the language is used, isn't it? Pain in some other culture may be a word which means a different sense of it. Do you remember my answer to what if I was called Lucy Smith? Is called Lucy Smith is not a rigid designator. Is called pain isn't a rigid designator. Pain is a rigid designator. OK, let's carry on. Are these words rigid designators? You can question that. I've suggested they are, but this is a way to get at Crippley's argument. Do they name the very same thing in every world in which that thing exists? Can you use these words to track states through different possible worlds? If not, you can diffuse Crippley's argument. So I've given you three questions here, such that if you answer yes to any of them, you can question Crippley. You can also question Crippley in the way... Sorry, what's your name? Penny. Penny wanted to question it. Could you say that just because pain feels awful in every world, it doesn't mean to say that everything that feels awful is pain? No, of course not. No, that would be to get your Venn diagrams mixed up. So you could have a state which felt awful. But don't forget identity theory says that it's a bi-conditional. It does say that everything that's a CFF is a pain, and everything that's a pain is a CFF. So identity theory... What we were saying is that you were challenging that because... or it was being challenged because saying in dogs they don't have C-fappers. But they do have pain. So all I was saying was that they don't have C-fappers, but they might have something else which causes them a state which is as awful as pain. Well, I do think that if you... If you're going to say that other species don't feel pain, I think you probably do have to say that there are states that feel awful that are not pain. That's all I'm saying. If you want to question it, you can answer any of these questions. I'm just going to move on. OK, I'm going to eat into the next session a little bit.